Hitler's Bandit Hunters (30 page)

Airpower granted the SS-Police an advanced capability originally explored in Prussia through the Inspectorate of Flying Troops (
Inspektion der Fliegertruppen
), in August 1919. The Prussian police flying squadron (
Polizeifliegerstaffeln
) began operations with 11 officers, and 106 NCOs and men, and 27 airplanes. They were based in Berlin with outposts in Königsberg, Brieg, Paderborn, and Gotha. The Security Police formed detachments and from their coastline bases operated flying boats. The mission of the Air Police (
Luftpolizei
) was to conduct reconnaissance patrols over the communications network, to participate in combat missions providing morale for the police forces on the ground, to undertake propaganda missions (leafleting, etc.), and to coordinate liaison between different units during an operation. It also worked for the criminal police and the marine police in combating smuggling, solving serious cases of criminal banditry, and hunting escaped prisoners and murderers. In 1920, this service briefly expanded, as was recorded in the diary of Polizei-Hauptmann Erhard Milch, later secretary of state and Luftwaffe field marshal.
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However, the Allies imposed the Versailles restrictions on the police squadron and forced its disbandment. The police attempted to camouflage the aircraft across Germany. The force survived in a piecemeal format through civilian airplanes until Daluege resurrected the squadron. In 1941, the senior SS-Police commanders used light airplanes to increase their operational capability during Operation “Barbarossa.”

