Lion of Jordan (81 page)

George H. W. Bush's victory in the American presidential elections of November 1988 gave Hussein some cause for optimism. A friendship between the two men had been formed when Bush was director of the CIA and during the eight years that he served as vice-president under Ronald Reagan. A day after the election Hussein called the president-elect to congratulate him on his victory. On 21 November, Bush wrote an effusive letter to Hussein: ‘I want to reach out to you and a few other world leaders to whom I feel particularly close. One of the greatest satisfactions I derived from winning this election is the knowledge that I will be able to continue the wonderful working relationship with you that we have developed over the last several years… You and your countrymen are on my mind. As I begin to form my foreign policy agenda, Jordan and the Middle East will remain one of my top priorities. I want to work together with you to forge fair and just solutions to the region's problems. I want you to know that I will be involved personally in that search.' The typewritten letter ended with ‘warm personal regards'. In his own hand, Bush scrawled at the bottom: ‘P. S. On the personal side, Barbara sends her love to Queen Noor and all the family. I value our friendship – I really do! George.' Hussein's reply, hand-delivered to Bush by the Jordanian ambassador to Washington two days later, was similarly warm and upbeat, beginning with ‘Dear George'. Hussein reviewed his recent efforts to promote a settlement and added: ‘One hand cannot clap by itself. I think the time has arrived for all of us to encourage our cousins across the river to accept to become our peace partners.' The friendly message thus contained a warning that nothing would move unless the United States brought its weight to bear on Israel.
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Hussein's first meeting with Bush as president took place in Tokyo in February 1989. The occasion was the funeral of the Emperor Hirohito. Although Tokyo was swarming with dignitaries, Bush suggested as a special mark of friendship that Hussein leave some time open for an unpublicized get-together. Accordingly, a late dinner was arranged for just the two men and their wives without aides or note-takers. There is
no record of what was said at this intimate meeting. But there is a copy of a twelve-page dossier that Hussein handed to Bush at the meeting. The dossier was stamped ‘Top Secret/Sensitive' and entitled ‘Personal for the President'. It consisted of a long letter and two enclosures: a ‘Chronology of Jordanian Efforts for Peace 1967–1989' and a list of ‘United States Commitments and Positions on Peace Settlement'. The letter began by noting that Bush was the sixth president to lead his country since 1967 and that instead of the promised era of peace, the Middle East was engulfed in two decades of uninterrupted conflict, death and destruction. A series of myths was said to have surrounded the problem and to have obstructed a solution.

Myth number one was that providing Israel with overwhelming military superiority was an inducement to peace. The record allegedly demonstrated that this policy produced the opposite result by promoting greater Israeli aggrandizement and intransigence. Myth number two was the belief that direct negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians could produce withdrawal and peace. But it was patently beyond the capacity of Jordan and Israel, on their own, to reach a comprehensive settlement. The previous twenty-two years had been replete with peace opportunities but every effort had ended in failure. At this point a note of bitterness overlay the analysis: ‘I speak with special authority because during the past two decades I have personally met in secret, on more than 150 occasions, totalling approximately 1,000 hours of talks, with almost every top Israeli official including, most recently, specifically at US request, with Prime Minister Shamir. To my eternal dismay and frustration, all those efforts have not brought us any closer to the peace I am determined to achieve.'

A third myth was that the United States conceived of the Arab–Israeli conflict as a foreign policy issue, when, in fact, it had a major and pervasive domestic political component. The reference here was to the power and influence of the Israel lobby in Washington: ‘Israel understands this and takes advantage of it. The Arabs have little recourse except to endure the consequences. This dichotomy must be resolved if the United States is to be a truly effective partner in the peace process. If this does not occur, I fear that the US mediation role will be rendered increasingly irrelevant.' Hussein's fourth myth involved the morality and legality of the Israeli policy of retaining permanent control of the West Bank and Gaza. A fifth myth was the belief that Israel's leaders
sincerely wanted to solve the conflict by exchanging land for peace. The truth, according to Hussein, was that they only paid lip service to a negotiated peace while creating excuses for inaction. A sixth myth was that anyone could negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians except the PLO. The Israeli refusal to deal with the PLO prevented negotiations and perpetuated the stalemate that remained the goal of the Israeli government. The next myth was the contention that the acquisition and retention of territory was essential for military security. This, according to Hussein, was neither an accepted principle nor a practicable proposition. Genuine security, he asserted, could be achieved only through peaceful coexistence: ‘Land-grabbing is not a guarantee for security, but a prescription for continuing hostilities.'

Despite all the myths, lost opportunities, frustrations and failures, Hussein declared himself to be optimistic. The source of this optimism was the existence of an Arab–Palestinian consensus to accept the existence of the State of Israel and to negotiate a comprehensive peace with it in accordance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242. The importance of this achievement could not be overestimated. The only remaining obstacle was the refusal of Israel to agree to enter negotiations for the same purpose on the same terms. ‘Mr President,' Hussein concluded, ‘please allow me to say, in all candor and friendship, that I feel I have done my best. I have worked hard to create the consensus the Arabs and Palestinians have achieved. Based on assurances I have received from the United States I have met every request, made every concession and honored every commitment which the United States has asked of me, often at risk to my person and my country. The history of the problem and the record of past negotiations make it clear that the only remaining viable vehicle for negotiations is an international conference, the terms for which are already substantially agreed upon and to which all the parties, except Israel, are committed to attend. The convening of a congress, within this year, must be our highest priority and we must leave no stone unturned until that goal is achieved.'
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The dinner and the dossier enabled Hussein to get in on the ground floor of the Bush administration.

