Lion of Jordan (31 page)

Hussein had good cause to fear both for the independence of his country and for his own life. The general sense that his days were numbered was bound to affect his self-confidence and his morale. Of all the many crises of his career, this one, according to one sympathetic Israeli observer, brought him to the brink of giving up.

Hussein descended into his personal crisis only after the first threat was over. About a week after the ‘Rihab slaughter' at Baghdad, he virtually locked himself up in his palace, tightly surrounded by his bodyguards and inaccessible to the visitors who normally paid their respects. It was the low point, to this day, of his image as a ruler, of his morale, and of his resilience. There are reports of Hussein's
fear of assassination bordering on panic during those days. And it is said that he spoke of going into exile abroad: no such stories are credibly connected with any other emergency through which he has passed.
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British moral and material support helped Hussein, more than any other factor, to recover his confidence in himself and his customary resilience. One man in particular made a huge difference: Wing Commander Jock Dalgleish, who had turned up at the airport on the outskirts of Jerusalem after the murder of King Abdullah. When the crisis in the Middle East broke out, Dalgleish was serving in the RAF headquarters in High Wycombe. He was sent to Jordan with the first group of paratroopers to report again to duty. The presence of the British Parachute Brigade in the capital sent a powerful signal to all Hussein's enemies and enabled him to stay on his throne until the shockwaves from the Iraqi capital had subsided. It gave him the breathing space he needed to rebuild his authority and to recapture the initiative. After a period of listlessness, he regained his energy and the courage to leave his fortified hill. He ‘began a round of successful visits to Army units, showing characteristic courage in moving without an escort through crowded gatherings of troops drawn from units of doubtful allegiance. This programme of visits did more than anything else to restore King Hussein's prestige and personal ascendancy in the Army and throughout the country.'
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The security situation continued to improve. A further regiment of loyal Bedouins was brought to reinforce the garrison of Amman. The British opened a sea route from Aqaba and a line of communication from Aqaba to Amman. But the crisis was by no means over. On 1 August, Harold Macmillan wrote in his diary, ‘The position in Jordan is precarious and may blow up at any moment. God grant that we can avoid a disaster. But, of course, our force is too small for any real conflict – if, for instance, the Jordanian Army deserts the King. Its only use is to strengthen the hand of the Government and provide an element of stability. The danger is that it might be overwhelmed. I do not think a mob could do this. But if the Jordanian armoured division went over to Nasser, we should have difficulty in extricating our troops. So it is – and will be – a continual worry, until we can get a UN force in their place.'
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On 21 August a Special Session of the UN General Assembly met to consider the situation in the Middle East. Hussein recognized the need
for a UN role in resolving the crisis, but he had serious worries that the session would result in an unworkable formula and a premature departure of the British troops. It therefore came as a great relief when the session unanimously adopted an Arab League-sponsored resolution calling on all Arab states to respect the territorial integrity of other states and to observe ‘strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs'. The resolution also called on the secretary-general to make practical arrangements for the evacuation of foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan. The ‘Arab resolution' reduced the tension between Nasser's camp and the pro-Western camp and paved the way to the withdrawal of the American marines from Lebanon and of the British paratroops from Jordan. Dag Hammarskjold, the UN secretary-general, arrived in Jordan at the end of the month, expecting, on the basis of press reports, to find it in its last gasp. He was therefore surprised by the calm and stability of the internal situation and impressed with the personalities of Hussein and Rifa'i. They had no difficulty in persuading him that British troops should not be withdrawn except on conditions to be agreed between themselves and the British government.
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Intervention by the UN also served to enhance Jordan's international legitimacy. Hussein's critics claimed that foreign troops were stationed in Jordan to protect him from his own people. UN involvement was used by him to show that the threat to his regime was external, not internal.

