How Hitler Could Have Won World War II (41 page)

p. 179: “to defeat the submarine menace.” Early in 1943 Hitler replaced Erich Raeder with Karl Dönitz, his U-boat expert, as navy chief. A big reason for the Allied shipping losses in 1942 was the disruption of Magic intercepts because of a change in the naval code of German Enigma radio signals early that year. At the beginning of 1943 cryptologists at Bletchley, England, broke the code, but soon the Germans put a new roller in the Enigma machines and another blackout ensued. German naval intelligence had cracked the Allied code, leading to the greatest convoy battle of the war, which commenced on March 16, 1943. The fast convoy HX 229 caught up with the slower convoy SC 122 in the Mid-Atlantic. The two convoys, with nearly a hundred ships, ran into 38 waiting U-boats, which sank 21 freighters totaling 141,000 tons, at the cost of one submarine. This disaster set off extraordinary efforts. At Bletchley, Magic cryptologists broke the new Enigma code, while naval leaders at last solved the problem of the “black pit”— the Atlantic gap 600 miles wide not covered by air patrols that stretched from Greenland to the Azores. Here Dönitz concentrated his submarines, where they attacked convoys as they left air cover and broke off when they regained it. A conference in Washington called by Admiral Ernest J. King ordered escort carriers to shield convoys through the gap and stepped up use of B-24 Liberators to cover the gap from land. These measures, plus vastly improved radar (a 10-centimeter wavelength apparatus that could not be picked up by U-boats), broke the hold of the subs. In May, the Allies sank 41 U-boats, 24 by aircraft. With these catastrophic losses, Dönitz ended convoy battles until scientists could come up with defenses, but no one developed any. Germany had lost the “supply war.” See Dahms, 421–24; Overy, 25–62; Liddell Hart,
Second World War,
370–94.

Chapter 17: Kasserine and the End in Africa

p. 183: “half the strength of the division.” The Allies relied on Ultra intercepts, which seemed to point toward Fondouk, though observers on the spot noticed a German buildup at Faid. The concentration on Fondouk, Omar Bradley wrote, “came to be a near-fatal assumption.” See Bradley and Blair, 127; Bradley, 25.

p. 184: “withdrawal to the Western Dorsals.” Bradley, 25.

p. 184: “some of the supply dumps there.” General Lucian Truscott described Fredendall as “outspoken in his opinions and critical of superiors and subordinates alike. . . . He rarely left his command post . . . yet was impatient with the recommendations of subordinates more familiar with the terrain and other conditions than he was.” Omar Bradley wrote that Fredendall's command post “was an embarrassment to every American soldier: a deep underground shelter dug or blasted by two hundred engineers in an inaccessible canyon far to the rear, near Tebessa. It gave the impression that, for all his bombast and bravado, Fredendall was lacking in personal courage.” See Bradley and Blair, 128.

p. 184: “ ‘uncertainty of command.' ” Liddell Hart,
Second World War,
405.

p. 185: “ ‘small private show of his own.' ” Rommel, 401.

p. 185: “ ‘against the strong enemy reserves.' ” Ibid., 402.

p. 187: “far lower tank losses.” Blumenson,
Patton,
181.

p. 187: “barred his return to Africa.” Rommel, 418–19.

p. 188: “the defeat at Kasserine.” Alexander's most damning indictment of Americans was in a letter to Alan Brooke: “They simply do not know their job as soldiers and this is the case from the highest to the lowest, from the general to the private soldier. Perhaps the weakest link of all is the junior leader who just does not lead, with the result that their men don't really fight.” See Hastings,
Overlord,
25.

p. 188: “attacks eastward, out of the mountains.” Bradley and Blair, 141.

p. 188: “could find to oppose it.” Omar Bradley agreed with Alexander, for he wrote that 2nd Corps “did not possess the force required for so ambitious a mission. Had we overextended ourselves from Gafsa to Gabès, we might have been seriously hurt on the flanks by an Axis counterattack.” He also wrote: “Alexander was right, 2nd Corps was not then ready in any respect to carry out operations beyond feints.” Bradley wrote that Patton and he accepted the corps's limitation “with good grace.” However, a May 1943 German evaluation was much more complimentary. It said Americans had an ability to learn on the battlefield and would develop quickly into worthy opponents. See Bradley, 59–51; Bradley and Blair, 142; Liddell Hart,
Second World War,
413, 415; Doubler, 28. Bradley's timidity shows a dramatic contrast with Rommel. One could scarcely doubt what Rommel would have done if he'd had four times as many men as the enemy placed firmly on the enemy's flank.

p. 189: “turn into a superb field commander.” Bradley and Blair, 98–101, 139; Bradley, 43–45; Blumenson,
Patton,
12, 17.

