Hitler's Bandit Hunters (44 page)

Following Korn’s resignation, Korsemann’s problems appeared to spiral out of control. On June 30, 1943, against Bach-Zelewski’s advice, Korsemann wrote a letter of complaint to Field Marshal von Kleist about the Wehrmacht rumor mill and protesting accusations that he was a drunk.
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We know little either of the content or of Kleist’s response, but the tone of the letter caused Himmler to take offense with Korsemann. On July 4, Himmler ordered Bach-Zelewski, as the commanding officer, to prepare a report on Korsemann. The
next day, Korsemann was suspended from all his positions. Himmler wrote to the chief of SS personnel, Maximillian von Herff, on July 6, requesting details of other incidents said to have arisen during Korsemann’s time in the Caucasus. Korsemann’s seniority drew to a close in September 1943 when Himmler finally cast his decision:

Too much alcohol in his life, too much fraternising with regular German army officers, too many parties with alcohol and regular army officers, too lazy in his duties as Chief of Police, too quick to retreat from the Caucasus when trouble arose and all together he is now degraded to the Waffen-SS.
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During interrogations in Nuremberg, Ernst Rode referred to Himmler’s preference for getting rid of people by playing one off against another. He indicated that this was the case with Korsemann.
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The threads did not end there. In a signal deciphered by the British in October 1943, there was evidence of ill-feelings about this case lingering within the corps. The intercept showed Rudolf Pannier criticizing Gottberg regarding the Korsemann case, as “he [Gottberg] has already once tried to worm his way into the structure, when I should have been made chief of staff to [Korsemann] the officer body to which I belong, have to keep silent in the face of naked reality.”
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Evidence of Gottberg’s role in the case is limited and largely circumstantial. On June 28, 1943, SS-Gruppenführer Korsemann issued the final details for “Günther,” an operation that placed Kampfgruppe Korsemann in overall command. The records show that since the beginning of January 1943, SSPF Weissruthenien, under SS-Brigadeführer Curt von Gottberg, had been leading operations with Kampfgruppe Gottberg. The internal politics involved a clear line of seniority with Gruppenführer Korsemann (HSSPF) senior to Brigadeführer Gottberg (SSPF). Korsemann had not slated Gottberg to participate in “Günther,” but following Korsemann’s departure, Kampfgruppe Gottberg took over the operation. The HSSPF controlled the central formations such as the SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger and the SS-Police Regiments. Therefore, line officers like Dirlewanger had more than a passing interest in their senior officers. Dirlewanger’s impression of what was happening to Korsemann raises some interesting evidence.

“Zauberflöte” exposed the ill feelings between Dirlewanger and Korsemann. Korsemann had openly circulated precise instructions to Dirlewanger and his men. The order then warned against plundering, which would be punishable with the severest means (
schärfsten Mitteln geahndeten
). All participants in the operation read this order, which snubbed Dirlewanger’s command as a group of uncontrollable plunderers.
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Following “Cottbus” but prior to “Günther,” Korsemann issued specific orders again to Dirlewanger warning him against any repeat of the destruction of suspected “bandit
villages” (
Banditendörfer
) that had occurred before, most probably during “Cottbus.” Later, Dirlewanger issued a most illuminating experience report (
Erfahrungsbericht
) on July 14, 1943, that left no doubt about his contempt for Korsemann. Writing under the heading of “Günther,” Dirlewanger responded to the criticism raised about his performance during “Cottbus.” In preparation for “Günther,” Korsemann had ordered that certain “peaceable peasant villages” to be spared. Reconnaissance had proved that the villages were rife with resistance. An alleged SD report had also confirmed this, according to Dirlewanger, stating the villages were “full of bandits and the roads and fields littered with mines.” The SD requested that the order to stay action against the villages be rescinded. Korsemann sent an unclear reply to spare the villages, even though the SD had been shot at and the roads were littered with mines. Dirlewanger’s 2nd Company had approached one of the villages and was fired on from all the houses, sustaining two dead and two wounded. Dirlewanger stated that such losses could have been prevented if his one year of unquestioned experience of bandit fighting had been trusted. Dirlewanger’s swipe at Korsemann concluded, “It seems, therefore, appropriate to employ leaders with Bandenbekämpfung experience to issue decisive orders, to prevent unnecessary losses.”
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In the heat of security politics, Dirlewanger was not content to comment solely about Korsemann. The deportation measures required the involvement of officials from Sauckel’s GBA. These rarely conformed to the will of either civilian administrators or the army high command, and deported labor at will. Once labor officials joined security operations, they attracted criticism. On July 14, 1943, Dirlewanger reported the performance of labor officials attached to his command during the “harvesting” (Erfassung) phase of “Günther” after its “military” phase. He caustically remarked, “we have made a new experience, the uniformed
Beamten
…. They like to boast that they receive 15 Reichsmark per day. This harmfully reduces the mood of the troops.” The report described how Dirlewanger’s troops had rounded up two thousand to three thousand people, hundreds of horses and cattle, but no collection camp or transport had been organized. In the absence of labor officials, the armed forces and the SS-Police were forced to process the deportees and arrange their transportation. The arrangement of these facilities was supposed to be made in advance. Concluding on a venomous note, Dirlewanger pondered whether Erfassung operations in the future might be conducted on Saturday afternoons or Sundays when the labor officials were off duty.

