Is Journalism Worth Dying For?: Final Dispatches (40 page)

You have stated on several occasions that there was no sign of international terrorist involvement in Beslan. On what basis?

The Commission has no evidence of the involvement of international terrorism in Beslan. The munitions were Russian, and nothing is known about who financed the group. Lebedev, the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, speaking at the Commission, talked a lot about how they had “terminated” things both abroad and in Russia, but what does terminate mean? Did they kill people? Did they bring them to court? Let’s see the reports of the investigative agencies and the court verdicts. There is nothing. The Commission has only a vague report. If I am given specific information I will change my view, but for the time being it is all just talk.

What percentage of those testifying to the Commission caused you to have doubts of this kind, that the quality of their information was dubious?

I didn’t count. I have given you the example of Lebedev. I asked him to name the emissaries of Wahhabism in Russia, and he replied that was not a matter for him. As regards Arab mercenaries, we were told some had been present in Beslan, but I appealed repeatedly to the representative of the Prosecutor’s Office to speak to the Saudi Arabian Embassy and find out if there were Saudis involved. Without that confirmation we really cannot make that categorical assertion. But actually, how much difference would it make even if Saudi Arabia did confirm some were present? From my point of view, none. Individual terrorists might go for a shoot-out, either for money or motivated by their religious fanaticism. There are plenty of people like that around in some parts of the world, but that does not mean they are members of an international terrorist network called al-Qaeda.

As for that mysterious tape which Torshin played during his public account, it was not discovered by the official investigators but supposedly by children, who handed it to an American journalist. On this tape a supposed Arab, Abu Dzeit, rattles away in Russian so fluent you
couldn’t better it! Where is the file on him? Again, all the information comes from abroad. The Commission has nothing.

I state publicly as a member of the Commission that I heard nothing specific from the appropriate intelligence agencies. I saw no evidence from which I could conclude who Abu Dzeit was. If I look at the report of the American Congress’s 9/11 Commission I find extremely detailed information about each of the terrorists: where he was born, where he studied, where he took his flying lessons, what resources he lived on. In our Commission there is just a list of names from the Prosecutor’s Office. Do they correspond to reality? Why did these individuals become resistance fighters? Why did they carry out such a dreadful act? The public will not be getting any answers.

What conclusions have you come to as to why the group which seized the Beslan school was formed?

For that you would need to study the composition of the group. The identity of eight of the terrorists has not even been established; on the others we possess only such general information as their names, their nationality, the fact that some had previous convictions, and that some were taking drugs. But how did those who were on drugs manage to resist so desperately for several hours? There is one extraordinary episode: Khuchbarov shot three of the terrorists, two women and a man, for refusing to obey his orders. When the children started drinking urine and were suffering terribly, these people started shouting at Khuchbarov that he couldn’t do this and must release the children. In other words, they took part in the hostage-taking but in the course of it repudiated their previous aims, and for that they were killed. Who were those three? Should not their bodies have been returned to their relatives? Are they resistance fighters or victims? There is a concept in law of voluntarily refusing to go through with a crime. That does not completely exonerate you, but it is taken into account when the sentence is being decided. Unfortunately, the Commission did not look into the terrorists’ personalities. I may propose that we should.

Beslan is part and parcel of the Chechen slaughter, one episode in an ongoing drama. If the Commission is supposed to be establishing
the causes of the school seizure, then quite plainly they are not to be found in Ossetia. I am alarmed that nobody is intending – and here I fundamentally disagree with Torshin’s report – to investigate the causes. In the report being prepared there is no consideration of why the resistance fighters appeared in the first place. Why do they enjoy support in their society? What role in all this is played by the massive violation of human rights in Chechnya?

Did the Commission at least study the history of the attack on Ingushetia on June 21–22, 2004, immediately prior to Beslan?

No. What are my disagreements with the Commission? The first point is that Putin, by refusing to provide Maskhadov with safe passage, made it certain that the assault would take place. Secondly, Patrushev and Putin’s advisers [Anisimov and Pronichev, Deputy Directors of the Russian FSB] had major involvement but are bearing no responsibility at all. Thirdly, the violation of human rights in the Caucasus is a major cause of the Beslan tragedy, engendering more and more new resistance fighters. Fourthly, we failed to investigate the causes. The seizure of Ingushetia and other terrorist acts were not examined by the Commission at all, as if they were completely unrelated to Beslan.

There is a serious problem. Given all the confusion that arose, and after the assassination of Maskhadov, there is speculation about an appalling alternative explanation. You hear this whenever Duma Deputies are talking among themselves. Perhaps, in order to stop Maskhadov getting to Beslan, somebody organised the explosion inside the school which triggered the assault and all the rest of it. According to the report of the Kesayev Commission, Advisers Anisimov and Pronichev had their own separate office in the operational headquarters. What was going on in there? What decisions were being taken? Who is going to believe now that the explosions were accidental, especially when they didn’t occur on the ground floor, where there is not even a crater, but somewhere above the ceiling?

The President himself sowed the seeds for this explanation of events. It is an explanation which people are trying not to discuss and are
pretending does not exist, but which would totally discredit the state. That is why I want answers from Putin.

The Commission has officially questioned Anisimov and Pronichev. What did they have to say?

They said they were sent to Beslan by Patrushev to offer advice and that was all. Beyond that, we are in the realm of speculation as to what they did or did not do there. In my view, the President and Patrushev confused the situation unbelievably. Under the law on the struggle against terrorism there should have been no advisers there, just an operational headquarters bearing full responsibility. In Beslan we had uncalled-for advisers functioning unlawfully in parallel with those in command. If Andreyev [Valeriy Andreyev, the Head of the North Ossetian FSB Directorate at the time the school was seized], who was in charge of the counter-terrorist operation, had two of his bosses advising him, how was he to take responsible decisions?

