Hitler's Bandit Hunters (31 page)

There is always a danger when placing elite troops in a position of guardianship over occupied indigenous populations. The Waffen-SS was responsible for many atrocities; they brought their unique combat experience to Bandenbekämpfung. George Stein concluded that the Waffen-SS was a tarnished shield because of its war crimes. He thought the men responsible for the antipartisan campaign did not represent the essence of the Waffen-SS.
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Bernd Wegner attributed this behavior to the doctrine of destruction the Waffen-SS followed. These political soldiers lived and existed in the belief that they were a “revolutionary fighting order” (
Kampfgemeinschaft).
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In the investment of Bandenbekämpfung, Himmler could only call on the limited availability of his elite Waffen-SS divisions. During “Barbarossa,” the SS-Police forces were bolstered by Waffen-SS reserves organized into three Waffen-SS brigades. In 1942, a dual process of reorganization began turning the Waffen-SS regiments and brigades into divisions, while the Order Police battalions were turned into regiments and specialists. On July 13, 1942, the Waffen-SS chief of staff, Hans Jüttner, published the Waffen-SS reserve muster order.
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Himmler had charged Jüttner, with increasing and reinforcing the Waffen-SS order of battle. Jüttner combined the functions of COS, ordnance and equipment, field supplies and raising troops into Waffen-SS orders of battle, and forming of new units. Jüttner had also been quasi-operations officer behind the SS countermeasures in Czechoslovakia during the state of emergency in 1941 and had reported the success of security operations to Himmler.
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The role of the cavalry was quite extensive in Bandenbekämpfung. The SS-Cavalry Brigade became the SS-Cavalry Division Florian Geyer and was placed under the command of combat-experienced Waffen-SS officers. Between June 1942 and May 1943, its command passed from Hermann Fegelein to Wilhelm Bittrich.
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Once the partisans employed heavy weapons, the cavalry division received artillery and an antitank detachment. This turned the division into a nineteenth-century cavalry formation and an advanced mechanized division of modern warfare—mounted troopers riding into combat with self-propelled guns and armored fighting vehicles. The Cossacks raised many formations, and in February 1944, the SS began reforming its brigades. Two regiments remained, but supporting units and the size of independent cavalry
detachments were decreased.
⁷⁹
This was yet another reversal of a Hitler announcement, “
We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms!
… Only the German may carry arms, not the Slav, not the Czech, not the Cossack nor the Ukrainian!”
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In February 1943, the infantry elements from the KSRFSS were formed into an assault brigade (
Sturmbrigade
) Reichsführer-SS. The SS Operational Headquarters recorded its actual strength at 112 officers, 612 NCOs, and 3,500 men, while the operational or fighting strength was 94 officers, 438 NCOs, 2,168 men, 70 Italian auxiliaries, and 5 ethnic German NCOs. The brigade eventually became the 16th SS-Division Reichsführer-SS, and its final complement was 50 percent volunteers, 50 percent conscripts of German, Austrian, and ethnic descent.
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In January 1944, the 1st SS-Infantry Brigade became the 18th SS-Panzer Grenadier Division Horst Wessel. The infantry brigade still commanded two regiments, the 8th and 10th. The 8th SS-Infantry regiment was composed of 30 percent volunteers, 50 percent conscripts, and 20 percent Rumanian ethnic German conscripts. The 10th was comprised of 30 percent conscripts, 40 percent conscripted ethnic Germans, and 30 percent Germans.
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In February 1942, Himmler issued a general order that redesignated the police regiments into “SS-Police Regiments.”
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These were assembled into fixed formations using existing police battalions from July 1942 onward.
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Twenty-eight regiments were formed, including the 18th SS-Police Mountain Regiment. The British codebreakers were quick to acknowledge the impact of this change: “Evidence from Russia and from Holland and Norway suggests that all Police Battalions will in future be grouped under Regiments, which will be numbered serially through the Reich and Occupied territories.”
