Losing Vietnam (18 page)

The USSAG study was particularly insightful in its discussion of four potential force structure alternatives. It considered as one alternative that the severe constraints imposed by the reduced U.S. funding, particularly in ammunition and air support, could in the long run only be offset by reducing the areas to be defended. While the South Vietnamese government might not willingly yield territory or population, it might do so as the result of communist actions. In which case, the most probable strategy would be to fall back along successive defensive lines to ultimately protect Saigon and the highly populated and rich delta region.

Any strategy that sacrificed population would have several immediate results: refugees in large numbers would take to the roads, attempting to escape communist control, which would exacerbate the military situation; the morale of the people and the military would plummet; and military personnel whose families were in abandoned areas would desert in large numbers to protect their kin.

However, adopting such a strategy to give up major portions of the country, most probably MR-1 and MR-2, would have several advantages. As the area to be defended would be greatly reduced, there could be defense in depth and interior lines, which would enable rapid reinforcements to points of enemy attack. The disadvantages, as stated, would be a significant reduction in morale, a large-scale refugee problem, and greatly increased desertions.

The adoption of a strategy to give up major portions of the country was very dangerous and required careful planning and coordination. A conscious yielding of territory, say, MR-1, should be effected only when it could be done most advantageously—that is, when the South Vietnamese were not under enemy pressure. Any strategy to hold enclaves in ceded regions should be considered only as interim measures.

Realistically, without additional funding, each of the four force structure alternatives foresaw a South Vietnamese defeat. In every case, the RVNAF would run out of resources. Even though a truncated territory to defend would provide a more concentrated defensive capability, a major North Vietnamese breakthrough would eventually result in the collapse of the defense of Saigon, and the South Vietnamese government would fall.

The 1974 summary of the assessment of the threat to the Republic of Vietnam concluded, “With reinforcements of one to five NVA divisions, the enemy would be capable of making significant military gains in MRs -1, -2, and -3, securing control of rice growing regions in MR-4, forcing major political concessions, and possibly bringing about the downfall of GVN.” This study was forwarded through U.S. channels only.

In early September I attended a Saigon embassy briefing on the military situation. This was professionally done, but its content disturbed me greatly. The embassy staff's interpretation of military events had a decidedly optimistic spin. At the time, the hamlet evaluation survey showed that the government controlled 92 percent of the population. However, it downplayed the increasing strength of the North Vietnamese and glossed over the declining RVNAF capabilities. I returned to the DAO compound that day very concerned. Previously, I had thought that the ambassador generally interpreted events over-optimistically. Now I understood why. When Ambassador Martin had testified before Congress with respect to the military situation just a month earlier, he stated: “Even with the North Vietnamese military
buildup since the Agreement, I am confident the South Vietnamese can continue to handle the military threat on their own, provided we continue to replace military supplies on the permitted one-for-one basis…. It is now crystal clear that the North Vietnamese cannot conquer South Vietnam militarily.”
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He sincerely believed that, but the situation was rapidly changing.

Martin strongly pressed the Congress for increased funding. The embassy's focus on supplemental funding gave the South Vietnamese government what turned out to be false hopes. Rather than adapt its military strategy to the greatly reduced funding levels, it continued to operate in the same manner as it had previously. As late as mid-April 1975, when the situation was dire, President Thieu, oblivious of the military situation, was still hoping for a supplemental.

This was also a period of tension between South Vietnam and its neighbors in Southeast Asia over the discovery of oil among offshore islands claimed by several countries earlier in the year. The South Vietnamese Navy had already sparred with Chinese warships at the Paracel Islands and had its nose bloodied.

And now in late summer there was a possible confrontation between Cambodia and South Vietnam over U.S.-French oil drilling in the Gulf of Thailand.
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The dispute centered on the ownership of Puolo Wei Island, claimed by South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. The South Vietnamese demanded the removal of the oil rig owned by Global Marine of Louisiana. Diplomatic sources reported that Lon Nol had ordered three hundred marines to reinforce a small garrison on an island near the drilling site. He recalled his ambassador to South Vietnam back to Phnom Penh for consultation. The military of each country had taken a bellicose stand.

