Hitler's Lost Spy (8 page)

So, an ideal spy will be an individual confidently living in the target community, positioned to collect valuable data and to successfully move this data to its point of transfer, capable of diverting suspicion from sudden adverse circumstances and inspired in the work by the opportunity to serve their country or another country to which they have been converted.

There are other factors, but without all of the above, the ‘returns' a spy's endeavours may generate will be at a risk that could miscarry a critical strategy against an enemy.

The Defector – the Spy's Enemy Below

Like everything else in an imperfect world, a flawless spy has never existed. Human shortcomings and a vast range of unforeseen circumstances have always guaranteed that espionage work is never without risk, and trust is never complete. In addition to operational risks, the spy constantly lives with the possibility of betrayal – a colleague who ‘turns' and exposes the spy's cover to the enemy. This prospect is not limited to other spies and their controllers. An example was Heinrich Cordes.

Heinrich Cordes was born in Germany in 1912 and joined the Nazi party in 1933. He was later elevated through the SS to serve on German merchant ships as the Nazi political officer. In September 1937 he deserted his ship in Sydney and later commenced a small business producing liquid soap in the Sydney suburb of Five Dock. On the outbreak of World War II he unsuccessfully offered to provide information on Nazi activities in Australia to avoid internment. He did, however, offer assistance during his custody. His name is mentioned in Annette's file as a possible source of information on her activities, but what he offered, if anything, is unknown. His case, however, is an example of the unpredictable and uncontrollable risks incurred by spies who may otherwise have established an unsuspecting record within the target community.

There are other means by which a spy's successful cover may be exposed, including carelessness. Annette Wagner's associations with the hard-core Nazis in Sydney were seemingly very few, and only with those who Military Intelligence had reason to be concerned about. One of these was Rudolph Durkop, mentioned in a Military Intelligence memo dated 1 December 1939, following his internment:

Further to this office M.I.S. 1342 of 27 October 1939, Navy
⁷
 now advise that the papers of Durkop referring to ‘the French girl Wagner' were taken by the Police Squad in a raid on the night of third/fourth September 
…

Australia joined Britain in declaring war on Germany on 3 September, hence the raid on the active Nazi Durkop – Nazi party member 2599504 – and others that evening. How Annette's name appeared in Durkop's possession is not known, but it may be reasoned the two were together for at least
one
common interest. Durkop's
de facto,
Helene Franze, entered in her diary for 5 April 1939 a visit to the cinema with four others. One of the four was recorded as ‘Wagner'. There is no certainty this was Annette; however, the name did not appear in her earlier diary entries for 1938 and 1939 listing friends and acquaintances. It is therefore highly feasible that this was, indeed, Annette.

As Nazis, Durkop and Franze were fanatics. It is likely their entire spare time was filled with any opportunity to further the cause – and to do anything they were ordered. 
Annette's association with them, no matter how infrequent, would have been with this knowledge.

Occasionally, however, conditions will exist that provide for a
reduction
of risk for the spy. One of these 
‘natural' advantages is the individual prepared to spy on behalf of a foreign government, and is already securely in place prior to a declaration of war. The threat of exposure, as detailed above, remains, but the usual ‘spy initiations' required to avoid suspicion are dispensed with. One of the ‘initiations' dealt with is the obtaining of permanent residency in the target country.

The ‘home-grown' spy has immediate advantages over the spy ‘imported'. Language, cultural issues, employment and general community knowledge in his or her area of operations do not present the difficulties that may challenge new arrivals. The prime problem for the spy's controllers is reliability. At what point will a citizen, living and working in the country of birth, decide to 
‘switch back' and spill everything to authorities in that country?

There are also possibilities resulting from migration. 
A German who migrated, for example, to the United States during the 1930s did so for a reason, and probably a good reason. To convert the migrant to spying for Germany would require a positive result in the 
‘conversion' formula. This would consist of providing an incentive to the prospective spy that would be greater than the sum of (1) the purpose of migration, plus (2) the risk of being caught. Espionage operations carry risks unlike any others and the fate of a captured spy is governed by both an absence of official assistance for that individual and the potential benefit, or otherwise, to the captors.

Most espionage objectives carry different techniques 
to accommodate the huge variety of likely obstacles existing in intelligence goals. Annette Wagner adapted her undercover persona extremely well, and it is very likely that had the lingering effects of typhoid fever resulted in her being bed-ridden one day in late October 1938, she may well have eluded suspicion entirely.

Naturally, any foreign agency planting a spy into another nation would employ a process enabling that spy to effectively study and develop a familiarity with the host nation's history and social, cultural and political traits – i.e. the training designed to ensure the spy's true status and intentions remain below the opposition's identification horizon. This should provide groundwork for determining the suitability of individuals for the foreign intelligence assignment. Not everyone is capable of devoting time and personal resources into an enemy society and then appearing to be supportive of it.

Annette Wagner was a professional. Her instinctive capabilities were suitably reinforced by above-average intelligence, and her extensive travels had embedded in her behaviour a combination of worldly knowledge, the economic and social conditions of the day, and an entrenched sense of caution. Annette's spy-training regime is unknown, but commencing long before she arrived in Australia she had been principally, and unintentionally, self-taught.

All processes have a beginning, and the assessment of what produces a competent undercover agent commences with providing a valid reason for residing in the target country. Without this, ground-level suspicion has a head start.

