Hitler's Terror Weapons (3 page)

“One cannot help thinking of him as a medium. For most of the time mediums are ordinary, insignificant people. Suddenly they are endowed with what seems to be supernatural powers which set them apart from the rest of humanity. These powers are something that is outside their true personality – visitors, as it were, from another planet. The medium is possessed. Once the crisis is past, they fall back again into mediocrity. It was in this way,
beyond any doubt,
that Hitler was possessed by forces outside himself.”

During Mussolini's visit to Munich in September 1937 the great psychologist C. J. Jung observed that, compared to the Duce,

“Hitler presents the appearance of a robot. One would have said a double, in whose interior the man Hitler was hiding as an appendix, careful not to interfere with the mechanism.”

Jung's final conclusion of Hitler was that:

“He belongs in the category of authentic wizards. His body does not suggest strength. He has in his eyes the expression of a prophet. His power is not absolutely political, it is magical. Hitler listens and obeys. The true leader is always one who is well led. The idea is confirmed by the word Mahdi, the Islamic Messiah, which translates to ‘He who is well led'.”

What man would have wanted such a responsibility foisted upon him? The extraordinary allegation being made here is that Adolf Hitler and the Führer were different entities inhabiting the same body.

What strikes one particularly in this context is Hitler's intuition
vis-à-vis
the motives of Stalin and the Soviet Union. It is not necessary to enlarge on this subject. What is required is for the British authorities to declassify
all the papers
relating to the interrogations of Rudolf Hess for the period 1941–1942.

It is, of course, not the intention of the foregoing to justify Nazi atrocities or the Holocaust. But we prefer to rely on the assertions of Governments and academic historians who, labouring in the realm of effects, cannot in the nature of things admit belief in cosmic intelligences, let alone their acting for change through leaders like Adolf Hitler. There is a danger in that, and the concluding chapter accentuates certain facts which should make the true situation incapable of being misunderstood.

Geoffrey Brooks

Uruguay, March, 2002

CHAPTER 1

Vergeltungswaffen:
V-1 to V-4

I
N A TALK with Marshall Antonescu of Rumania at Führer HQ
Wolfsschanze
on 5 August 1944 Hitler spoke of four V-Weapons which Germany was in the process of introducing into the conflict. The source of this information is Henry Picker
⁷
who between 1942 and 1944 was Martin Bormann's ADC and stenographer.

The German noun
Vergeltung
has a dictionary meaning of ‘retribution', ‘retaliation' or ‘reprisal', but its National Socialist meaning was broader, for the concept of retaliation as such merely contemplates the taking of revenge.

In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, this would simply imply taking measures to inflict more damage on British cities than the RAF and American air raids had inflicted on German cities, a militarily purposeless enterprise. It was by no means the object of the V-weapons programme to exchange ‘rubble for rubble':
Vergeltung
meant the use of retaliation to terrorize the enemy's civilian population as a political tool to coerce their Government into seeking an armistice. It was not intended to punish Londoners, therefore, but to extract Britain's agreement to withdraw from the war and to expel from her soil the American presence there.

The V-1

The first of Hitler's V-Weapons was the Fieseler Fi 103 unpiloted flying bomb. It was launched either from a short ramp under its own jet power or from a low-flying Heinkel bomber. The warhead was 1 tonne of high explosive. Its maximum speed was 650 kms per hour and its range 370 kms. At the nose was a small log consisting of a propellor connected to a revolution counter preset with the number of turns of the propellor imparted at a particular speed and height in reaching a known distance. As soon as the preset revolutions were reached, the counter cut out the engine and the bomb then dropped. The weapon was grossly inaccurate and indiscriminate. London and southern England were always its intended target but in May 1943 preliminary discussions were held on the feasibility of firing the V-1 from a submarine such as the large Type XIV replenishment U-boat. After Field Marshal Milch had expressed his scepticism the idea of using the flying bomb against New York was shelved.
⁸

The bombardment of London began on the morning of 13 June 1944. Ten days later Goebbels explained the intended effect of the campaign:

“Of course, a 1000-tonne raid has a different effect. But the effect of the German bombardment lies in its persistency. It's like toothache. Finally you have to do what you should have done all along. You go to the dentist. The V-weapons bombardment will be continued come what may and it will increase each month until Britain comes to her senses, that is to say, until the English inner circle sweeps aside those responsible for this insane British policy and clears the way for an understanding with us.”
⁹

This outlook summarizes the philosophy behind the V-weapons campaign. Rather than use the weapon against troop formations on the various fronts rapidly compressing the territory remaining in German hands, the Third Reich leadership resolved to rely entirely on the psychological effect of the terror bombardment of London and the Home Counties with the objective of forcing the British Government to the negotiating table. An unspoken hope existed that, if that were not to be the case, then perhaps the British Government might in desperation resort to some act so escalating the slaughter of German civilians that Hitler could justifiably respond with his ultimate weapons of terror.

As the bombardment entered its third week the intermittent attacks continued day and night, imposing a severe strain psychologically on the inhabitants of London. The flying bombs had already killed nearly 2,000 Londoners, although this was not a large casualty figure compared with any single great raid on a German city at that time.

By 6 July 1944 the V-1 provoked a response. In a Most Secret minute
¹⁰
to the Chiefs of Staff on that day, Churchill wrote:

“If the bombardment of London really becomes a serious nuisance and great rockets with far-reaching and devastating effect fall on many centres of Government and labour, I should be prepared to do anything that would hit the enemy in a murderous place…. It may be several weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench Germany with poison gas, and if we do it, let us do it 100 per cent …”

The Joint Planning Staff considered the proposal but advised that “if the Allies initiated chemical warfare, the Germans would immediately retaliate both in the field and against the United Kingdom. London would be the primary target and could expect to be attacked by flying bombs filled with gas and by up to 120 long-range bombers carrying chemical payloads.” In the circumstances, the JPS was not prepared to recommend the use of chemical or biological weapons.

Germany had huge stocks of battlefield gases, together with nerve gases which were unique to the Third Reich, but a gas war with the British was not what the V-1 campaign was intended to achieve. The Luftwaffe could have launched a full-scale surprise attack at any time when it happened to suit their purposes. The Army and Luftwaffe had discussed at Münster gas depot the possibility of loading the V-1 with phosgene for use in the event of a gas war and subsequently experiments with a 1-tonne warhead of phosgene were found satisfactory. No tests were carried out with the V-2 but a payload of 2½ tonnes is mentioned in documents. The Germans had at their disposal in the west at least 12,000 tonnes of the nerve gas Tabun and vastly more of the nerve gas Sarin, which is four times more potent. Most of this material was kept in semi-readiness in 250-kg bombs. A Sarin bomb of this size was thought likely to destroy all life within several square kilometres of the exposure point.
¹¹

Over the period from 13 June to 5 September 1944 10,632 V-1 flying bombs were launched from Northern France of which 5,602 (52.7%) exploded in the area intended. Fighters and AA batteries accounted for 3,230 projectiles, collisions with barrage balloons brought down 231 and 1015 were failures.

From 16 September 1944 to 14 January 1945 about 1400 V-1s were fired from the North Sea coast of which 301 (21.5%) found their target area successfully.

During March 1945 a success rate of 47 hits (17%) was achieved with the 275 flying bombs despatched from western Holland.

During the defence of the Rhine in 1944/1945 11,988 V-1s were fired at Antwerp, Brussels and Liège. 2448 hits were obtained (20.4%).

In England the final death toll from the V-1 was put at 6,860 dead and 17,981 injured, Belgium suffered 4,152 dead (3,470 civilians and 682 military). In order to counter the offensive Britain committed eight fighter squadrons, 480 barrage balloons and 438 AA guns at home, while 40% of the RAF bombing effort was diverted to destroying the launching ramps.

The best system of defence involved (i) anti-V1 fighter patrols over the Channel, (ii) massed AA batteries along the coast, (iii) a second line of fighter patrols between the AA guns and London and (iv) a deep concentration of barrage balloons at the approaches to London. The defence expenditure was nearly four times greater than the operational cost of the offensive.
¹²

The main problem for the attackers was to obtain precise information regarding the fall of the projectiles, and attempts were made to improve accuracy by the installation of a remote control gear.

