Lion of Jordan (29 page)

The Arab Union was launched in a colourful ceremony in Amman on 14 February 1958. The entire Jordanian establishment was present as well as a large Iraqi delegation. The flag of the Arab Revolt – black, red, white and green – was unfurled for the second time to emphasize that it was the Hashemites, not the UAR, who were the keepers of the flame of Arab independence and unity. In a broadcast to the nation, Hussein proclaimed, ‘This is the happiest day of my life, a great day in Arab history. We are under one banner, the banner of Arabism which our great-grandfather, Hussein ibn Ali the Great, carried in the great Arab Revolt.' Hussein boasted repeatedly that the Hashemite union was based on real equality, in contrast to the UAR, in which one partner was dominant and the other was subservient.
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The brave rhetoric, however, concealed deep anxiety about the rising popularity throughout the Arab world of Nasser. The Arab Union was not so much a match for the
UAR as a defensive response, a rearguard action. Even in Jordan itself the new union failed to capture the popular imagination. Iraq was still a member of the Baghdad Pact, which had provoked violent demonstrations in Jordan in 1955. On the West Bank the Palestinians were fervently pro-Nasser, and they believed his charges that Jordan had conspired with imperialism and world Zionism to betray them. By mid March, American policy-makers were aware that the West Bank Palestinians regarded the federation with Iraq as a step backward and that most Jordanians were convinced that they were in the wrong union.
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Nuri as-Said regarded Nasser and the UAR as the most serious threat to Iraq's position, a threat to which the union with Jordan provided puny defence. No sooner was the UAR formed than he started intriguing against Syria with the aim of detaching it from Egypt. His British allies, however, gave him no encouragement to pursue what they regarded as dangerously vague schemes. Nor did Said get any support for his idea of putting pressure on Kuwait to join the Arab Union so that it might share with Iraq the cost of propping up Jordan.
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Damascus did not accord diplomatic recognition to the Arab Union and lost no time in attacking it over the airwaves, claiming it had uncovered a Hashemite-supported plot to undermine the government. It alleged that ‘imperialist and Zionist agents' had infiltrated Syria from Jordan and, in addition, that America had given $1million to Sharif Nasser to arm and equip the Bedouin tribes in southern Syria. Jordan made it illegal to listen to Radio Damascus or Radio Cairo.
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The propaganda war between the two unions continued, and, in March, Jordanian and Syrian troops clashed along the border.
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Meanwhile, Said plotted to topple the republican regime in Damascus and to replace it with a monarchy headed by Abd al-Ilah. In mid June he visited London again and made another pitch for Anglo-American military intervention to bring down the Syrian government.
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These intrigues, stemming from Said's pan-Arab ambition and the Syrian counter-plots, contributed indirectly to the military
coup d'état
that eventually brought down the Iraqi monarchy.

