In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (58 page)

8.
Seth G. Jones and Martin Libicki,
How Terrorist Groups End
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, forthcoming).

9.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 60; Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon,
The Age of Sacred Terror
(New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 132, 242.

10.
“Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques,”
Al Islah
(London), September 2, 1996.

11.
“Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,”
Al-Quds al-Arabi
(London), February 23, 1998.

12.
House of Commons,
Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005,
p. 29.

13.
See, for example, Bernard Lewis,
The Crisis of Islam
(New York: Random House, 2003), p. xi.

14.
On the establishment of a Caliphate, see, for example, Abu Bakr Naji,
The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass,
translated and published by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, May 23, 2006.

15.
Ayman al-Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
translated by Laura Mansfield (Old Tappan, NJ: TLG Publications, 2002), p. 132.

16.
Osama bin Laden, “Message to the Peoples of Europe,” released in November 2007.

17.
Fawaz A. Gerges,
The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 49.

18.
Zawahiri’s reference to the Afghan jihad in this context was the Soviet War in the 1980s. He argued that it provided a critical opportunity for training Arabs against the forthcoming war with the United States. Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
p. 38.

19.
This section adopts the framework laid out by Bruce Hoffman. See, for example, Bruce Hoffman,
Inside Terrorism,
2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 285–89; Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat.”

20.
Indeed, six months after September 11, 2001, al Qa’ida had lost sixteen of twenty-five key leaders on the Pentagon’s “Most Wanted” list. Rohan Gunaratna,
Inside Al Qa’ida: Global Network of Terror
(New York: Berkley Books, 2002), p. 303.

21.
“Pakistan: Villagers Start Rebuilding Seminary Destroyed in Bajaur Airstrike,”
The News
(Pakistan), November 18, 2006.

22.
Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat” Jason Burke,
Al-Qa’ida: The True Story of Radical Islam
(London: Penguin, 2004); Peter L. Bergen,
Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden
(New York: Touchstone, 2001); Lawrence Wright,
The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11
(New York: Knopf, 2006).

23.
Greg Miller, “Influx of Al Qa’ida, Money into Pakistan Is Seen,”
Los Angeles Times,
May 20, 2007.

24.
United States Department of State,
Country Reports on Terrorism 2006
(Washington, DC: United States Department of State), p. 269; Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat.”

25.
House of Commons,
Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July
2005, pp. 24–27; Hoffman, “Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the Global Terrorist Threat.”

26.
New York Police Department,
Threat Analysis: JFK Airport/Pipeline Plot
(New York: New York Police Department, June 2, 2007).

27.
Juzgado Central de Instrucción Numero 5, Audiencia Nacional, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 21/2006 L, Madrid, 23 Octubre 2007.

28.
The Information Center for the Support of the Iraqi People,
Iraqi Jihad, Hopes and Risks: Analysis of the Reality and Visions for the Future, and Actual Steps in the Path of the Blessed Jihad
(The Information Center for the Support of the Iraqi People, December 2003).

29.
Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 579–92; Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst,
From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order
(The Hague: Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, December 2004).

30.
U.S. Department of Defense,
Background and Activities of Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007). Also see U.S.
Department of State,
Wanted Poster for Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi
(Washington, DC: Rewards for Justice Program, U.S. Department of State, 2006).

31.
Dipesh Gadher, “Al-Qa’ida ‘Planning Big British Attack,’”
Sunday Times
(London), April 22, 2007.

32.
On Wadi al-Aqiq, see, for example, Wright,
The Looming Tower,
pp. 166, 192.

33.
See, for example, “Bin Laden’s Treasurer Appointed New Afghan Qa’ida Leader,”
Daily Times
(Pakistan), May 30, 2007.

34.
General Michael V. Hayden,
The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 2.

35.
Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qa’ida Homegrown,”
The New Yorker
, January 22, 2007.

36.
Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples,
The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 6.

37.
Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,”
Middle East Quarterly,
vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2005. On
zakat
and jihad, also see Marc Sage-man,
Understanding Terror Networks
(Philadelphia: University of Pennyslvania Press, 2004).

