Japan's Comfort Women (34 page)

From the ballroom, we walked to the girls’ room. There were fifty cubicles to a building, each tiny room separated by a low partition, and a thin curtain for a door. Each entrance had a crayon-coloured sign reading, “Well Come, Kimi,” or “Well Come, Haruko,” those being the names of the occupants.

. . .

Off the stairway we saw a long, narrow room with the sign “PRO Station” painted out lightly. This was the room where the Army supplied prophylactics for the GIs until it put the place off limits. . . .

Every twenty-four hours a woman “processed” an average of 15 GIs, each of whom paid ¥50, or $3.30. Of this amount, half went to the management,

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Plate 6.5
A US soldier visiting a Japanese comfort woman in Kyoto in October 1945.

Source: Mainichi Shimbun

and the other half was kept by the women. Out of their income, the women paid for their food, medical expenses, cosmetics and clothes. I did a rapid bit of calculating. Among them, the 250 women “processed” 3,750 GIs every twenty-four hours. This meant a daily income of $6,200 for the International Palace.60

There is also a document prepared by the PHW Section of the GHQ which briefly refers to this large brothel complex. According to this document: •

The price of “Short Time” at the International Palace is now 50 Yen. A patron staying after 12 midnight, usually stays all night and must buy four 50 Yen tickets. . . .

•

There are many girls who desire to keep on in this business. Most have lost one or both parents in the bombing, and have no funds and no means of livelihood otherwise.

•

In the “International [ Palace]” the fee is divided as follows: 10 percent to the House; 45 percent to the “Chaperone”; 45 percent to the girl. Girls pay about 10 Yen per day for food. Clothing is very expensive but the exact price and the arrangement for procuring it were not know to the informants. . . .

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•

Some of their girls came from Ut[s]unomiya, near Nikko. “We had one girl there who served 50 men in one night. She was very busy and the American soldiers stood in line to get to her. . . .”61

In the same document dated December 29, 1945, the PHW Section estimated that the total number of prostitutes in the Tokyo area at that time was 6,000, and all of them were “within communicating distance of American troops.” It also estimated that the total number of prostitutes in all Japan was 150,000.

However, the PHW Section acknowledged that this “estimate does not take into consideration any number of street prostitutes.”62

According to one Japanese source, by the end of November, apart from RAA facilities, 25 new comfort stations had been set up in various places in Tokyo, employing a total of more than 1,500 comfort women.63 The number of comfort women and “taxi dancers” employed by the RAA was well over 2,000 at that time.64 Thus, in the Tokyo area alone, it can be estimated that the total number of comfort women and prostitutes serving the occupation troops at the end of 1945 was 10,000.

It is no exaggeration to say that it was not the textile, chemical or other industries that were rehabilitating the immediate postwar Japanese economy but the sex industry, and that this came at the expense of the physical and psychological health of tens of thousands of Japanese sex workers. According to the survey conducted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Headquarters, in 1948 (that is three years after the war) 77.5 percent of prostitutes had become sex workers due to poverty.65 According to a similar survey conducted by the Yokohama City Police Office in 1950 – five years after the war – more than 43 percent of the 584 prostitutes who were interviewed cited poverty as the main reason they had become prostitutes. Apart from poverty, these women had suffered in other ways. The above survey noted that 13 percent of the interviewed prostitutes had lost their parents either during or immediately after the war.66 In addition, a large number of the women suffered further with venereal disease contracted through their work.

VD problems and the failure of GHQ’s VD

prevention policies

The Allied troops suffered VD problems from the start of the occupation. Within a short time VD had become the most serious health issue that GHQ had to confront. This was despite the establishment of a number of VD preventive prophylactic stations in red-light districts.

For example, the VD ratio for the 8th Army troops more than doubled from 26.84 per 1,000 in early September to 56.39 per 1,000 in late October, 1945.

The VD rate for the entire US occupation forces during the first three months of 1946 rose as high as 233 per 1,000. The rate was astonishingly high among the US Navy and Marine troops – 476.12 per 1,000 for the troops in Yokosuka and 574.84 per 1,000 for the troops in Sasebo in Nagasaki prefecture in June 1946.67

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In other words, in some cases, at least half the US Navy and Marine troops were suffering from VD, in particular gonorrhea.

At the same time in Hiroshima and other prefectures of the Ch
e
goku region of southwest Japan, the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF ) faced a far more serious VD problem. Between their arrival in Japan in early February 1946 and that June, the VD rate for the 34th Australian Infantry Brigade was 550 per 1,000. According to one of the Brigade’s official reports, during this period, at least three men from the brigade were diagnosed with “latent gonorrhea,”

which meant that they were almost incurable. More than 50 soldiers from the brigade had become neurotic cases as a result of the disease and some had to be sent back to Australia. By September 27, 1946, a total of 5,823 BCOF members were suffering from VD, of which 3,491 were Australian soldiers.68 Many of these Australian men were infected with syphilis. The headquarters of the brigade adopted a conspiracy theory in order to explain the extraordinarily high incidence of the disease. They claimed that “there may be some substance in the charge that the health of our force is being deliberately destroyed.”69

In order to combat widespread VD problems among the US occupation troops, Lieutenant-Colonel James H. Gordon, a VD control medical officer in the PHW Section of GHQ , planned to introduce more rigorous VD examinations of the comfort women and prompt treatment for those infected. This plan was devised in September 1945, less than one month after the landing of the troops in Japan. With this aim, Gordon had a series of meetings with Ishibashi Ukichi, head of the Preventive Health Department of the Ministry of Health and Public Welfare of the Japanese government. On October 3, 1945, he summoned Dr. Yosano Hikaru, Chief of the Preventive Medical Section of the Tokyo Preventive Health Department and Dr. Fukai Katsu, superintendent of Yoshiwara City Hospital (a special VD hospital in one of the traditional brothel districts of Tokyo). He wanted to find out about the VD clinics in the metropolitan area and to discuss with the doctors how to control VD among those women in the “service industry.”70 From that point on, the two doctors, and other Japanese VD specialists, were often summoned to the PHW Section and their cooperation sought in implementing the US examination and treatment measures that were new to Japan at the time.

