Humphry Clinker (3 page)
Authors: Tobias Smollett
As we have seen, Hume intended his theory of human nature to provide a foundation for other sciences:
Even
Mathematics, Natural Philosophy
, and
Natural Religion
, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN;⦠'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings.
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His account of the âoperation' of probable reasoning should, therefore, contribute to âchanges and improvements' in natural science and natural religion. The theory as summarized above applies initially to those inferences we make from causes and effects in everyday life, and these are characteristically immediate and unreflective. When I see the child put her hand in the fire, I infer at once that she will be burned. Although the inference arises from my past experience of the effects of fire, I do not even call this experience to mind. Hume recognizes, however, that we also make inferences of a more reflective nature. For example, when our experience is limited in extent, we proceed with more caution. We try to review what experience suggests. We begin to form what he calls âgeneral rules' to guide our more reflective reasonings. These form the basis of the even more elaborately reflective methodological principles of the natural scientist. One thing we then do is deliberately to seek experience of the conjunctions of phenomena, in experimentation. What the theory of human nature should do is enable us to recognize that the basis of a proper methodology, in any science, should be the natural workings of the human mind. That follows from the discovery that all reasoning is, in essence, a kind of natural instinct. In realizing this, we see what we can hope to achieve in any area. For example, we realize that we simply
cannot
discover natural laws in science by
a priori
reasoning. We understand that âphilosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected.'
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As any natural theologian must, each character in the
Dialogues
assumes an epistemology. An epistemology not grounded
in the theory of human nature is, for Hume, mistaken in itself, and therefore incapable of supporting conclusions in natural theology. Although both Demea and Cleanthes are made to employ principles drawn from Hume's own theory in criticism of the other speakers, Philo's methods of reasoning are the closest of the three to Hume's. By skilfully putting themes from his own philosophy into the mouths of his characters, and equally by having them also represent other types of philosophy opposed to his own, Hume aims to achieve the âchanges and improvements' which he considers so desirable in natural religion. He considers it especially desirable that his theory of human nature is applied to natural religion because the subject is not purely theoretical, but has a practical relation to how we should live.
In
Part II
, Cleanthes proposes a version of the Design Argument. He says that the argument is
a posteriori
, that is, from matters of fact established by experience, and that it is the only argument needed to prove both âthe existence of a deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence'. An analogy can be seen between the structure of the world, and machines. The world resembles âone great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines'. As in a machine, the parts are âadjusted to each other' with astonishing accuracy. In the case of machines, we know that the adjustment of parts to each other, and the âadapting of means to ends', are caused by âhuman design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence'. Since the ordered structure of a machine resembles the ordered structure of the world, and that of a machine is caused by intelligent design, we may infer âby all the rules of analogy' that the cause of the ordered structure of the world is also intelligent design. As the structure of the world so much surpasses that of a machine, so, by analogy, the mind of the author of nature surpasses that of a man. He is proved to be âsomewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed'.
In giving this argument, Cleanthes has claimed to be inferring a cause from an effect, and to be arguing analogically. But he has not, of course, given any detailed account of these principles of
reasoning. By the device of having Philo suggest that Demea's vehement objection to the argument arises in part from his failing to see its logical structure, Hume introduces some of his own theory of such reasoning through Philo's ârestatement' of it. Philo paraphrases Hume to establish that âexperience alone can point out to [anyone] the true cause of any phenomenon'. It follows that whether or not such phenomena as âorder, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes' are caused by design is something which can be established only by experience. If we consider only what is
a priori
conceivable, then it could be that the material world has a cause of its order inherent within it. Subtly, Philo brings out that Cleanthes must be assuming that the ideas in God's mind cause order in the world by themselves being ordered and structured, and similarly the ideas in the mind of a human being who makes a watch or a house âarrange themselves so as to form the plan'. So Cleanthes is committed to the possibility of
some
things being inherently ordered.
A priori
, it could be matter as much as mind which has a cause of order inherent in it. So Cleanthes is claiming that it is from experience that we know that matter is not, but mind is, inherently ordered. Philo implies that all of this is already tacitly contained in Cleanthes' initial argument. By thus ârestating' it in terms of Hume's philosophy, Philo in fact identifies some of the weak points in it. But Cleanthes is invited to confirm that Philo has âmade a fair representation of it', and does so.
