Hitler's Hangman (7 page)

bend where the assassins could wait for Heydrich’s car without arousing

suspicion.21

Yet the apparent ease with which the parachutists had managed to

infiltrate the Protectorate made them less cautious than they should have

been in the circumstances. Both Gabčík and Kubiš began sexual affairs

with women they met through the families that offered them shelter, thus

violating all rules of secrecy. Numerous persons and families who belonged

to the wider Czech resistance circle were unnecessarily compromised by

the careless use of safe houses and borrowed bicycles, articles of clothing

and briefcases that would subsequently lead the Gestapo to their helpers

and ultimately wipe out all organized resistance in the Protectorate. For

the time being, however, Gabčík and Kubiš were lucky enough not to be

discovered.

Others were less fortunate. The five parachutists of groups Silver A and

Silver B, who had been airdropped only minutes after Gabčik and Kubiš

on the night of 28 December, split up shortly after landing. Many of them

were either arrested by the Gestapo or turned themselves in when they felt

that their families were endangered. Only the group leader of Silver A,

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HITLER’S HANGMAN

Alfréd Bartoš, managed to re-establish contact with one of the few

surviving commanders of ÚVOD, Captain Václav Morávek, and to install

a radio transmitter, codenamed Libuše, which soon began beaming infor-

mation on industrial production and the population’s mood back to

London. His reports, however, confirmed that resistance activities in the

Protectorate had become ‘exceptionally difficult’, if not impossible, because

‘for everyone politically active, there is a permanent Gestapo agent’.22

If another of the reasons for sending agents into the Protectorate was to

facilitate the bombing of vital arms-production plants, this, too, had limited

success. A plan to co-ordinate a British air raid on the Škoda works in

Pilsen with the aid of the Libuše transmitter faltered. Other missions,

including Silver B, failed completely. Between December 1941 and the

end of May 1942, sixteen other parachutists from England were dropped

over the Protectorate, but none of them completed his mission: two

were arrested by police; two placed themselves voluntarily at the Gestapo’s

disposal in order to avoid imprisonment or torture; and some were shot or

committed suicide when chased by the German police. Others simply

abandoned their missions and returned home to their families. Surprised

by the pervasiveness of the Nazi police state and holding poor-quality

false documents, many simply panicked. In one case, a parachutist sent

word to his mother that he was alive and wel . The excited mother told an

acquaintance, who promptly reported the news to the Gestapo. The para-

chutist’s father and two brothers were held as hostages and threatened with

execution until the parachutist turned himself in.23

In May Bartoš demanded that the parachute drops be halted altogether.

‘You are sending us people for whom we have no use,’ he told London.

‘They are a burden on the organizational network which is undesirable in

today’s critical times. The Czech and German security authorities have so

much information and knowledge about us that to repeat these operations

would be a waste of people and equipment.’24 But SOE and Beneš pressed

on. Before long, to his horror, Bartoš found out about the purpose of the

mission entrusted to Gabčík and Kubiš.25 Twice in early May, ÚVOD

broadcast desperate messages to Beneš entreating him to abandon the

assassination, arguing that German reprisals for the killing of Heydrich

were likely to wipe out whatever was left of the Czech underground:

Judging by the preparations which Ota and Zdenek [the codenames of

Gabčík and Kubiš] are making, and by the place where they are making

these preparations, we assume, in spite of the silence they are maintaining,

that they are planning to assassinate ‘H’. This assassination would in no

way benefit the Al ies, and might have incalculable consequences for our

nation. It would not only endanger our hostages and political prisoners,

D E AT H I N P R AG U E

9

but also cost thousands of other lives. It would expose the nation to

unparal eled consequences, while at the same time sweeping away the last

remnants of [underground] organization. As a result it would become

impossible to do anything useful for the Al ies in future. We therefore ask

that you issue instructions through Silver A for the assassination to be

cancel ed. Delay might prove dangerous. Send instructions immediately.

Should an assassination nevertheless be desirable for considerations of

foreign policy, let it be directed against someone else.26

Two days later, Beneš’s chief of intel igence, František Moravec,

responded with a misleading message: ‘Don’t worry when it comes to

terrorist actions. We believe we see the situation clearly, therefore, given the

situation, any actions against officials of the German Reich do not come

into consideration. Let ÚVOD know . . .’ The fol owing day, on 15 May,

Beneš himself sent a message to the underground without even mentioning

the assassination plan:

I expect that in the forthcoming offensive the Germans will push with

their forces. They are sure to have some success . . . In such a case I would

expect German proposals for an inconclusive peace. The crisis would

be a serious one [for us] . . . In such a situation, an act of violence such

as disturbances, direct subversion, sabotage, or demonstrations, might be

imperative or even necessary in our country. This would save the nation

internationally, and even great sacrifices would be worth it.27

Beneš had once again succumbed to pressure from the British govern-

ment. As intelligence analysts in London pointed out, ‘recent telegrams

from Silver A indicate that the Czech people are relying more and

more on the Russians . . .’ – a development that posed a serious threat to

British long-term interests in Central Europe. The democratic Czech

underground, the report concluded, was simply not pulling its weight and

was surely ‘capable of making far greater efforts . . .’. It now appeared

‘essential, both from the military and political point of view, to take

drastic action to revive confidence in the British war effort, and particu-

larly in S.O.E., if we are to maintain the initiative in directing subsequent

operations’.28

Gabčík and Kubiš, despite final pleas from their underground protec-

tors to abandon the mission, decided that it was time to act. As soldiers,

they felt that they were in no position to question orders that had been

given to them directly by Beneš. When a Czech informer from within

Prague Castle leaked to the resistance Heydrich’s travel plans for a

meeting with Hitler on 27 May, suggesting that the Reich Protector

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would then be out of the country for several weeks, Gabčík and Kubiš

decided that this was the date on which to carry out the assassination.29

On the morning of 27 May, while Heydrich was still playing with his

children in his country estate, they accordingly positioned themselves near

the hairpin curve designated for the attack. Despite the warm weather,

Gabčík carried a raincoat over his arm, concealing his sub-machine gun.