Under existing Japanese law at the time, licensed prostitutes were liable for VD examinations. They were examined once a week by government health personnel and compelled to undertake hospital treatment if found to be infected.

On October 16, 1945, GHQ issued an ordinance to the Japanese government not only to enforce this law rigidly but to expand the periodic VD examination system from licensed prostitutes only to “all individuals whose occupations or activities subject them to serious hazard of venereal disease transmission.” Through the Japanese government, governors of all prefectures were ordered to enact this ordinance from October 23. At the same time, the PHW instructed the Ministry of Health and Public Welfare to investigate the situation of medical supplies, particularly penicillin and condoms, in each prefecture “as to the amount of such supplies on hand and amounts needed.”71

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According to Gordon’s memorandum on October 26, the Tokyo metropolitan government also published the new VD examination requirements. The brothels were often inspected by medical officers, and prophylactic stations were set up in almost all red-light districts. However, he realized that there was a lack of laboratories to perform VD tests in the metropolitan area. On October 27, Gordon met Dr. Ichikawa Tokuji, Professor of Urology at Tokyo Imperial University and an executive member of the Japanese Association for Control of Venereal Disease. Through Ichikawa and his organization, Gordon tried to re-establish and expand clinics and organic laboratories for VD diagnosis in Japan. Many of these had presumably been destroyed by bombing during the war. Gordon also asked Ichikawa to provide a list of competent venerealogists in Tokyo, expecting that he would utilize their services to conduct VD examinations on women in the “service industry.” Ichikawa also promised Gordon that he would submit a roster of about 1,500 qualified dermatologists and urologists in Japan.72

Despite the new regulations adopted throughout Japan and the continuous efforts to implement a thorough VD examination system, the problem worsened rather than improved. Many brothels in Tokyo, for example, in particular those which were not operated by the RAA, had to be placed “off-limits.” In order to tackle this ever-growing problem, the 8th Army – the core body of the US

occupation forces – authorized the use of drugs from its stocks for the treatment of “Japanese civilians”
i.e.
“the women who were a potential source of VD.”73

Drugs, in particular penicillin, a new and effective antibiotic, were not readily available in Japan at that time. From early November, the 8th Army released not only penicillin but various other anti-VD drugs to Japanese health agencies.

The following strict order from the PHW Section made sure that the drugs provided by the US forces would not be utilized for anyone but the women who were providing sexual service to the US occupation troops: Plans for the Use of Anti-Venereal Drugs Released to Japanese from US

Army Stocks.

1

The Prefectural Health Office will be held accountable for the proper use of materials supplied from US Army stocks.

2

These supplies will be used only in the treatment of individuals who represent a potential source of venereal disease to personnel of the occupational forces, that is, women infected with gonorrhea, chancroid, lymphogranulom verereum or early syphilis.

. . .

7

In the event of failure of the Prefectural Health Officer or a subordinate health agency to comply with the requirement set forth herein (or such other restrictions as may be set up) the stock of drugs supplied and remaining on hand will be recaptured by the Surgeon of the military command concerned and additional supplies will be released in that Prefecture only upon further authorization by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power.74

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On December 22, 1945, however, GHQ received instructions from Washington, DC that “in view of the recent development of an acute shortage of penicillin for US civilians, US-produced penicillin should not be used for Japanese or Koreans except in extreme emergency as a life saving measure.”75 GHQ ignored this instruction and continued to use penicillin predominantly as an anti-VD medi-cine. GHQ administered a large quantity of penicillin and other anti-VD drugs to the Japanese women in the early stage of occupation at a time when penicillin was highly sought after as an effective drug for TB and when ordinary people could not afford to purchase it. The Japanese local governments gratefully accepted massive provisions of these drugs and issued them free to infected women. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the US

government sought payment for a large amount of drugs, including penicillin for treatment of VD – even where the Japanese had not asked for them. Eventually, the Ministry of Finance agreed to pay on behalf of the local governments.76

Together with the provision of new drugs, GHQ introduced a rigorous examination program and VD control laws. On November 22, 1945, the “Complementary Regulation for the Venereal Disease Prevention Law” was issued. This law made it compulsory for any doctor who diagnosed VD in a patient to report all the personal details of the patient such as name, address, and occupation to a local government. Local governments were mandated to order an infected person “whose occupation naturally involves liability of spreading venereal disease to be admitted to a hospital.” Furthermore, without a health certificate issued by a local government, a woman was not allowed to “engage in the business of receiving a guest.” Proprietors and managers of brothels were also liable to furnish “necessary equipment for the prevention of venereal disease in accordance with the instruction given by a local government.” Proprietors were not allowed to operate a business unless they equipped it with appropriate disinfect-ant equipment. The law also stipulated that anyone who violated the regulations would be fined.77 As for the enforcement of this law, instructions were sent to every prefectural governor saying in part that if the patient was unable to pay, local government should make sure the woman received adequate medical treatment free of charge.78 This instruction clearly indicated that both GHQ and Japanese government officials knew that many “service women” were too poor to pay the cost of medical treatment.