38.
See, for example, Alfred B. Prados and Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia:
Terrorist Financing Issues
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004); The 9/11
Commission Report
, p. 55.

39.
General Michael V. Hayden,
The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2006), p. 2.

40.
United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 15 November 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed to the President of the Security Council, November 29, 2007, S/2007/677, p. 8.

41.
United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/ a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad,
United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Exhibit 2, Federal Bureau of Investigation FD-302 of William “Jamaal” Chrisman. Interview conducted December 2, 2006.

42.
Statement from Mullah Omar, Leader of the Taliban, released December 17, 2007.

43.
United States of America v. Babar Ahmad,
United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:04-CR-301-MRK, Indictment, Filed October 6, 2004.

44.
United States of America v. Syed Talha Ahsan,
United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:06-CR-194-JCH, Indictment. Also see
United States of America. v. Hassan Abujihaad, a/k/a Paul R. Hall, Abu-Jihaad,
United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:07-CR-57, Indictment.

45.
Author interviews with European, Afghan, and Pakistani government officials,
Kabul, Afghanistan 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. Also see Ali Jalali, “The Future of Afghanistan,”
Parameters,
vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 8.

46.
Author interviews with U.S. government officials in Shkin, Afghanistan, April 2006. Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, July 2005. Also see such press accounts as Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Unholy Allies,”
Newsweek,
September 26, 2005, pp. 40–42.

47.
In what appeared to be a forced confession, Saeed Allah Khan stated: “I worked as a spy for the Americans along with four other people. The group received $45,000 and my share is $7,000.” Hekmat Karzai,
Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics
(Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, January 2006), p. 2.

48.
Author interview with U.S. government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 2005.

49.
On the rationale for suicide bombers, see Al Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, February 2006.

50.
Zawahiri,
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,
p. 200.

51.
C. Christine Fair et al.,
Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001–2007
(Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, September 2007), p. 10.

52.
Hekmat Karzai,
Afghanistan and the Logic of Suicide Terrorism
(Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, March 2006); “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Suicide Bomb Attack in Afghan Kandahar Province,”
Afghan Islamic Press,
October 9, 2005; “Pajhwok News Describes Video of Afghan Beheading by ‘Masked Arabs,’ Taliban,”
Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News,
October 9, 2005; “Canadian Soldier Dies in Suicide Attack in Kandahar,”
Afghan Islamic Press,
March 3, 2006; “Taliban Claim Attack on Police in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province,” Kabul National TV, January 7, 2006.

53.
See, for example, Robert Pape,
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
(New York: Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The
Allure of Suicide Terror
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Christoph Reuter,
My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Hoffman,
Inside Terrorism.

54.
Hekmat Karzai and Seth G. Jones, “How to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan,”
Christian Science Monitor,
July 18, 2006.

55.
In its public rhetoric, the Taliban tended to identify the suicide bombers as Afghans, since it suggested there was a significant indigenous component of the insurgency.

56.
Fair et al.,
Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan,
p. 28.

Chapter Seventeen

1.
Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, June 10, 2008.

2.
Asia Foundation,
Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People
(Kabul and San Francisco: Asia Foundation, 2008).

3.
Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

4.
Colin Soloway, “I Yelled at Them to Stop,”
Newsweek
, October 7, 2002; Hy S. Rothstein,
Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 141–42.

5.
Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

6.
Roger Trinquier,
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,
translated by Daniel Lee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 6.

7.
Author interview with Commander Larry Legree, March 8, 2008; author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

8.
Author interview with Colonel Martin Schweitzer, March 7, 2008.

9.
British Government, Afghanistan: Countering the Insurgency RC(E) vs. RC (S) Comparative Approaches, May 12, 2008.

10.
The quote is from Bruce Hoffman and Seth G. Jones, “Cell Phones in the Hindu Kush,”
The National Interest,
No. 96, July/August 2008.

11.
International Security Assistance Force,
ISAF Campaign Plan
(Kabul: ISAF, November 2008).

12.
Trinquier,
Modern Warfare,
p. 6.

13.
Prior to the establishment of the first Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams—Afghanistan supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. These began in 2002.