Chapter 18: The Invasion of Sicily

p. 195: “cross-Channel invasion.” Kimball, 214.

p. 196: “commanders in the Mediterranean.” Churchill,
Second World War, Hinge of
Fate,
812–31.

p. 196: “ ‘the Messina bottleneck first.' ” Bradley and Blair, 162–63.

p. 197: “ ‘an overwhelming victory.' ” Ibid., 162; Liddell Hart,
Second World War,
446.

p. 197: “the Allies invaded Sardinia.” Liddell Hart,
Second World War,
437–38.

p. 199: “ ‘surrenders were frequent.' ” Ibid., 442.

p. 200: “ ‘on that goddamn beach.' ” Kimball, 226. Churchill went ahead with a British-only effort to seize the Dodecanese Islands. The Germans beat the British to the islands, and the British failed badly, losing 4,500 men, 21 warships, and 113 aircraft. See ibid., 226–27; Michael W. Parish, Aegean Adventures
1940–1943 and the End of Churchill's Dream
(Sussex, England: The Book Guild, 1993).

p. 201: “Badoglio announced surrender.” Liddell Hart,
The Other Side of the Hill,
356–57.

p. 203: “delivered him from disgrace.” Blumenson,
Patton,
209–18; Eisenhower, 179–83; Bradley, 160–62, 229; Bradley and Blair, 195–98, 201–2, 206–7, 218.

Chapter 19: The Citadel Disaster

p. 204: “and fighting troops.” Manstein, 443.

p. 204: “ ‘strongest fortress in the world.' ” Mellenthin, 217.

p. 204: “mobilizing millions more.” Dahms, 439–40.

p. 205: “ ‘begging to be sliced off.' ” Manstein, 445.

p. 205: “ ‘on the Black Sea.' ” Ibid., 446.

p. 205: “they needed to prepare.” The original Tiger was a 56-ton machine mounting a high-velocity 88-millimeter cannon and 100 millimeters of armor, with a range of 87 miles. The 1944 model was several tons heavier with a slighter, longer range and shell-deflecting sloped sides on the turret like the Russian T-34. The Panther was first used in the Kursk battle. It was six tons lighter than the Tiger. It originally mounted an 88-millimeter gun, but later a 75-millimeter high-velocity cannon. Its range was 124 miles and it had 110-millimeter turret armor and 80-millimeter hull armor. Both were formidable weapons, and the Tiger was the best tank to come out of World War II.

p. 207: “ ‘my stomach turns over.' ” Guderian, 306–9.

p. 207: “and 5,100 tanks.” Dahms, 442.

p. 208: “SS Panzer Corps.” The SS (
Schutzstaffel,
or protective staff) began in 1925 as Hitler's bodyguard, and under Heinrich Himmler expanded into many fields: intelligence (
Sicherheitsdienst
or SD); concentration camp guards; police, including the
Geheime Staatspolizei
(Gestapo or secret police); rulers of occupied territories; and the Waffen-SS or armed SS, which totaled 50,000 men in 1939 and 910,000 in 39 divisions in autumn 1944. SS divisions and corps were integrated into the
Wehrmacht
chain of command, and were generally directed by senior army generals. The Waffen-SS originally required volunteers to be of racially “pure Aryan” stock, but this provision disappeared in the late stages of the war. Although Waffen-SS units developed into effective fighting organizations, they were responsible for many atrocities, and were known for routine brutality. See Zabecki, vol. 1, 759–63 (Jon Moulton); 782–84 (Samuel J. Doss).

p. 209: “losses were often heavy.” Mellenthin, 230–31. After Citadel, the Germans abandoned the
Panzerkeil
for the
Panzerglocke,
or tank bell. Superheavy tanks went to the center of the bell, medium tanks left and right, and light tanks behind ready for pursuit. The commander traveled behind the leading medium tanks, in radio contact with fighter-bombers, while engineers in armored vehicles just behind forward tanks were ready to clear gaps through minefields.

p. 209: “ ‘quail-shooting with cannons.' ” Guderian, 311. At a demonstration on March 19, 1943, Guderian discovered the fatal flaw in Porsche's Tigers, but since Hitler was enthusiastic, Guderian had to use them. At this same event, Hitler and Guderian saw new armor plate “aprons” for the Mark III and IV panzers. These aprons or skirts hung loose about the flanks and rear of the tanks to cause antitank shells to detonate prematurely and not penetrate the main tank armor. The innovation was highly effective, leading the Russians to produce larger, high-velocity antitank guns and main tank guns. The T-34 gun was raised from 76 millimeters to 85 millimeters. See ibid.; Glanz and House, 162. p. 212: “the size of its own.” Manstein, 457.

