Hitler's Bandit Hunters (26 page)

Germans are now beginning to discuss whether perhaps in their treatment of the Jews they have gone too far and to be anxious lest one day they may have to pay dearly for their inhumanity. The conviction is spreading that in any case the future of generations of Germans will have to pay.
⁷⁴

The pacification of the Warsaw ghetto uprising in April–May 1943, discussed in
chapter 8
, from a diplomatic standpoint backfired on the Nazis. In April 1943, the German propaganda service announced the discovery of a site of massacred Polish army officers at Katyn. In 1940, the Soviet secret police had executed more than ten thousand Polish POWs in several killing sites. Goebbels hoped to exploit the incident, but his scheme was undermined. The Germans placed posters in Polish streets denouncing the massacre and listing the names of the Polish officers discovered at Katyn. Many of the victims on the lists were Jewish, and according to Joseph Mackiewicz, the Germans blamed their murdering on “Jewish Bolshevism.” The Germans named three members of the Minsk NKVD, all with Jewish names, as responsible for the killings.
⁷⁵
The Nazis had projected the destruction of Lidice and Warsaw to the world, and the world responded by believing the Nazis had committed Katyn.

After the wave of defeats in February and March 1943, the Waffen-SS delivered a tactical victory at Kharkov. One reward for the battle-scarred veterans was a speech from Himmler, the first in what became a series of important speeches presented through the year. Himmler’s speech corresponded to Hitler’s mission. “I would like to give it a name: it is the great fortress Europe,” Himmler said. “The fortress of Europe with its frontiers must be held and will be held too, as long as is necessary.” German success, according to Himmler, was her destiny, but this could only be assured through a political-military victory underscored by security and mass killings. He reiterated the master plan: “The decision … lies here in the East; here must the Russian enemy, this people numbering two hundred million Russians, be destroyed on the battlefield and person by person, and made to bleed to death.” This tidal wave of human destruction also included the last phase in the extermination of the Jews as he declared,

Anti-Semitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness…. We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then the matter is finished within the whole of Germany…. We have only one task, to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle without mercy.
⁷⁶

In 1943, Dr. Rudolf Thierfelder published a report on the German occupation of France.
⁷⁷
The thrust of Thierfelder’s argument was that German methods adhered to The Hague conventions (1899 and 1907) and the Lieber code. His argument exploited the cyclical interpretation that underpinned any analysis of the laws of war. The Lieber code was spun and weaved to prove Germany was conducting its war within legal limits. The thread of Lieber’s code stated, “A territory under military occupation automatically falls under martial law…. Martial law in a hostile country suspends criminal and civil law as well as civil administration.”
⁷⁸
Lieber reasoned that “The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”
⁷⁹
Lieber’s principle underpinned Goebbels’s call for rapid and total war. Thierfelder exploited Lieber’s interpretation of partisans or “bandits,” in the general classification of combatants and non-combatants. Lieber’s definition of the partisan was recognized by all belligerents:

Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging to a corps, which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured they are entitled to all the privileges of the prisoner of war.
⁸⁰

Lieber was intolerant of guerrillas, whom he deemed robbers and scoundrels, and equated guerrilla war to the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War. Guerrilla warfare was defined as criminal banditry: “so much is certain, that no army, no society, engaged in war, any more than a society at peace, can allow unpunished assassination, robbery, and devastation, without the deepest injury to itself and disastrous consequences, which might change the very issue of the war.”
⁸¹
Thierfelder judged German intolerance of resistance as further proof of Germany’s observance of the Lieber code.

In 1942, Directive 46 was introduced to eradicate “banditry” in order to exploit Soviet lands uninterrupted. Addendums “a” and “b” were attached to extend the application of punitive measures to include allied Special Forces (discussed in
chapter 3
). In May 1944 the OKW issued the formal regulations for Bandenbekämpfung, replacing all prior standing orders or guidelines (discussed in
chapter 5
).
⁸²
Long before then, the language and principles of Bandenbekämpfung had become routine for the Wehrmacht and SS. A Luftwaffe Eastern Front “bandit-situation” report (
Bandenlage
) from January 1944 provides an example. The report, written by Colonel Kollee, advised that “amongst the bandits the Jews have a certain role, they work according to their nature, and they act as spies. There is an independent Jewish bandit group operating near Leszniow.” Kollee went on to discuss the different forms of resistance: “There has been an increase in the number of opportunists’
bandits with the minimum of training. Their numbers have increased with the German retreat.”
⁸³
The “bandit bands” were identified as composed of Red Army stragglers, enemy troops that infiltrated the front lines, parachutists (
Fallschirmspringer
), POW escapees, German deserters, former collaborators, civilian volunteers, and coerced locals. The larger bands included specialists in their order of battle including bridging units, demolition parties, cavalry detachments, and antitank squads. The bands’ signals detachments were known for their superior training, and their capture was highly prized. The Germans particularly singled out armed women (
Flintenweiber
) or females assisting in supply, medical signals functions, and serving as enemy agents. Many reports identified the leaders of the “Bolshevist bands” as “bandits” but then went on to describe them as Red Army officers, political commissars, or public servants. Russian village leaders or Ukrainian chieftains who raised private bands were categorized as “bandit leaders” (
Bandenhäuptling).
⁸⁴