Hussein had advance warning of the conspiracies against the two branches of the Hashemite family. In Jordan a young officer with Nasserist links was arrested on suspicion of plotting to kill Hussein and his uncle Sharif Nasser. In the interrogation, Cadet Ahmad Yusef al-Hiyari revealed that there was a UAR-instigated plan afoot to stage
coup d'états
simultaneously in Iraq and in Jordan in mid July. Hussein
was also alerted by Israeli intelligence to a plot to use Egyptian agents to kill him and to seize power. The information was relayed by the Israeli military attacheé in London to the Foreign Office with a request that they transmit it immediately to the Jordanian monarch.
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Israel's move stemmed from a desire to preserve the Hashemite monarchy in Amman and to curb Nasser's influence in the Arab world. Hussein got his third tip-off from the CIA, who identified Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmud al-Rusan as the chief conspirator. Rusan was the Jordanian military attacheé in Washington whose phone was tapped by the FBI. His co-conspirators were all nationalist Jordanian officers: his brothers Muhammad and Sadiq and Salih al-Shar'a. Rusan was also in contact with Colonel Mahmud al-Musa and through him with Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, a Syrian Army officer who was at that time the minister of the interior of the Northern Region of the UAR.
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Hussein and his prime minister, Samir Rifa'i, reacted by arresting forty pro-Nasser officers ‘from cadet to colonel' and vowing that the Hashemites would not ‘act like lambs in the pen' to be eaten by the wolf at a time of its own choosing.
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Hussein telephoned Faisal immediately to warn him of the plot and to ask him to send urgently a trusted emissary to receive more details. Faisal thanked him and sent General Rafiq Arif, the commander-in-chief of the Arab Union forces, to Amman. Arif received a full briefing from the king, the prime minister and the chief of the royal court. Arif's reaction, however, was one of polite boredom. ‘Your Majesty,' he said, ‘we are very thankful for your concern. I appreciate all your trouble, but I assure you the Iraqi Army is built on tradition. It is generally considered the best in the Middle East. It has not had the problems – nor the changes – your army has had, sir, in the past few years.' He paused for breath. ‘I feel that it is rather we who should be concerned about Jordan, Your Majesty. This
coup
applies to your country, and it is you we are worried about. I beseech you to take care.'
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Arif was given precise information, and Hussein stressed to him that the plot they had uncovered within their armed forces was directly linked to a plot by Iraqi officers against the regime, but Arif simply repeated what he had already said: ‘You look after yourselves. Iraq is a very stable country, unlike Jordan. If there is any worry it is Jordan that should be worried.'
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Arif's own loyalty was not in question. But he completely rejected the possibility that the army was plotting against the regime.
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The Iraqi leadership in general looked down loftily on their Jordanian junior partner. But Hussein could not help thinking that Abd al-Ilah was partly responsible for the casual attitude shown by the Iraqi government to the warning they had received of the impending disaster.
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In private Hussein was much more scathing about Abd al-Ilah than he was in his memoirs. Many years later Hussein told the director of his private office that Abd al-Ilah was so consumed by envy and ambition, and so desperate to be king, that he had plotted a quiet palace revolution with some army officers in order to remove young Faisal from the throne and take his place. In Hussein's judgement, Abd al-Ilah bore a large share of the responsibility for the court intrigues that culminated in the downfall of the monarchy.
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Hussein kept his suspicions to himself because to air them in public would have been damaging to the reputation of the Hashemite dynasty.

