In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (51 page)

80.
Ibid., p. 89.

81.
Francesc Vendrell,
EUSR Vendrell’s Valedictory Report
(Kabul: European Union, 2008).

Chapter Eight

1.
Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.

2.
Mountstuart Elphinstone,
An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India
(Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck, 1969), p. 489.

3.
Radek Sikorski, “The Devil You Know,”
Newsweek,
August 9, 2004, p. 31.

4.
Author interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, July 27, 2007.

5.
Ibid.

6.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1383, December 6, 2001, S/RES/1383 (2001).

7.
“Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” December 2001, Annex II.

8.
Ahmed Rashid,
Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia
(New York: Viking, 2008), p. 184.

9.
Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.

10.
David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,”
New York Times,
August 12, 2007, p. A1.

11.
Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.

12.
Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008; Statement of Zalmay Khalilzad Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 29, 2003.

13.
Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.

14.
Statement of Zalmay Khalilzad Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 29, 2003.

15.
Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.

16.
Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau,
The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
(Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, Studies and Analysis Division, 1995).

17.
Ali A. Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army,”
Parameters,
vol. 32, no. 3, Autumn 2002, p. 79.

18.
Author interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, February 22, 2008.

19.
Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.

20.
Michael O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque,
Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 15, 2005).

21.
Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, January 17, 2008.

22.
Lieutenant General David W. Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’: Counter-insurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005,”
Military Review,
September-October 2007, p. 36.

23.
Memorandum from Donald L. Evans to the President, Subject: “Recent Visit to Baghdad, Iraq, and Kabul, Afghanistan,” October 24, 2003. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently wrote a memo to Evans noting that “your report to the President on your visit to Iraq and Afghanistan was excellent. Thanks so much for going. I appreciate it a great deal. Thanks also for letting other folks know what you found.” Letter from Donald Rumsfeld to the Honorable Donald L. Evans, October 29, 2003.

24.
Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, September 4, 2007.

25.
George W. Bush,
State of the Union Address
(Washington, DC: White House, 2004).

26.
Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, January 17, 2008.

27.
See, for example, International Crisis Group,
Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes
(Kabul: International Crisis Group, 2006).

28.
ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll,
Afghanistan—Where Things Stand
(Kabul: ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, December 2007), p. 6.

29.
Frank Newport,
Bush Job Approval at 28%, Lowest of His Administration
(Washington, DC: Gallup, April 11, 2008). The poll included Bush’s job-approval average each year from 2001 to 2008.

30.
Info Memo from Ronald Neumann to the Administrator, Subject: Highlights of the June 24th MCNS Meeting, June 24, 2004.

31.
E-mail from Paul Bremer to Jaymie Durnan, Subject: Message for SecDef, June 30, 2003.

32.
Coalition Provisional Authority, Summary: Bomb-Making Tips, Mukhabarat Habits, Views from the Street, July 15, 2003.

33.
E-mail from Paul Bremer to Jaymie Durnan, Subject: Message for SecDef, June 30, 2003.

34.
Brief on Iraq Security and Military Issues, NSC Meeting, July 1, 2003.

35.
Coalition Provisional Authority, Security Update for Ambassador Bremer, July 18, 2003.

36.
Office of Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State,
Iraqis Offer Dim Evaluation of Reconstruction Effort Thus Far,
August 22, 2003.

37.
Iraqi Impressions of Coalition Forces and the Security Situation in Iraq: Office of Research Survey Results from 7 Cities in Iraq & Preliminary Results from Gallup Baghdad Survey, September 30, 2003.

38.
Memo from James Ellery to Ambassador Bremer, Subject: Read Ahead for Ambassador Bremer: Infrastructure Security Strategy, January 11, 2004.

39.
Infrastructure Security Planning Group, Infrastructure Security Strategy, January 12, 2004.

40.
Info Memo from Bill Miller to the Administrator, Subject: Security Town Hall, March 18, 2004. Also see Memorandum from L. Paul Bremer to Regional and Governorate Coordinators, Subject: Safety and Security, March 19, 2004.

