India (Frommer's, 4th Edition) (12 page)

This represents a huge shift, and is both the result and the driver of the economic engine that is powering India. But there is one growth industry guaranteed to stymie, if not wreck, genuine progress: the feud between Muslim and Hindu fundamentalists. At the heart of the latter ideology—most acutely represented by the RSS and Bajrang Dal—is the belief that today’s Muslims should be punished for historical wrongs perpetrated by medieval Muslim conquerors. It’s a belief that is fired by modern-day resentments (such as the concern that Muslims have, proportionally, the highest birth rate in India) and fears that
madrasas
are creating hotbeds of Muslim fundamentalism. The worst Hindu-Muslim rioting and looting happened in the western state of Gujarat in 2002, but bomb blasts still occur almost annually and are proof that sectarian trouble is simply on slow-brew.

Nationalism also takes its toll in the Kashmir dispute that bedevils relations between the nuclear-capable neighbors India and Pakistan. The two countries have fought two of their three wars over Kashmir, engaged in another low-level conflict in 1998, and came to the brink of another in 2002. Driven by popular enthusiasm and political initiatives on either side, there has been a thawing in India-Pakistan relations since then, and the peace process has enjoyed a visible momentum with issues such as visa issuance significantly improved. That said, there is still a lack of progress in resolving many bilateral problems, and any further improvements are unlikely given the recent spike in terrorist incidences (most notably the devastation that occurred in Mumbai in Nov 2008 when terrorists who trained in Pakistan wreaked havoc in various key locations in the southern part of the city).

The problems of nationalism are exacerbated by politicians who try to pit Hindus, who constitute 80% of the population, against the 150-million Muslim minority before elections in order to garner votes—this happened again in 2006 and 2007 in the UP elections, when the BJP released a highly inflammatory CD featuring Muslims slaughtering cows and kidnapping Hindu women.

Yet, recent elections have proved that change is definitely on the horizon. The 2004 polls hinted that the masses cannot be won over for long through this diabolical strategy of dividing communities, and in some subconscious way there seems to be a recognition that if divisive politics win, India will lose. When the nation went to the polls on May 18, 2009, some 420 million voters turned up and effectively took part in the biggest single democratic event in human history. That the voters, a hugely disparate group separated by geographic distance, culture, economic situation, caste, religious belief, and access to the social infrastructure, managed to vote, in Fareed Zakaria’s words, “with remarkable intelligence” by rewarding the incumbent ruling Congress for bringing economic growth to the nation, is a momentous feat. Indeed, at the polls, it seemed evident that India’s voters had given precedent to economic reform, and within days local stock market indicators went orbital. As India’s reform-minded government allocated ministerial portfolios and people on the ground celebrated, media headlines emphatically declared nothing short of a virtual new order.
The Times of India
eagerly reported that “with the Left decimated and the Congress no longer dependent on coercise allies, a stable government would be able to push reforms.” In many ways, the election result symbolized the emergence of “a new age for India on the world stage,” and the next leg in the evolution of the country’s independence—people power had finally usurped state power. And, to preserve the sense of order established by the Congress’s first term in power, its leader, Sonia Gandhi, again declined the post of prime minister, retaining Manmohan Singh—highly respected for the role he played in the liberalization of India’s economy in the ’90s—for the post.

Bill Clinton once said: “India remains a battleground for every single conflict the world has to win.” Certainly India copes with huge problems—massive corruption, joblessness, judicial bottlenecks with few convictions and delays of up to 20 years for delivering justice, AIDS, acute water shortages, poverty, disease, environmental degradation, unbearable overcrowding in metropolitan cities, crises of governance, sectarian violence, and terrorism. India adds one Australia to itself every year—
18 million people.
The rural poor (who form the majority) see children as an economic resource, the only security net for old age, and high child-mortality rates necessitate the need for more than one, or two. Apart from India’s huge natural growth rate, an estimated two million poor Bangladeshis slip into India every year in search of work.

But this is a country of remarkable stamina. As Manmohan Singh has stated, “Our real strength has always been our willingness to live and let live.” Home to scores of languages, cuisines, landscapes, and cultures, India is a giant. But she will move at her own pace. She is not an Asian tiger. She is more like a stately Indian elephant. No one can whip or crack her into a run. If you try, the stubborn elephant will dig in her heels and refuse to budge. No power on earth can then force her to move. But equally so, she cannot be stopped once she’s on the move. And with the slow but fundamental shift from silent acceptance of karma to the belief that one can—and should—give shape to destiny, she is most certainly on the move. There is no point arguing whether this is good or bad. It is good and bad. And it is many things in between.

After all, this is India.

Impressions

Who is an authentic Indian and who isn’t? Is India Indian? Does it matter? Let’s just say we’re an ancient people learning to live in a recent nation . . .

—Arundhati Roy, The Algebra of Injustice

2 India Past to Present

by Nigel Worden

History professor specializing in the Indian Ocean region

No visitor to India can fail to be overwhelmed by the combination of a bustling, modernizing nation and an ancient but omnipresent past. India’s history is everywhere, in its temples and mosques, forts and palaces, tombs and monuments, but it has only recently become a single country, which makes its history a complex one. Successions of kingdoms and empires have controlled parts of the subcontinent, but none unified the whole—even the British Raj’s “Jewel in the Crown of the Empire” excluded large swaths of territory ruled by independent princes. Thus the accounts of history vary, and competing versions have often been the cause of bitter conflict. Given the tensions between Hindus and Muslims in South Asia, it is hardly surprising that the Islamic era in particular is highly controversial. Were the Muslims invaders and pillagers of an ancient Indian tradition, as Hindu nationalist historians claim? Or were they Indians who created a distinctive culture of architecture, painting, and literature by blending indigenous forms with Islamic influences? Is the Taj Mahal a uniquely Indian masterpiece, or a symbol of the Islamic oppressor? As is usually the case with history, it all depends on where you are, and to whom you’re talking.