The Hashemites were fighting the Nasserist challenge on several fronts. In Lebanon, UAR-supported domestic opposition groups were trying to bring down the pro-Western government of President Camille Chamoun. This had originated as a domestic crisis, a struggle for power between radicals and conservatives, rather than being instigated by the Soviets. But the American policy-makers viewed it through a cold-war lens and started to apply the Domino Theory which had first surfaced in South-East Asia, to the Middle East. The theory highlighted the danger of geo-strategic chain reactions in the event of one friendly state falling into the hands of the opposite camp. Hussein needed no geo-strategic theories to grasp that he would be the first domino to fall if a Nasserist regime were to rise to power in Lebanon. He and Samir Rifa'i impressed upon the Americans that if this came to pass, Nasser would emerge in the eyes of the Arab world as the victor, which would encourage the malcontents in Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to overthrow the existing regimes. With the situation in Lebanon rapidly deteriorating, Hussein asked his Iraqi allies to send troops to Jordan to provide protection against Syria. In response to this appeal, Said decided to send an Iraqi brigade to Jordan. The date for the move was set for 13 July.
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Ironically, the Iraqi move to protect Jordan provided the Iraqi Free Officers with the perfect opportunity to mount their own
coup d'état
at home. The leaders were Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif. Qasim was a favourite of Abd al-Ilah and Said. He
commanded the 19th Brigade in the Third Division, which was stationed in Ba'quba, about forty miles east of Baghdad. Said's order to move the 19th Brigade from Ba'quba to Mafraq gave the conspirators the chance to strike. The most direct route to Mafraq lay through Baghdad. As a precaution against coups, the Iraqi Army's standing orders laid down that any unit passing through the capital should be stripped of its ammunition, but on this occasion the order was not observed. At about three o'clock in the morning on 14 July, Colonel Arif's battalion reached the Faisal Bridge over the Tigris in Baghdad, whence it dispersed to capture the radio station, the railway depot and the principal government buildings. The unit that advanced on the Rihab Palace encountered some resistance from the royal guard. During a pause in the exchange of fire, the king and his uncle went out into the garden to parley with the rebels, but they were killed instantly. The troops and a large crowd then stormed the palace and killed the rest of the royal family, including the women. Abd al-Ilah was beheaded; his body was tied by the feet to a car and dragged through the streets.
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Nuri as-Said managed to escape from his house disguised as a woman, but he was discovered, mobbed and murdered the following day. His body too was mutilated and dragged through the streets of Baghdad. The British Embassy was burned down. A story was put about that the leaders of the conspiracy had intended to spare the king, but this story is implausible.
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What is clear is that the entire royal family was mowed down in a terrible exhibition of blood-lust by a group of junior officers.
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The Free Officers who staged the coup, like the opposition parties, were opposed to the Baghdad Pact and to Iraq's close connection with Britain. There is some evidence to suggest that their decision to kill the three men at the top was made because they feared that they might come back to power with the support of Britain or other Baghdad Pact powers.
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News of the bloody revolution in Baghdad reached Hussein at 7.00 a.m. on Monday, 14 July. He was awakened by a telephone call and informed that his cousin had been murdered. This was a bitter personal blow to Hussein because he and Faisal had been so close since their childhood. It was also devastating politically because it signalled the end of the recently formed union with Iraq. Hussein's first impulse was to seize the initiative and to restore Hashemite rule by force. He ordered Sharif Nasser to lead an expeditionary force into Iraq, launch a counter-attack against the rebels and restore the old order. Hussein was
no doubt influenced by the precedent of 1941, when the Arab Legion had helped Britain to suppress the pro-Axis revolt of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and to restore the monarchy. Hussein thought he had a legitimate claim to the throne of Iraq, and he asserted this claim by assuming the presidency of the Arab Union after the death of Faisal. He also hoped that the Iraqi brigade in Mafraq would rally to the royal cause and help to overthrow the newly proclaimed republic. But this was based on nothing more than wishful thinking. The Iraqi brigade, on orders from its headquarters, moved out of Jordan and took up position by the oil-pumping station at H-3. A further setback was the Anglo-American refusal to provide air cover for Sharif Nasser's troops. Last but not least, Samir Rifa'i, who was not known for faint-heartedness, urged caution. All these factors combined to persuade Hussein to recall Sharif Nasser, who was by this time 150 miles inside Iraq.

Hussein had to change his priorities from reversing the revolution in Iraq to safeguarding Jordan and his own regime. Forceful steps were taken to this end. First, Hussein imposed martial law and, with the help of the CIA, purged the army of all potentially subversive elements.
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Second, he appointed Habis al-Majali as commander-in-chief of the Arab Union forces and Sharif Nasser as military commander of Amman. Third, he repressed the opposition by arrests, curfews, censorship and other draconian measures. But his most significant decision, and one that he knew would not go down well with his people, was to request Britain and America to send troops to Jordan. He felt acutely the need for Western support, not just physical but moral and psychological. The British had been the traditional protectors of Hussein's family and the appeal to them may have saved his throne.

In making the request for military support on 16 July, King Hussein and Samir Rifa'i said they wanted these troops in order to free their own army to deal with a coup that they expected the UAR to launch the following day. It was made clear that the Anglo-American forces would not be used against Jordanians but only to deal with external aggression. Nor would they be used to release Jordanian forces to attack Iraq.
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The overthrow of the monarchy in Baghdad threatened to alter the entire strategic landscape of the Middle East to Britain's disadvantage. Iraq had not only been a client of Britain but a major oil producer and the keystone of the Baghdad Pact. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was aware that the future of Jordan was hanging by a thread and that
Britain's credibility as an ally was on the line. The risks of military intervention were great, but the dangers of inaction he considered to be even greater. Macmillan convened an emergency cabinet meeting that decided to respond positively to King Hussein's request. In his diary Macmillan wrote, ‘We all thought the Cabinet were determined to do this rather “quixotic” act and that we would not forgive ourselves if the King were murdered tomorrow, like the Royal Family of Iraq.'
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