Brig. Gen. William “Jack” Palmer had called me earlier from Cambodia about the matter, stating that Lt. Gen. Sosthene Fernandez and the entire Cambodian military establishment were worked up over a report that the South Vietnamese Navy was circling the island. There was talk of the Khmer Navy being ordered to take the offensive. Jack was very concerned that neither side should take provocative actions; there was no question but that this was a very serious matter. The Saigon embassy was understandably upset to see our two main allies at each other's throats. Wolf Lehman, the deputy chief of mission and acting
ambassador while Ambassador Martin was in the States, asked me if I could discuss this matter with the JGS to see whether we could head off this ridiculous state of affairs. I took advantage of a social gathering at the JGS compound to discuss the situation with the senior officers, emphasizing that the communists were our enemy and South Vietnam and Cambodia should concentrate on defeating them and that they should continue to work closely together with the Cambodians to that end. The senior Vietnamese officers understood the situation and were very calm about it. They would discuss it with their president. The situation subsequently cooled off, yet both of the economically stretched countries harbored the hope that oil would be their salvation.

In the fall of 1974 the Pentagon indicated a much increased interest in the RVNAF casualty data because casualties were an indication of combat intensity and the Department of Defense was at the time trying to convince Congress to budget for the expanding Vietnam War effort. Admittedly, reported casualty data could be confusing, since there were four sources of data: First, the Joint Operations Center (JOC) reported on a daily basis the friendly and enemy killed and friendly wounded based on compiled battlefield spot reports. Second, the Adjutant General Casualty Report Branch reported two casualty categories from hostile actions: first, those killed or wounded in action (casualties resulting from ground contacts), and second, those other troops killed or wounded by the enemy (casualties from booby traps, grenades, or indirect fire). Third, the Adjutant General Personnel Computerized Center reported only those killed based upon morning report changes. The J-1 used these figures for unit replacements. Finally, the surgeon general's office reported all wounded and died in the hospital from hostile and nonhostile causes.
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In December 1974, U.S. Army Pacific Command requested that we clarify the casualty data. In our reply, we expressed surprise, since it had stated that Washington had been using the spot report data. It was known in military channels that this data was greatly underestimated. It was only natural that initial casualty reports were understated, since no commander wanted to exaggerate losses in the field and unit commanders had no way of knowing what happened to seriously wounded soldiers after they left the battlefield area. It is worthy of note that the numbers of KHA listed in morning reports were higher than in the ultimate resolution by the adjutant general; this would tend to indicate
the commanders were reporting casualties accurately, once there was time for a proper determination.

In addition to those soldiers killed by hostile causes, a substantial number were casualties from nonhostile actions—for example, those injured or killed in vehicle accidents or from training mishaps. In 1973, 9,617 were killed from nonhostile action, whereas 27,901 were killed by hostile actions. In the same year, 2,668 of the 27,901 KHAs (9.6 percent) died in the hospital.
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We ascertained also that the wounded in action data had been understated. Prior to August 1974, the surgeon general reported only those wounded who were absent from duty for one or more days. Effective in August, the surgeon general included those treated and returned to duty immediately. Thus, minor shrapnel and bullet wounds would be properly recorded as wounded by hostile action.

To clarify the situation the DAO requested that the official JGS casualty data be provided for each year from 1965 through 1972 and for each month beginning in 1973. After serious study, the JGS decided that the official sources for casualty data would be the Adjutant General Personnel Computerized Center (known as J-1 data) for all casualties killed outright by hostile and nonhostile sources and the surgeon general's office for all who were wounded or injured and died in the hospital from both hostile and nonhostile causes. The killed by hostile action data is shown in
table 11
.