ANCIENT INDIA
Historical accounts of India usually begin with the
Harappan civilization
of the Indus Valley, a sophisticated agricultural and urban society that flourished from 3000 to 1700
B.C
. (about the same time as the earliest Egyptian civilization); although many of its sites are now located in latter-day Pakistan, you can view Harappan artifacts in places like the National Museum in New Delhi. Not much is known about the people, not least because their writing system has yet to be deciphered, but their active trade with the civilizations of the Euphrates (contemporary Iran and Iraq) show that northern India had links from very early on with the rest of Asia.

A more recognizably and distinctive “Indian” culture developed from around 1500
B.C.
in the northern part of the subcontinent, spreading steadily eastward in the 1st millennium
B.C.
, although never penetrating to the far south. This is usually referred to as the
Vedic period.
The ancient written
Vedas
provide a rich record of this era, led by a Sanskrit-speaking elite, which embedded into India Hinduism the caste system (led by a Brahmin priesthood), and the dichotomy between a rural farming majority and an urbanized merchant class, all ruled by local kings and princes. A series of Vedic kingdoms rose and fell, each centered on a city, of which Varanasi is today the oldest-living and best-known example. Much controversy surrounds the interpretation of the “Aryans,” as the Vedic culture is known—some claim that they originated as invaders from the north who conquered and subjugated the local population, while Hindu nationalists today see them as the archetypal indigenous Indian—a controversy that makes Indian archaeology a tempestuous field of study. Whichever interpretation you buy into, the influence of the Vedic era is all-pervasive in modern Indian life, and the historical focus of a modern Hindu identity.

From the 6th century
B.C.,
the Aryan states were themselves subject to invasions from the north, in a cycle of incursion and subsequent local adaptation that was to dominate much of India’s history. Even Alexander the Great, hearing of the wealth and fertility of the area, tried to invade, but his army apparently refused to cross the Indus River and instead made their way back to Macedonia. Other invaders (or settlers, depending on your preference) of Greek, Persian, and central Asian origin moved in, challenging some of the indigenous states, such as Shakas of western India and the Magadha state of the northeast. In time, all of these newcomers were absorbed into the local population. It was during this period that Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha) was born in latter-day Nepal; he later moved to India, where he sought—and found—enlightenment at Bodghaya, and starting teaching at Sarnath, just outside Varanasi.

The first large state to emerge in this region was under the
Mauryan rulers
(322–185
B.C.
), who incorporated much of northern India, including the region west of the Indus; at its largest, it even reached south to Karnataka. The most famous of these rulers was
Asoka,
who converted to Buddhism after a particularly murderous episode of conquest pricked his conscience; he spread the Buddha’s teachings throughout northern India, particularly at Sarnath and Sanchi, where you can still view the
stupas
(commemorative cairns) he built. Asoka’s decrees, which were inscribed onto rock (literally), carved his reputation throughout the region, while his emblem of four back-to-back lion heads (which you can also view at Sarnath) has been adopted as the modern symbol of India.

Asoka’s empire barely survived his death in 232
B.C.
, however, and in the subsequent centuries local states rose and fell in the north with alacrity. The
Gupta empire
emerged from
A.D.
319
to
540 under Sumadra Gupta, who conquered the small kingdoms of much of northern India and Bengal, while his son extended its range to the west. This loose confederacy was marked by a reinvigoration of Hinduism and the power of the Brahmins, which reduced the influence of Buddhism in the subcontinent (though it had taken strong root in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia). But Hun invasions from the north in turn destroyed Gupta power, and northern India was again split into numerous small kingdoms.

It should be noted that the southern part of India remained unaffected by these developments. With the exception of Asoka’s Mauryan empire, none of the northern states extended their influence beyond the central plains, and South India developed its own economic systems, trading with Southeast Asia and across the western Indian Ocean as far afield as the Roman Empire. Dravidian kingdoms emerged, some of which established sizable empires such as the
Pallava
(
A.D.
300–900) and
Chola
(
A.D.
900–1300). Hinduism flourished, evident in the rich legacy of Dravidian temple architecture (notably at Thanjavur).

THE ISLAMIC ERA
Even Indian historians refer to the period from the 10th to the 16th centuries as “medieval,” but a more accurate characterization of it relates to the impact of Islam. Muslim influence from the northwest was evident in northern India from at least
A.D.
1000, but it was only with the arrival of Islamic forces from the 13th century onward that its presence became dominant. A succession of fragmented and unstable Moslem states emerged around new centers such as Lahore (Pakistan), Delhi, and Agra, collectively known as the Delhi Sultanates. Conversions to Islam were made among the local population, mainly from the lower castes or where Hinduism was weaker, as in Bengal, but the majority of the population remained Hindu. In most areas the Muslim rulers and their administrators were but a thin layer, ruling societies that followed earlier traditions and practices.

In the south, Muslims made much less impact. Muslim raids in the 14th century instead led to unified Hindu resistance by the Vijayanagar empire centered in Hampi, which flourished in the south as one of the strongest Hindu states in Indian history, surviving until the 16th century.