On the opposite side of the street, Kubiš was leaning against a lamp post,

two highly sensitive fused bombs in his briefcase. A third man, Josef

Valčík, who had been parachuted into the Protectorate in December as a

member of team Silver A, positioned himself further up the hill where he

acted as lookout for the approaching car. At around 10.20 a.m., Valčík’s

shaving mirror flashed in the sun, signalling that Heydrich’s car was

approaching.30

As the assassins had anticipated, Heydrich’s driver slowed down for the

bend. When the car turned the corner, Gabčík leaped out, aiming his

machine gun at Heydrich and pulling the trigger, but the gun, previously

dismantled and concealed in his briefcase under a layer of grass, jammed.

Heydrich, assuming that there was only one assassin, hastily ordered his

driver to stop the car and drew his pistol, determined to shoot Gabčík – a

fatal error of judgement that would cost him his life. As the car braked

sharply, Kubiš stepped out of the shadows and tossed one of his bombs

towards the open Mercedes. He misjudged the distance and the bomb

exploded against the car’s rear wheel, throwing shrapnel back into Kubiš’s

face and shattering the windows of a passing tram. As the noise of the

explosion died away, Heydrich and his driver jumped from the wrecked

car with drawn pistols ready to kill the assassins. While Klein ran towards

Kubiš, who was half blinded by blood dripping from his forehead,

Heydrich turned uphill to where Gabčík stood, still paralysed and holding

his useless machine gun. As Klein stumbled towards him, disorientated by

the explosion, Kubiš managed to grab his bicycle and escape downhill,

convinced that the assassination attempt had failed.31

Gabčík found escape less easy. As Heydrich came towards him through

the dust of the explosion Gabčík took cover behind a telegraph pole, fully

expecting Heydrich to shoot him. Suddenly, however, Heydrich collapsed

in agony, while Gabčík seized his opportunity and fled. As soon as the

assassins had vanished, Czech and German passers-by came to Heydrich’s

aid and halted a baker’s van which transported the injured man to the

nearby Bulovka Hospital, where an X-ray confirmed that surgery was

urgently required: his diaphragm was ruptured, and fragments of shrapnel

and horsehair from the car’s upholstery were lodged in his spleen.

Although in severe pain, Heydrich’s paranoia and suspicion of the Czechs

were strong: he refused to let the local doctor operate on him, demanding

D E AT H I N P R AG U E

11

instead that a specialist be flown in from Berlin to perform the urgently

needed surgery. By noon, he settled for a compromise and agreed that a

team of local specialists, led by Professor Josef A. Hohlbaum from the

German Surgical Clinic of Prague, should carry out the operation. Shortly

after midday, Heydrich was wheeled into the operating theatre while

Himmler and Hitler, who had been immediately informed of the attack,

dispatched their personal physicians, Professor Karl Gebhardt and Dr

Theodor Morell, to Prague.32

While Heydrich lay in hospital, his fate uncertain, rage spread among

Nazi leaders and Protectorate Germans. Police had to restrain ethnic

Germans from attacking Czech stores, bars and restaurants and from

lynching their Czech neighbours.33 Officially, the Nazi-controlled press

played down the significance of the attack, emphasizing that Heydrich’s

injuries were not life-threatening and instead reporting on the successes

of the German summer offensive on the Eastern Front, most notably the

recent encirclement battle south of Kharkov where more than 240,000

Red Army soldiers had been taken prisoner.34 Privately, however, the Nazi

leadership was far more agitated than it was willing to admit in public. As

Goebbels noted in his diary on 28 May 1942:

Alarming news is arriving from Prague. A bomb attack was staged

against Heydrich in a Prague suburb which has severely wounded him.

Even if he is not in mortal danger at the moment, his condition is

nevertheless worrisome . . . It is imperative that we get hold of the assas-

sins. Then a tribunal should be held to deal with them and their accom-

plices. The background of the attack is not yet clear. But it is revealing

that London reported on the attack very early on. We must be clear that

such an attack could set a precedent if we do not counter it with the

most brutal of means.35

The Führer himself was entirely in agreement. Less than an hour after the

assassination attempt, an outraged Hitler ordered Heydrich’s deputy and

Higher SS and Police Leader in the Protectorate, Karl Hermann Frank,

to execute up to 10,000 Czechs in retaliation for the attack. Later that

evening, a deeply shaken Himmler reiterated Hitler’s order, insisting

that the ‘one hundred most important’ Czech hostages should be shot that

very night.36

Frank, fearing that large-scale reprisals might work against Germany’s

vital economic interests in the region, immediately flew to Berlin in a

bid to convince Hitler that the attack was an isolated act orchestrated

from London. To engage in mass killings, Frank suggested, would mean

to abandon Heydrich’s successful occupation policies, endangering the

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productivity of the Czech armaments industry and playing into the hands