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In January 1943, Daluege presented what proved to be his last annual report on the Order Police. The fighting contingent of the police represented approximately 15 percent of the overall number. The actual police component was about 180,000 of which 132,000 were reservists, boosted by 301,000 collaboration auxiliaries. Another 25,000 police were committed to the Wehrmacht, the GFP, or the Waffen-SS Polizei Division. Daluege announced the total casualties sustained in 1942 as 5,012 dead, 9,389 wounded, and 251 held as prisoners of war.
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According to Georg Tessin, the full complement of the Ordnungspolizei in 1942 was 276,000 with a Hilfspolizei of 1,991,500.
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The final accounting for the 1943 Schutzpolizei complement stood at 117,053 and for 1944 was 126,404.
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After a disastrous winter, Himmler was forced to raise more regiments.
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The Chef der Ordnungspolizei (CdO) also raised four police rifle regiments. The commander of 31st Police Rifle Regiment, Oberst der Schutzpolizei Hannibal, was a senior Hamburg police officer who later formed his own Kampfgruppe.
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To compensate for its lack of antitank weapons, the SS-Police raised armored companies (
Polizei-Panzerkompanien
), which were supplied with captured tanks and tank-hunting companies (
Polizei-Panzerjäger-Kompanien
) and trained to use antitank weapons and artillery. A Police Tank Reserve Battalion
was based in Vienna with a strength of eighteen officers and 137 men. Their vehicles included seven French armored cars, eight French tanks, and five Russian tanks including a T-34.
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In 1944, Bach-Zelewski took control of powerful siege artillery. During the defensive fighting in Kovel (discussed in
chapter 8
), Bach-Zelewski received armored assault artillery. In the pacification of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, his special units included flamethrowers, siege mortars for destroying fortifications, armored trains, and tanks.

In September 1942, Daluege issued a standing order for the formation of police guard battalions (
Polizei-Wach-Bataillonen
). This order reflected the new conditions of Bandenbekämpfung and Himmler’s regimentation of the Order Police.
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According to Daluege, the new battalions stood alongside existing police formations as “an alert and elastic in resolving critical war shortages.”
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On September 17, 1942, in line with these reforms, the home police organization was rationalized. The balance between police officials (
Verwaltungspolizei
), security police, and Order Police was reset. As a consequence of the reforms, the manpower surplus from the Verwaltungspolizei was redirected toward policing the occupied zones. The numbers involved fourteen hundred officials and were regarded as significant in 1942.
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The Schuma battalions were even more lightweight than the police battalions. In a report from 1943, Daluege justified employment of this force on the grounds of the onerous tasks placed on the Order Police.
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By this time, the Schuma represented a major factor in Himmler’s human resource pool. Over the period of the war, 158 Schuma battalions were raised in the Baltic States, twenty-three in Russia-Centre, sixty-five in the Ukraine, and eleven in the General Government of Poland. Total police troops in 1943 were 181,412, with 117,053 from the Schupo, 49,075 gendarmerie, and the Schuma at 150,000, while volunteers from Italy had raised 100,000, in Croatia 30,000, and Holland 22,000. Tessin estimated that an overall force of 650,000 came under Order Police control, which, if the Hilfspolizei are included, increased the manpower upward to 3,500,000.
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The Schuma formations came under Daluege’s recommendations for the German police battalions in 1942, with a motor-vehicle pool and provision for three armored cars. In terms of firepower, all Schuma battalions were to be fully equipped with infantry field guns, heavy and medium machine guns, and mortars.
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A report from February 1, 1944, concerned the Ukrainian 204th Schuma Battalion, which was comprised 32 officers (8 Germans), 8 officials (2 German), 232 troopers (58 Germans), 16 translators, and 8 drivers. The German cadre was collected in Wehrkreis XII and organized through BdO Wiesbaden. The men came from the 1896 intake and were not older than forty-eight years old in 1944. Throughout February 1944, the BdO Ostland worked to increase the numbers of German cadres in the Schuma.