Throughout
Part II
Philo raises a series of difficulties with Cleanthes' method of argument, some of which are explored further in other parts. He objects, for example, that the analogy between the world and a machine is not close enough to permit the inference to design in the case of the world to be anything more than a conjecture. He points out that we know that design is a cause of order only in human activities, and these are a tiny part of the universe. Can we make such a small part a rule for the whole? He suggests that since the universe taken as a whole is a special, unique case, we simply have no relevant experience at all from which we could infer its cause. For himself, he says, so far as reason goes, he is content to say that he does not know
what is the cause of the ordered, structured and purposeful world.
Hume's introduction of his own epistemology into the
Dialogues
as a critical weapon can be seen also in the case of Demea. From
Part II
to
Part VIII
, Cleanthes' design argument is thoroughly examined. As a result, it appears full of difficulties, and open to many doubts. Demea thinks such an argument, which Cleanthes asserted to be the only possible way to establish results in natural theology, is wholly inadequate as a basis for religious belief. In its place, he offers a âsimple and sublime argument
a priori'
which will be âinfallible'. This is a version of what is known as the cosmological argument. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason for its existence. In considering the series of causes of things, we must either think of this as going on in infinite succession, or we must think that there is an ultimate cause whose existence is
necessary.
But there cannot be an infinite series of things each of which is caused to exist by its predecessor and causes its successor to exist. For, if we consider the infinite series as a whole, it too must have a cause for its existence. (There could have been nothing at all rather than the whole infinite series.)
Ex hypothesi
there is no external cause for the whole infinite series. Nothing which is a member of the series can cause the whole. Consequently, it has no cause for its existence, which contradicts the premiss that whatever exists has a cause for its existence. âWe must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent being who carries the
reason
of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction.'
This time it is Cleanthes who refutes the argument, employing Hume's principles. The essence of the refutation rests on the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact. Whether or not something exists is a matter of fact. Anything which is provable
a priori
is such that its negation is inconceivable. But whatever we think of as existing, we can equally think of as not existing. Therefore, there is nothing whose non-existence is inconceivable, and so nothing whose existence can be proved
a priori.
In fact, âthe words⦠“necessary existence” have
no meaning'. What Cleanthes says here is derived from Book I,
Part III
, Section VII of the
Treatise.
There Hume says:
âTis evident⦠that the idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that when after the simple conception of any thing we wou'd conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the existence, which we attribute to him, conceiv'd by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them.
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When we form the idea that 16 is the square of 4, we have a complex idea which contains the component ideas of 16 and the square of 4. By reflecting on this complex idea, we see that the components must stand in the relation they do. But, if Hume is right about existence, when we think of something, and when we think of it as existing, there is no additional component idea of existence which is related to the idea of the thing. Consequently, it cannot be that by reflection we see that the idea of existence
must
be connected with the idea of the thing, because there is no separable idea of existence. Hence the words ânecessary existence' cannot stand for an idea. They have no meaning. Whether or not something exists is a matter of whether there is in reality anything corresponding to our idea; it is not a matter of what the
content of our idea
is.
The design argument given by Cleanthes is supposed to establish the existence of God, and something of his nature â that he possesses great wisdom, for example. The
a priori
argument given by Demea is also intended to prove the existence of a deity. But at the beginning of the
Dialogues
it is said that the existence of God is not in question; what will be discussed is the divine attributes, the nature of God. However, that there is no dispute about the existence of God is asserted initially by Pamphilus. Although all three characters are prepared to say that there is a God, they are not agreed about either what this means or whether it can be established by reason. Given Hume's view about existence, one
could not believe that God exists without having an idea of God. So the distinction between questions about the existence and questions about the nature of God is shaky. Cleanthes holds that the design argument establishes similarity between God and human minds. This is attacked by both Philo and Demea. Demea's objection is that God is transcendent; he is beyond our comprehension. God's nature is a religious mystery. But, he says, the method of reasoning employed by Cleanthes suggests that we can understand the nature of God as analogous to our own. From his first statement of this position, in
Part II
, Demea expresses his position in religious rather than philosophical language:
Finite, weak, and blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence, and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite perfections which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.