Turning to Bach-Zelewski’s diary for this period, we are offered another perspective on the events as they unfolded. Since his promotion to the full command of all Bandenkampfverbände on June 19, Bach-Zelewski had been running a tight schedule. “Cottbus” was implemented prior to his taking command, but its results came under his control. On June 29, 1943, he visited the
1st Police Grenadier Regiment to observe their operational performance. He traveled to Minsk on July 3, to join Korsemann, Gottberg, and SS-Brigadeführer Hermann, commander of 1st SS-Infantry Brigade, while they were preparing “Hermann.” The next day, he attended a meeting with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, arranged by Himmler, to raise a formation of Muslim recruits from the Balkans. The following day, when Korsemann was relieved, he briefed Field Marshal von Kleist on the overall security situation. It is likely that Kleist passed comment on Korsemann’s letter during Bach-Zelewski’s visit. The next day, Bach-Zelewski received news of Schenckendorff’s death by heart attack. As a mark of respect, he secured Himmler’s approval for the Breslau Police band to perform a full military funeral service. This took place on July 9 with due pomp and ceremony and with Bach-Zelewski accepting the march past.
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A week later, after a brief visit to the Balkans, he met with Warlimont on July 16, to plan a large-scale operation in the Polotsk region of Russia. From there, he visited the command of “Hermann” to observe the progress. Apparently satisfied, he flew to Bialystok, to confer with Gauleiter Sauckel, regarding the new quotas for forced labor. On July 19, he flew back to Minsk only to return to Poland (Lublin) the next day to assist SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik in the handling of “Wehrwolf” against the Kovpak band. This travel ranged across Rovno, Lvov, Kraków, Breslau, and Warsaw until he returned to his headquarters at Lötzen on July 26.

In the midst of all this activity, SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei Eberhard Herf arrived on the scene. Eberhard Herf was a member of Himmler’s personal staff and had undertaken what might be loosely termed time and motion studies of SS performance in the east. Herf had already attracted British codebreaking activity in January 1942 when Himmler wrote to him via HSSPF Russia-North. It seems Herf had a quarrel with Zenner, and Jeckeln had been asked by Himmler to investigate the case. Herf had requested a transfer, but Himmler quashed that decision until the investigation had been completed. Himmler was particularly angry because he had expected Herf to report to him with any troubles.
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This was an omen of things to come.