At a meeting in November 1944 at Reichsführer-SS HQ Höhenlychen, Hauptsturmführer Otto Skorzeny argued energetically for the immediate implementation of the V-1 project against New York.
¹³
Himmler promised to speak on the matter to Hitler and Grossadmiral Dönitz remarked, “I see here a new and big chance of bringing about a change in the course of the war.” He could hardly have been speaking of half-a-dozen conventional V-1 flying bombs and must have meant using them with a poison gas payload. According to the German historian Gellermann, in February 1945, after deciding on that course of action as a reprisal for Dresden, Hitler was talked out of the idea by Keitel and Jodl.

The Americans were well informed of these proposals through their Enigma decryption operation and spies and were concerned that even a Type VII U-boat fitted with a hangar on the foredeck could carry four V-1s and launch them with impunity within a few minutes at night or in fog. They need approach no closer than 300 kilometres from the coast.

It was not quite so simple as it seemed, however. By the end of 1944 all Type XIV boats had been sunk and the US offshore anti-submarine defences were such that the Kriegsmarine considered only the new Type XXI
Elektro-boote
capable of carrying out the operation with a prospect of surviving it. Another material drawback was the inaccuracy of the V-1. It was not remote-controlled at that stage and this factor, compounded with the pitch and roll of the boat at launch while firing on a compass bearing at a city 300 kilometres away, made the planners wonder if the target could ever be hit.

In order to overcome these problems a remote control system was tried, a version of the ZSG
Radieschen,
a passive radar which was fitted to the BV 246 glider bomb and homed in on enemy radar and Loran transmitters. This 15 kg target-seeker was found successful. A similar idea was in effect for the A9/10 rocket. The remaining technical problems to be surmounted were the relatively poor quality transmitters available and the need to have somebody put the set in place and turn it on at the right time at the target end. This meant that a number of agents would have to be landed in the United States for the task. A special version of the sea-launched V-1 was ready for use in November 1944
¹⁴
, probably the Fi-103E, but the OKL development contract awarded to the
Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Segelflug
for the V-1
Radieschen,
which resulted in the
Ewald II
homing device and the
Sauerkirsch II
radio remote control system, did not bear fruit until April 1945, by which time hopes for the V-1 campaign were dead.

The V-2

The V-2 was the A-4 giant rocket 14 metres in length, 1.6 metres at the widest point of the fuselage and 3.5 metres across the tail assembly. Takeoff weight was 12 tonnes including a 1-tonne warhead in the nose. The rocket was transported aboard a chassis known as a
Meillerwagen
which was towed by a road or rail locomotive. At the launch point it was raised upright on the detachable starting platform for firing. The fuel was a grain alcohol/liquid oxygen mixture which burned for about a minute before the rocket fell to earth in a ballistic trajectory. Maximum altitude was 80 kilometres and the range was up to 305 kilometres. During powered flight the projectile was remote-controlled from the ground or regulated by an onboard gyro-compass.

The impact of an A-4 was equivalent to fifty 100-ton steam locomotives hitting the ground simultaneously at 70 mph. Even without its warhead the rocket would excavate a crater thirty feet deep and 75 feet in diameter. The London correspondent of a Swedish national daily reported: “I have personally seen great craters made by the V-2. In urban areas a single projectile can ruin 600 houses. It is not the explosion or blast that does the damage, but the tremendous earthquake effect.”

Accuracy was poor, however, and only 50% fell within 10 kilometres of the aiming point.

The V-2 offensive against London opened from The Hague on 8 September 1944, the first missile falling in Chiswick; the last fell on 27 March 1945. The despatch rate began at four per day and climbed to twenty-five units per day. Of 1269 launches against England, 1115 rockets (87%) arrived. The death toll from these was 2724 persons. 1739 A-4 missiles were fired at cities in France, Belgium and Holland, plus ten at Remagen, of which 1265 (73%) arrived, causing 7000 fatalities.