In August 1942, discussions were initiated between Himmler and Göring
over the centralization of all aircraft under the Luftwaffe, following a rationalization proposal by Unruh. In recompense, Göring offered Himmler support for new aviation missions. This proved to be a weak promise; Himmler was able to acquire a new Fieseler Storch for the new HSSPF Caucasus, but when he requested a Junkers JU52 for flying in poor weather, Göring refused because of the shortages. Only travel space on an airplane could be guaranteed.
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A decoded message from August 1942 confirmed that the 7th Special Flying Group (Fliegergruppe z.b.V. 7) was transferred to the Luftwaffe. The known structure of the 7th Special Flying Group was its headquarters in East Prussia in Marienwerder (Malbork: Poland) and squadrons (
Staffeln
) dispersed to Cracow, Riga, Minsk, Radzwillow, Agram, Ljubljana, Cottbus, and Oslo. Little is known of its history although considerable reference to its operations can be found in police radio signals intercepted by the British.
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The orders for the subordination and operations of the 7th Special Flying Group were issued by Himmler in September 1943. Himmler stated that Bandenbekämpfung and the enlargement of his command into the south and southeast led him to issue these orders. The 7th Special Flying Group came under his direct command; its commander joined his staff. It had certain prescribed objectives to fulfill. The subordination of the flying group to an HSSPF during a reconnaissance or combat operation depended on the Ch.BKV. The concentration of several squadrons within a single operation also depended on the Ch.BKV. Larger transport and reconnaissance planes were set aside for use by main offices and senior commanders. One courier plane was kept at the Lötzen headquarters of the KSRFSS at all times. Himmler’s control over the use of the planes was an attempt to restrict them from private use in order to conserve fuel. On the fifth day of each month, the commander of the flying group was to submit a complete log of flights, with details, to the KSRFSS. The flying group was reorganized to maintain its capacity in Bandenbekämpfung, hence the expansion of squadrons in the east and southeast of Europe.
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The offices of the RFSS, the CdO, the CdS, and the Ch.BKV each received a Junkers JU52. Each HSSPF was assigned a liaison plane, Storch, while each BdS and BdO within that command shared a Storch. The 7th Special Flying Group eventually moved to Strausberg near Berlin, where the senior’s aircraft were maintained and the special duties planes working out of Lötzen (Fi156) were controlled, under the orders of the central offices (four planes, including the FW58) and for training purposes (three Fi156). Some areas like HSSPF Russia-Centre and the other Russian based HSSPFs received an FW58 utility airplane, which could be employed in reconnaissance as well as bombing strikes. The first squadron was based in Kraków, Poland, with eight airplanes; the second squadron was based in Riga, with seven aircraft; the 3rd Staffel was based in Minsk with thirteen aircraft. One airplane (Hs126) was a glider tug for covert operations. Three FW189 were used for reconnaissance
and bombing, and five Fi156 were assigned to Bandenbekämpfung. The 4th Staffel was based in Rovno with fifteen airplanes.
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The expected order of battle for the 7th Special Flying Group was to raise its firepower and standardize the machines. The Staffel were renumbered and were to carry nine airplanes. The 8th Staffel (Minsk) received ten JU87 Stuka airplanes with long towing cables for pulling DFS 230 gliders.
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Himmler lost control of the fleet in May 1944 and was obliged to issue further instructions on the use of aircraft. He stated that Göring had ordered a reduction in air operations and that this had been communicated to the HSSPFs. He then pointed out that the
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
(OKL) had placed checks on fuel usage. He demanded that airplanes be used only in Bandenbekämpfung. Alternatives of motor and railway transportation were to replace the use of airplanes. All flights were to be monitored and examined by Luftwaffe personnel. The control of air missions was confined to the decision of the 7th Special Flying Group’s commander.
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Covert operations were not new to the SS. In August 1939, they staged a Polish attack against the Gleiwitz radio station before the invasion of Poland.
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In 1943, SS-Gruppenführer Walter Schellenberg was typical of the youthful, intelligent, and highly motivated SD officers. He came under Heydrich’s influence and became the “young Turk” of the SS intelligence faction. He was party to the Heydrich-Wagner agreement that was central to the illegal “Barbarossa” directives. He formed Operation “Zeppelin” (UZ) as a covert RSHA counterintelligence initiative to infiltrate trusties behind Russian lines and within the bands. The British learned all about UZ operations and their commander never realized their secrecy was breached. Alan Bullock once wrote of
The Schellenberg Memoirs
(1956) that, if nothing else, it made a good spy story. Recently, the subject was raised in an article by Perry Biddiscombe focusing on the clandestine activities of spying and sabotage missions.
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Following the assassination of Heydrich, Schellenberg appears to have stayed in contact with Himmler, awaiting a new boss. Kaltenbrunner proved a disappointment, and Schellenberg had a rocky relationship with him. Kaltenbrunner encouraged Skorzeny to undermine and irritate the upstart intelligence officer at every opportunity. In the last days of the war, Kaltenbrunner succeeded in removing Schellenberg from office, but it was a hollow victory. Schellenberg and other SD evidence presented at Nuremberg contributed to Kaltenbrunner’s sentence and execution for war crimes.
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Bach-Zelewski and Schellenberg formed a working relationship and met on several occasions. According to Bach-Zelewski’s diary, they first met on November 25, 1942, to discuss the subject of trusties.
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From March 1942, UZ came to play a significant part in the counter-espionage activities of Bandenbekämpfung. The plan behind Zeppelin was to place German agents who were natives in the partisan bands. Each HSSPF in Russia received a detachment of UZ. They worked closely with the Luftwaffe pilots who flew
them into drop zones behind the Red Army lines.
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UZ operations fell between the formation of yet another private army and genuine counterintelligence work. This is confirmed by the rather strange case of the Druzhina I and Druzhina II. The former was a group of former Red Army POWs, trusted to return, and employed in Bandenbekämpfung operations within the German rear area. The latter was a group trusted to conduct subversion operations behind the Russian lines. Colonel Rodionov (known as “Gil”) commanded Druzhina I, which gradually grew to battalion size. Deployed under HSSPF Russia-Centre, the formation joined Gottberg’s order of battle. In the summer of 1943, they turned on their erstwhile SS comrades, killing more than sixty before deserting back to the Soviets.
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On June 8, 1943, British codebreakers intercepted an SD signal: “Von dem Bach is informed by RSHA Amt A that the Russian officers company of UZ, Amt VI C Z with 125 Russian officers is ready to set out. Von dem Bach is to inform them of their destination.”
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That same month, Rodionov and Gottberg held further discussion in Berlin, a few days after Bach-Zelewski’s promotion. They met on August 21, 1943, to discuss large-scale operations behind Russian front lines.

Bach-Zelewski at various times led troops under his personal command. In 1941, his Police Regiment Centre carried three battalions and numerous support troops. He was granted the support of the SS brigades to conduct the killing actions in Russia. In 1942, his authority progressed into brigade command with several regiments. By 1943, he was leading Korpsgruppe von dem Bach of several brigades and ancillary troops. By 1944, his command authority included corps and divisions. Bach-Zelewski’s expertise was not leading troops into combat but coordinating and handling operations, some with complicated configuration.