He goes on to quote from Malebranche's
De la recherche de la vérité (The Search after Truth
, 1674â5), in order to suggest that there is here harmony between reason and faith. This allows Hume to introduce into the
Dialogues
the notion of
anthropomorphism
, that is, the attribution to God of human characteristics. Philo and Demea then can use this term to summarize their criticism of Cleanthes. Demea regards the anthropomorphic notion of God generated by the design argument as not a proper object of religious devotion. In
Part III
, Cleanthes tries to support his argument with thought experiments â the examples of âan articulate voice⦠heard in the clouds', and of a library of books which are ânatural volumes', not produced by mankind, but reproducing themselves âin the same manner with animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation'. If there were such phenomena, he says, it would be absurd not to infer that they were the product of intelligence and design, for they would contain intelligible messages. He then draws an analogy with the actual structure of nature. (The idea of nature as a book, in which we can read the message of divine purpose, is an ancient one; it is found, for example, in the
Natural Theology
of Raymond Sebond, written around 1430.
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) Demea objects that in reading a book we
enter into the mind of the author, but we cannot enter into the mind of God. âHis ways are not our ways.' Besides, he says, the human mind, both in its
sentiments
and its
ideas
is wholly unlike the divine mind. Human sentiments, such as gratitude, love, pity, etc., âhave a plain reference to the state and situation of man'. And human thought is âfluctuating, uncertain, fleeting, successive, and compounded'. But the God of faith cannot be thought to have sentiments or thoughts as we do.
In the main, however, it is left to Philo to develop the criticism of anthropomorphism. In
Part V
, he emphasizes that, insofar as Cleanthes is arguing from analogy, his conclusion will be better supported the more similar the inferred cause (of the order in nature) is to the known cause (of the order in machines). Thus the logic of Cleanthes' position pushes him into a more and more anthropomorphic conception of the mind of God. Cleanthes agrees with Philo that, for his argument, comparing divine and human intelligence, âthe liker the better'.
Philo exploits this in a series of arguments. He shows that the argument from analogy cannot establish any of God's attributes to be infinite, for âthe cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect'. Again, if we knew
a priori
that God is a perfect being, the imperfection in nature could be said to appear an objection only because of our limited understanding. (In
Part X
Demea expresses his faith that the wickedness and misery of mankind will at last be seen âin some future period of existence' not to be inconsistent with divine power and benevolence. Cleanthes regards this as âbuilding entirely in the air'.) But if we are arguing
a posteriori
, then âthese difficulties become all real'. Furthermore, even if nature were perfect, the analogy with human design could suggest that the product results from trial and error: âMany worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out.' Again, arguing from analogy cannot establish the unity of God. It would be even more analogous to human creation to suppose that so great a creation as the universe required the cooperation of a number of deities.
While Philo and Demea seek to make evident the incompatibility of Cleanthes' anthropomorphism with the religious idea of a
single, transcendent, infinitely perfect God, Cleanthes attacks the idea that God's nature is incomprehensible as âmysticism'. At the beginning of
Part IV
he asks how the thesis that the nature of God is incomprehensible differs from the view of âsceptics or atheists' that the first cause is unknown. Similarly, in
Part XI
, he says that âif we abandon all human analogy⦠I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration.' Cleanthes is here as before depending on the empiricist account of the origin of ideas: that all our ideas must be derived from experience. Although Demea and Philo are initially made to appear in agreement, Demea is affronted by Philo's radical scepticism. Philo is concerned above all to establish a negative conclusion, that argument from analogy cannot yield the traditional view. Their divergence, hinted early in the
Dialogues
, becomes most apparent in Parts X and XI, which deal with the problem of evil.
Demea and Philo combine to paint a powerful picture of moral and natural evil. But Demea and not Philo thinks that in some way the imperfections of nature support religious belief. His attempt at arguing
a priori
having proved a failure, he now suggests:
