Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (36 page)

Through late February, the main Soviet movement in the Fourth Panzer sector had been in the direction of Sheptovka, possibly with an end goal of L’vov. As von Manstein’s staff correctly surmised, Stavka planned for the heavily reinforced 1st Ukrainian Front to attack his north, right on the seam between Fourth and First Panzer Armies through Proskurov and into the Carpathians. Zhukov, now commanding the front, moved on 4 March, both along the boundary and in the Lutsk–Dubno area. Within two days the space between the two panzer armies had grown to over 130km as Zhukov pushed his commanders to advance even at night. All Raus had to counter with and keep the rail line open were remnants ofXLVIII Panzer and two inexperienced divisions rushed in from Germany. Fighting raged around Ternopol for days with 7th Panzer (no operational AFVs) and Leibstandarte putting up a credible defense against vastly superior numbers. First Panzer also stiffened, and by the second week of March, Zhukov’s efforts had been frustrated. He therefore shifted his main effort north, the 13th Army taking both Dubno and Lutsk on the 16th and later investing Kovel. To this last-named town von Manstein dispatched the XXXII Corps (131st Infantry and SS Viking, the latter very weak and trying to recover from the Korsun pocket), although chances were slim for both of these depleted formations to have any dramatic effect. After a week of preparation, Zhukov was ready to try again at Ternopol, attacking on the 21st with 200 tanks of the 1st and 4th Tank Armies. Two days later the two panzer divisions plus the 68th Infantry were falling back in tiny, uncoordinated packets. Ternopol of course was garrisoned in accordance with Führer Order 11, which codified the concept of’fortified places’. It was at this point that Raus
(in particular, the briefly assigned II SS Panzer Corps) assisted First Panzer Army in escaping its trap near Kamenets-Podolsky (see p. 54). Likewise, Fourth Panzer’s right flank defensive positions provided a safe haven for Hube’s retreating masses.
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The end of March also meant the end of von Manstein’s tenure and the arrival of Model to command the new Army Group North Ukraine. These moves had no bearing on Zhukov, who kept advancing into early April. After taking Dubno he pushed down the rail line to L’vov (Army Group headquarters), eventually hitting the small town of Brody, designated by Hitler as another Fester Platz. A tug-of-war battle developed, and Raus recalled one counterattack to break the siege:

They did succeed in encircling the town on several occasions, but the traps were broken each time by provisional Kampfgruppe Friebe made up of one battalion of PzKw VI Tigers and one of PzKw V Panthers. This KG, augmented by a Nebelwerfer Brigade equipped with 900[!] late-model launchers, struck the enemy while he was still in his assembly areas preparing for the final all-out attack. This mass concentration of firepower resulted in the creation of a mass grave. As far as the eye could see, men, guns, smoldering stumps of trees and clumps of earth lay in ghastly confusion. The margin of the forest had vanished down to the roots.
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Colonel General Hans Valentin Hube

Hube was born in Silesia in 1890, and joined the Imperial Army’s Infantry Regiment 26 in 1909. Two months into the First World War he received severe wounds, causing his left arm to be amputated. Later, he also spent one year convalescing in a hospital after being gassed in April 1918. Retained by the Reichsheer despite his wounds, during the interwar period he instructed at the Infantry Schools in Dresden and Doberitz and authored works on infantry tactics. In 1939–40, Hube commanded Infantry Regiment 3, and on 1 June 1940 took over the 16th Infantry Division from Gotthard Heinrici. Throughout the second half of 1940 and early 1941, Hube oversaw the conversion of his outfit into the 16th Panzer Division.

During Barbarossa, Hube led the 16th through the Dubno and Stalin Line battles, earning the Knight’s Cross in early July. The division participated in the fighting for Uman, Nikopol and the Kiev Pocket, where it spearheaded von Kleist’s panzer group in linking up with Guderian at Lockvitsa. Hube then spun around to the south, taking part in the Sea of Azov encirclement battle in October, and reached the Don River the following month. During Operation Blau, his 16th Panzer again led the way, being the first German outfit to reach the Volga River, in this case north of Stalingrad. On 15 September 1942, Sixth Army commander Paulus placed Hube in charge of XIV Panzer Corps. During the Battle of the Stalingrad, Hube flew in and out of city numerous times, reported directly to Hitler to describe conditions inside the pocket and finally had to be ordered to leave his beleaguered comrades. During the last few weeks of that battle he helped lead the Luftwaffe resupply effort.