Can you give an assessment of the conduct of senior state officials? Patrushev, for example? Did he do everything he could?

He told us he was in Moscow and not at the scene, but we have a different complaint against him: why to this day have no effective informants been infiltrated into the terrorists’ ranks? Why was the FSB unprepared, not only in Beslan but also in Ingushetia, when resistance fighters rampaged unchecked for several hours and killed people who supported the federal authorities? That too was a disgrace.

The same goes for Minister Nurgaliev. The most serious complaint against the Interior Ministry is that it failed to organise an effective cordon round the school. They said that people in the Caucasus are hotheaded and just ignored it. Minister Nurgaliev sent his deputy, Pankov, there. There was a crowd right round the school which joined in the assault and the fire engines could not get through because of a huge number of private cars obstructing them. What was the militia doing in the meantime? I would not say that Nurgaliev should take personal responsibility for this, but Pankov certainly should. Instead, the explanation was: “It was splendid that the local townsfolk assisted.
Without them far more people would have died, and they pulled many of the injured free.” Does that mean that next time the hostages’ relatives should just grab whatever comes to hand and mount an assault?

How do you rate Dzasokhov’s actions?

Do you mean, do I think he should have gone into the school? I have no answer to that. Should Dzasokhov have gone to his death? Your question is too difficult. It is absolutely clear that Aushev, who did go in, was much less at risk than Dzasokhov. Given their past records, Aushev was much less at risk than Zyazikov or Dzasokhov who, I am quite sure, would not have come out alive. For me it is obvious that in situations like that the Republican presidents need to be protected. They should not bear the burden for everything that happens in the course of a counter-terrorist operation. Did Dzasokhov do everything he could? Well, what could he do? He initiated the process of negotiating with Zakayev. He was at the scene, among the people, not hiding. I imagine he did what he could.

What about Zyazikov?

If he had gone in they would have killed him. For them he was a traitor.

Did Dr Roshal do enough?

Roshal was questioned by the Commission. He is a decent man. My impression was that he should not have been asked to go to talk to the fighters. The only conversation he had with them ended with them calling him a kike – a foul, churlish insult. On the other hand, it was he they called for initially, and he came.

How do you assess Aushev’s actions?

Aushev is a figure from the Caucasian elite of the Yeltsin era. At the beginning they were all presidents and ministers: Aushev, Maskhadov, Dudayev, Basayev were quite often seated at the same table. The Caucasus is a brotherhood. Then the Chechens went off the rails and started killing people. The war with Russia started and Aushev sided with Russia. In Beslan Aushev did everything right.

The so-called advisers, Anisimov and Pronichev?

The decision to send advisers was taken by Patrushev and Putin. Before the Commission Anisimov and Pronichev took the line that they had been given orders, went to Beslan, and gave advice.

What did you learn from your work in the Commission that was new?

The most unexpected discovery was the activity of the human rights organizations. My attitude towards them was that they were “little shits,” to use the expression of Pavel Grachev [the Russian Minister of Defence during the First Chechen War]. My view of the little shits dated from 1993–5 when I was meeting refugees from Chechnya and realized that what was happening there was a genocide of the Russians, and that the human rights activists were not speaking up for them but only for the Chechens. That infuriated me. Today, though, I have to admit that the human rights organizations have overcome that bias. They are fighting for the rights of people in the Caucasus irrespective of nationality, protecting the rights of ordinary people, not of the nouveaux riches. They take risks. They don’t spare themselves. At any moment they could be knifed or shot.

One final question: Gryzlov, as you describe it, on one occasion effectively took over the chair of the Commission, but the Commission was also visited by Lyubov Sliska, the Deputy Speaker of the Duma. What justification did she offer for interfering?

In November Sliska and Mironov came to the Commission and told us we should have our conclusion out before the New Year. She said the public were very stirred up and we needed to work as quickly as possible. They got support. Lyubov Sliska is an extremely glamorous woman who gets featured in the glossy magazines. How could you refuse her? Of course, Gryzlov had no business delegating Sliska to come and tell us what to do, but I would not call it interference. Let us just say it was less a meeting of the Commission than a meeting with a glamorous woman. She asked the Commission to bring its work to a conclusion. We agreed and passed a resolution, but then changed our minds. Instead of the final report, what Torshin presented
on December 28 was an account of the work we have done. Incidentally, neither Gryzlov, Mironov nor Sliska turned up to hear it.

I asked Torshin to state publicly that I was opposed to the account both in form and in substance. He did not do so, and has effectively obliged me to go to the press. That is why I am giving this interview, addressing the Russian public myself.

BASAYEV BLOWN TO BITS: CHECHNYA WITHOUT TERRORIST NO. 1

July 13, 2006

A long-awaited event occurred this week: according to official sources, Terrorist No. 1, Shamil Basayev, has been killed, a man responsible for dozens of terrorist acts and the taking of hundreds of lives. If this was, as claimed, a successful operation by the intelligence services, they are to be congratulated, as are we all.

There remain not a few questions in respect of the fatal explosion in the village of Ekazhevo. Distrust of the official version is entirely understandable: Basayev has been “killed” several times before, only for it to be found that the claims were premature. Even more often he has managed to slip out of what appeared to be totally inescapable situations, as during the raid on Dagestan in 1999 [suspected to have been orchestrated by the FSB, and used as a pretext to start the Second Chechen War] when his rabble marched out unscathed, in formation, under the puzzled gaze of special operations soldiers watching the procession through their telescopic sights.

Be that as it may, whether Basayev was liquidated or liquidated himself, the bastard is no longer a player in either politics or terrorism. We can breathe more easily, but can we really relax?

The Career of Terrorist Basayev