Inside the Crosshairs (9 page)

In the graveyard he found the concrete-and-metal crypt the sniper had used as a “hide.” Next to the heavy slab covering the grave lay a short stick for propping open the cover just
enough for a rifle and scope to protrude. The former infantry officer continued, “ ‘I lifted the slab and drew it away. Then horror seizing me in its grip, I turned hurriedly away and did not look back again. One look had been enough. Within the narrow retaining wall lay a moldering skeleton, to which clung rotting folds of gray uniform! Beside the body lay a rusty rifle and the remains of a light pack. What a ghastly revenge!’ ”

The captain paused, according to the author, and then continued, “ ‘For the sergeant and the private had crept upon the sniper and made him prisoner. Then they had thrust him back into that horrible retaining wall—ALIVE—after which they returned the slab to its place. But they had made retribution doubly sure. For wrapped around and about that moldering skeleton, fold upon fold, was a veritable maze of rusty barbed wire.’ ”

Whether or not they had such horrors in mind, it is not surprising that the United States and its allies once again shelved their snipers at the end of the war. Besides expressing resistance to men who cold-bloodedly killed with no warning from hiding, many world leaders thought that World War I was “the war to end all wars” and that neither snipers nor armies themselves would be needed in the future.

Unfortunately, “the war to end all wars” did not live up to its billing, and by the end of the 1930s combat once again swept across the plains of Europe and expanded around the world. Renewed interest in snipers surfaced in the earliest battles of World War II. During the Spanish Civil War, Loyalist snipers had experienced particular success in engaging the flanks and rear areas of the attacking Nationalist forces. Both Russian and German observers of the Spanish war returned to their countries with recommendations that they include snipers in the pending global conflict.

Once World War II began in earnest with the German blitzkrieg across Europe, however, the swift Nazi offensives did not require the skills of individual marksmen. The Germans had snipers with their infantry in the war’s initial months, but they found little opportunity to use them.

The British were as ill prepared to field snipers against the blitzkrieg as they were to stop the attacks. British sniper expert Captain Clifford Shore wrote in 1948, “I have spoken to many men who were in France from September 1939 until the time of Dunkirk [June 1940] and to date have not met anyone who could tell me that he saw any sniper rifles in that campaign.”

It was not until the German offensive on the Russian front stalled outside Stalingrad in late 1942 that the sniper emerged as a viable weapon in World War II. When the lines stagnated outside the Russian city, German and Soviet snipers began to make it extremely deadly for anyone to leave the protective foxholes, bunkers, and reinforced positions in the city’s buildings. Soviet snipers armed with 7.62-mm bolt-action Model 1891/30 Mosin-Nagant rifles and German marksmen with Gewehr 98ks, slightly modified into a shorter-barreled version of the World War I rifle, engaged enemy infantry as well as each other throughout the long cold winter.

The snipers so impressed the Soviet commanders at Stalingrad that they began a training school within the city inside a section of the Lazur Chemical Plant. Firing at targets painted on the factory’s wall, Soviet riflemen trained for only two days with scope-equipped Mosins before rejoining the front lines as snipers.

According to articles written by Soviet officers that appeared in U.S. military journals shortly after the Battle of Stalingrad, the Russian snipers worked in teams of two, one shooter and one observer, and focused on officers, machine gunners, mortar crews, and enemy snipers. Vassili Zaitsev, a former hunter from Elininski in the Ural Mountains, honed his skills at Stalingrad and by the end of the war is said to have achieved 242 confirmed kills of German soldiers. That number included several of the Nazi’s top snipers.

Although the story of Zaitsev appears valid, the Soviets did not hesitate to greatly enhance tales of the proficiency of their snipers and other soldiers to bolster morale. The actual contribution of Soviet snipers in securing Stalingrad and counterattacking into the German heartland is impossible to calculate,
but the Germans were known to respect and fear the single shot from the Soviet lines.

Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, also appreciated the skills of his marksmen. On May 1, 1942, Stalin issued an order that advised, “Line troops must learn the rifle thoroughly, must become masters of their weapons, must kill the enemy without fail, as do our glorious snipers, the exterminators of the German invaders.”

