Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (47 page)

The first contact with the enemy was made at 0630 hours on April 12. The fighting lasted most of the day. The Norwegians were forced to destroy the tourist station and make a hasty withdrawal to Lapphaugen when a double German envelopment threatened to cut their line of retreat. The southern German envelopment was within 400 meters of cutting the Norwegian route of withdrawal but they managed to slip through since visibility was severely reduced by a heavy snowfall.

The fighting around Gratangen Tourist Station was a minor engagement with light casualties. The Norwegians had no losses while the Germans had two killed and three wounded. However, this small engagement had a substantial impact on future operations. It gave the Norwegians another 24 hours to organize and prepare. The Germans noted the stiffening resistance and realized that any attempt to push past Oalgge Pass with the limited forces at their disposal would be very hazardous as their flanks became increasingly exposed.

Forseth’s company reached Lapphaugen about 2100 hours on April 12 where it linked up with a platoon from Co 5 and a mountain howitzer from Battery 8. Captain Forseth received a report from brigade at 0430 hours on April 13 that a large German force was advancing on Fossbakken from Vassdal. Forseth considered it possible that this was the same force reported at 0100 by a security patrol but he was unable to confirm this by reconnaissance since it was dark and near blizzard conditions. There were no Norwegian forces at the important road junction at Fossbakken and Captain Forseth decided to withdraw from Lapphaugen and occupy the road junction before the Germans captured it.

Lapphaugen and the mountain pass immediately to the west (Oalgge) are located along the most elevated part of the road leading north from Gratangen—Route 50. Faulty intelligence caused Forseth’s company to abandon this excellent defensive position, an important objective in the German plans. Forseth’s men had operated continually for 72 hours in severe weather and it was beginning to tell. The exhausted troops were beginning to hallucinate, heavy fire was opened several times during the night at imaginary targets, and one soldier was killed by friendly fire. The company was finally relieved by the 2/15th Inf on April 14 but remained attached to that battalion until April 30.

By April 14 the Germans had not managed to secure the railroad to the Swedish border. The capture of Narvik would lose its value unless this was achieved. The German northern thrust had reached a point about 30 kilometers north of Bjerkvik against stiffening Norwegian resistance. They were still 30 and 57 kilometers respectively from their objectives at Setermoen and Bardufoss.

The Second Naval Battle

The Admiralty, operating on the assumption that there could be one or possibly two German cruisers and five to six destroyers in Narvik, decided on April 12 to launch a far heavier attack on those forces. Forbes’ main force was concentrated south of the Lofoten Islands, knowing that the German battleships had returned safely to Germany. The Admiralty ordered Forbes “to clean up enemy naval forces and batteries in Narvik by using a battleship heavily escorted by destroyers, with synchronized dive-bombing attacks from Furious.”
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No mention was made about landing forces to capture the city.

The detailed order issued by Admiral Forbes also makes no mention of a landing in Narvik although Forbes knew that the recapture of that city was a high British priority. It was to be purely a naval operation, a continuation of the action begun on April 10. The decision to send in a battleship may not have been taken so lightly had the British known that five German submarines were present in the area. Some writers point out that it would have made more sense to delay the operation until a suitable landing force could take advantage of the naval bombardment to capture the town. The same critics maintain that it made little sense to risk a battleship in these restricted waters solely to eliminate the German destroyers since they could be bottled up until a landing force was available.

However, the problems associated with carrying out immediate landing operations were more difficult to overcome than the critics would lead us to believe. First, the troops headed for Harstad were not ready to make a landing on a hostile shore and it would take weeks before they were operational. Second, the inter-service coordination and cooperation was entirely lacking and the service component commanders were responding to uncoordinated orders and directives. Admiral Cork and General Mackesy were still operating independently.

