Losing Vietnam (5 page)

These communist analyses set the stage for the rest of the war. The communists' strategy was to capture more land and gain a larger population. Their primary targets appeared to be the RVNAF static defense forces and elements assigned to support the pacification program. For starters, they intended to overrun a number of South Vietnamese outposts in remote rural and mountainous areas. Currently, they were organizing all their forces in South Vietnam into a modern army capable of launching a sustained offensive supported by armor, heavy artillery, and antiaircraft.
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Their goal was to strike a final blow to topple South Vietnam. They thought that as they grew more successful the United States might reenter the war with tactical air support, but they were certain that the Americans would commit no ground forces. In 1973, all sides agreed that the RVNAF had superior firepower, mobility, and logistics support. The communists would do everything to reverse that balance of power. It was up to the United States to see that the RVNAF remained better equipped and supplied. If that occurred, the final outcome would depend on the fighting capabilities of the respective armed forces.

The South Vietnamese strategy, like all military strategies, was rooted in politics. One of the key articles in the cease-fire agreement was the establishment of an administrative unit, the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord. In the eyes of the South Vietnamese, this would establish a de facto coalition government, which was anathema to the South Vietnamese, who thought that if the North Vietnamese gained a credible amount of territory and controlled a sufficient number of people, they would have a rationale for demanding participation
in government. President Nguyen Van Thieu wanted to prevent this possibility, and he adamantly insisted on a policy of no loss of territory or population. The United States supported him in this policy and had crafted the hamlet evaluation survey to measure the number of hamlets and the population under government control on a monthly basis. These concerns were certainly not far-fetched; the communists in Cambodia were demanding that the United Nations recognize the Sihanouk government because it did in fact control about 70 percent of the territory (but only 32 percent of the population).
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Notwithstanding the perceived political realities, the South Vietnamese policy of attempting to maintain control over all territory and population was, on final analysis, one of the major reasons for the South's downfall.

The strategy of South Vietnam, as General Vien, the chairman of the joint general staff, and others explained to me, was to maintain control over all territory and population, improve and modernize the armed forces, and reinforce the Pacification and Rural Development Program.

This was certainly a coherent strategy, with its centerpieces being the strength, capabilities, and combat effectiveness of the RVNAF. The pacification program had been immensely successful, providing security to more than 5 million additional rural inhabitants, and the RVNAF's ability to provide substantial protection was the key to this success. Without security, there was no pacification. Having deprived the communists of much of their rural base, the RVNAF then had to repel all enemy attempts to retake those hamlets and villages under South Vietnamese control; again, this could only be accomplished by military action.

Although this strategy was coherent, it was seriously flawed. It was primarily a defensive tactic to contain communist expansion. The ARVN was spread thin trying to protect some twelve thousand hamlets; it had very few resources with which to counter enemy aggressions, and many of its troops lost the spirit of the offense, having been positioned so long in a static defensive posture. The strategy gave the initiative to the communists, who could concentrate their forces to attack the smaller outposts and bases, thereby assuring the enemy of local combat superiority.

During the 1972 Easter Offensive, the enemy overran many outposts
and besieged several others. The surrounded South Vietnamese outposts required continuing aerial reinforcements and logistical resupply, which was a major drain of friendly assets. So, in late 1972 the JGS recommended that the ARVN withdraw from many of its relatively isolated positions. To the JGS's consternation, President Thieu firmly rejected the request, reiterating with respect to the enemy what came to be called the “Four No's”—no land, no population, no coalition, and no belief (in communist pronouncements).

The cease-fire agreement required the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam; at its height, the number included ten divisions and their combat and logistical support units plus the U.S. Air Force and Navy's formidable close air support and strategic bombing capabilities, as well as the naval gunfire of the U.S. fleet, exceeding over 500,000 personnel. Yet the agreement allowed approximately 270,000 armed NVA/VC troops to remain. Thus, the balance of forces dramatically shifted. For South Vietnam, this was the predominant factor influencing the future conduct of hostilities. President Thieu compared the situation to one in which a burglar inside the house breaks out through the front door while the police officer is outside waiting to take action.
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Having discussed the South Vietnamese strategy, it is important to review the RVNAF personnel strengths as well as the main firepower and mobility components: air force, navy, and army armor and artillery. In 1967 the RVNAF had 643,000 personnel under arms, and in 1973, as the allied contingents were drawn down, to offset the loss of the allied forces this number increased to 1.2 million authorized troops. After the peace accord was signed, the Ministry of National Defense intended to reduce the size of the RVNAF. However, the continuation of hostilities after the cease-fire precluded this, and there was only a small downsizing of 100,000 men to an approved force size of 1.1 million. Yet, this was less a reduction than an increase in the quality of the armed forces.
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The ARVN, the regular ground combat organization, was composed of eleven infantry divisions, an airborne division, and the marine corps division. Additionally, there were seven ranger groups. Artillery and armor supported these thirteen divisions. The approximate number of ARVN personnel in these combat units totaled 210,000: eleven infantry divisions, 105,000; an airborne division, 12,000; a marine
division, 14,000; rangers, 28,000; artillery, 36,000 (including 23,000 troops assigned to divisions); and armor, 15,000.
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The territorial forces included the regional forces (RF) and the popular forces (PF). After Tet, the JGS placed the territorial forces under ARVN control, and the United States agreed to upgrade their equipment. The regional forces' basic operating unit was the hundred-man company. Many of these were organized into battalions, consisting of four companies each; later in the war these were provided mobile assets. The regional forces generally operated within their own provinces. The popular force operated in platoons of twenty-nine men each, generally within their own districts, villages, or hamlets. The regional force units had more equipment, better training, and more competent leadership than the popular force units. Although it was normal to group the two organizations together, the regional forces were much better qualified in terms of combat capability. Their ranks were filled mostly from local recruiting, and what these troops lacked in combat capability they made up for with their knowledge of local areas. These added another 500,000 troops of varying quality and capabilities: 145,000 in regional force battalions, 155,000 among other regional forces, and 200,000 in popular force units.
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Although the ground combat troops (ARVN, RF, PF) numbered about 710,000 soldiers in January 1973, only the army and, to a much lesser extent, the regional force battalions could be considered for deployment to meet enemy combat initiatives anywhere. Thus, more than 50 percent of the ground combat units were primarily disposed in a static defensive posture and were then primarily reactive forces, since it was almost a requirement that the twelve thousand South Vietnamese hamlets had to be protected and the civilian population kept under government control to coincide with President Thieu's policy of losing no population.