Hube was in command in Sicily during the summer of 1943, organized the Etna Line defenses and managed the evacuation of German forces from that island to the Italian mainland, earning praise even from Churchill. Back on the Eastern Front, Hitler wanted new leadership for the First Panzer Army, and put Hube in command on 29 October. By March 1944, First Panzer was cut off behind Soviet lines. Initially Hube refused to withdraw, and relented only when ordered by von Manstein. He created the classic ‘wandering pocket’, and in April regained German positions, although at a cost of half his men and most of his equipment. Hitler flew the general to Berchtesgaden to promote him and award the Diamonds to his Knight’s Cross. On the following day, taking off from Salzburg, his He–111 crashed into a mountainside, killing Hube and all aboard.

Hube’s nickname throughout the German Army was der Mensch (the Man). Hitler admired his ‘old warhorse’, and Hube impressed his men with his powerful build and black-gloved prosthetic hand. He inspired confidence with his unflappability, taking a daily nap in the middle of battle and eating regular meals regardless of the combat situation. Some subordinates criticized him, however, for falling too easily under Hitler’s mesmerizing spell, the infamous ‘sun–ray cure’.

A similar struggle centered on Ternopol, the other ‘fortified place’ in Raus’ area of responsibility. The SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, detached from II SS Panzer Corps, attempted a relief attack starting on 11 April but only made modest progress. On the 14th, Model replaced the enthusiastic but unprofessional SS officers commanding the panzers with more experienced Army officers. In 24 hours this group advanced close to the city but could not break in. The city fell on the 16th. That spring, both sides were concerned with strategic developments: the fates of Hungary and Romania and the upcoming invasion of western Europe. Also, Stavka cast and recast plans for its series of summer offensives, the cornerstone of which was the destruction of the Army Group Center bulge. Fourth Panzer, shifted north by Model to cover the Chelm–Lubin axis in southern Poland, braced for the next onslaught. Surprisingly, given Hitler’s insistence on holding every square meter of ground, he allowed
Harpe (who assumed command on 18 May) to give up Brody, Kovel and Torchin with hardly a whimper. Straightening the panzer army line eliminated costly to defend salients and freed up units for both defense and counter-attack.
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Koniev, the new 1st Ukrainian Front commander, launched his offensive a day ahead of schedule on 13 July with 4 armies, 3 guards (relatively better resourced and considered ‘all arms’) armies, 3 tank armies, 2 cavalry corps and 2 air armies following a 170,000-round artillery barrage. Their first target was the 291st Infantry Division on the far right of Harpe’s line, again on the boundary with First Panzer. Koniev’s 13th Army had more success the next day as two other armies joined in to pound the panzer army to the south. A counterattack south by the XLVI Panzer Corps (16th and 17th Panzer Divisions) ran afoul of T–34s and the Red Army Air Force. Model pulled both back to the Prinz Eugen Line, but with Koniev on their heels these new positions did not hold out long. The 1st Guards Tank Army crossed the Bug at Krystynopol on the 18th, on the same day the newly organized 1st Belorussian Front (Rokossovsky) attacked along the road to Chelm. The 8th Guards Army forced the Bug on the 21st, causing Harpe to withdraw the entire Fourth Panzer behind the river. His 20 operational panzers and 154 assault guns were completely outmatched. On 22 July, the Soviets took Chelm in the morning and Lubin in the evening; when Hitler designated the latter a Fester Platz, he basically condemned its 900-man garrison. A last-ditch rescue effort by 17th Panzer came up short when the division ran out offuel and had to destroy its AFVs in place. The Germans clearly saw that the 2nd Tank Army was exploiting into central Poland. Harpe told Model that if he were to save his panzer army it would have to withdraw to the Vistula-San River Line as soon as possible. Days later, the Fourth Panzer represented a German island in Poland surrounded on three sides by the Red Army, there were nearly 100km between it and its neighbors to the north and south. By the 28th, Harpe reached the Vistula and managed to beat back Soviet attempts to cross to the west bank. Fourth Panzer held near Sandomeriez but the 1st Tank and 13th Armies created a bridgehead on either side of Baranow. At the beginning of August, counterattacks by Fourth Panzer and its new neighbor to the south, Seventeenth Army, failed to slow significantly Koniev. Then, almost inexplicably, the one infantry and three tank armies crowded into Baranow became lethargic.
