Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (83 page)

Eastern European studies on the problem of minorities during the inter-

war years.

Following Martin Schulze Wessel’s attempt to establish loyalty as a ba-

sic concept in historical writing, the term can be defined as a category of

social action and feeling that refers to the interdependence of care and

faithfulness (Schulze Wessel, 2004). Peter Haslinger, taking up Schulze

Wessel’s ideas that minority groups steer a middle course between an in-

ternal national loyalty and the faithful duty of citizens toward the state, has

distinguished an external from an internal form of identification. Patriot-

ism, he contends, though difficult to grasp, is to be sought on the individ-

ual level while the external perspective can at least be quantified using such

public collective acts as complying with a call-up or voting in elections

(Haslinger 2004, 47–49; Haslinger and Puttkammer).

In contrast to loyalty, immunity and self-willed behavior stand for dis-

sent and non-conformism. These terms also mark a difference to all forms

of open or politically motivated opposition, which had claimed the atten-

tion of historians for a long time. It was Martin Broszat who in his re-

search on National Socialism introduced the concept of immunity (“Resi-

stenz”), wanting to point out that the regime had to fend off not merely

the political opposition on the part of organized labor and the conservative

elites; he also wanted to stress that the mass of the people showed a certain

immunity to the regime’s system of values and norms. Although Broszat

——————

6 Anke Stephan distinguishes the narrower term of “dissidence“ from the wider “dissent”, saying that the latter subsumes all varieties of non-conformism. “Dissidence”, on the other hand, is used to refer to a kind of non-violent protest in which the public arena is the central agency invoked, and in which dissidents (inakomysliashchie), who appealed to human as well as civil rights, utilized the samizdat information network (i.e. uncensored literary works published by the authors themselves). Stephan (2005, 22–27, especially 24–25).

“ T H E P E O P L E ’ S V O I C E ” : E L E C T I O N S T O T H E S U P R E M E S O V I E T

313

had only proposed a revision of the purely political explanatory approach,

he was faced with his critics’ contention that the regime, notwithstanding

some partial immunity, had overall met with broad-based approval.7 For

research on the GDR, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk has subsumed the terms

“resistance” and “opposition” under the expression of “refractory be-

havior” (“widerständiges Verhalten”), on which basis he described a canon

of options for action that questioned, limited or otherwise constrained the

claim to power by the Party. “Social refusal”, he argued, had been reflected

in the conscious or unconscious boycott of official conventions, such as

non-participation in demonstrations, while “social protest” had manifested

itself in the grumbles about everyday grievances, whether in the form of

petitions or strikes. “Political dissent”, he explained, had expressed itself in three ways, as anticommunist, as socio-cultural or societal, and as reform-socialist opposition. “Mass protest”, finally, he said had emerged only

twice, in 1953 and 1989.8

A conceptual instrument in contrast to the categories of loyalty and dis-

sent is represented by the category of self-will (“Eigensinn”), which Alf

Lüdtke applied to the everyday history of workers before 1945 and Tho-

mas Lindenberger used to refer specifically to the history of the GDR.

Describing this phenomenon, Lüdtke went back to the educational pro-

gram of the Enlightenment and defined self-will as being opposed to disci-

pline and culture or as the expression of the limited capacity for adapting

to society. Behind this term, he contended, was a basic attitude of distance

to everybody and everything, which resulted in forms of behavior ranging

from passive acceptance and participation on the one hand to non-con-

formism and emancipation on the other (Lüdtke 1993; 1994; 1997). In

particular, Lindenberger drew attention to the fact that self-willed behavior

was motivated less by conscious resistance than by the individual’s social

role and situation, and was the product of egoistic interests (Lindenberger

1999, 21–26). All this goes some way towards explaining why during elec-

tion campaigns the Soviet regime met not only with widespread indiffer-

——————

7 Cf. Broszat (1981, 697–699; 1987, 49–52, 55, 61–66). Cf. Schlögl (1996), and Eckert (1995), Kleßmann (1996), and Stöver (1997), who offer a comparative perspective.

8 Cf. Kowalczuk (1995a, 1995b), who took his inspiration from Richard Löwenthal, who in turn distinguished in the debate with Broszat between “political opposition”, “societal refusal” and “ideological dissent”. See Löwenthal (1984). Cf. also Neubert (1998), Neubert and Eisenfeld (2001) as well as Henke et al. (1999).