Bandenbekämpfung regulations recognized that some bands were organized as military formations with internal military structures. The Germans often reported in a patronizing way how a band adopted military terms. For example, the Soviets often used “brigade” to identify bands more than a hundred strong, and the Germans believed this was a deliberate misuse of correct terminology. Their language focused on the question of uniforms and discipline. The Germans often referred to the ability of the bands to maintain discipline. The question of uniforms was ambiguous; some bands wore civilian clothing while the Red Army’s partisans wore full uniforms. This failure to treat captives in a recognizable uniform as combatants was a clear breach of the laws of war.
⁸⁵
The Germans described the fighting style of “bandits” as aggressive and destructive. The bands were linked to six tasks. Three were military tasks: attacking strongpoints, depots, transports, marching troops, supply columns, and individual vehicles; attacking German offensives (destroying bridges, mining roads, blocking tracks, and disrupting rail traffic); and disrupting German communications. A fourth task was economic warfare: the bands were ordered to destroy everything of economic value to the Germans, particularly the harvest. The two political tasks of the bands included terrorizing the populace to undermine German authority and administration and undermining the morale of all collaborators. Himmler summarized the picture of the opponent:

We are dealing with an enemy who simply disregards many of our tactical and strategic experiences. For instance, he just does not care whether he is encircled; it is no importance to him. He attacks at places where our tactical sense, or perhaps we had better say our tactical doctrine tells us that there is no sense in doing so. Still, attack he does, and often enough he is successful.
⁸⁶

German regulations officially maligned the “bandit” as a bully, deceitful and cowardly, only attacking troops that were weak. The German soldier was warned that capture would lead to a horrible death. The partisans were accused of mutilating German wounded as a means to stirrup mercilessness in the troops. The “bandit” was described as a saboteur who avoided open combat. A typical tactic of the “bandits” was stopping transport columns by triggering multiple mines and explosives without exposing themselves to German retaliation. They might also conduct a surprise attack with concentrated fire and then quickly disappear. A band suspicious of being surrounded would attack desperately to escape. Decoys might be used to distract the Germans from the main escape route. The “bandits” used camouflage; one particular example seemed to fascinate the Germans because it turned up so many times in reports: “We found bandits, who stood up to their mouths in water, who camouflaged their head with bits of grass or who buried themselves almost completely into the ground.” In 1941 and 1942, the governing motivation of German policy was that “all Jews are partisans and all partisans are Jews.” From 1943, all armed resistance was “banditry” and all Jews, irrespective of circumstances, were treated as “bandits.” By October 1943, Himmler could confidently present a speech to army officers at Bad Schachen exploiting this process of vilification:

For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the East, the creation of the German Reich we shall be a people of 120 million Germanic souls…. We are up against an enemy who uses the laws of war with a sort of Slav cruelty in his own ranks against us…. He is capable of cannibalism, of butchering his neighbor, cutting out his liver and keeping it in his haversack.
⁸⁷

In 1942, Hitler had warned the troops of placing misguided trust for the civilians of occupied countries (refer to
chapter 3
). The Lieber Code addressed the position of civilians in war:

Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.
⁸⁸

Given the nature of Nazi rule, it might seem ludicrous to imagine that loyalty was demanded from Russian civilians, but the Germans expected both loyalty and collaboration. Collaboration was measured by membership of the collaboration police (Schuma) or other organizations, while economic productivity proved loyalty. A section of the 1944 regulations, “Treatment of the Population, Bandit Helpers and Bandits” (
Behandlung der Bevölkerung, der
Bandenhelfer und der Banditen
), attempted to resolve the ambiguity.
⁸⁹
The regulations stressed reliance on local German administrators to distinguish between reliable and unreliable civilians. The agricultural economy officer (
Landwirtschaftsführer
) monitored the attitude and mood of civilians. They measured civilian loyalty through the achievement of “production targets” (
Ablieferungszoll erfüllen
). When the Germans announced production targets, they issued “individual produce obligations” (
Ablieferungsleistungen
) and announced penalties for not achieving targets (
Nichterfüllen der Forderung
). The most severe punishment for failure included the confiscation of cattle, or in the case of rotten foodstuff, the substitution by other produce while the farmer received a receipt of his debt to the state to be accounted for in due course. The presence of bands allowed the Germans to designate such areas as diseased or infected and awaiting treatment (discussed in
chapter 6
). This led to the further classification of civilian disloyalty as the “bandit helper” (
Bandenhelfer
) and the “bandit-suspicious” (
Bandenverdächtigte
). This brought about the enforcement of security through a regime of guilt by association or suspicion. The only mitigating circumstance for civilians under suspicion was if they proved they were press-ganged. Initially the Bandenhelfer were executed, but Himmler rescinded this order in January 1943 and incarcerated them in concentration camps instead. Bandenverdächtigte, in another case of confusion, were either executed or enslaved.

The circumvention and manipulation of the Geneva Conventions was, therefore, not surprisingly a major aspect of Hitler’s war. The 1941 Barbarossa directives and the 1942 Commando Order challenged the protection offered to soldiers in uniform. Gradually, the number of allied servicemen exposed to ill-treatment or execution included all Special Forces personnel, the random killing of downed bomber aircrew vilified as “terror-fliers” (
Terrorflieger
), and personnel from Poland, France, and Czechoslovakia serving with the allied armies; in particular Poles, French, and Czechs, imprisoned and escaped from German prison camps became subject to the “bullet decree” (
Plan Kugel
) upon recapture.
⁹⁰

The confusion caused by these regulations even led some British paratroopers captured at Arnhem to be treated as “bandits” and sent to Auschwitz as labor. In Normandy, Canadian soldiers were executed by Waffen-SS troopers. The allied personnel who escaped from German prisoner of war camps were executed if found. The mass breakout from the Sagen prisoner of war camp led to the execution of fifty recaptured allied officers. In simple terms, a uniform no longer guaranteed protection for captured allied soldiers. The differences between the Lieber Code and Nazi regulation lay in the quest for ethical warfare, a concept that even a gifted Nazi political-warrior like Himmler could barely comprehend: