Hitler's Bandit Hunters (34 page)

The SS-Police erected complexes across occupied Europe that extended the network of preventative security. Installations were established in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, and Holland—especially field recruit depots (
SSFeldrekruten-Depot
) and troop training grounds (
Truppenübungsplätze
). In Poland, SS facilities congregated around Warsaw and Debica. By March 1942, the SS-Führungshauptamt operated three Waffen-SS and police supply commands (
Nachschubkommandanturen der Waffen-SS und Polizei
) as the controlling agencies for reserves, supply, and operational training in the east.
¹⁴
The Order Police also erected training facilities, including Truppenübungsplatz
Kuznica near Grodno in Belorussia.
¹⁵
In March, Himmler decided to extend these facilities as fortified central hubs handling recruits, reserves, and supplies. These were located in Riga, Bobruisk, and Dnepropetrovsk.
¹⁶
The construction site of the Bobruisk complex was visited by Bach-Zelewski on his return to duty in May 1942.
¹⁷

In April, Himmler and Wolff discussed the question of Unruh’s visit to Warsaw, where SS installations included reserve and supply depots.
¹⁸
In May 1942, Unruh conducted an investigation of rear-area functions of the Eastern Front. He visited the SS supply facility in Riga and recommended its closure alongside other SS facilities as wasteful duplication. The SS representative assigned to the party, SS-Sturmbannführer With, attempted to convince Unruh of the necessity for the HSSPF and Waffen-SS to manage their supply facilities independently. Unruh refused to accept any counter-arguments and, on May 11, ordered one company of police and two battalions of Schuma to be placed under Wehrmacht command. With urgently sent a message to Himmler warning him of the implications of the report Unruh intended to put before Hitler.
¹⁹
Himmler intervened through Hitler and so prevented any further interference with his forces. Henceforth, Unruh and Himmler treated one another with due circumspection.
²⁰
In a meeting lasting nearly five hours, Hitler, Unruh, Keitel, and Himmler agreed to another rationalization assignment in the General Government of Poland. Himmler cautioned Unruh not to interfere in SS business. Yet some weeks later, Himmler instructed Krüger to provide Unruh with all the assistance necessary to complete his tasks.
²¹
With’s efforts to limit Unruh were appreciated by Himmler, who transferred him to his personal staff to become an internal auditor of SS-Police affairs.
²²

Himmler’s “General Plan for the East” envisaged the creation of colonial estates. This settlement policy (
Siedlungspolitik
) incorporated the vast construction of romanticized Germanic medieval-style burgs across Russia. These burgs were initially integrated into the security system as “armed villages” (
Wehrdörfer
), creating a self-defense network. Even generals of the Wehrmacht applied to Himmler for the right to own a farmstead.
²³
There were other SS complexes in the east with the sole purpose of administering security. In March 1943, the intelligence officer (Ic) of Nachschubkommandantur der Waffen-SS Russland-Mitte issued his fourth situation report (the first three are missing). The report concentrated on the “bandit-helpers,” the newspaper
Bobruisker Partisanen
, the use of mines as bombs by “bandits,” the situation of bandit camps, and heavy mortar attacks.
²⁴
There was little to indicate whether the base was central to SS operations. By the summer of 1943, the Nachschubkommandantur had been redesignated SS-Waldlager Bobruisk. This large, fortified complex straddled several camps in the middle of a forest and alongside the main railway line from Minsk to Bobruisk. Its multiple functions
included training, provisioning (protecting the local harvests), and supply.
²⁵
The installation’s commander, SS-Standartenführer Rudolf Pannier, was a former businessman and a reserve police officer who had received the Knight’s Cross during the winter battles of 1941. By July 1943, the installation was fully operational, and its functions suggested a wider brief than that of an advanced supply and recruit depot. The Waldlager amalgamated headquarters functions and replicated staff positions typically found only within the army Wehrkreis system. The SS-Waldlager Bobruisk was an emerging SS-Wehrkreis (refer to diagram III). The existence of this installation, under Unruh’s scrutiny, indicates how Himmler had been able to circumvent OKW policy with minimal resources. Whether this was to become part of an extensive SS-Wehrkreis is open to pure speculation. The advance of the Red Army in the latter half of 1943 eventually led to its abandonment.
²⁶
Yet it demonstrates the extent of SS ambitions.

According to Pannier, a Red Army barracks had formed part of the site, but further work extended and fortified the complex. This involved staggered artillery, infantry, and antitank defenses. The western flank of the complex was protected by flooded and impassable ground, deliberately caused by damming a stream. Recruits assigned to the complex were detailed to building and construction duties. Pannier reported that the men’s barracks were homely; the company of artisans had erected latrines and washrooms. Several barracks had been prepared for winter comfort, and cupboards lined the insides. The construction program included a barrack-block for female SS auxiliaries who erected stores for wood and peat, produced locally in Bobruisk. Ninety-two tons were supplied to the complex. A wood and pulp factory was included in the complex and supplied 2,700 cubic meters of construction timber. The recruits sunk a drinking water well of 2 meters, which was later increased to 20 meters with an extraction pump. The complex had sixty-four vehicles, all maintained in the local workshops. The maintenance teams converted some vehicles to use wood-gas, produced on site; this allowed for significant energy savings. The ordnance detachment repaired weapons for use by the installation. Their gunsmiths rebored three captured Pak 45mm antitank guns and replaced their range-finding equipment. In anticipation of winter, there was a program for making skis and snowshoes. The complex installed a central generator to allow the signals equipment to remain functioning even while under attack. In September, the recruits completed the construction a command bunker (
Führer-Bunker).
²⁷
By October 1943, the Waldlager was a fully functioning and self-sufficient armed complex.

Once the German armies began to retreat, operational and security zones collapsed on top of each other. In October 1943, Pannier observed that Army Group Centre was under pressure to erect defense lines. Clashes broke out between the SS and the army over control of installations and other bases in the Bobruisk area. There was a major disagreement over the SS-Waldlager
hospital and medical facilities. Pannier wrote to Field Marshal Model, commander of Army Group Centre, to explain the security situation but did not received a response. He advised Model of significant changes in the tactics of the “bandits” whom he said were no longer roaming independently but operating under military direction. Pannier suggested Model might determine the direction of Soviet attacks by tracking the direction of the “bandits.” The bands had exploited the rear-area chaos, and individual “bandits” had mingled with the mass exodus of refugees. The bands also exploited the fears of Hiwis working in headquarters and were able to gather security intelligence.
²⁸
Internal security was a constant problem. The August report mentioned spies within the installation and the arrest of five people for alleged contact with the bands. On August 27, a woman alleged to be a “bandit-helper” was discovered searching desks of an office in the Waldlager. The next day, two more “bandit helpers” were arrested while trying to pass information regarding German troop movements. In each case, they were known to be locals working in the Waldlager. On August 31, six “bandit helpers” were arrested for passing messages about the traffic movements on the Bobruisk-Brosha railway. Similar cases occurred in September as sabotage, espionage, and desertion to the bands increased.
²⁹

An outline survey of SS-Police manpower indicates a lack of clarity and consistent policy initiatives. This lack stemmed in part from the inability of the SS-Police to take advantage of Germany’s conscription program. In 1937, Himmler announced, “I can carry out the all the former tasks of the Landsturm i.e. guarding munitions factories, railroad crossings etc. with civilians over 45, who would be drafted as auxiliary police as planned provided I have as a backbone a troop that is young. For this the Deaths Head Units are provided, ranging in age from 25–35, not older and not younger.”
³⁰
From 1939, the SS-Police made concerted efforts to recruit manpower below the German army age limits by offering non-combatant duties as alternatives to combat war service.
³¹
By 1943–44, the age-range factor became a lottery played out between the Wehrmacht and the SS. In February 1944, all institutions received orders to enlist men in the 1906 age group and younger. The last assessment of police strengths, made under the Wehrmacht replacement plan of 1945, registered 323,300 men and 36,600 women, of which 118,700 were below thirty-eight years of age.
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Surviving records from the SS recruiting office in Düsseldorf indicate two trends.
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First, large numbers of Germans and ethnic Germans continued to volunteer for the SS. Bernd Wegner attributed the end of the all-volunteer force as a contributing factor in the decline in the Waffen-SS as an elite organization.
³⁴
In fact, large numbers of young men continued to volunteer for the SS primarily because of its elite standing. The inducements of lands
and farms in the east also helped, while police recruitment in particular seemed to offer a way of avoiding frontline duty. Recruits were indoctrinated into an elaborate vision of the eastern frontier, a wall of armed farmers as a Nazi buffer against the Mongol horde. Bandenbekämpfung was glorified in the recruitment process, portrayed as necessary for eradicating Bolshevism and “bandit” criminality. The pamphlet “With the Sicherheitspolizei in the East” offered the prospect of combating Bolsheviks who habitually murdered and plundered the indigenous people of the east.
³⁵
In “The Spooky Forest” (
Der unheimliche Wald
), the SS candidate was told of the fight against NKVD-led bandit groups in the forests of the east and combat in the camp of the snipers (
Heckenschützenlager).
³⁶
Thus, the depiction of Bandenbekämpfung at the recruitment point was a youthful exercise in gaining glory cheaply for vast material reward.

Race played an important role in police manpower policy with the 1935 Nuremberg race laws excluding all Jewish constables. The police were administered through the civil code and, as public servants, were obliged to adhere to these race laws. On December 20, 1940, the Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei issued a general notice from Himmler that the anti-Semitic film
Jud Süss
was available for members of the police and their families to enjoy a special viewing.
³⁷
In November 1940, Gustav Lombard, a senior SS-Cavalry officer serving in Poland, ushered his men to attend a private showing.
³⁸
In October 1942, Himmler issued instructions concerning the continuing employment of Jews in the police reserve or the police administration. Those of first-degree mixed German-Jewish blood (
Mischlinge
), that is, with a Jewish mother or father, were expelled from the police. Second-degree Mischlinge (Jewish grandparents) could remain on the police strength only with Himmler’s permission. Each police recruit had to sign a document confirming that there were no Mischlinge of first-degree or second-degree status within his or her racial profile. All reports on Mischlinge second degree or police officers married to Jews were collected on December 15, 1942.
³⁹
Women also began to take up important roles within the SS-Police administration. From 1942, women auxiliaries began to replace men in most of the signals functions. Women signals auxiliaries (SS-Helferinnen) had undergone full training in operating skills at a training school (Oberehnheim SS-Reichsschule) in Alsace. The school came under the SS-Police chief of signals. There were three categories of trade for women switchboard operators, teleprinters, and wireless operations. This all-volunteer force was open to women aged between eigthteen and thirty-five. The recruits received a full program of ideological as well as technical training. Trained women were assigned to duties in Germany and the occupied territories. They remained under the direct command and guard of the HSSPF at all times.
⁴⁰

From 1940, the Waffen-SS established reserve battalions for recruits; these were usually stationed outside Germany beyond the reach of the army conscription system. The SS-Polizei Division trained in Holland and maintained
its reserve depots there. The Waffen-SS installed commands in Poland, Holland, and Czechoslovakia, and the SS-Totenkopfverbände established a central recruitment and reserve depot in Warsaw. The reserve detachments— SS-Reserve Battalion Ost (Zhitomir), SS-Reserve Police Grenadier Battalion I (Hertsogenbosch), SS-Reserve Police Grenadier Battalion II (Amersfoert), Reserve Company Danish Freikorps (Bobruisk), and Reserve Company Norwegian Legion (Mitau)—extended the establishment of occupation by widespread dispersal. The integration of SS and police forces began with induction training. In 1939, three training detachments—SS-Totenkopf Ersatzbataillon I, II, III—were raised for the SS-Totenkopfverbände. These were joined in April 1941 by the SS-Ersatzbataillon Ost, mustered in Breslau. This battalion served as the recruit collection center for all SS-Police formations in the east.
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The SS-Totenkopf Ersatz battalions eventually served as the recruit collection establishment for all Waffen-SS theaters of operations.
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The training battalions were joined by specialist military expertise companies to provide support during operations and were supplied with nonstandard equipment.
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