41.
Memo from L. Paul Bremer to Hon. Chris Shays, April 16, 2004; Memo from L. Paul Bremer to Hon. Brian Baird, April 1, 2004; Memo from L. Paul Bremer to Hon. Jim Kolbe, April 1, 2004.

42.
Some have argued that the insurgency began in earnest in June 2004. But Taliban offensive operations two years earlier suggest that it was in the spring of 2002. Colonel Walter M. Herd et al.,
One Valley at a Time
(Fort Bragg, NC: Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, 2005), p. 121.

43.
“Country Risk Assessment: Afghanistan,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review,
vol. 16,
no. 5, May 2004, pp. 38–41; Michael Bhatia, Kevin Lanigan, and Philip Wilkinson,
Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan
(Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004), pp. 1–8; Anthony Davis, “Afghan Security Deteriorates as Taliban Regroup,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review,
vol. 15, no. 5, May 2003, pp. 10–15.

44.
ANSO Security Situation Summary,
Weekly Report 039, September 24–30, 2004, p. 15.

45.
Carlotta Gall, “21 Killed in Afghanistan Attacks Directed at Provincial Governor,”
New York Times,
August 15, 2004;
ANSO Security Situation Summary,
Weekly Report 039, September 24–30, 2004, p. 7; ANSO Security Situation Summary, Weekly Report 036, September 3–9, 2004, p. 5;
ANSO Security Situation Summary,
Weekly Report 038, September 17–23, 2004, PP. 7–8.

46.
Author interview with Daoud Yaqub, January 2, 2008.

47.
Author interview with Lieutenant General David Barno, January 17, 2008.

48.
Memo from Donald Rumsfeld to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, General Pete Pace, and Doug Feith, Subject: Global War on Terrorism, October 16, 2003.

49.
On Afghan numbers, see Seth G. Jones et al.,
Establishing Law and Order After Conflict
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), pp. 89–91.

50.
The Asia Foundation,
Voter Education Planning Survey: Afghanistan 2004 National Elections
(Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2004), p. 106.

51.
International Republican Institute,
Afghanistan: Election Day Survey,
October 9, 2004, slide 13.

52.
Arno J. Mayer,
The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 323.

Chapter Nine

1.
Mao Tse-tung,
On Guerrilla Warfare,
translated by Samuel B. Griffith II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 93.

2.
William Cullen Bryant,
Poems
(Philadelphia: Henry Altemus, 1895), p. 79.

3.
On the definition of insurgency, see Central Intelligence Agency,
Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.), p. 2;
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
, Joint Publication 102 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), p. 266.

4.
David Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
(St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1964), p. 3.

5.
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
Joint Publication 1–02, defines unconventional warfare as: “A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly
conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.” U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
Joint Publication 102 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), p. 574.

6.
Roger Trinquier,
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,
translated by Daniel Lee (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 6.

7.
Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel, “El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revisited,” in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds.,
Low-Intensity Warfare: Counter-insurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 119.

8.
Bruce Hoffman,
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004); U.S. Marine Corps,
Small Wars Manual
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940); Julian Paget,
Counter-Insurgency Campaigning
(London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Charles Simpson,
Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years
(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982); Robert J. Wilensky,
Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam War
(Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004).

9.
Daniel Byman,
Understanding Proto-Insurgencies
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), p. 1.

10.
Trinquier,
Modern Warfare, p.
8; Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,
pp. 7–8.

11.
Kimberly Marten Zisk,
Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Amitai Etzioni, “A Self-Restrained Approach to Nation-Building by Foreign Powers,”
International Affairs,
vol. 80, no. 1 (2004); Etzioni,
From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Stephen T. Hosmer,
The Army’s Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency
(Santa Monica, Calif,: RAND Corporation, R-3947-A, 1990), pp. 30–31.

12.
Seth G. Jones,
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). On time, also see Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare,
p. 10.

13.
David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,”
International Security,
vol. 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), p. 51.

14.
See, for example, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”
American Political Science Review,
vol. 97, no. 1, February 2003, pp. 83, 85; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis, “The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design,” in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds.,
Understanding Civil War, Vol. 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), pp. 1–34; Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare,
pp. 37–38.