The German army was bested at Stalingrad, but the German sniper remained an efficient killer for the balance of the war. An article written by an officer that appeared in the
Hamburger Fremdenblatt
on May 9, 1944, praised German snipers for their service to the Fatherland. Referring to the performance of snipers against the Russians as “very satisfactory,” the unnamed officer provided an excellent description of the expert marksmen that would remain true for the rest of the war—as well as today: “Not everyone becomes or is able to become a sniper. Not everyone meets the necessary requirements. Natural proclivity, passion for the chase, fanatical love of firearms—these assure the results required of a sniper.”

The German army continued to recruit and train snipers until the last days of the war. In 1944, to promote volunteers and encourage those already in the program, the German army authorized a special oval sniper badge composed of an eagle’s head and oak leaves. Twenty confirmed kills gained a sniper the first-degree badge, forty the second-degree badge and sixty the third-degree badge.

Despite the successes of German and Soviet snipers on the Eastern Front the British high command remained unconvinced of the need for special riflemen on the mobile battlefield. Not until they encountered increased German sniper activity in North Africa and Italy did the British finally reactivate the sniper training they had used in World War I. In September 1943, the first British sniping school began training at Llanberis, in North Wales.

In conjunction with the training school, the British decided to present to infantry battalion commanders two-day orientations on sniper operations before they deployed for the battle
zones. This training provided information on sniper capabilities as well as instruction on their proper deployment.

The acceptance of snipers in Commonwealth regiments accelerated steadily during the war. By early 1944 sniping instructors had established schools in the rear areas of battle zones to provide immediate replacements. Members of the unit that eventually became the 21st Army Sniping School landed at Normandy on August 17, 1944, and began their first instruction two days later. The unofficial definition of British sniping became “the art of drilling round holes into square heads.”

Despite years of warning, the United States Army entered the conflict as ill prepared to field snipers as the British had been. German marksmen immediately took a toll of U.S. infantrymen from their earliest battles in North Africa and continued to do so until the war’s final fights. Despite their losses to German snipers and the success of Allied marksmen, the U.S. Army did not establish a central sniper training program or policy during the war.

In the European Theater, the U.S. senior command left sniper training and employment to the individual units. Some division, regiment, and battalion commanders did not use snipers at all, while others actively recruited soldiers with extensive hunting or competitive shooting experience. The army’s minimum standard for designation as a sniper became the ability to strike a dummy target at 400 yards and to hit a head-size target at 200 yards.

The War Department did provide some written guidance. Its Field Manual 21-75, “Infantry Scouting, Patrolling, and Sniping,” which appeared in various editions and updates before, during, and after the war, provided extremely brief and basic sniping principles. For instance, the February 6, 1944, edition of FM 21-75 included a mere twelve pages of sniping information in a chapter at the end of the manual. War Department technical manuals of the period also included useful guidelines on the maintenance and care of the various sniper rifles and scopes.

Once trained—to whatever degree—by their units, U.S.
Army snipers in Europe generally employed the same procedures and tactics as other countries’ snipers. They primarily worked in two-man teams and focused on engaging officers and heavy weapons crews. Most American snipers, especially early in the war, used the same ’03 Springfields that had proved successful in World War I and adapted several advanced telescopic sights to these weapons.

American snipers also used the M1C and M1D models of the .30-caliber M1 Garand that became the basic U.S. infantry rifle of the war. Between 1937 and 1945, the Springfield and Winchester arms companies produced more than 4.5 million of the gas-operated. clip-fed, air-cooled, semiautomatic weapons. The M1 proved to be a highly durable, accurate rifle that significantly contributed to the U.S. military victory. However, although ordinary World War II infantrymen coveted their M1s, many snipers continued to use the extremely accurate ’03 Springfields even after the C- and D-model M1s with sight-mounting adaptations became readily available.

