Authors: Tobias Smollett
Humphry Clinker (5 page)
A person, seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity⦠To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing
Christian.
This idea, that scepticism, by undermining the pretensions of reason, makes it possible for us to accept religious revelation by faith alone, has a long intellectual history. It would be perfectly familiar to Hume, not least from the writings of Pierre Bayle (1647â1706). But there is no doubt that Hume himself had no such tendency.
At the end of the
Dialogues
, Pamphilus judges that Cleanthes' principles are nearer to the truth than the others. This, too, is no guide to Hume's opinion. It echoes the ending of
De Natura Deorum
, where Cicero claims to have found that the theology proposed by the Stoic speaker âapproximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth' than the scepticism of the Academic spokesman. Since Cicero is identified in that work as one of the âdisciples of Philo, and have learned from him to know nothing', Hume is using the rhetorical device learned from his classical model. His intention in using the dialogue form is to avoid a direct statement of his position. He could well have had in mind Cicero again:
Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their. own judgementâ¦
Additionally, the dialogue form enables Hume to practise the sceptical technique of balancing opposing arguments. According
to his own theory of the nature of belief, this leads to a state of equilibrium, freeing the mind from dogmatism. This is illustrated most dramatically in
Part XII
, where Philo suggests that the end result of the discussion is a verdict so meagre in its content that whether we regard it as favouring theism or not is a purely verbal matter. But it is crucial, in Hume's eyes, that this minimal conclusion â
that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence
â is strictly a philosophical conclusion. It belongs to what Philo calls âthe philosophical and rational kind' of religion, and, as such, has no practical consequences whatever for how we ought to live our lives. And, of course, no sane man will think it worth the spilling of a single drop of blood. Hume consistently argued that where men and women hold religious beliefs as certain truths, regard all who do not share them as in error and seek to enforce religious practices, the consequences are always pernicious. But a purely theoretical examination of natural religion is, by its very inability to achieve results of any consequence, itself an antidote to the dogmatism and passion of popular religion. As Hume made his final revisions of the text of the
Dialogues
in the last months of his life, his judgement on the relation between religious conviction and philosophical investigation remained the same as it had been when he wrote the
Treatise
forty years earlier:
For as superstition arises naturally and easily from the popular opinions of mankind, it seizes more strongly on the mind, and is often able to disturb us in the conduct of our lives and actions. Philosophy on the contrary, if just, can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments; and if false and extravagant, its opinions are merely the objects of a cold and general speculation, and seldom go so far as to interrupt the course of our natural propensities⦠Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.
22
(Further bibliographical details are given in the Select Bibliography, page
152
.
1
. (
p. 1
) Quoted in Kemp Smith,
Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
, Appendix A.
2
. (
p. 5
) See E. C. Mossner,
The Life of David Hume
, Chapter 33.
3
. (
p. 5
) âHume and the Legacy of the Dialogues' in G. P. Morice (ed.),
David Hume: Bicentenary Papers
(Edinburgh, 1977), p. 2. For Mossner's biography of Hume, see preceding note. Details of the work by Berkeley, and of Mossner's edition of the
Treatise
, are given in the Select Bibliography. All references of the form âT.
n
' are to page
n
of the Penguin Classics edition of the
Treatise.
4
. (
p. 8
)
The Natural History of Religion
, Section II.
5
. (
p. 8
) Ibid., Section III.
6
. (
p. 9
) âOf Superstition and Enthusiasm' in
Essays: Moral; Political and Literary.
7
. (
p. 10
) âThere is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different.' T. 135.
8
. (
p. 11
)
Treatise
, Book I,
Part III
, Section I, âOf knowledge', Section II, âOf probability; and of the idea of cause and effect'.
9
. (
p. 11
) In Hume's writings, including the
Dialogues
, the word âpretend' is commonly used to mean âpropose', âclaim', âoffer for consideration'.
10
. (
p. 11
) T.43.
11
. (
p. 11
) In a letter of 1737, Hume advised a friend to read works by Malebranche, Berkeley, Pierre Bayle (1647â1706) and Descartes, which âwill make you easily comprehend the metaphysical parts of my reasoning'. The letter does not mention Locke, but there is ample evidence of his influence on the
Treatise.
For the provenance of the letter and details of its publication, see R. H. Popkin,
The High Road to Pyrrhonism
(San Diego, 1980), p. 290. Modern editions of the works mentioned by Hume are listed in the Select Bibliography.
12
. (
p. 12
) T.243.
13
. (
p. 12
) See below,
Part II
, pp. 53.
14
. (
p. 14
)
Treatise
, Book I,
Part III
, Section VI, âOf the inference from the impression to the idea'.
15
. (
p. 14
) T.228.
16
. (
p. 15
) T.42.
17
. (
p. 15
)
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
, Section XII,
Part III
.
18
. (
p. 19
) T.142.
19
. (
p. 20
) See the Introduction by M. A. Screech to Michel de Montaigne,
An Apology for Raymond Sebond
(Penguin Classics, 1987), p. xv.
20
. (
p. 26
) T.234.
21
. (
p. 28
)
R. H. Hurlbutt, âDavid Hume and Scientific Theism',
Journal of the History of Ideas
, 17,1956, pp. 486-97.
22
. (
p. 30
) T.319.
THE present text is based on Hume's manuscript, with some modernization. In most instances where Hume uses an initial capital for a substantive, this text employs lower case; but there are exceptions, such as âGod'. Abbreviated forms such as âtho' and âconvey'd' have been expanded: âthough', âconveyed'. Spelling has been modernized; but for the most part Hume's punctuation is retained, since changes might affect the meaning.
Hume's own notes are signalled in the text by asterisks, and appear at the foot of the page. Editorial notes are signalled by superscript numerals, and are together after the text.
I am grateful to the Council of the Royal Society of Edinburgh for permission to use the manuscript, and to the staff of the National Library of Scotland for their help, and for making photocopies of the manuscript and of the so-called Second Edition, London, 1779.
DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION
TO
HERMIPPUS
IT
has been remarked, my
Hermippus
, that, though the ancient philosophers conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this method of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom succeeded in the hands of those, who have attempted it. Accurate and regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point, at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce the proofs, on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in conversation scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of
author
and
reader
, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the image of
pedagogue
and
pupil
. Or if he carries on the dispute in the natural spirit of good-company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and preserving a proper balance among the speakers; he often loses so much time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them.
There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue writing is peculiarly adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method of composition.
Any point of doctrine, which is so
obvious
, that it scarcely admits of dispute, but at the same time so
important
, that it cannot be too often inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the novelty of the manner may
compensate the triteness of the subject, where the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept, and where the variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may appear neither tedious nor redundant.
Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so
obscure
and
uncertain
, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all; seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive: Opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement: And if the subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, into company, and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life, study and society.
Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of
NATURAL RELIGION
. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the
being
of a God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle, which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations? But in treating of this obvious and important truth; what obscure questions occur, concerning the
nature
of that divine being; his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? These have been always subjected to the disputations of men: Concerning these, human reason has not reached any certain determination: But these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction have, as yet, been the result of our most accurate researches.
This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of the summer season with
CLEANTHES
, and was present at those conversations of his with PHILO and DEMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must of necessity enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and display those various systems,
which they advanced with regard to so delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast in their characters still further raised your expectations; while you opposed the accurate philosophical turn of
Cleanthes
to the careless scepticism of
Philo
, or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of
Demea
. My youth rendered me a mere auditor of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any considerable part of them in the recital.