Chapter 20: The Assault on Italy

p. 214: “Rome into Allied hands.” Liddell Hart,
Other Side of the Hill,
361–65.

p. 215: “forty self-propelled assault guns.” Mark Clark in his memoirs,
Calculated Risk,
wrote the Germans probably had “about six hundred tanks at Salerno.” See Clark, 199.

p. 218: “ ‘obtain tactical surprise.' ” Linklater, 63.

p. 219: “ready to evacuate 6th Corps.” Cunningham, 569; Liddell Hart,
Second World
War,
463.

p. 221: “with John P. Lucas.” Eisenhower, 188.

p. 221: “obvious a place of landing.” Liddell Hart,
Second World War,
469.

p. 223: “attacks on enemy positions.” Doubler, 13–21.

p. 225: “ ‘tactical move of my opponent.' ” Liddell Hart,
Other Side of the Hill,
364.

p. 227: “ ‘was a stranded whale.' ” Churchill,
Second World War, Closing the Ring.
488.

p. 228: “attack on Cassino had failed.” Ibid., 500.

p. 229: “ ‘hours of such terrific hammering.' ” Ibid., 506.

p. 230: “ ‘have been disastrous.' ” Ibid., 429.

Chapter 21: Normandy

p. 233: “ ‘once it had been recognized.' ” Guderian, 328.

p. 233: “the other south of Paris.” An eleventh division, 19th Panzer, was in southern Holland and would not be used unless the Allies invaded the Low Countries.

p. 234: “ ‘at any other point.' ” Guderian, 329.

p. 234: “ ‘handling large ships.' ” Ibid., 331; Rommel, 453. Another factor pointed to the Pas de Calais: Hitler's new revenge weapons, the V-1 unmanned jet bombers or cruise missiles, and the V-2 rocket-propelled ballistic missiles, were coming on line. The Allies were aware of them, and knew, because their range was limited, they had to be launched from around the Pas de Calais. The Germans believed the Allies would invade there to knock out the launch sites as quickly as possible.

p. 234: “commander of the Panzer Lehr Division.” Rommel, 468.

p. 235: “extended to Normandy.” Ibid., 454.

p. 237: “along the Norman coast.” Liddell Hart,
Other Side of the Hill,
391–92; Shulman, 112.

p. 237: “further disorder and war.” Kimball, 238.

p. 238: “ ‘going to command Overlord.' ” Eisenhower, 207.

p. 238: “ ‘his difficult subordinates.' ” Hastings,
Overlord,
29.

p. 239: “an American company's 21,000.” Ibid., 34–35, 46.

p. 239: “work began apace.” Churchill,
Second World War, Closing the Ring,
72–76, 586–87; Eisenhower, 234–35.

p. 240: “especially the Pas de Calais.” Eisenhower, 221–23, 225–29, 232–33; Bradley and Blair, 229–30.

p. 240: “fighters, now being introduced.” Liddell Hart,
Second World War,
606–12.

p. 241: “in the west—inevitable.” D'Este, 76.

p. 241: “upon weather forecasts.” Eisenhower, 239.

p. 242: “assault ever attempted.” Ibid., 249.

p. 249: “among them three sets of brothers.” Man, 46–48.

p. 250: “ ‘and burn furiously.' ” Ibid., 52–54.

p. 250: “ ‘get the hell out of here.' ” Bradley and Blair, 251.

p. 251: “were at last released.” Liddell Hart,
Other Side of the Hill,
405; Rommel, 474.

p. 253: “by all its formations.” Rommel, 483; D'Este, 148, 162–63.

p. 253: “ballistic missiles.” The V-1 had a range of 140 miles, a speed of 350 mph, an 1,800-pound warhead, and was accurate only within an eight-mile radius. Although the Germans launched 9,200 against England, antiaircraft fire and fighters destroyed 4,600. The V-2 had a range of 200 miles, a 2,200-pound warhead, and was less accurate than the V-1. However, it flew at 2,200 mph, beyond the speed of sound, and gave no warning. The Germans fired 1,300 V-2s against thirteen British cities. Later the Germans fired V-1s and V-2s against targets on the continent. The V-1s killed a total of 7,800 people and injured 44,400. The V-2s killed 4,100 and injured 8,400. See Zabecki, vol. 2, 1054–57 (Jonathan B. A. Bailey and Robert G. Waite).

p. 253: “wholly defensive operation.” Rommel, 474–78.

Chapter 22: The Liberation of France

p. 254: “talk with the Fuehrer.” Rommel, 479–80.

p. 254: “most of them ill-trained.” Guderian, 334.