Bach-Zelewski first met Eberhard Herf, on July 1, 1943, in his quarters at Lötzen. They spent the best part of two days together, discussing the command system and meeting with the staff, before Bach-Zelewski departed for Minsk. During Bach-Zelewski’s absence, Herf was presumably left to settle into his prestigious assignment as chief of staff but found the operational procedures did not meet with his standards. On July 19, 1943, in a famous letter first discussed by Hans Buchheim in the 1960s, and often referred to since, Herf wrote to his friend and namesake SS-Obergruppenführer Maxi-millian von Herff, the chief of SS-Personnel Main Office (
SS-Personalhauptamt
), relating an accusation that there were serious problems within Bandenbekämpfung reporting. From the outset, Herf confirmed his disapproval of German policy in the east and the security measures in particular. He had
“misgivings over the colonization process,” which he felt would lead to defeat in the winter of 1943–44 as resentment continued to swell support for the partisans. He was particularly unhappy at the practice of keeping the body count figures “artificially low” to highlight the “successes.” Herf believed the figures sent to Himmler were “cooked.” To add weight to this comment, he said that rumors circulating during his time in the Ukraine were being broadcast by Kube and Lohse as fact. Herf indicated that Kube and Lohse had in fact got hold of secret reports and were openly denouncing the failings of a system that recorded that 480 rifles were found on 6,000 dead “partisans.” In other words, the reports had not been distributed to them through the usual channels. The number of rifles had been fudged, according to Herf, “to swell the figure of enemy losses and highlight our own ‘heroic deeds.’” His investigation of the numbers led to the common excuse that the insurgents destroyed their weapons and disguised themselves as innocent civilians to escape from the police. Herf was not convinced, reflecting on the severity of the fighting. “How easy it must be to suppress these guerrillas—when they destroy their weapons!”
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The Herf to Herff correspondence continued. On July 21, the police general wrote, “since yesterday I am in a completely different position. The RFSS has asked me to write to him about the situation…. I explained starkly with statistics how the situation is deteriorating.”
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Following his return on July 27, Bach-Zelewski discussed matters with all the staff, which was clearly unsatisfactory for Herf. The next day, he wrote again to his friend regarding the meeting. “Bach is back. He said he felt that I wanted to rule here (
Ich würde hier die Zügel der Regierung in die Hand nehmen
).” Herff replied that as chief of staff he had greater authority than what was being granted. In his diary for July 28, 1943, Bach-Zelewski wrote, “report to the RFSS, my chief of staff is not suitable for the position.” The following day, Herf wrote again to his SS friend, in what was the final letter:

Alea sund [sic] jacta! [The die is cast!] These are the facts I can disappear here. They will find somebody else for this job as they did before. Their explanation was classical “too much commander and not enough chief of staff” who has to be flexible and considerate. “You want to rule yourself. The RFSS needs to have someone to shout at, but you are too old and too old to report to him everyday.” I wrote to you of the real motives.
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Herf decided to leave, commenting that even his request for genuine reports when they projected no deterioration were denied by the reluctant staffs. “It was openly told to me how everybody could guess the strategy,” he continued. “They offered me a Kampfgruppe.” Herf was fed up but filed Bach-Zelewski’s final comment. “Reconsider your decision said Bach, you can lose
reputation and honor, or as well achieve honour.”
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Bach-Zelewski’s final words on Herf are in his diary. “Lectured to by the RFSS. My chief of staff has been recalled, because he has not matched up to the task.”
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Heinz Lammerding (see
chapter 9
) became Bach-Zelewski’s chief of staff on August 13, 1943, a choice with which he was very content.
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So often depicted as an upstanding German officer in the “Cottbus” case, Generalmajor der Polizei und SS-Brigadeführer Eberhard Herf returned to his position as KdO Minsk. He had been KdO Minsk since 1941 and had received the order from Kube, on January 29, 1942, for the “second wave” of Jewish extermination, of the Minsk ghetto. He was hanged after being found guilty of war crimes during the Minsk trial in 1946.
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What can be gleaned from these events? In the summer of 1943, these incidents represented the most extraordinary behavior. The shopping list of ranks highlights two Nazi ministers (Himmler and Rosenberg), a field marshal, four senior officers (a general from the army and three SS-Obergruppenführer), two Reichskommissars, five general rank or equivalent officers, and at least three senior line officers. The butchers’ bill included one senior officer disgraced, a state secretary killed, and a general dead of a heart attack. New accounting regulations, discussed in
chapter 6
, were issued to the Bandenkampfverbände on July 12, 1943, three days after Herf’s first letter.
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As for Rosenberg and his motley crew, their castigation of the SS was hard-faced politics. Their selectivity in highlighting some victims over others is revealed in the telling disclaimer of the letter from June 18, 1943, that “the fact that Jews receive [‘special treatment’]
Sonderbehandlung
requires no further discussion.” Gerald Reitlinger suggested that not until July 10, 1943, did Himmler receive Kube’s report. This might indicate Himmler had been planning new accounting rules before the “Cottbus” incident. Reitlinger also suggested that “Cottbus” was the clearing of the “Partisan Republic of Lake Palik,” which might have triggered the extreme measures. Later, Kube told Strauch that this action was unworthy of a nation that had produced Kant and Goethe. In response, Strauch accused Kube of not handling disciplinary charges against Jews properly and of not removing the electrician who had bugged his telephone line. Kube was blown up by his chambermaid on September 23, 1943; Strauch had all seventy Jews under Kube’s control killed in reprisal, and another thousand Jews were slaughtered in Minsk. Adding a final twist to the remarkable series of coincidences, Himmler told Bach-Zelewski that Kube’s assassination was “a boon to the German people.”
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