Lethal Trajectories (4 page)

“I can see how time is in our favor, Mr. Chairman, but how does that relate to the current Chunxiao situation?” Wang knew the answer, but he knew that Cheng desired the chance to articulate it as he would have to at the PSC meeting.

“Good question. Simply put, I would much rather engage the United States on our terms, not theirs. Why arouse the sleeping giant with a senseless conflict neither side can win? China is far better off surpassing them quietly in all key power areas than energizing them in an open conflict. We can deal with Japan, but a confrontation with the United States is certain to upset our timetable.”

Wang nodded and asked, “How would you position your proposition today that America’s power is eroding, but she can still strike like a dragon if provoked by a precipitous counteraction against Japan?”

“America’s power is formidable,” Lin responded, “but their economy has been mismanaged. Their dollar and petro-dollar currency statuses continue to deteriorate; they have unsustainable debt loads and future entitlement obligations they can’t meet; and their ability to print money, monetize debt, and rely on their international fiat currency reserve status to sustain them is coming to an end. With those negative trajectories, why break the chain by overreacting against Japan and inviting the Americans to openly side against us? As I said, time is in our favor. No need to rush it.”

“I agree,” Wang responded, confident in Lin’s reasoning so far.
Still,
he wondered,
how could such a great and prosperous country like America ever let such a thing happen?

“By comparison,” Lin continued, “China has become the new international economic powerhouse, and the financial focus of the world has shifted from New York and London to the Pacific Rim. Our GDP will overtake America’s in a few years, and our economic leverage over the United States is daunting by virtue of the surplus trade dollars we hold in our central banks and our institutional investments in American T-bills and private placements. We need America as a trade partner, but we have the power to send their economy into a deep depression if we were ever to withdraw our holdings and dump the dollars we hold.”

“We have that leverage indeed, Mr. Chairman, but I doubt many Americans know this. It’s one of their government’s dirty little secrets.” He said this with regret as he fondly remembered the many years he lived in America as a student at Stanford.

“I would also remind the PSC,” Lin said, “that in a geopolitical sense, China has outflanked America in sewing up new markets and developing partnerships. Our Shanghai Cooperative Organization partners, the side arrangements we have with Iran and Iraq, our African partnerships, and our joint ventures with Brazil, Canada, and Venezuela have all helped to strengthen our access to oil and resources for years to come. These nations have become our trade partners because it is easier to do business with us than with the Americans, who place political preconditions on them for human rights, environmental, and other concerns. Our partners also like the air cover we can provide them against unwanted sanctions by virtue of our permanent membership and veto power in the UN Security Council. Our formula with trade partners, I would remind the PSC, is simple: we invest in their infrastructure, make deals, get their raw resources, and then manufacture and ship back to them finished goods and military equipment. Our factories are running and our population has jobs. Why would we want to disrupt this winning formula with a needless war?”

Wang smiled in appreciation. “It’s a winning formula indeed, Mr. Chairman, but one that can be easily disrupted by wars and other destabilizing geopolitical events. Will the PSC see this as they consider actions against Japan, or will they insist on a military solution that will surely cause Japan to call on the United States in a conflict against China?”

“I wish I knew,” the pensive chairman replied. “My greatest concern is that Japan will bring the United States into the conflict by virtue of their once-close security alliance. Militarily, Japan is insignificant. The Americans are still powerful, though the Seventh Fleet is not what it used to be. In a conventional war with America there would be a standoff; in a nuclear war, we are all destroyed. We are making great progress with the expansion of our blue-water navy to safeguard our sea lanes with international trade partners and to extend our naval power beyond the China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. I’d hate to see all this risked in a premature confrontation with the United States.”

Wang nodded, in full agreement with the chairman’s assessments.

“When all is said and done, Peng, the dragon in the chicken coop is still King Oil. Saudi Arabia and its OPEC partners still hold all the cards. The Saudis are one of our major suppliers of oil, but in all honesty I couldn’t tell you for sure what side they would take if it came to war with the United States over Chunxiao. Have you read any of the latest intelligence reports from that area, by the way?”

“Yes I have, and they are disturbing. Hard to say how accurate they are, but it would appear that the royal Saudi government has become increasingly unpopular with powerful segments of the hard-line Islamic fundamentalists and average citizens who see little benefit from oil revenues. It bears careful watching. A destabilized Middle East is certainly something this world can’t abide.”

Lin nodded in agreement and seemed lost for a moment in some troubling thought before he continued.

“Our challenge today with the PSC, Peng, will be to convince them that it makes no sense to engage Japan—or worse, the United States—in a military confrontation at this time. They will be boiling mad and eager to attack, but it is a wise man who knows when to fight and when not to. We will seek recompense from the Japanese for the loss of the
Dragon II
via the United Nations and do the usual diplomatic things—expel their ambassador and so forth. But our biggest challenge will be to neutralize America’s influence. We must turn this crisis into an opportunity … but first things first.”

They walked over to the PSC meeting with preoccupied minds. Lin Cheng was thinking ahead to the call he would have to make to the president of the United States, and Wang Peng wondered why, despite what appeared to be imminent war with Japan, his thoughts kept returning to a conversation shared with his friend, Jack McCarty, over some troubling new climate-change data.

The PSC meeting was a grueling five-hour affair, but Lin won the day with respect to China’s position on Chunxiao. Exhausted from the effort, Lin knew there was little margin for error. He needed a few short-term victories to assuage the distraught PSC members.