Annette Wagner – The Spy Who Came in from the
Heat

Annette arrived in Australia suitably prepared, having a second cousin living in a small community about two hours' drive north of Sydney. She told authorities in Australia she had contracted typhoid fever while living in Madagascar. Following six months in hospital, she was offered a return to France in January 1938, but Australia in summer was her preferred recovery option to France in winter. She asserted that the illness resulted from her work in assisting with health services to the local population, for which she was awarded a decoration by the French government.

Her stated objective in coming to Australia was to catch up with her cousin and medically recuperate. For a foreign resident security rating, this would attract a high score. Her reason was clear, understandable, and supported by the presence of relatives. The only gremlin in her admission into Australia was in her customs declaration when arriving in Fremantle. Annette advised her estimated period of residency in Australia would be six weeks. This may have passed unnoticed by Security, or, perhaps it may have been explained by a simple change of plans and a more permanent residency was applied for in the normal manner.

Annette's Security Test – A Comfortable Pass

Annette's search for employment, when it finally commenced, may have called for a security assessment – 
either formal or informal. Swiss-born, a French citizen, married to a French civil servant and her formative years spent in England all added up to a politically harmless background. The only potential glitch was her German-speaking father, but that was in Switzerland, and at the time Annette arrived in Australia, Hitler was talking peace to the world.

Hitler's manoeuvres in Europe may have created mixed responses, but the real national security anxieties in Australia in 1938 were focused in one direction only – 
north – to the Japanese aggression in China, the extensive build-up of the Japanese navy, well in excess of defensive requirements, and the new commercially based Japanese spy operations in Southeast Asia and the South West Pacific. A European arrival in Australia, depending on origin and political circumstances, may have attracted some security attention, but the greatest potential menace was closer to home.

Add to Annette's background some personal charm and clever conversation when necessary, plus a few relapses from her admirably acquired typhoid fever, and the result in any security assessment is likely to have been a solid pass. She did not present any distinguishing features that would cause security alarm bells to ring.

So Annette entered comfortably into the country of interest, but how did she rate with the Germans as a potentially reliable spy?

In this evaluation, there are considerable gaps in our understanding of the lady. These gaps are the result of, firstly, the secret nature of espionage and, secondly, Annette's capacity to be very good at what she was ordained to do. A sloppy spy may leave openings as to methods and trails of evidence, but a crafty spy, careful with operations, contacts and communications, may leave signs of evidence so minuscule they are almost non-detectible. So it was with Annette Wagner. Her exposure as a spy did not begin with suspicious behaviour from her operations – she was not ‘traced' or entrapped. She was monitored by Military Intelligence, and it was only through intense observation, by various means, that the cracks in her deception came to light.

The German assessment of Annette would have included the same process conducted by Australian authorities, had there been one, but in reverse. 
Obviously, the Germans were satisfied with the results they obtained with whatever tests were applied. But this also introduces a further question we cannot answer. 
Was Annette sourced and trained by a German intelligence agency
before
she arrived in Australia, or did her Nazi contacts in Australia do so
after
she arrived in March 1938? There is a distinct possibility that Annette arrived in Australia with the intentions she described, and nothing more. This unknown may be extended to include the possibility that Annette's trip to Australia had not been arranged directly by a German intelligence branch. Perhaps she arrived on ‘recommendation' from an unknown source. We will never know.

There is yet another possibility – that Annette's entry into radio broadcasting may have signalled her usefulness for dispatching coded messages via the most effective, and safest, form of secret communication available at that time. It is possible the Nazi spy network in Australia in 1938 made contact with Annette following the awareness of both the radio potential and her arrival from Madagascar where the administration had pro-Nazi leanings. Unfortunately, the records offering the answer to the question of Annette's arrangement with Axis spying were probably destroyed prior to, or immediately following, the German surrender in May 1945.

The Assimilation Project – Annette's Star Performance

Successful players in the espionage game endeavour to assimilate into a target community at a level devoid of suspicion. Spies need to blend in. ‘Differences' need to be removed as far as possible as variations from the 
‘normal' may initiate doubts, justified or not, that could lead to mistrust. In an era of international stress and suspicion, too many ‘differences' may result in official enquiries and an unwelcome intrusion into the spy's private world. Taking this further, an active rather than reclusive role in the community social scene will undoubtedly produce acquaintances capable of offering support should this be useful. Solid target community connections may be the best form of insurance available to a spy.

Annette did not cultivate many friendships in Sydney. 
But those with whom she did develop an affiliation served their purpose commendably. Residing in
The
Manor
would have introduced early contacts, out of which some close friendships evolved. Connecting with the membership of Alliance Francaise exposed her to a pool of potential but selective relationships – including Jack Clancy. Her radio connections would yield others.

Numbers, however, were less important than the valued influence a few friends may offer in a time of need. A small number of reliable alliances would have the effect of offering some distance from her espionage contacts, in addition to providing a platform of respectability. Unless she had been caught red-handed in one of her covert activities, or suspicions aroused by events occurring while she was under surveillance, she may well have been a near-perfect spy – at least until the commencement of the war. While economical with her friendships, they appear to have offered her a great deal in supporting her dual pursuits – both day and night. The information available alludes to Annette's selection of close friends and associates being overseen by her immediate needs and sought advantages, and little else. 
Social friendships, with the exception of Jack Clancy, do not register in her file's surveillance notes.

The successful groundwork carefully nurtured by Annette was to be capped off with an opportunity spies could comfortably regard as the ultimate in espionage communications – access to public radio broadcasting. 
This was not the propaganda broadcasting of ‘Lord Haw-Haw' in Europe, or of ‘Tokyo Rose' in the Pacific 
– this was the real thing, and the dispatching of a spy's communications over the airwaves is the fastest and safest route for any secret information requiring a transfer out of the spy's hands.