Table 11.
RVNAF Soldiers Killed by Hostile Action (official data)

Source
: Message, “Casualty Reporting,” 211045Z February 1975, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

A fax from the office of the secretary of Defense principal deputy assistant secretary (comptroller)
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stated that during hearings before Congress on the Vietnam budget an understatement of casualties had provided an effective argument for the reduction of assistance to the $700 million level. It is true that casualty figures are an important measurement of the level of intensity of combat and that the Senate Armed Services Committee gave a 75 percent decline in RVNAF casualties in 1973 as one reason for cutting the Department of Defense's FY 75 military assistance request.
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It appears this was wishful thinking and that Congress supposed the cease-fire agreement was curtailing the conflict. It amazed me that the official figures used reflected 38,697 South Vietnamese combat deaths in 1972 and only 11,093 in 1973. They were comparing the morning report data in 1972 with the understated spot reporting data in 1973. The 1972 data was essentially correct, but the J-1 data for 1973 should have been 27,901 KHA.
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The Department of Defense was well aware that the spot report data was understated, and the mistake in not presenting accurate casualty data led in great measure to major reductions in funding. The insatiable appetite in Washington for immediate data on all matters at every level—in this case, the need to know battle casualties as they occurred—led to this most serious misunderstanding. The Defense Department could have utilized USSAG's reports on the levels of combat intensity, which took into consideration the number of casualties and definitely indicated a continuous escalation of levels of combat in South Vietnam. The fact was that the RVNAF casualties during the cease-fire period exceeded the casualties of every other year of conflict except the 1972 high point (39,195).

One day about noon I was returning from a meeting in downtown Saigon to the DAO compound at Tan Son Nhut airfield in my chauffeur-driven official car with U.S. flags posted on the front fenders. As we were driving we were startled by incessant police sirens coming from the rear. Looking back, I saw by the flags flying from an escorted limousine that it was the North Vietnamese delegation, probably headed to Tan Son Nhut for a flight back to North Vietnam. I told my driver not to pull off the road and to continue normally. When the limousine carrying the North Vietnamese delegation passed us, it purposely swerved to the right to cut us off, and our front left bumper
caught the right rear fender of the North Vietnamese limousine, ripping the fender completely off. They continued on, and when we got to the airfield I returned to my office as if nothing had happened. Later I looked out the window into the yard below, and there were about twenty South Vietnamese employees huddled around my sedan listening to my proud Vietnamese driver tell his story. He was hailed as a hero! Such was the dislike the southerners had for the communists.

In the fall of 1974, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements visited Saigon. He was the highest-ranking U.S. government official to visit Vietnam since the cease-fire. In a speech prior to his trip he claimed that cuts in military aid had put our allies “on the military equivalent of starvation rations,” this after the United States had told the Vietnamese that America would provide the tools and expect them to do the job. So, General Vien and the Vietnamese government officials looked forward to Secretary Clements's visit, which would allow them a personal briefing on the deteriorating situation. In preparing for a private luncheon for Clements with Vien and his staff, the general asked me what special measures he should take. I told Vien to just do it normally but suggested the centerpiece might be yellow roses, since Clements was from Texas. Sure enough, the secretary picked up on this cue and told the group the story of the mulatto girl, the Yellow Rose of Texas, responsible in large part for the defeat of the Mexican general Santa Anna at San Jacinto. Clements was polite and charming and listened well to the RVNAF situation, unlike many arrogant congressional types before and after him. He discussed that the administration would attempt to get a supplemental bill for more military aid, although this would be extremely unpopular in Congress. In a press conference later, Clements stated that the return of U.S. air and naval forces “would have to be considered” in the event of a major North Vietnamese offensive. He further stated that the inability to replace lost equipment or to train enough soldiers adequately was weakening South Vietnam's long-term capability. His strong personal support for additional funding gave the senior Vietnamese officers continued hope for a supplemental.