As they adjourned to his office to debrief, Lin poured tea for Wang and asked, “What was your take on the meeting, Peng?”

“I can’t ever remember seeing as much anger and rage as I saw today. My initial impression was that it would be hard to walk out of there without a firm declaration of war against Japan.”

“And how prevalent do you think that feeling was at the conclusion of the meeting?”

Wang thought about his boss’s masterful performance before answering. “The outrage against Japan was still there, but you made a compelling case for a more measured response. My guess is that at least two-thirds of the members were solidly behind you. The rest seemed willing to follow your lead, but the Nanking contingent has deep feelings and long memories regarding the atrocities committed there by Japan prior to World War II.”

“I agree, Peng. They will not challenge me head-on, but we both know how quickly our position will deteriorate if our more ideological comrades—particularly in the full Politburo—sense weakness in our dealings with our capitalist opponents. We’re on a tight leash.”

“Indeed, and a pivotal part of our strategy will be to keep the United States from aggressively supporting Japan. Like you, Mr. Chairman, I believe we can deal with Japan on our own terms and maybe even use this as opportunity to further our broader agenda of oceanic expansion, but America’s position will be the critical factor.”

Lin looked at his watch and was surprised to see it was almost three o’clock in the afternoon. “I want to come back to your thoughts on how we should approach the United States. But first, what do we have for the official report?”

Wang opened his laptop and considered his copious notes. “Let me read to you the agreed-upon points.

“First, our official position is that Japan made an unprovoked attack on the
Dragon II,
destroying the $1.8 billion-dollar platform with considerable loss of life: an act of war perpetrated by Japan against China. Second, China was therefore justified in its defensive response of destroying the Japanese attackers as well as assets in the area that could be used against China. Third, China will expel the Japanese ambassador, freeze all Japanese assets in China until compensated for its losses, and take whatever actions are necessary to defend its interests, but will refrain from offensive military actions. If fired upon, China will retaliate with overwhelming force. Fourth, China will call on the United Nations to condemn Japan’s aggression against the People’s Republic of China; demand reparations from Japan for the loss of the platform, lost future oil production, and loss of lives; petition the UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to redefine coastal waters to meet our desired definitions; and instruct Japan to back off the EEZ and territorial areas claimed by China. We will make every effort to minimize U.S. intervention in the negotiations and prevent the formation of an international coalition against China.

“Finally, China will accelerate its plan to expand its oceanic horizons by building two aircraft carriers and expanding submarine and surface ship capacity to project our power far beyond the China Sea. We will also push to realize our rightful claim to the Daioye Islands and gradually marginalize Taiwan for eventual friendly takeover.”

“Excellent summary, Peng,” Lin responded, comparing his own notes for a moment. “I assume you’ll fill in the pieces and get the minutes out in a couple of days.”

Wang nodded in concurrence, and Lin continued.

“Now, please tell me now how you think I might best approach President Burkmeister in the call I must make in the next few hours.” Lin appreciated Wang Peng’s knowledge of America and was well aware of his close personal ties with the McCarty family.

“Burkmeister and McCarty are wise men,” Wang responded. “They are well aware of China’s financial leverage over them, so you need not mention it. If you refrain from that implied threat, they will interpret it as a good-faith effort on your part.” He weighed his words carefully before continuing.

“You might want to approach President Burkmeister as a compatriot who, like you, leads a powerful country susceptible to hard-line forces more content to strike first and ask questions later. Tell him we don’t want war. Suggest to him that your Politburo, like his Congress, is often hard to contain and that you need a little latitude from the United States to hold them off. He’ll appreciate your candor. The Americans are very direct people and take such things as a sign of trustworthiness.” Lin Cheng nodded appreciatively.

“You might start by telling him the Japanese ambassador will be expelled as a symbolic statement of our displeasure. Depending on your level of comfort, you might then suggest that you would be willing to share with him in advance any significant actions to be taken against Japan. Suggest to him that such information-sharing would not be possible if the United States were to send their Seventh Fleet into the waters of the East China Sea. I know you have high regard for the president, and it might not hurt to mention that as well. Frankly, I think he will be surprised and grateful for your conciliatory and open-minded approach and see it as a sign of willingness to work through the crisis in a reasonable manner. He may not get the same response from Japan, and if so this will work even more in our favor.”

Wang suddenly realized he might have been a little too commanding and added, “I apologize for my candor and directness, Mr. Chairman. I mean you no disrespect, but I have too much respect for you to not give you the best answers I possibly can.”

“Peng,” the chairman said warmly, “I can’t tell you how much I appreciate your candor and counsel, and I will make use of your suggested approach. Let’s see, it’s almost 3:55 in the afternoon here and, ah, 3:55 in the morning in Washington. I’ll make the call at about seven o’clock our time. Please make arrangements with the White House. Will you be here for the call?”

“Of course, Mr. Chairman, and I think seven would be just fine.” Three hours seemed like an interminably long wait, but from what Wang knew of the American president, he expected that these two supremely powerful men would connect on a personal level. He shuddered to think of the alternative.

Like all presidents before him, President Burkmeister had tweaked his national security apparatus to fit his own organizational and management style. He was attracted from the beginning to the idea of a small but potent force of advisors with the clout and smarts to cut through red tape and make things happen. He dubbed this special group his “SWAT team,” and they were, in effect, the leading players within the larger National Security Council structure. More often than not, policy was formulated in this group and disseminated later, for execution, to the larger NSC body.