Hussein's zest for foreign affairs and foreign travel had its counterpart in a deplorable neglect of internal affairs and especially the welfare of his people. Hopeless at managing his private financial affairs and prone to getting into debt, he was certainly not up to the task of managing the
financial affairs of his kingdom. Moreover, his own alleged habit of taking commissions on major government contracts meant that he was not a shining example of probity or transparency. Hassan, his younger brother, was both able and willing to take charge of economic policy, but as crown prince he had no authority under the constitution to do so. The constitution entrusted the prime minister and the Council of Ministers with responsibility for administering the affairs of state. The prime minister at the time was Zaid Rifa'i, in his third term in office. Rifa'i was a clever, experienced and shrewd politician, but, like his master, he was much more interested in foreign affairs than in domestic ones. Rifa'i held office by grace of the king, his classmate and friend, and it was widely believed that he used this public office to amass a personal fortune. Rifa'i was far from unique in this respect. Indeed, he was typical of the nepotism, patronage, lack of accountability and disdain for the common people that were all too common within the ruling class in Jordan.

Rifa'i was unpopular in the country at large, and had many opponents and enemies in the ruling class. The charge of corruption was frequently levelled against him and against his government. It was an era of economic prosperity, business opportunity and unregulated growth. Commissions, backhanders and bribes were the order of the day. Marwan Kasim, the chief of the royal court, regarded Rifa'i as brilliant but unreliable and untrustworthy. He also thought that his extreme free market economic policies were not in the best long-term interests of the country. On one occasion Kasim told Rifa'i in the presence of the king that a very rotten smell was coming out of his government. The king cautioned Kasim not to believe all the rumours he heard. Kasim replied that everything he said was validated. The king dropped the subject, but he then asked Rifa'i to get rid of the thieves in his cabinet.
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In general the king was far too lenient and too forgiving, and it was he who was ultimately responsible for the rotten smell of corruption that continued to pollute the public sphere.

One of the few senior persons in the regime who resisted corruption and upheld higher standards of honesty and integrity in public life was Crown Prince Hassan. Hassan understood that taking commissions and cuts compromised one's independence, and he was determined to preserve his own. Without the backing of his brother or the prime minister, however, there was not much that he could do to root out
corruption. Hassan recalled a conversation he had with Rifa'i in 1969 when Rifa'i came with an envelope full of money. Hassan said, ‘What is this?' Rifa'i allegedly replied, ‘It is an envelope from our brother.' Hassan gave it back to him saying that he could not accept anything from his brother through either Rifa'i's hands or anyone else's. Once Hussein came into the room with an envelope stuffed with dollar bills and tumbled the bills on Hassan's head. Hassan was not amused. But, although Hassan took a dim view of this aspect of his brother's reign, he did not confront him directly on the issue.
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With indifference and incompetence at the top of the pyramid of power, economic conditions inside Jordan continued to deteriorate, culminating in the outbreak of bread riots in Ma'an on 18 April 1989. The background to the crisis was a sudden drop in Iraqi demand for Jordanian goods following the end of the Iran–Iraq War; an economic recession in the Gulf and a consequent dwindling of foreign aid; a decline in the remittances made by Jordanian nationals working in the Gulf; rising unemployment; declining living standards; profligate government spending that led to the depletion of foreign currency reserves; a 30 per cent devaluation of the dinar; and widespread corruption at all levels of the government. The immediate trigger for the riots was the sudden withdrawal of food subsidies and the ham-fisted imposition of austerity measures by the government on the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The two main charges against the government were authoritarianism and corruption. People did not see why they should have to tighten their belts when the ministers were using their official positions to line their own pockets. The riots broke out in underdeveloped towns and villages of the south, traditionally the most loyal supporters of the regime. They started in Ma'an, Tafila and Kerak, and spread to Salt in the north. The rioters denounced the austerity measures and demanded the resignation of Zaid Rifa'i. A petition from Kerak demanded, in addition, a reform of the existing electoral laws; the holding of parliamentary elections; the lifting of martial law; and the removal of restrictions on freedom of the press and freedom of expression.
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The riots in the Hashemite heartland were a serious blow to the regime, shaking it to its core. Prince Hassan went down to the south to try to pacify the people and restore order but his car was stoned by the angry crowd. Hussein cut short his state visit to the US and returned home immediately to take charge. He was the object of his people's
wrath for being out of touch, for his extravagant life style, and for failing to curb the rampant corruption of his ministers. The chief of the royal court at the time considered the Ma'an riots as one of the three most painful episodes of Hussein's reign, the other two being the loss of Jerusalem in June 1967 and the Gulf War of January 1991.
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In 1989 Hussein went on a series of trips to the south as part of an exercise in damage limitation. These enabled him to talk to the people directly, to listen and to hear their pain. Some of the people he met were militant. An old peasant from Ma'an pointed his finger at the king and said to him, ‘You know that we gave our loyalty to your grandfather when he came to this country and you know that we give the same loyalty to you. What made us revolt was the move by your ministers to deprive us of eggs, onions, potatoes and tomatoes. These basic foodstuffs are no longer available because the prices shot up and we cannot afford them.'
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The king heaped ashes on his head.

A tribal chief in Wadi Rum loudly reprimanded the king by saying, ‘Abu Abdullah, where have you been all these days? We have missed you. We need water, we need electricity, and we need clinics. Your prime minister is a thief; your ministers are no good.' The king responded to this tongue-lashing by apologizing for not being around to attend to their needs, and he promised to put everything right when he got home with the help of those responsible in the government. When Prince Raad bin Zaid, the lord chamberlain, called the tribal chief to order, Hussein brushed him aside and let his irate subject have his say. Later, when Raad bin Zaid asked the king how he had managed to be so kind, the king replied, ‘We have to allow our countrymen to vent their feelings, and it is up to us to listen and to take action whenever possible.' This episode struck the loyal lord chamberlain as an example of democracy in action Arab style.
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