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Throughout the remainder of 1944, the central theater’s front-line trace did not change much. While the Polish Home Army first rose up and then perished and while Himmler’s extermination camps murdered millions, Stavka directed its attention elsewhere. It seems that in the center, the offensive operations
of June and July had exhausted the Red Army; most activity that autumn and early winter took place in the Baltic and Balkan regions. However, Stalin knew the war would have to be won on the central front and so ordered his commanders to continue with a New Year’s offensive along the length of the Polish front. Fourth Panzer Army held the middle Vistula, and had successfully contained the Baranow bridgehead. Its primary mission was to protect Krakow and the upper Silesian industrial area, still working full-blast in place of the bombed out Ruhr. For this General of Panzer Troops Fritz-Hubert Graeser (commander since September) had 7 infantry divisions, 96 guns, 474 AFVs spread across 190km of front. The Soviets created another massive attack force: compared to the Fourth Panzer, 1st Ukrainian forces outnumbered the Germans between 9–10:1 in the key categories of infantry, armor and artillery. Vatutin’s initial objective was Radomsko, 150km northwest, from which he would then turn north and south to assist his neighboring fronts destroy German formations attempting to block their way. The 1st Ukrainian’s intermediate goal would be the same Breslau that Graeser had to defend and then it was on to Berlin.
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The XLVIII Panzer Corps (with no panzer divisions) had the misfortune of occupying the ground over which Vatutin planned to attack. At 0300 hours on 12 January, the Red artillery began a 3-hour barrage by approximately 300 guns per km. The Germans called this 70,000 shell-per-hour fire raid a ‘Hurricane’. Following penal battalions clearing the way, Soviet infantry created a penetration 6-8km deep when Vatutin committed his tanks. By the end of the day, the three German divisions ceased to exist, a gap 20km deep and 35km wide had been created and the road was open for the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies and 52nd Army. The Soviets reached the Nida River on the 13th, and Army Group A sent what was left of its reserve, XIV Panzer (16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, approximately 200 panzers under Nehring), to Kielce to try and stop them. Vatutin’s men took Kielce on 15 January, cutting the Warsaw-Krakow rail line. The XXIV Panzer tried to keep a corridor westward for the XLII Corps to escape through. Completely lacking mobility, Graeser’s Landsers were cut to pieces in the open countryside. Orders to halt Vatutin at Czestochowa were useless. Graeser’s two forlorn corps made up a ‘wandering pocket’ that drifted towards Germany, hounded every meter of the way by the Soviets. By the 21st, what was left of Fourth Panzer reached a bridgehead over the Warte being held open by Grossdeutschland (now a panzer corps of its own). A week later the panzer army received its next mission: hold Breslau. This Graeser did, holding a small outpost there as Vatutin crossed the Oder River on either side of the Silesian capital.
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Fourth Panzer had two bridgeheads east of the Oder, at Breslau and Glogau (army headquarters), while Vatutin had many on the west bank. By 0600 hours on 8 February, the 1st Ukrainian Front was ready to move again. Some Soviet units advanced 60km by nightfall. Within days, instead of two bridgeheads, Graeser had two surrounded ‘fortresses’ at Breslau (116,000 civilians and 35,000 military) and Glogau (7,800 and 4,100). A turn south by 3rd Guards Tank Army briefly left the flank of 4th Tank Army unguarded, a situation exploited by the Brandenburger and 20th Panzergrenadier Divisions’ brief counterthrust near Sagan on the Bober on 14–15 February. Graeser’s six weak divisions fell back to the Neisse. When 1st Ukrainian pulled up to the river on the 21st, Vatutin called a halt. Back in Breslau, ensconced behind First World War fortifications (medieval ones had been destroyed by Napoleon) parts of five divisions manned a 120km-long defensive line, and held on in the face of numerous Soviet attempts to reduce the fortress. For over three months, until VE Day, this collection of Army, Navy, SS, Police, Volksturm and Hitler Youth held out. However, this thorn in Vatutin’s side did not stop the 1st Ukrainian Front from exceeding Stavka’s expectations for it. As attrited were the Germans after five and a half years of war, the Red Army was also in bad shape. While fighting raged in Hungary during the late winter and early spring, Soviet forces along the Oder River prepared for the final lunge on the core of Hitler’s Reich. Koniev would attack through three Neisse bridgeheads at Forst, Bad Muskau and Gorlitz into Saxony for an anticipated junction with the Americans and possibly, a supporting attack into Berlin’s southern defenses.
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