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Several crossover formations combined elements of the Waffen-SS with the SS-Police. In March 1943, the Waffen-SS raised Ukrainian volunteers for a division. According to Michael Logusz, the initiative for the 14th Waffen-SS
Grenadier Division Galician came from the district governor of Galicia, Dr. Wächter. On March 14, 1943, Wächter discussed the idea with Himmler in Berlin. Following brief correspondence, in which the twin priorities of raising manpower and gathering in the annual harvest were pointed out by Himmler to Wächter, Hitler authorized a Galician (but not a Ukrainian) SS division to be financed through the state of Galicia. The division was to be infantry rather than a police formation. For assistance, Himmler recommended Wächter, Berger, and Krüger in the organizational arrangements. Wächter moved fast and ignored requests by Himmler’s adjutant Brandt to remain cautious (Brandt was probably cautious of the racial-political minefield that Wächter was entering).
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The 14th Division absorbed the 4th and 5th SS-Police Regiments and initially fit the profile of the SS-Polizeiverbände structure rather than the Waffen-SS. On April 12, a conference hosted by Wächter to incorporate the division brought together an interesting group of SS grandees, including SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei Joseph Stroop Generalleutnant Kurt Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (
Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei
) and the inspector of the colonial police department. Several Nazi Party functionaries and SS administrators assisted them. Recruits mustered through the existing collaboration system were 85 to 90 percent Ukrainian with a sprinkling of former Polish army officers. This entailed the release of men from labor assignment by agreement with local Nazi bosses, the police, and the army’s agricultural offices. The expected time frame for the first units to receive volunteers was estimated by Pfeffer-Wildenbruch as May 15, 1943. SSPF Lemberg carried out the division’s initial administration during induction.
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Another crossover force was the Schutzmannschaft-Brigade Siegling, which became 30th Waffen Grenadier Division (
russische Nr
. 2). It was formed from Belorussian Schuma battalions in January 1944. This division was commanded by SS-Police officers with Waffen-SS ranks and with a long period of service in Bandenbekämpfung. The division was raised in France, while its family members were housed in German cities.
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Since the war, Bach-Zelewski’s command and leadership style has been derided and vilified because of his connection with extermination. However, during the war, he was promoted to high command. In theory, Himmler could have promoted any of his senior Waffen-SS officers to the Ch.BKV. There was confidence in Bach-Zelewski, and it came from other sources besides Hitler and Himmler. Along with a reputation for ruthlessness, he possessed security warfare skills in operations, leadership, and technique.

In 1943, Himmler stated that “the most important precondition[s] to combating the ways of the bandit are strong nerves, a fearless heart, the will and the capability to attack the enemy with very small forces and the necessity to maintain the initiative, rather than to leave it to the enemy, who are
poorer quality.” To remind the troops of the seriousness of failure he warned, “Cowards amongst the German ranks are to be treated like the bandit, killed.”
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Hitler included instructions to those who failed to carry out the Commando orders: “I will hold responsible under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order or acted against this order where it was to be executed.” The failure of even a non-commissioned officer to carry out these orders was to be reported.
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In another document Hitler wrote, “I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with these orders severely punishable.”
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Personal honor was to be a prerogative of the Bandenkampfverbände; a strong character was equated with being a true National Socialist. Lack of discipline or examples of ill discipline were regarded as personal flaws.

Bach-Zelewski’s design for the fighting style of Bandenbekämpfung reflected his political and military experiences. He painted a relentless struggle in the 1944 regulations. The “bandits” had to be located, with hunting dogs, while engineers cleared mines and reconnaissance patrols located “bandit” camps. When engineers were not available, he recommended driving cattle ahead of the troops; there was no advice over what to do if there were no cattle. Deserters, POWs, and locals were to be employed as guides under guard. The troops were expected to undertake total security when entering villages or when hunting “bandits” in swamps, woods, and primeval forests. The troops had to be capable of beating the “bandits” in any environment. The 1944 regulations obliged soldiers to embrace the hardships common to the conflict. Additionally, they should be mobile. All motorized forces and units with pack animals had to employ speed to remain within possible reach of “bandits.” The aim of these tactics was to bring combatants to decisive points in an operation, primed for action.