314

T H O M A S M . B O H N

ence from its people but also, in some individual cases, decided antipathy

as well as decided approval.

The Development of the Soviet Electoral System

In accordance with the tradition of the workers’ councils (soviets), the

Soviet electoral system adhered to the principle of delegation of worker

representatives and the rules of democratic centralism until the Constitu-

tion of 1936 took effect. Direct elections were known only at the lowest

level. While the nomination of deputies for the Soviets in towns and vil-

lages was made by informal vote in factory meetings, a selection was estab-

lished for all other administrative levels, with nominating agencies merely

rubberstamping the recommendations of the relevant body at the next

higher level. Overall, the Soviet system was based upon a sort of class-

oriented electoral practice: frowned-upon social groups like entrepreneurs,

middling farmers and priests were excluded from elections, while there

was, on the other hand, a town-country contrast in the supra-regional

bodies based on a ratio of one to five (i.e. one deputy for 25,000 electors in

towns and 125,000 in villages).9

It was not until the 1936 Constitution that general, direct and secret

elections were guaranteed on the basis of the principle of territoriality.

After the official termination of the class struggle within the Soviet Union,

restrictions to the franchise of supposed class enemies became superflu-

ous. By means of constituencies calculated in proportion to the electorate,

an equal number of candidates was achieved for town and country (Mau-

rach 1936/37; Getty 1991). In the election regulations of July 9, 1937 and

January 9, 1950, the nomination of candidates in the factories was retained

but the respective pre-election meetings were no more than discussion

forums and were given an acclamatory function only, since the right of

nomination was reserved for the Party organizations.10 In the resolution of

——————

9 On this issue cf. the general treatments by Leng (1969, 1973), Diederich (1972), Klokočka (1989). On the general development cf. Zaitzeff (1925/26), and Uschakow (1988).

10 Cf. Ob utverzhdenie “Polozheniia o vyborakh v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR”. Ukaz ot 9

ianvariia 1950 g. [On the confirmation of the “Regulations for the Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR”. Ukas of 9 January 1950]. In: Sbornik zakonov SSSR i

“ T H E P E O P L E ’ S V O I C E ” : E L E C T I O N S T O T H E S U P R E M E S O V I E T

315

January 21, 1957, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union confirmed the widespread practice of nominating only one

candidate for each seat.11

Western Research on Soviet Elections

During the Cold War Sovietologists derived their information on elections

in the USSR from published legal provisions and official election statistics

contained in propaganda literature, as well as from the statements of emi-

grants. This was the basis on which election campaigns, votes and election

results were discussed.12

As far as election campaigns were concerned, the nomination of candi-

dates and the mobilization of the masses were at the center of interest:

judging by the composition of the Soviets in various republics, the conclu-

sion was drawn that the nomination of women and Party members must

have been based on a quota system—a plausible assumption, which has

however so far been impossible to trace back to an official resolution

(Jacobs 1970, 67; Hill 1973, 197). As the failure rate of candidates in the

pre-election meetings for local elections was, according to Soviet data, in

the region of 1:1,000 (Friedgut 1979, 86), the people’s say in this matter, it

was assumed, had been reduced to the possibility of formulating questions

and giving deputies so-called fictive-voter mandates (Révész’ 1979, 461;

Hahn 1988, 104–105). Nevertheless, no fewer than around 15 per cent of

the total electorate are said to have been involved in election campaigns,

either as agitators or members of election committees (Zaslavsky and Brym

1978, 365).13 The agitators, who went door to door to about 30 families,

——————

Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. 1938 g. – 1961 g. Moscow: Izvestiia

Sovetov deputatov trudiashchichsia SSSR, 1961, 105–22.

11 Ob uluchshenii deiatel’nosti Sovetov deputatov trudiashchichsia i usilenii ich sviazei s massami [On the Improvement of the Work of the Soviets of the Worker Deputies and the Intensification of their Connections with the masses]. In: Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika. Moscow: Politizdat, 1957, 448.

12 Cf. Carson 1955; Swearer 1961; Mote 1965; Gilison 1968; Maggs 1968; Jacobs 1970; Lammich 1972; Reichel 1973; Hill 1973; Zaslavsky and Brym 1978, 1983; Révész 1979; Schneider 1981; White 1985; Karklins 1986.

13 Friedgut puts the share of agitators in the electorate for 1975 at 5 per cent (Friedgut 1979, 98).