As the UN stepped in, Jordan's Western friends stepped up their financial assistance. The American government pledged a total of $40 million in the current fiscal year and another $10 million were earmarked for development. The British government promised a million pounds in aid, an interest-free loan and other forms of economic assistance. Despite the offers of aid, some Western policy-makers remained pessimistic about Jordan's prospects of survival. In a letter home on 31 August, Charles Johnston revealed that

There is a school of thought in London and Washington which believes that Jordan is a dead loss and that the best thing is to… let Nasser have it, but in a decent-looking way, using Hammarskjold and the UN to do the deed, rather as the Runciman mission was used to scupper Czechoslovakia in 1938. I think this would be not only ignoble but also very foolish of us, and I have been screaming my head off by telegraph against any such thing. Whether my screams were listened to or not, London and Washington have now agreed to keep this place
afloat for the time being. An odd twist to the story is that Nasser doesn't really want Jordan anyway. So what with one thing and another the prospects of this Kingdom staggering on for some time are better than could have been expected – barring accidents and bullets of course.
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The withdrawal of British troops was carefully managed so as not to disturb the calm and weaken the king's position. It began on 20 October and was completed by 29 October. In his memoirs he noted with gratitude that ‘The British force was small, but its very presence had given us a chance to breathe. The famous red berets in the streets made people realize we were not alone, that this was no time for despair.'
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Dag Hammarskjold secured from Nasser assurances of ‘good neighbourliness' and an agreement to lift the blockade of Jordan. On 29 October the UAR announced the resumption of normal land and air communications with Jordan. On the surface at least the crisis seemed to be over.

After the strains and stresses of the last three months Hussein felt in need of a rest. He decided to fly to Lausanne in Switzerland for a three-week holiday with his mother, Queen Zain, his daughter Alia and the rest of his family. He also planned to celebrate his twenty-third birthday with them. On the morning of 10 November, Hussein took off from Amman Airport in his twin-engine De Haviland Dove, which had belonged to his grandfather. His co-pilot was Wing Commander Jock Dalgleish, who stayed behind after the crisis as an air adviser within the Joint Services Mission. The other members of the party were Sharif Nasser and two Jordanian pilots who were to fly the plane back home. The flight path went through Damascus, Beirut and Athens, and all the necessary overflight permits had been obtained. The first sign of trouble was a message from Syrian air flight control that said: ‘You are not cleared to overfly. You must land at Damascus.' The aircraft replied that they were cleared to overfly though not to land at Damascus, but the order to land was repeated more insistently. At this point Hussein and his co-pilot turned the plane around, dropped to a low altitude and made a dash for the nearest point of the Jordanian border. To their dismay, two Syrian MiGs appeared overhead and started to make attacking passes at the Dove. Hussein handed over the controls to Dalgleish, who took repeatedly evasive action and after several near misses landed safely at Amman Airport. The Syrian authorities gave no explanation for this wanton attack on an unarmed aircraft on a lawful flight. Hussein
concluded that the motive was to kill him and put an end to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
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A hero's welcome awaited Hussein on his return to Amman. A crowd quickly gathered in the streets and greeted their monarch with scenes of tumultuous enthusiasm and great rejoicing. Hussein's supporters made the most of the incident to boost his image as the brave king who was fighting the evil forces of communism. A few hours after his return, Hussein made a broadcast in which he thanked his people for their enthusiastic welcome and announced that he would not go abroad after all, as ‘the best holiday and the best place is here with you.'
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The next day was declared a public holiday. Tribal chiefs and other dignitaries went to the palace to congratulate the king on his escape. Crowds danced in the streets and shouted, ‘Long live the king!' The king's popularity shot up overnight, and there were signs of the new mood even on the normally hostile West Bank. Rumours spread that the king's uncle had been with him in the airplane. Sharif Nasser was respected by the Bedouins for his bravery and generosity but regarded by the Palestinians as the man with the iron fist; it was said that he was going to murder Ali Abu Nuwar and that he was stopped from doing so only by the king. The monarchy in general had been unpopular, but at this point it suited Hussein to have all the complaints and criticism directed at his wicked uncle.
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The whole episode had a powerful effect in building up the Hussein legend of a brave and resourceful king surrounded on all sides by treacherous enemies. One British diplomat was quoted after the Syrian MiG episode as saying, ‘This is not a country but a geographical monument to the courage of one young man – Hussein.'
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In the eyes of the population at large the young man fully lived up to his title as ‘the Lion of Jordan'.

