Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins (44 page)

“rewind the tapes”: Richard Whittle, “Newest Afghanistan Surveillance System” InvestorsHub, January 1, 2011.
http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=58320282
.

Gorgon Stare didn’t work: Department of the Air Force, 203 West D Avenue, Suite 609, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, “Memorandum to USAFWC/CC from 53 WG/CC, Subject: MQ9 Gorgon Stare Fielding Requirements,” December 31, 2010.

“moderate-resolution”: Senate Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, p. 84.
http://www.dtic.mil/congressional_budget/pdfs/FY2010_pdfs/SASC_111-35.pdf
.

For example, in 2004 they hired Dawn Gibbons: Jeff German and J. Patrick Coolican, “More Questions Raised About Gibbons,”
Las Vegas Sun
, March 31, 2007.

A 2010 Congressional Ethics Office report: Eric Lichtblau and David C. Kirkpatrick, “Panel Clears 7 Lawmakers in Lobbying Scandal,”
New York Times
, February 27, 2010.

Following his retirement, Meermans embarked on a second career: Richard Whittle, “Predator’s Big Safari,” op. cit., p. 11.

Given Meermans’ subsequent third career as vice president for strategic planning: Linkedin profile page, “Mike Meermans, VP for Strategic Planning at Sierra Nevada Corporation.”
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/mike-meermans/7/349/ab7
. Accessed July 26, 2014.

“so close they share rubbers”: Aram Roston, “The Colonel and His Labyrinth,” Vocativ,
www.vocativ.com
.
http://www.vocativ.com/usa/nat-sec/colonel-labyrinth/
. Accessed October 30, 2013.

The pilot … was blind in one eye: Aram Roston: “A Secret Mission, a One-Eyed Pilot, and a Fiery Crash in Colombia, Vocativ,
www.vocativ.com
. Accessed December 16, 2013.

11 | Death by a Number

Petraeus told reporters that special forces operations in Afghanistan were “at absolutely the highest operational tempo”: Viola Gienger, “Petraeus Says Afghan Raids on Rebels Exceed Iraq,”
Bloomberg News
, September 3, 2010.

“Petraeus knew he was only going to be there a short time”: Interview with former ISAF adviser, Washington, DC, April 13, 2014.

The renewed emphasis on high-value targeting in Afghanistan: Gareth Porter, “How McChrystal and Petraeus Built an Indiscriminate Killing Machine,”
Truthout
, September 26, 2011.

Apart from his Taliban leadership status: Gienger, op. cit.

which in this period was Task Force 373: Nick Davies, “Afghan War Logs, Task Force 373, Special Ops Hunting Top Taliban,”
The Guardian,
July 25, 2010.

“mowing the grass”: Interview with former U.S. civilian adviser, Afghanistan, Washington, DC, December 9, 2012.

“targets to eliminate”: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM3-24, ch. 5, p. 106.

specialties such as leader, facilitator: Felix Kuehn and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “A Knock on the Door: 22 Months of ISAF Press Releases,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Kabul, October 12, 2011.

NSA recorded every single conversation and stored them for five years: Wikileaks, “Statement on the Mass Recording of Afghan Phone Calls by NSA,” May 23, 2014.

turning a blind eye: Gareth Porter, “How McChrystal and Petraeus Built an Indiscriminate ‘Killing Machine,’”
Truthout
, September 26, 2013.

in 2009 they launched a campaign to destroy the system: Frances Robinson, “Fewer Cell Towers Shut Down in Afghanistan,”
Wall Street Journal
, February 28, 2013.

IMSI Catcher: For a good explanation of the technology, see Amicus Brief filed by Electronic Privacy Information Center in
New Jersey
v.
Earls
, December 20, 2012, p. 17.
http://epic.org/amicus/location/earls/EPIC-Supplemental-Amicus-Brief.pdf
.

A little after 9:00 a.m., as the first two vehicles moved out of one of these narrow passes: The story of the Takhar attack is taken from journalist Kate Clark’s incisive account: Kate Clark, “The Takhar Attack,” AAN Thematic Report, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Kabul, May 2011, pp. 20–24.
http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2012/10/20110511KClark_Takhar-attack_final.pdf
.

That same day, ISAF issued a press release: ISAF News, “Coalition Forces Conduct Precision Strike Against Senior IMU Member in Takhar Province,” ISAF Joint Command, Afghanistan 2010-09-CA-027, September 2, 2010.

“I can confirm that a very senior official”: Christopher Bodeen, “NATO Airstrike Killed Civilians According to Afghan President,”
Christian Science Monitor
, September 3, 2010.

