Implosion (60 page)

Other points of potential conflict are developing over China’s ‘hydro-hegemony’ which could affect one-third of India’s yearly water supply that comes from Tibet. Chellaney says that ‘in contrast to the bilateral water treaties between many of its neighbours, China rejects the concept of a water-sharing arrangement or joint, rules-based management of common resources’.
⁵¹
There is a large-scale dam building programme on international rivers originating on China’s Tibetan plateau and flowing to southern and southeastern Asia, including the mighty Brahmaputra river which India relies on for its water. China, however, has not been consulting India and has not given details of its plans as requested by India.

There was a sudden worsening of relations in April 2013 when 30 PLA troops not only crossed the LAC and moved 19 km inside what India regarded as its territory on the 16,000ft-high Depsang Plain in the Ladakh sector of the disputed border. This was in the no-man’s land, or the red zone as it is called, which is the overlapping area between the two countries’ perception of their territory. It is quite common for troops from both sides to cross into this area and then withdraw, but on this occasion the Chinese pitched tents and stayed. A procedure agreed in 2005 for solving such a face-off was not operated by China so, after some characteristically nervous indecision and delay, India reacted to heavy domestic political and media pressure and moved its troops and tents into the disputed area in a face-off with the Chinese. India also strengthened its previously soft diplomatic stance. After three weeks, both sides removed their troops and withdrew from Depsang, but the terms of the truce were not revealed.
⁵²
This confrontation was totally unexpected in Delhi, especially coming soon after China’s new president, Xi Jinping, had put forward five proposals for improving ties and said that ‘peace and tranquillity’ should be maintained on the border in order to help solve the border issue, a task that ‘won’t be easy’.
⁵³

India avoided condemning China for the incursion because it did not want to upset the visit to Delhi a month later by China’s new premier, Li Keqiang. Though the visit was a presentational success, no firm commitments were made by either side. He repeated China’s usual line about the border issue being ‘a question left over by history’ but added that the two sides had ‘agreed to push forward with negotiations’, which contrasted sharply with the line taken by Wen and most Chinese leaders in recent years.
⁵⁴

That apparent change of mood was the most notable point to emerge from the visit, especially coming at the start of the ten-year term in office of the new leadership, but it prompted questions about China’s motives. Did it really want to solve disagreements over the border, which seemed unlikely, or did it have other aims? It was certainly teasing the US – Li quoted a Chinese proverb that ‘a distant relative may not be as useful as a near neighbour,’ appearing to be trying (fruitlessly of course) to wean India away from America. Or it could have decided that it had sent the wrong signals with the recent border row, and that it should not fall out with its biggest neighbour at the same time as it was aggressively confronting Japan and the Philippines.

Problems over the border, and over China possibly blocking India’s river waters with new upstream dams, had been dodged during Li’s visit by talking about mechanisms rather than potentially more controversial substance. That fitted with India’s traditionally low-key approach to foreign diplomacy everywhere, and of course played into China’s hands. It also fitted with what C. Raja Mohan describes despairingly as India’s ‘ideological romanticism and political timidity’ and ‘relentless mystification of Chinese policies’.
⁵⁵
It remained to be seen whether India would push for real movement, not just presentational mechanisms, and whether China would be willing to respond. Manmohan Singh visited Beijing a few months later and signed a border defence co-operation agreement aimed at preventing upsets with regular exchanges of information, and China agreed to share hydrological data. These were small steps of debatable signig cance.
⁵⁶

It looks as though this uncertain see-saw relationship will continue indefinitely, certainly so long as both countries are preoccupied with their internal economic development and growth, and consequently have neither the time nor inclination to interfere extensively in each other’s affairs. There are, however, two problems with this approach, and India does not seem to be prepared for either because – chalta hai – it has no apparent overall plan for its dealings with China on a range of issues from infrastructure investment and corporate loans to border and river water issues.

First, what will China do when it has achieved what Deng Xiaoping described as its first priority of achieving an ‘orderly rise’ in economic and development terms? Deng is reported to have said – and India agrees – that modernization needed ‘two prerequisites – one is international peace, and the other is domestic political stability’.
⁵⁷
When the development goals have been achieved, will globalization have developed so far that China continues with that orderly rise, or will it then want to settle scores with its neighbours? The second problem is that likely differences over international oil and gas rights, access to sea-lanes and river waters, and maybe other issues could be seen by China as affecting its orderly economic development and modernization, and could therefore upset the equilibrium. Already there are the signs that it is moving on from another Deng dictum – ‘hiding strengths and biding time’ – and will be asserting itself internationally.

There is nothing to suggest that the border issue, which lies at the heart of the current differences, will be resolved any time soon. China will want to keep India on edge on the mountain peaks and passes, and it will also continue to develop close economic and defence relations in the neighbourhood. The best solution for India would be to keep talking with Beijing without expecting any agreements, while also strengthening border defences, improving liaison with Japan and other Asian countries, and watching out for King Goujian mustering his armies.

