Losing Vietnam (10 page)

Table 6.
Friendly Weapons Ratio, Weapons Lost, Friendly Killed/Total Contacts (period 3, 16 December 1973–14 June 1974)

Source
: Analysis, “Summary of Ceasefire Statistics,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanon, Thailand.

Now that our attention was focused on the poor performance of the territorials in MR-4, we noticed in late 1974 that there was a large increase in the number of those killed compared to the number
wounded; the ratio of killed to total casualties increased from 24 percent in period 3 to 32 percent in period 4. This could be an indication that medical evacuation had been curtailed or that medical treatment was lacking, either of which could seriously affect morale. I asked the JGS to look into the matter. Its findings were fascinating. According to reports from the field, medical procedures and treatment had not changed during the period. However, the territorials in MR-4 had lost so many M-16s to the enemy that the enemy was using these weapons against them. According to the ARVN, the lethality of the M-16 was so much greater than that of the AK-47 that the wounded were succumbing in greater numbers.

The topography and the climate varied appreciably for each military region, greatly affecting military operations. Two major seasons characterized the climate: the southwest monsoon (wet season), which occurs generally from May through October, and the northeast monsoon (dry season), which usually runs from November through April. A major exception is the weather in the North Vietnamese panhandle south through MR-1 and -2 during November, December, and January, which are wet because of heavy coastal precipitation associated with the active tropical storm season.
Figure 2
highlights the dry season for Southeast Asia. All values are the mean monthly precipitation for the larger areas, and the precipitation values for specific locations can vary considerably from the mean. This provides insight to the tempo of combat operations; for example, it suggests why communist attacks in MR-3 were often initiated in December, whereas in MR-1 and MR-2 they usually did not commence until February or March.

As additional data became available, particularly with respect to the times of day when attacks were initiated, the JGS could obtain a much better understanding of communist tactics and the RVNAF responses. Since the enemy regional commanders had relative autonomy concerning day-to-day operations, the spectrum of the times enemy ground attacks were initiated against separate South Vietnamese military regions varied greatly. They peaked in MR-1 and -2 at 0600 hours, in MR-3 at 0100 and 0200 hours, and in MR-4 at 1900 hours. Although there were definite peaks in each MR, overall the enemy initiated contacts equally over a twenty-four-hour period; thus, almost half of the attacks came at night.

Figure 2. Dry-Season Analysis. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.)

Figure 3. Time of Day of Friendly KHA Due to Enemy-Initiated Contacts. (Source: “Republic of Vietnam Ammunition Conservation Study,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.)

Considering the friendly casualties resulting from the enemy-initiated contacts, one might expect the time spectrum of casualties to mirror the enemy attacks. However, while there were spikes at 0200 hours and between 0600 and 0800, this did not hold true for the early evening hours, even though that was the period of maximum enemy contacts. The RVNAF was most vulnerable to both enemy ground attacks and attacks by fire between 0600 and 0800 hours; it just had a difficult time getting started in the morning (see
figure 3
). The enemy attacks by fire were mostly in the daytime, the opposite of my 1968–1969 experiences.

The South Vietnamese initiated operations predominantly in the daytime. When informed, the JGS, recognizing the importance of night initiatives, brought this matter to the military region commanders' attention. Between 16 December 1973 and 14 June 1974, the ARVN initiated about 1,620 contacts between 2200 hours and 0600 hours. However, between 15 June and 14 December 1974, it conducted about 5,280 friendly-initiated night contacts, over three times as many operations. A big improvement. The results of the friendly night initiatives, however, were poorer than those of daytime forays. Unfortunately, the ARVN did not have the night vision devices that enabled the U.S. forces in South Vietnam to be so successful with nighttime operations.

The JGS's prodding of commanders had some immediate effects with respect to aggressiveness. The RVNAF continued to expand its operational initiatives throughout the war. In 1975 it initiated more contacts than the enemy. This had been true for MR-1, -2, and -3 since the summer of 1974. No longer was it sitting in its bases; it was effectively taking the battle to the enemy.

When considering communist casualties, it is important to note that the number of enemy killed by air when ground forces were not in contact are not included in these statistics. Air force attacks on enemy troop movements, bivouac areas, supply points, and lines of communications were carried out throughout the post-cease-fire period. Enemy casualties resulting from the massive amounts of unobserved harassment and interdiction artillery fires also were not included. The numbers of enemy killed by these two actions, particularly by air, were substantial.