“for a better future”: WGBH Boston, “Kill Capture,” PBS
Frontline
, May 10, 2011.

The dead, campaign volunteers all: Kate Clark, op. cit., p. 17.

Clark was perfectly aware that the high-tech assassins had murdered the wrong man: Telephone interview with Clark, Kabul, March 6, 2014.

“They hung me from the ceiling”: Kate Clark, op. cit., p. 15.

“We’re aware of the allegations”: ISAF press release, op. cit.

“We had days and days of what’s called ‘the unblinking eye’”: WGBH Boston, op. cit.

“He basically ordered the Special Forces to be frank with me”: Telephone interview with Kate Clark, March 6, 2014.

“targeting the telephones”: Clark, op. cit., p. 13.

getting himself expelled from Afghanistan: Alastair Leithead, “‘Great Game’ or Just Misunderstanding?” BBC News, January 5, 2008.

“I am well known”: Clark, “Takhar Attack,” op. cit., p. 17.

“gray area insurgent”: Michael Semple, “Caught in the Crossfire,” Foreign
Policy.com
, May 16, 2011.

“I did come to the conclusion”: Telephone interview with Michael Semple, March 19, 2014.

“On September 2, coalition forces did kill the targeted individual, Mohammed Amin”: Quil Lawrence, “Afghan Raids Common but What if Targets Are Wrong?” NPR
Morning Edition
, May 12, 2011.

A-10 pilots had refused orders to bomb the same target:
Andrew Cockburn
, “Tunnel Vision,”
Harper’s
, January 2014.

many Afghans “have a few Taliban commander numbers saved in their mobile phone contacts”: Telephone interview with Michael Semple, March 19, 2014.

The whole complex effort: Pamphlet #4, “Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment,” February 24, 2004.

Marine Major General Richard Mills evoked a bucolic note: U.S. Marine Corps History Division: Oral History Interview–Field Report: Interviewee Major General Richard P. Mills, Institute for the Study of War, May 2, 2011, p. 8.

In August 2008, the United States had obligingly bombed a family memorial service in Azizabad: Robert Dreyfus, “Mass Casualty Attacks in Afghanistan,”
The Nation
, September 19, 2013.

In an infamous February 2010 incident in Gardez: Jeremy Scahill,
Dirty Wars
(New York: Nationbooks, 2013), pp. 334–43.

The May 2012 B-1 strike in Paktia Province: Interview with Colonel Robert Brown, USAF, November 22, 2013.

“The bottom line is we have been played like pawns”: Email, March 23, 2014.

One measure of the cost to the overall U.S. war effort: Gareth Porter, “Doubling of SOF Night Raids Backfired in Kandahar,” Inter Press Service, September 15, 2010.

In a series of media interviews in August 2010: Ibid.

Leaving aside the number of innocent civilians represented in those figures: Felix Kuehn and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “A Knock on the Door: 22 Months of ISAF Press Releases,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Kabul, October 12, 2011.

seventeen commanders had been killed: Antonio Gustozzi and Christopher Reuter, “The Insurgents of the Afghan North,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, Kabul, April 2011, p. 29.

Squadron Leader Keith Dear: Keith Patrick Dear, “Beheading the Hydra: Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work?” RAF Department of Defense Studies, August 2011, p. 22.

They were also younger: Ibid., p. 22.

“We want to die anyway”: WGBH Boston, “Kill Capture,” op. cit.

A marine officer who served two tours in the lethally dangerous neighborhood of Sangin: Interview with marine officer, Jacksonville, NC, December 2, 2012.

making the Taliban
even more cruel
: Alex Strick van Linschoten, “Entropy and Insurgent Radicalisation: An ISAF Goal?” A Different Place (blog), December 7, 2011.
http://www.alexstrick.com/2011/12/entropy-and-insurgent-radicalisation-an-isaf-goal/
.

Three of the victims were children: Rod Nordland and Habib Zahori, “Killing of Afghan Journalist and Family Members Stuns Media Peers,”
New York Times
, March 26, 2014.

“It just shows you”: Email, March 14, 2014.

The Taliban, said Lavoy, were making significant gains: U.S. State Department Cable, “Allies find briefing on Afghanistan NIE ‘Gloomy’ but focus on recommendations to improve situation,” Secret—NOFORN, December 5, 2008: Wikileaks, Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy.
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08USNATO453_a.html
.

“I simply doubt our ability”: Email from Matthew Hoh, April 3, 2014.

