Implosion (63 page)

Distant Peace

There is no chance of the main dispute over Kashmir and the Line of Control being solved permanently in the foreseeable future, and military and other sensitivities on both sides make it difficult to settle the border at Siachen and Sir Creek. That situation could continue, without severe disruption to either country, so long as extremists in the ISI and terrorist groups based in Pakistan do not seize power or escalate attacks. Almost inevitably, however, a terrorist attack in India, or a major border incident, will raise tensions. The risk, says Ahmed Rashid, a leading Pakistani writer on terrorism and diplomacy, is that ‘the proxy wars’ that India and Pakistan wage could escalate. ‘Terrorist groups who have been sponsored by the Pakistani military in the past and are not under any control now could create a war syndrome on the border, just as the 2008 suicide attack in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba did when 166 Indians were killed. Likewise, India is needling Pakistan by allegedly backing separatists in Baluchistan’.
³²

Policy planners should not expect the two countries to make peace for many years ahead. It is inconceivable that China would allow Pakistan to make a deal while it continues to have border and other differences with India. There will be constructive periods, as there have been, when successful attempts are made to build ties, though there will always be the risk that extremists in Pakistan will launch terror attacks to destabilize talks if they seem to be successful. What is needed in parallel is leadership from the prime ministers in both countries to develop the exchanges and possible agreements on trade, investment, visas and cross-border links. If these help Pakistan’s economy to develop, optimists believe that its army might realize that it should slow down militancy and border clashes in order not to disrupt trade co-operation. At the same time, India would have to tolerate Pakistan regularly (but ineffectually) raising the issue of Kashmir in international meetings such as the United Nations.

India would need to develop a more coherent and tough policy than it has displayed in recent years, when Manmohan Singh’s determination to keep talks going has undermined the ability of his government and army to retaliate. This is a neighbourhood example of how India needs to toughen up its habitually soft approach to international diplomacy and set firm boundaries for co-operation that Pakistan can accept or reject. A consensus would have to be reached in India with other political parties and with the states. International pressure could help to persuade Pakistan’s civilian government and the military to co-operate. Unless that happens, it will be business as usual, with occasional trouble on the LoC, possible terrorist attacks, and some talks – and with Pakistan being unable to reap the benefits of trade and investment co-operation with India.

Notes

1
.   
http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ajai-shukla-the-lac-is-not-the-loc-112091800050_1.html

2
.   ‘Protests in Indian Kashmir – Stony ground – A new round of anti-government unrest’, 8 July 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/16542619?story_id=16542619

3
.   
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/07/07/security-forces%E2%80%99-bullets-for-stones-bring-death-and-disaster-to-kashmir/

4
.   
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/manmohan-singh-displays-his-own-and-his-government%E2%80%99s-limitations/

5
.   Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser, ‘Our ability to change India in a globalised world’, The Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture, IIC, New Delhi 11 August 2011; full text
http://www.prembhatiatrust.com/
click on Lecture 16

6
.   ‘Summit ascended, but Kashmir not yet broached – The Indo-Pakistani summit came close to success, and may yet achieve it if the hardliners on both sides can be restrained’,
The Economist
, 19 July 2001,
http://www.economist.com/node/702471

7
.   Shekhar Gupta ‘National Interest’ column, ‘On the LoC, in fact’,
Indian Express
, 19 January 2013; the figures were sourced from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the J&K Government and appear in a table in the newspaper headed ‘The Ceasefire Dividend’,
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/national-interest-on-the-loc-in-fact/1061720/0

8
.   ‘Manmohan Singh, Musharraf came close to striking Kashmir deal: WikiLeaks’,
The Times of India
, 3 September 2011,
http://www.articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-03/india/30109679_1_ pervez-musharraf-president-musharraf-pakistani-president
and Musharraf speaking at Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, Delhi, November 2012
http://www.youtube.com/watchflv=dh30ffA4-6k