The JGS, concerned in April 1974 that enemy attacks by fire caused 27 percent of casualties, alerted the field commanders in April and again in October 1974. Subsequently, USSAG carefully monitored the problem. One measure of the enemy's ABF effectiveness was the number of friendly soldiers killed per attack by fire: 0.12 fatalities, an average of one killed in every eight attacks. This takes into account multiple fatalities. However, there were more than six wounded per those killed.
Without our operations analysis, there was no way the field commanders could have realized the overall effects of enemy attacks by fire on the troops. By directing unit commanders to focus on this problem, the JGS was able to cut the enemy's effectiveness between 28 January 1973 and 20 April 1975 from 1.62 casualties per ABF to 0.73 casualties per attack by fire, even though the intensity of the attacks (rounds per attack) continued to increase throughout the periods. Countrywide summary statistics concerning friendly casualties from enemy attacks by fire are given in
table 7
.

Table 7.
Casualties from Attacks by Fire

Source
: Analysis, “Summary of Ceasefire Statistics,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

There were 6.6 wounded by hostile action (WHA) per 1 killed by hostile action (KHA) resulting from attacks by fire, twice the 3.2 ratio resulting from all ground attacks. Thus, the importance of taking defensive measures against attacks by fire to protect the troops is evident. If the ratio of casualties to attacks by fire in the first period (1.62) had continued throughout the subsequent four periods, there would have been 23,211 more friendly casualties. ARVN protective measures created a huge savings in manpower and costs, to say nothing of morale.

There were several major attacks in early August 1974, particularly at Plei Me in MR-2, where the 320th NVA Division expended more than ten thousand artillery and mortar rounds attempting to defeat the 82nd ARVN Ranger Battalion.
⁴²
Even though the intensity (rounds/ABF) increased somewhat in later periods, the friendly losses per attack were reduced by half from the earlier periods. Nevertheless, the casualties were much too high and reflected poorly on small unit leadership across the board. As an example, in period 3 there were 11,725 ARVN
casualties resulting from enemy-initiated contacts and 6,558 casualties from attacks by fire.

Of all friendly casualties caused by enemy-initiated actions in period 3, 36 percent were the result of attacks by fire. When the 1,818 KHAs and 5,637 WHAs resulting from the 2,387 friendly-initiated attacks are added to the totals above, 25.5 percent of all casualties resulted from attacks by fire. We sliced the combat data in many, many ways, and generally the lessons learned were very valuable and often when implemented saved lives. The aforementioned examples are but a few.

The fourth major type of enemy-initiated incidents after attacks by fire, contacts, and harassments was terrorism, an important weapon of the communist insurgency, one continually practiced by the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Terror tactics constituted an integral part of communist strategy, and the assassination of civilians by terrorists was therefore deliberate and systematic. Terrorism could also be nonlethal, as manifested by taxation, abduction, and political agitation. An October 1973 review indicated enemy terrorism had declined somewhat in intensity since the January cease-fire agreement.

It was impossible to draw an exact comparison between the 1973 incident rate and those of 1969, 1970, and 1971, as tabulating procedures had changed. In gross terms, however, there appears to have been a steady four-year decline in the number of civilian casualties. Through October 1973, the number of victims killed, wounded, or abducted/missing was running about one-half of what it had been in 1969 and 1970. The number of civilians wounded in 1973 (6,841) nearly equaled that in 1971 and was higher than in 1972, which indicated that communist harassment and shellings continued to affect populated areas. Basic government controls in urban and other normally secure areas were not affected by increased military activities in 1972 or 1973.

A U.S.-funded public survey, the Pacification Statistical Analysis System, from which the foregoing data is taken, confirmed the trends in the statistical reporting and the recent shift toward nonlethal terrorism.
⁴³
This system was an important guide to terrorist activity, which is
“successful” only if it actually persuades or coerces the target—in other words, affects the population's attitudes. Its findings indicated a lack of success nearly everywhere in South Vietnam.

In 1973, assassinations (attacks on select single individuals in which only they were killed) accounted for 393 of the 2,487 civilian deaths. Moreover, the assassination rate since the cease-fire declaration had remained close to thirty cases per month despite an upturn in civilian casualties (killed) in September. The communists evidently did not have sufficient access to target those who most threatened them politically. The more important government officials remained beyond their control.