Authors: Ira A. Hunt Jr.
Losing Vietnam
Losing Vietnam
B
ATTLES AND
C
AMPAIGNS
The Battles and Campaigns series examines the military and strategic results of particular combat techniques, strategies, and methods used by soldiers, sailors, and airmen throughout history. Focusing on different nations and branches of the armed services, this series aims to educate readers by detailed analysis of military engagements.
Series editor: Roger Cirillo
An AUSA Book
How America Abandoned Southeast Asia
Major General Ira A. Hunt Jr.
USA (Ret.)
Copyright © 2013 by The University Press of Kentucky
Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth,
serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University.
All rights reserved.
Editorial and Sales Offices
: The University Press of Kentucky
663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008
www.kentuckypress.com
17 16 15 14 13 Â Â 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hunt, Ira Augustus, 1924-
Losing Vietnam : how America abandoned Southeast Asia / Major General Ira A. Hunt Jr., USA (Ret.).
p. cm. â (Battles and campaigns)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8131-4208-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) â ISBN 978-0-8131-4206-7 (epub) â
ISBN 978-0-8131-4207-4 (pdf)
1. Vietnam War, 1961-1975âEconomic aspects. 2. CambodiaâHistoryâCivil War, 1970-1975âEconomic aspects. 3. Military assistance, AmericanâEconomic aspects. 4. Military assistance, AmericanâVietnam (Republic) 5. Military assistance, AmericanâCambodia. I. Title.
DS559.42.H86 2013
959.704'3âdc23
2013008898
This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
| Member of the Association of |
This book is dedicated to those
Americans, Vietnamese,
and Cambodians
who so valiantly fought
against communist aggressions.
Illustrations
Figures
Figure 1
. Enemy Troop Levels
Figure 2
. Dry-Season Analysis
Figure 3
. Time of Day of Friendly KHA Due to Enemy-Initiated Contacts
Figure 4
. Hamlet Evaluation System Model Hierarchy
Figure 5
. Combat Intensity by Week
Figure 6
. Tripartite Deputies Organization
Figure 7
. Locations of Khmer Communist Attacks by Fire on Mekong River Convoys
Figure 8
. Height of Mekong River and Attack Rate
Maps
Map 1
. Southeast Asia
Map 2
. South Vietnam Administrative Divisions
Map 3
. NVA/VC Military Regions
Map 4
. The Battles for MR-2
Map 5
. Withdrawal from MR-1
Map 6
. Troop Dispositions, Saigon, 28 April 1975
Map 7
. Mekong River Wet Season Flooding
Map 8
. Cambodia, Major Routes and Enclaves
Map 9
. KC Military Regions
Map 10
. GKR Military Regions
Map 11
. Northern Koh Tang Island, Indicating Landing Zones
Photographs
Photo 1
. Traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 21 Dec 1973
Photo 2
. Tank Mired in the Mud
Photo 3
. Tan Son Nhut Airfield, 28 April 1975
Photo 4
. Tan Son Nhut Airfield, 30 April 1975. The Aftermath
Photo 5
. Convoy Passing through Mekong Narrows at Peam Reang Island with Petroleum Tanker on Fire
Photo 6
. Barge Protection on the Mekong River
Photo 7
. Mekong Convoy, 29 January 1975
Photo 8
. Barricades on the Mekong with Sunken Tugs
Photo 9
. The Recovery of the
Mayaguez
Photo 10
. Bomb Damage Assessment, Kompong Som, 15 April 1975
Photo 11
. Destroyed CH-53 Helicopters on Koh Tang Island
Tables
Table 1
. NVA/VC Order of Battle Gains/Losses, 1967â1974
Table 2
. NVA/VC Order of Battle Net Gains/Losses, 1967â1974
Table 3
. NVA/VC Order of Battle Strengths, Units in South Vietnam
Table 4
. Enemy-Initiated Incidents, Percent by Type, Countrywide, January 1973âJanuary 1974
Table 5
. Exchange Ratio, Friendly Efficiency, Enemy KIA/Friendly KHA
Table 6
. Friendly Weapons Ratio, Weapons Lost, Friendly Killed/Total Contacts
Table 7
. Casualties from Attacks by Fire
Table 8
. Comparative Required Supply Rates, Rounds per Weapon per Day, October 1973
Table 9
. Army Ground Ammunition Issues
Table 10
. Ratio of Casualties and Ammo Expenditures to Combat Intensity
Table 11
. RVNAF Soldiers Killed by Hostile Action
Table 12
. Friendly Weapons Ratio
Table 13
. The Won-Lost Ledger
Table 14
. Weekly Percentile of Activities, 6â12 December 1974
Table 15
. Combat Intensity Factors, 8 Novemberâ12 December 1974
Table 16
. Total Incidents, 28 January 1973â19 April 1975
Table 17
. Khmer Communist Command and Control Organizations
Table 18
. Effect of Weapons Densities on Ground Munitions
Table 19
. Projected Total Ammo Expenditures
Table 20
. MAP-CB Funding
Table 21
. Analysis of Cambodian Daily Expenditure Rate of Ammunition
Table 22
. Storage Objectives and Replenishment Requirements
Table 23
. Countrywide Casualty Figures and Attrition
Table 24
. Force Distributions, Battalions
Table 25
. Khmer RepublicâCasualty Recap, 1 Januaryâ11 April 1975
Table 26
. Combat Data, FY 75
As a prelude to the signing of the Vietnamese cease-fire agreement the United States agreed to build up the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and to continue to supply them with essential military supplies and equipment. To supervise that effort and to maintain liaison with the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG), a major headquarters, was established in northeast Thailand. Most people thought that the cease-fire would herald a stable and lasting peace, but the war continued unabated, much to the consternation of Washington as to which side was violating the agreement.
At a meeting with the JGS in Saigon in October 1973, after inquiring about the initiation of hostilities, I was pleased to learn that RVNAF field reports could provide information as to the origin of combat activities as well as a myriad of other useful data concerning hostilities. Earlier in Vietnam my unit had great success utilizing operational analysis to sharpen our combat edge. I felt that an analytical study of this data could be helpful to the RVNAF to improve its military operations. USSAG offered to analyze the data on a continuing basis. Our initial analysis indicated that 90 percent of the cease-fire violations were initiated by the North Vietnamese in land-grabbing operations. More importantly, it showed that on the few occasions when the RVNAF attacked they were much more efficient than when they were fending off the enemy. It was essential for the South Vietnamese to go on the offensive to prevent the enemy from taking over their country. So, on 3 December 1973 a JGS order went out to the RVNAF to seize the initiative, and during the next ten months or so the RVNAF was very successful in defeating the communists and blunting their attacks. However in July 1974 the U.S. Congress drastically reduced the funding for South Vietnam. The RVNAF was forced to seriously ration
ammunition and to appreciably cut back air force flying hours, greatly diminishing its firepower and tactical mobility.