In the meantime, the British launched air attacks against Narvik. Nine British aircraft from the carrier
Furious
conducted a bombing raid on Narvik between 1800 and 1900 hours on April 12. They launched from the carrier in bad weather while the ship was 150 miles from Narvik. The British were apparently impressed with the German dive-bombing of their fleet in the North Sea and decided to try this method after the failure of torpedo attacks in Trondheim. The slow double-decker Swordfish aircraft were unsuitable and their crews untrained for this type attack. Despite releasing some bombs from an altitude of only 400 feet, the German destroyers were not hit. The captured Norwegian patrol vessel
Senja
was sunk and another captured Norwegian patrol boat,
Michael Sars
, was damaged and sank the following day. The British pilots reported intense and accurate antiaircraft fire and two aircraft were lost in the attack. A third aircraft was lost in the night landing on the aircraft carrier.

A second wave of nine British aircraft from the
Furious
ran into a snowstorm and forced to return to the carrier. The attack did slow the repairs on
Erich Koellner
and prevented it from taking up its floating battery position that day.
U64
arrived in Narvik in the evening of April 12 and reported hectic British naval activity in the Vestfjord.

German naval intelligence again proved to be excellent, but it was not much help to the trapped German destroyers. By listening to British radio signals, the Germans concluded that the British would attack in the afternoon of April 13. Two messages from Naval Command West to Commander Bey at 0044 hours and 0900 hours on April 13 gave a rather accurate order of battle for the British forces assembling off Narvik.
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The 0044 message read, “German aircraft report the following warships in the Vestfjord near Tranøy on the afternoon of April 12. One large ship with two smokestacks, a smaller ship with one smokestack, four torpedo boats and three destroyers further out.” The 0900 hours message related that an enemy attack on Narvik was expected in the afternoon of April 13. It reported that the battleships
Warspite
and
Repulse
, nine destroyers and one aircraft carrier would take part in the attack.

The report from Naval Command West was wrong in only one detail.
Repulse
did not take part in the attack. Admiral Forbes’ heavy units south of Lofoten consisted at this time of the battleships
Rodney
and
Warspite
, the aircraft carrier
Furious
, and the battle cruisers
Repulse
and
Renown
. He had detached a part of the Home Fleet to provide security for the troop transports on their way to Harstad.

There was no longer any doubt in Commander Bey’s mind that a major attack was imminent and he issued the following orders, but apparently failed to insure that they were carried out in a timely manner:

1. All seaworthy destroyers are to be disposed in such a manner that they can surround the lighter British naval forces as was done on April 10.

2. The destroyers that are not seaworthy are to be at battle stations by 1200 hours.

3. Erich Koellner
is to proceed immediately to Tårstad (east of Ramnes) and placed in position as a floating battery.

Admiral Forbes ordered Whitworth to carry out the Admiralty orders in the afternoon of April 13 with a force consisting of the battleship
Warspite
and nine destroyers. Whitworth transferred his flag to
Warspite
and assembled his force in Vestfjord that morning. The weather was squally but the visibility was good.

The April 13 operation made no attempt at surprise and relied instead on massive force. The passage through Vestfjord took place in full daylight, within easy observation from shore. The aircraft from the carrier were ordered to bomb the coastal fortifications that the British still believed existed in Ofotfjord as well as targets in Narvik harbor.

A reconnaissance aircraft launched from
Warspite
managed to provide exceptionally good service for the approaching fleet. It not only reported two German destroyers behind a small island near Hamnes but managed to dive-bomb and sink
U64
at the mouth of Herjangsfjord with a 100-lb bomb. This was the first sinking of a German submarine by aircraft during World War II. Eight German sailors died in the attack.

The British fleet narrowly escaped what could have been a disaster at the entrance to Ofotfjord.
U46
, commanded by Lieutenant Herbert Sohler, spotted the British armada as it entered its patrol sector east of Barøy. Sohler had promised Bey on April 11 that the submarines would provide better service to the destroyers in the future and he now had an opportunity to make good on his promise. Sohler managed to slip in behind the British destroyer screen and was in a perfect position to launch torpedoes against
Warspite
. The range was approximately 700 meters as the giant 32,000-ton battleship appeared in Sohler’s periscope.
Warspite
had a deep draft and the problem with the depth-seeking mechanism on the German torpedoes was therefore not as crucial as in the case of attacks on destroyers.
U46
was ready to launch its deadly salvo of torpedoes when the submarine collided with an underwater ridge. The impact interrupted the firing and forced the submarine to surface. It managed to dive before being spotted. It was not until after the war that the British learned how close they came to possibly losing a battleship.

The German destroyer
Erich Koellner
, which was capable of a speed of only seven knots and carrying only enough personnel to operate the ship as a floating gun platform, was escorted by
Hermann Künne
in Ofotfjord on its way to Tårstad when it spotted a British aircraft to its west. The destroyers were still three miles short of their goal. A short time thereafter,
Hermann Künne
spotted nine British destroyers near Barøy and reported to Commander Bey that the British were entering the fjord.

The German destroyer turned around immediately and headed for Narvik. The British opened fire but the shells fell considerably short of their target. The 1913-vintage
Warspite
also opened fire with its 15-inch guns, but the slow firing guns were ineffective against a fast moving destroyer steering a zigzag course.

Commander Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs,
Erich Koellner’s
skipper, realized immediately that it was too late to reach his designated location and decided to take his ship to Djupvik, on the southern shore of the fjord. He picked an excellent flanking position that was hidden in view from the fjord. Schulze-Hinrichs’ intention was to open a surprise barrage against the British destroyers with guns and torpedoes as they passed his position.

Erich Koellner
opened fire at a range of only 1,500 meters as the first British destroyer came into view. The British were not surprised since they had been warned about the ambush by
Warspite’s
reconnaissance aircraft. The German destroyer also fired torpedoes against the British ships but those failed to hit their targets or malfunctioned.
Bedouin
,
Punjabi
, and
Eskimo
had their guns and torpedoes trained to starboard as they rounded the Djupvik Peninsula and concentrated their fire on the lone German ship. Many hits were registered but the Germans continued to fire and it was not until
Warspite
fired several 15-inch salvos that the enemy was silenced.
Erich Koellner
sank at 1215 hours after a number of devastating hits. Thirty-one crewmembers were killed and 35 wounded. Norwegian forces captured the survivors.

Hermann Künne
had meanwhile continued towards Narvik on a zigzag course at 24 knots. She laid smoke in an effort to shield those German destroyers exiting Narvik harbor to meet the British but the fresh wind quickly removed the smoke. Kohte, seeing the size of the approaching enemy force, must have realized there was little he or his friends could do to save the situation. The German destroyers had not taken their designated defensive positions in the side fjords, despite intelligence warnings of an imminent attack. Bey’s orders came too late or were not executed swiftly.

Commander Bey exited Narvik on a westerly course at 1215 hours to meet the British. His force consisted of
Hans Lüdemann
,
Wolfgang Zenker
, and
Bernd von Arnim
.
Hermann Künne
also reversed course to join its friends in their futile attempt to halt the British advance.
Georg Thiele
and
Erich Giese
remained in Narvik since they were not ready to get underway.

Knowing that the attacking force included a battleship, Commander Bey would have been wise not to meet the British in the relatively open waters of Ofotfjord where
Warspite’s
massive guns could be used. A withdrawal into one or more of the narrow side fjords where
Warspite
could not follow would have reduced the odds and made German fire, especially the torpedoes, more effective since the enemy’s maneuver room would be restricted.

The British force was within range when the three German destroyers came abreast of Ballangen Bay and
Hans Lüdemann
opened fire at a distance of 17,000 meters against the British destroyers that were preceding
Warspite
by three miles. The long-range gun battle that followed was generally ineffective on both sides. Commander Rechel tried to carry out a torpedo attack against
Warspite
but was driven back by overwhelming firepower.