Americans deploying to the Pacific also faced formidable snipers. Japan, particularly after losing the offensive momentum and beginning a defensive war, used snipers throughout the Pacific Theater. Japanese snipers initially carried the 6.5-mm Type 38 rifle that had been in use since 1905. As the war progressed, many of those were replaced by Arisaka Type 97 rifles with a 2.5 power scope. The relatively small-caliber rifle and low-power scope limited the accuracy and range of Japanese snipers to about 300 yards. However, the long-barreled, small-projectile weapon produced little smoke or muzzle flash, making Japanese sniper fire extremely difficult for opponents to pinpoint.

Disciplined Japanese snipers combined shooting skills with excellent concealment and camouflage techniques. More important, the marksmen, like all Japanese soldiers, swore to fight to the death for their emperor. As a result, to gain better fields of fire Japanese snipers, not worrying about escape or surrender, willingly established their “hides” in the tops of trees.

Individual Japanese infantrymen with open-sighted, nonscoped rifles also frequently engaged the Americans with sporadic fire, causing U.S. soldiers and Marines to refer to almost any low-volume shooting as “sniper fire.” Colonel James A. Donovan, USMC (Retired), served from 1940 to 1945 with the 2nd Marine Division, including time as the executive officer of a battalion of the 6th Marines during the battles for the Mariana Islands. In an interview more than fifty years after World War II, Donovan explained, “In the Pacific all Jap riflemen were dubbed ‘snipers’ by Marines. Of course, they were only riflemen—but were all good at cover, concealment, and patience. They were fair shots and caused many delays in our advances. They were more effective than they deserved to be.”

One of the most common countersniper measures employed by the army and the Marine Corps in the Pacific was the same as that used in Europe. A training note for the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry Regiment, provides an excellent summary of countersniper measures. According to the report, when the 163rd replaced an Australian unit during the Battle of Sananada in New Guinea on January 2, 1943, the American infantrymen immediately came under Japanese sniper fire that killed and wounded several.

Initially, the 163rd used observers to locate the snipers and then raked the treetops and ground level with automatic rifle and machine gun fire. That neutralized some of the sniper fire but casualties continued. After several days, the 163rd brought their 37-mm antitank gun section forward and in response to sniper fire blasted nearby treetops with the cannons. Even though the sniping significantly decreased, the 163rd never completely ended it until the offensives overran and destroyed the last Japanese units.

Other army units in the Pacific employed similar antisniper techniques, but like their comrades in Europe, they never had support from an army- or theater-level sniper-training program. In the Pacific, sniper training within the army remained an individual decision of unit commanders down to battalion level.

Marines in the Pacific also practiced the mass-firepower tactic, but senior corps leaders recognized even before the war began that trained individual marksmen themselves were the most efficient countersnipers. The Marine Corps had no formal sniper program prior to U.S. entry into World War II, but it did encourage improvements in civilian manufacture of telescopic sights and assigned officers and enlisted men to study the possible uses of advanced marksmanship.

Two years before the war began, Captain George O. Van Orden and Chief Marine Gunner Calvin A. Lloyd of the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, Rifle Range Detachment studied the history of sniping and drew conclusions about the future need for such marksmen. Early in 1941 the two men published their findings in a seventy-two-page, single-spaced report titled “Equipment for the American Sniper.”
^‡
The Marine Corps reproduced the report and forwarded 1,000 copies to units around the world.

The first twenty pages of the document extensively quote World War I personal memoirs on sniping. The last section discusses the merits of various rifles and scopes. Despite its brevity, the study stands alone as the best summary of sniping prior to World War II and the best predictor of future U.S. sniper developments.

The theme throughout the writing of Van Orden and Lloyd is that snipers are a necessary part of any ground combat force and that these special marksmen required and deserved weapons, scopes, and ammunition specially manufactured for their difficult missions. At the conclusion of
Chapter 2
, the two Marines emphasized, “The sniper has not survived merely because of the romantic, adventurous glamour which surrounds his campaign of individual extermination—the private war he wages. He is present on the battlefields because there is a real and vital need for him. It is safe to say that the American sniper could be regarded as the greatest all-around rifleman
the world has ever known, and his equipment should include the best aids to his dangerous calling that the inventive genius of the United States can produce.”