9
.   
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2011/07/28/a-new-young-face-brings-hope-to-pakistan%E2%80%99s-tortured-india-relationship/

10
.
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2012/12/18/pakistan-minister-fuels-a-bad-relationship-with-india/

11
. Kanwal Sibal, ‘India’s Options in Dealing with Pakistan’,
Indian Defence Review
, 7 August 2013,
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indias-options-in-dealing-with-pakistan/0/

12
. G. Parthasarathy, ‘India’s Pakistan policy comprising uninterrupted dialogue and getting US to pressure Pakistan on terrorism is falling apart’,
The Hindu Business Line
, 13 February 2013,
http://www. thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/composite-dialogue-with-pak-a-failure/article4411449.ece

13
.
http://www.ridingtheelephant.wordpress.com/2009/03/08/musharraf-walks-a-delhi-tightrope-%E2%80%93-in-a-time-warp/

14
. ‘Pak army kills 5 soldiers in raid, tests India’s patience yet again’,
The Times of India
, 7 August 2013,
http://www.articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-07/india/41166744_1_poonch-sector-indian-soldiers-pakistan-troops

15
. ‘Just a small skirmish in Kashmir? John Elliott on why the India-Pakistan border is suddenly the world’s most dangerous place’,
New Statesman
, 7 June 1999,
http://www.newstatesman.com/node/134912

16
. ‘Pak military chiefs boycott Wagah welcome’, Rediff.com, 20 February 1999,
http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus2.htm
and
http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus1.htm

17
. The Lahore Declaration, a Memorandum of Understanding, and a Joint Statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore, 20-21 February 1999, Stimson Research Papers
http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/lahore-summit/

18
. Mani Dixit, former India Foreign Secretary,
India and Pakistan in War and Peace
, p 43, Books Today (India Today Group), India, and Routledge, USA, 2002,
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415304726/
and online at
http://www.books.google.co.in/booksflid=XnzRttnqExUC&pg=PA25&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false

19
. Pervez Musharraf,
In the Line of Fire, A Memoir,
pp 87-93, Simon and Schuster, London, 2006, Simon and Schuster Pocketbook paperback, 2008, Free Press, India, 2008, extracts on line
http://www.amazon.co.uk/In-Line-Fire-Pervez-Musharraf/dp/074329582X
(also sold on Delhi and Mumbai streets in pirated edition for Rs 200)

20
. Swaran Singh, ‘The Kargil conflict: Why and How of China’s Neutrality’,
Strategic Analysis Volume
23, Issue 7, 1999, IDSA,
http://www. www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-3.html

21
. Sohail Warraich, ‘Ghaddar Kaun?’,
http://www.bookcentreorg.wordpress.com/2012/02/21/ghaddar-kaun-author-sohail-warraich-price-us-28-50-price-pak-rs/

22
. Pervez Musharraf,
In the Line of Fire, A Memoir
, p. 96

23
. Pervez Musharraf produced photographs of Nawaz Sharif’s visit on a Pakistan TV channel,
http://www.businessplustv.pk/
in July 2006. ‘Look at these pictures,’ said Musharraf. ‘In one of these pictures, I am receiving him.’ ‘Musharraf says Sharif knew about Kargil’,
DNA
, 13 July 2006,
http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_ghaddar-kaun-musharraf-says-sharif-knew-about-kargil_1041540

24
. ‘‘99 phone tapes show General kept Sharif in dark on Kargil, in book he says opposite’,
Indian Express
, 26 October 2006,
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-99-phone-tapes-show-general-kept-sharif-in-dark-on-kargil-in-book-he-says-opposite/15422/0

25
. Mani Dixit,
India and Pakistan in War and Peace

25
. ‘Kargil adventure was four-man show’,
Dawn
, 29 January 2013
http://www.dawn.com/2013/01/29/kargil-adventure-was-four-man-show-general/

27
. Humphrey Hawksley,
Dragonfire
, Macmillan, London, 2000. George Fernandes, India’s Minister of Defence at the time said: ‘The political and historical backdrop against which he [Hawksley] writes is real. The dramatis personae couldn’t have been more real. The flctional denouement stands out as a call for reason to assert before time runs out. I commend this book to every Indian.’