The SS Special Forces deployed in operations were a direct contradiction to the rules and regulations of Bandenbekämpfung. The Dirlewanger formation, variously called a
Sonderkommando, Sondebataillon
, regiment, brigade, and later division, was the most significant unit of the Bandenkampfverbände.
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In March 1940, Hitler agreed that convicted poachers should be employed in security duties. The Reich minister of justice relocated prison inmates found guilty of poaching to this unit. In 1944, 94 percent of the unit was other prisoners and SS men serving penal sentences.
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It has often been assumed that Himmler had a widespread policy of using prison manpower; however, in terms of the Waffen-SS, the case of Dirlewanger was an exception, and mostly confined to the central theater of Russia.
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With some sense of irony, Hans-Peter Klausch found that after the bomb plot in 1944, when Himmler took command of the Replacement Army, soldiers and civilians found guilty of being members of the resistance by the People’s Court were sent to the Dirlewanger Brigade. Hitler agreed with Himmler in the development of this formation, as he admitted over dinner in September 1942. By suppressing the poachers and sending them to counter the “bandits,” not only did it appear to
Hitler that SS policy was serving a dual purpose, but it also seemed the resulting formation would be a corps of sharpshooters.
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The record of the formation in hunting “bandits” was exceptional; it was an execution brigade.

Skorzeny’s idea for his specialist unit, the SS-Sonderverbände Friedenthal, was to employ criminals serving severe prison sentences. Skorzeny painted a false picture of his unit’s organization as the product of the Waffen-SS and the efforts of Hans Jüttner. The reality behind Skorzeny and his “legion” was murky, a lurid tale involving the SS-Totenkopfverbände, the RSHA, and Buchenwald concentration camp. He began raising the unit three months to the day of joining the RSHA. A few documents from the selection process remain in Skorzeny’s SS personnel file. One trail indicates the involvement of the SS legal office, under SS-Gruppenführer Bender, and Himmler in the “acquisition” of “volunteers.”
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The men were all long-term prisoners, dishonorably discharged from the SS and serving sentences of hard labor in concentration camps. The first wave of “volunteers” were collected at a training ground in Berlin, part of the depot complex of Adolf Hitler’s bodyguard regiment. The men were held under strict control, and the slightest infraction of discipline led to their return to prison. As a temporary expediency, they continued to wear SS insignia, which was removed before combat. The men had already forfeited SS membership, and Himmler would not allow their reinstatement after the war, even if they distinguished themselves.
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In other words, the men had only a second chance for survival.

Skorzeny was not competing with Dirlewanger although the recruitment of felons and criminals made it appear that way. Himmler held the final decision over postings and did not appear to favor competition to Dirlewanger. Among the cases from Skorzeny’s file is Hans Amman, a former SS-Obersturmführer. Thirty-two years old, Amman was first sentenced to death for stealing twenty-eight bottles of champagne that were intended for the wounded of in an SS field hospital. Then his sentence was reduced to fifteen years. Dietrich Nernhardt, a cashiered SS officer, organized the black-market supply of wood in Norway; he was serving a four-year prison sentence since 1942. Andreas Daross, another former SS-Obersturmführer, received a sentence of ten years imprisonment by the SS court of the General Government of Poland. While assigned to an SS courier section, he was discovered “plundering” comrades’ personal effects. The other recruits had been involved in cruelty, racketeering petrol, and bringing women into the operational zone. However, two “volunteers” particularly stand out. Hans Steinfurth was a thirty-six-year-old criminal commissioner and SS official. In 1941, while serving in Brünn (Austria), he employed a Jewish baker called Weiss as a Gestapo trusty. Weiss volunteered to conduct investigations into secret finance and the business activities of the Jewish community but also proved duplicitous, taking protection money. Weiss used the money to entertain the SS with drinking binges and orgies. Weiss’s punishment remains unknown, but
Steinfurth received a fourteen-year sentence with hard labor. Finally, there was the case of Karl Gebauer, a twenty-year-old SS-Oberjunker from the Waffen-SS. During a Bandenbekämpfung operation in Croatia, in 1943, he and an unnamed SS-Unter-sturmführer, both drunk, attempted to rape a thirty-one-year-old woman. Only briefly foiled, Gebauer moved on to another family and raped their seventeen-year-old daughter in front of her parents. He received a ten-year prison sentence.
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Himmler assigned Gebauer to Skorzeny; the others were posted to the Dirlewanger Brigade.
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