“I have yet to see one of those out here”: Email, April 9, 2014.

12 | Drones, Baby, Drones!

The Richard M. Helms Award dinner: CIA Officers Memorial Foundation: “Richard M. Helms Award Dinner 2011,”
Compass
(no. 1), undated.

Joining them were senior executives of various defense corporations: Recollection of attendees at dinner.

“the CIA gets what it wants”: Daniel Klaidman,
Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency
(New York: Houghton Mifflin–Harcourt, 2012), p. 121.

At just under $15 billion: Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, “‘Black Budget’ Summary Details U.S. Spy Networks’ Successes, Failures, and Objectives,”
Washington Post
, August 29, 2013.

“those bastards”: Communication from the late Colonel Richard M. Hallock, who had many discussions with Helms on this topic when the latter was ambassador to Iran.

“all-consuming ambition”: Interview with former CIA official Ray McGovern (the supervisor in question), Arlington, VA, January 9, 2014.

On one occasion, notorious within the community: Aram Roston, “Obama’s Counterterror Czar Gave Bogus Intel to Bush White House,”
C4ISR Journal
, October 1, 2012.

Exiting government service in 2005: Aram Roston, “Intel Firm Paid CIA Nominee Well as He Left for White House,”
Defense News
, February 4, 2013.

“finishing Brennan’s sentences”: Daniel Klaidman, op. cit., p. 23.

“You know, our president has his brutal side”: Interview with former CIA official, Washington, DC, April 13, 2011.

After paying due tribute to previous honorees: Interview with attendee at dinner, April 6, 2011.

As is the custom in Pashtun culture: Kathy Gannon, “Timing of U.S. Drone Strike Questioned,” AP Exclusive, August 2, 2011.

Although the ominous buzz of drones was always in the air: Akbar Ahmed,
The Thistle and the Drone
(New York: HarperCollins, 2013), p. 85.

However, the land in question: Gannon, op. cit.

In Lahore, a burly American named Raymond Davis: Mark Mazzetti,
The Way of the Knife
(New York: Penguin, 2013), p. 264.

The man they selected to kill: Ahmed, op. cit., p. 82.

“The CIA was angry”: Gannon, op. cit.

After all, it was an established point of drone-strike doctrine: Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,”
New York Times
, May 29, 2012.

Finally, sometime after 10:00 a.m.: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, “Living Under Drones; Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan” (2012), p. 59.
http://livingunderdrones.org/report/
.

“The smell was awful.”: Ben Emmerson, UNSRCT Drone Inquiry, “Interview with witness #3,” Case Study #1: Datta Khel, March 14, 2014.
http://vimeo.com/79102292
.

The country’s foreign office called it: Manzoor Ali, “Pakistan Furious as U.S. Drone Strike Kills Civilians,”
Express Tribune
, March 18, 2011.

“in a manner consistent…”: Sebastian Abbott, “New Light on Drone War’s Death Toll,”
AP Impact
, February 26, 2012.

“These guys were terrorists”: Tom Wright and Rehmat Mehsud, “Pakistan Slams U.S. Drone Strike,”
Wall Street Journal
, March 18, 2011.

A separate probe by the Associated Press: Abbott, op. cit.

Although the positions held by the dead men were now of course vacant: Stanford and NYU Law Schools, op. cit., p. 60.

When presented with the tool of a Hellfire-armed Predator: Steve Simon and Dan Benjamin,
Age of Sacred Terror
(New York: Random House, 2002), p. 345.

Soon, visiting dignitaries: Mazzetti, op. cit., p. 6.

In 2004, when the CIA sought Pakistani permission to launch drone strikes: Mazzetti, op. cit., p. 103ff.

Nor was the tally of high-value targets impressive: Bill Roggio, “Senior al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan,”
Long War Journal
, 2004–2013.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts.php#ixzz2yiEkZAY0
.

“completely done by the Pakistani military”:
New York Times,
October 30, 2006.

“It is something that we have done”: “Bajaur Operation Not under Any Pressure: FO,”
Dawn.com
, October 31, 2006.

police barracks: Ahmed, op. cit.,
p. 81.

“Is Cofer some sort of vampire?”: Interview with former senior CIA official, Washington, DC, March 27, 2014.

“I’ve had a lot of run-ins with the CIA”: Interview with former State Department official, Washington, DC, April 25, 2014.

By 2011 the Counterterrorism Center accounted for 10 percent: Greg Miller and Julie Tate, “CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets,”
Washington Post,
September 1, 2011.