28
. Humphrey Hawksley,
Democracy Kills
, p. 168, Macmillan, London, 2009

29
. Ibid., pp. 167-168

30
. Humphrey Hawksley in conversation with JE, September 2013

31
.
http://www.multimedia.journalism.berkeley.edu/people/kencooper/

32
. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Beware Pakistan’s small nuclear weapons’, Blogs FT.com,
http://www.blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/10/22/beware-pakistans-small-nuclear-weapons/#axzz2iQHAMoKG

22
India and the US

Sometimes Partners, Not Allies

India’s relations with the US were transformed in 2008 with a deal on the civilian use of nuclear energy that gave it a new level of acceptability in Washington and international respectability, plus access to nuclear energy and freedom to trade internationally in sensitive technologies. In terms of the history of independent India, this stood alongside the economic liberalization reforms that began in 1991, which were the biggest positive event since the British left in 1947.
¹
Its effect has not been as instantly dramatic as those of 1947, nor yet as progressive as 1991, but it helped to change India’s potential place in international affairs and laid the foundations for the world’s most powerful and largest democracies to become allies one day, though progress is slow.

There have been ups and downs since 2008 as both sides have begun to learn about each other’s priorities and limitations, but there are strong bilateral links. Nearly three million people of Indian origin live in America, forming the second largest Asian community there and playing a significant role in politics and business, and there are almost 100,000 Indian students studying in the country.
²
There is a $100bn target for annual two-way trade and there is substantial direct investment in businesses and projects – $50bn from the US into India and over $11bn from India into the US.
³

From the Indian side, the nuclear deal was achieved primarily because of three men who saw the historic potential of ending a half-century stand-off. The first two were Jaswant Singh, who was India’s external affairs minister from 1998 to 2002 in the then NDA government, and Brajesh Mishra, a retired diplomat who was a central figure in that government, pulling the strings of power for Prime Minister Vajpayee. With Vajpayee and Singh, Mishra led a transformation of foreign (and security) policy, not just with the US but also Israel and Pakistan.
⁴
The third person was Manmohan Singh. Though largely seen from 2009 as an ineffectual prime minister, he had had the vision to revive the nuclear deal when it appeared to be collapsing in 2008
⁵
and to drive it through a parliamentary confidence vote (amid allegations of bribery) on the floor of the Lok Sabha
⁶
. In terms of personal initiative, this far exceeded his role as finance minister in 1991. All three men had to overcome extreme scepticism in India because of a deep distrust of America, especially in the self-consciously leftward-leaning Congress party where it has never been politically correct to display pro-US tendencies.

The US Turns

The change in US attitudes began with India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Within a month, Bill Clinton, the US president who till then had tilted towards Pakistan rather than India, sent Strobe Talbott, a senior state department official, to Delhi to start a dialogue with Jaswant Singh
⁷
. In Washington, there was a surge of interest and access for Indian diplomats that had not been seen before.
⁸
Clinton then supported India during its potentially dangerous conflict with Pakistan in 1999, when he told Nawaz Sharif to withdraw troops from the mountain peaks above Kargil. He had a triumphant visit to India in 2000, saying he welcomed ‘India’s leadership in the region and the world’, adding that he knew it must be difficult to be ‘bordered by nations whose governments reject democracy’.
⁹
But Clinton did little more. In particular, he did nothing to lift a multitude of nuclear-linked sanctions on India. This was partly because his Democratic Party took a strong line on nuclear non-proliferation after the 1998 tests, and partly because the state department did not want to upset Pakistan which it saw as its more important ally.