In the years between the 1958 revolution in Iraq and the June War of 1967, King Hussein continued to consolidate his position as Jordan's principal policy-maker. He also became better known internationally as a result of his frequent visits abroad. As in previous years, Hussein took only a superficial and intermittent interest in economic affairs, delegating them to the government, while he himself was much more directly involved with the army and with foreign relations. The army was the key to the survival of the monarchy and, after the turmoil of the two previous years, it called for careful monitoring. Foreign relations moved in three main spheres: the West, the Arabs and Israel. In all of these Hussein's conduct was governed by dynastic interests. None was predictable or stable. Inter-Arab politics revolved round the rivalry between the conservative and the revolutionary states in what was aptly dubbed ‘the Arab cold war'. These years also saw the emergence, with Nasser's encouragement, of a Palestinian competitor to Hussein's regime, and the transformation, partly as a result of Arab and Palestinian antagonism, of Hussein's perception of Israel from deadly foe to secret friend and ally.

The king's advisers were divided into two rival factions who stood for different foreign policies. One faction was headed by Sharif Nasser. It included two members of the prominent tribal family from Kerak in the south: Hazza' al-Majali, the chief of the royal court, and his cousin Habis al-Majali, the army chief of staff. This faction had a pro-British orientation. It advocated an uncompromising stand in confronting the UAR and a proactive policy of expanding Jordan's role in regional politics. The second faction included Sadiq al-Shar'a, the deputy chief of staff, and Akif al-Fayez, the son of the shaikh of the powerful Bani Sakhr tribal confederation in northern Jordan. This group was allied to prime minister Samir Rifa'i and generally considered pro-American. It
favoured a less confrontational policy towards the UAR and believed that Jordan should make an effort to reach accommodation with the radical Arab states. At stake were not just rival foreign and security policies but competition for political and economic power.
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As 1958 turned into 1959, Hussein felt secure enough to embark on extended travels abroad. Between February and May he went on a world tour that helped to put Jordan on the map and greatly increased his own range of contacts and stature as a leader. Ahmad al-Lozi, who, as chief of royal protocol, accompanied Hussein on this world tour, has suggested that Hussein valued it as a vehicle to forging friendships between people, a bridge to international cooperation and a means of enabling leaders to discharge their joint responsibilities. One royal tour included Iran, Turkey, Spain, Morocco and some African countries that had yet to gain their independence, such as Ghana, Guinea and Kenya. The visit to Ethiopia produced an unusual gift. Emperor Haile Selasse gave Hussein two lion cubs and a guardian to look after them. The royal party took the cubs on the plane back to Amman, where they were kept in the garden of the palace. When they grew up, they were put in cages. The king used to visit them every day, until they died a few years later.
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Emperor Haile Selasse had as one of his many titles ‘the Lion of Judah', and Hussein of course came to be called by his admirers ‘the Lion of Jordan'.

By far the most important country on Hussein's itinerary was the United States, where he went with a large party of aides and advisers in March 1959. The main purpose of the trip was to persuade the Eisenhower administration to increase its economic aid and arms supplies to Jordan; another aim was to present Jordan as a bastion of regional stability in the Middle East and as a strategic asset for the US in the cold war. The Jordanian line in the talks with American officials was essentially ‘You don't count dollars and cents when your security is at stake.' At the meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House, Hussein outlined his vision for a stable and peaceful Middle East and followed it with a powerful pitch for expanding American aid for his country. He criticized Nasser for helping to bring the Soviet Union into the Middle East and restated Jordan's determination to stand up to Nasser and to preserve its independence. Hussein also rejected the notion that the Arab world could remain neutral in the cold war: he felt that they had to choose between the US and the USSR. Eisenhower was
profoundly impressed with ‘the brave young king', and made complimentary remarks about his courage and leadership; he also noted that, while Hussein was concerned with Israel, he realized the real danger to the Middle East was communist imperialism. On the public relations front Hussein also scored notable successes. He visited half a dozen American cities and made strong anti-communist speeches that went down well with his listeners, made him the darling of the conservative media and won him many friends in Congress. The concrete outcome of the trip was an aid package of $47.8 million. Beyond that, as Lawrence Tal has noted, the trip was important for Jordan's future security because it established a personal basis for the relationship between the top decision-makers and their American opposite numbers.
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