Notes

1
.   ‘Chinese PM Wen Jiabao begins bumper Indian trade trip’
–
useful background here:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11997221

2
.   
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/china-and-india-quarrel-despite-16bn-economic-carrots/

3
.   China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, Wen Jiabao Addresses the Indian Council of World Affairs,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wenjiabaofangwenyinduhebjst/t779524.htm

4
.   ‘Wen: Patience needed to resolve boundary question’, Xinhua News Agency,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010wenindia/2010-12/16/content_11714501.htm

5
.   Website of the Embassy of the Republic of India in Beijing, China,
http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId= 3&SubMenuId=0

6
.   Jagat Mehta, speaking in Delhi at the launch of his book
The Tryst Betrayed
, Penguin Viking, 2010

7
.   B.G. Verghese, ‘The War We Lost’,
Tehelka,
13 October 2012,
http://www. tehelka.com/the-war-we-lost/
; Verghese writes that Nehru said this to India’s new ambassador to China, G. Parthasarathi (according to Parthasarathi’s son Ashok), on 18 March 1958 prior to his departure for Peking

8
.   Ajai Shukla, ‘The LAC is not the LOC’,
Business Standard
, 19 September 2012,
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinionajai-shukla-the-lac-is-not-the-loc-112091800050_1.html
, and
Broadsword
blog
http://www.ajaishukla.blogspot.in/

9
.   Adam Roberts of
The Economist
graphically described a visit to the area in October 2012 on the magazine’s ‘Banyan’ blog –
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/10/indias-remote-north-east

10
. Brahma Chellaney, ‘The Lessons of the China-India War’, 14 October 2012,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-china-india-tensions-are-growing-by-brahma-chellaney# 2lvQQFMAHUiTL1VW.99

11
. Ibid.

12
. As recounted by Brajesh Mishra to JE, August 2009

13
. 13. Ibid

14
. 14. Mani Shankar Aiyar, ‘India’s foreign policy – from Jawaharlal Nehru to Manmohan Singh’, Australia-India Institute, University of Melbourne, 22 September 2011

15
. 15. Nicholas Nugent,
Rajiv Gandhi Son of a Dynasty
, BBC Books 1990, UBS Delhi 1991

16
. Conversation with JE

17
. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, office of the Secretary of Defense,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_ FINAL.pdf

18
. ‘Can Pakistan survive without US aidfi’,
Dawn
, 15 February 2012,
http://www.dawn.com/2012/02/15/can-pakistan-survive-without-us-aid/
; this article quotes a
Guardian
(UK) newspaper report
http://www. www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan
– on six decades of US aid to Pakistan compiled by Wren Elhai of the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. Since 1948, US assistance to Pakistan had largely been for civilian purposes – out of $61.7bn total assistance 19482010 (in constant 2009 dollars), $40.4bn was economic and $21.3bn military.

19
. ‘Wiki: China helping Pak upgrade its missiles’,
Indian Express
, 12 September 2011,
https://www.google.co.in/search?q=Wiki%3A+China+helping+Pak+upgrade+its+missiles&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-GB:official&client=firefox-a

20
. ‘Break India, says China think-tank’, TNN, 12 August 2009,
http://www.articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-12/india/28195335_1_dai-bingguo-state-councillor-chinese-website
– Chinese website www.iiss.cn now not accessible on internet

21
.
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2009/08/13/china-aims-to-block-india%E2%80%99s-place-in-the-sun/

22
.
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/03/21/china-out-guns-the-us-in-friendliness-at-a-delhi-conference/

23
.
http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_deluded-india-stands-no-chance-in-arms-race-china-s-reaction-to-agni-v_1677979

24
. Kanwal Sibal, ‘Bested by China’s strategy’,
Mail Today,
11 December 2012

25
. ‘Fear of influence’
– Financial Times
article with interactive map of ‘string of pearls’ published 2009 (so lacking later information)
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/84a13062-6f0c-11de-9109-00144feabdc0. html#axzz26ibsc8AR

26
. ‘NIA chargesheet: NSCN got arms from Chinese firms’,
Indian Express
, 1 April 2012,
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/nia-chargesheet-nscn-got-arms-from-chinese-firms/770069

27
. ‘Untangling the GMR-Male row: Timeline of incidents that lead to the scrapping of the $500 million airport development deal’,
Business Standard
, 16 December 2012,
http://www.business-standard. com/article/current-affairs/special-untangling-the-gmr-male-row-112121600022_1.html

28
. ‘An insensitive political class: Public anger at the decline of governance’, G. Parthasarathy,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20130116/edit.htm#4

29
.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/27/us-srilanka-china-highway-idUSBRE99Q06G20131027
and
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Sri-Lanka%E2%80%99s-inaugurates-second-highway,-%27made-in-China-%27-29389.html

30
.
http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_-_Sri_Lanka_ Relations.pdf

31
. JE, ‘The Modern Path to Enlightenment’,
Financial Times
, 2 May 1987

32
. Govinda Riza, ‘Bhutan-China Border Mismatch’, Bhutan News Service, 1 January 2013,
www.bhutannewsservice.com/column-opinion/commentry/bhutan-china-border-mismatch/– analysis with maps

33
. Virendra Sahai Verma, ‘Dances with dragons’, 21 August 2012
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article3800096.ece
– article with map

34
.
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2011/05/29/bhutan-climbs-a-learning-curve-for-happiness/

35
. JE, ‘The Modern Path to Enlightenment’,
Financial Times
, 2 May 1987, and on
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2008/11/05/bhutan%E2%80%99s-king-told-me-about-his-plans-for-gross-national-happiness/

36
. ‘The background of Gross National Happiness: A development path with values’, GNH Centre Bhutan,
http://www.gnhbhutan.org/about/a_development_path_with_values.aspx#sthash.7iUeemoF. dpuf

37
. Omair Ahmad, ‘The Royal Pleasure Index’,
Sunday Guardian
, 2 March 2013,
http://www.sunday-guardian.com/artbeat/the-royal-pleasure-index
. Omair Ahmed is the author of
The Kingdom at the Centre of the World – Journeys into Bhutan
, Aleph Book Company, Delhi, 2013