The combat support slice, or the necessary personnel to keep combat units in line, amounted to about 328,000 troops. Although these essential units were located throughout the country, the major logistical installations were primarily in the vicinity of Saigon. At any one time the personnel absent from units was about 150,000 soldiers, of which 70,000 were in training.

The approximate overall strength of the South Vietnamese forces at the time of the cease-fire included 210,000 in ARVN/Marine combat
units, 145,000 in regional force battalions, 355,000 in other RF/PFs, 328,000 in ARVN support troops, 64,000 in the Vietnamese Air Force, and 41,000 in the Vietnamese Navy, for a total of 1,143,000 soldiers.
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Subsequent to the cease-fire, the ARVN was chronically understrength. Although the government had passed a general mobilization law, after about a decade of intense conflict the manpower resources were drying up. Considering the demographics of South Vietnam's population of 20 million, the number of physically fit males reaching draft age yearly was probably between 120,000 and 130,000. This should have been enough to maintain a force structure of 1.1 million soldiers. In fact, most observers thought that manpower was not a problem. Yet, it was always a matter of grave concern. South Vietnam had serious difficulties in controlling its manpower. Considering the constant enemy attacks against isolated hamlets and villages, the constant flow of displaced persons, the large urban buildup, and the efforts of draftable youths to evade military service, manpower control difficulties were understandable. The ARVN had continuous attrition because of combat losses and other casualties, discharges, elimination of the unfit, and desertions. By far the most serious drain on manpower was desertions. Efforts to round up draft dodgers and to recover deserters were ineffective. Deserters blended into the overcrowded cities undetected. Some joined the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) to avoid ARVN combat duty. In 1973 there were 215,023 desertions, 20 percent of the assigned strength. The total losses per month averaged 2.5 percent, of which two-thirds were desertions.
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There were other personnel problems—such as ghost soldiers, nonexistent names that were nonetheless carried on the rolls; flower soldiers, who were carried on the rolls but were off elsewhere; and those who were absent without leave for prolonged periods—but the desertion rate was by far the most important.

These personnel problems manifested themselves in a chronic shortfall of troops present for duty in combat units. Demographics made it difficult to make up for the loss of manpower resulting from combat losses, desertions, and discharges. Therefore, on the average, combat units had assigned about 85 percent of their authorized strength, and those present for duty were often about 85 percent of the assigned strength. Combat is a team effort; when there are too many soldiers not present for duty, unit effectiveness suffers. Combat units with fewer
than 70 percent present for duty are not considered combat effective. Each army infantry battalion generally had an authorized strength of 639 soldiers. Therefore, unit commanders continuously made major efforts to ensure a foxhole strength of at least 450 combatants.

While personnel strengths were a problem, at the senior levels the leadership of the ARVN was good. Most major commanders had been trained at U.S. Army branch schools in the United States, and many were command and staff college graduates. Yet, President Thieu assigned some of the key command billets to officers whose loyalty he could count on, and several of these were considered incompetent. Some of the senior officers lacked the ability to make hurried and decisive decisions in stressful situations. The junior officers lacked the experience of those in higher echelons, but almost all had been battle tested. The intense combat in 1972 had resulted in many companygrade leader casualties. The inadequate pay and long separations from families hurt the morale of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Those who had their families close by could not make ends meet. However, in 1973 the overall morale was satisfactory, considering that the war had been going for longer than eight years and showed no signs of ending.

At the national level the South Vietnamese JGS was organized on normal general staff principles. However, the commander of the air force and the chief of naval operations appeared only at the operational level, as did the commanding generals of the four corps. By and large there were few air force and naval personnel at the staff level, which reflected the actual state of the armed forces. Thus it was mostly an army organization instead of a true joint staff.

I had worked with the JGS in 1968–1969 and was very pleased to resume my friendships—particularly with Gen. Cao Van Vien and Brigadier General Tho. Vien was a quiet, intelligent officer, the former airborne division commander, with decades of military experience. A combat-proven officer, he appeared perfect for the job, since he had the respect and loyalty of the officer corps and he could work with President Thieu. Working with the president was not easy. Vien's complete lack of political ambition was undoubtedly an important factor in their continuing relationship.

The chief of staff was Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, who doubled as the chief of the Central Logistics Command (CLC). He had a phenomenal grasp of logistical matters and was an innovator. His Joint Staff was competent across the board, but two officers stood out. Brigadier General Tho, the J-3, was a superior officer who grasped situations quickly and also had Vien's complete confidence. Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, the J-2, was also extremely competent. These two officers made a great team.

The military was well supplied with ammunition, petroleum, and rations. The RVNAF's Vietnamization was causing problems with supply procedures, particularly spare parts and maintenance. Thus, there were considerable equipment deadlines. However, the DAO had many U.S. contractors on hand attempting to take up the slack.