Losing Vietnam (40 page)

In the fall of 1974, the military conflict in Cambodia was being conducted for an important political consideration, the UN General Assembly's recognition of the legitimacy of the Khmer government. The contest, of course, was between the government of Lon Nol, the GKR, and the government-in-exile of Prince Sihanouk, the communist government
in Cambodia (GRUNK). Until the question of the seating of government in the United Nations was decided, GRUNK had categorically ruled out any negotiations or compromise with the GKR. The GKR, supported by the United States and most democratic countries, was actually attempting to improve its international credentials prior to the November 1974 UN debate. On the other side, Khieu Samphan, the KC forces' commander, trumpeted the fact that sixty-two countries (many aligned with the communists) recognized GRUNK and supported Prince Sihanouk's royal government. Samphan claimed that GRUNK held almost all the territory and was a complete state politically, economically, and militarily. In late November, the UN General Assembly voted 56–44 to support a resolution calling for talks to end the war. The resolution noted that GRUNK, presided over by Sihanouk, had authority over part of Cambodia but the GKR still controlled the preponderant number of Cambodian people. It further stated that the two parties to the conflict should solve their problems free from external influence. The resolution effectively left Cambodia with the UN seat for another year.

Besides pleasing the Cambodian government, the UN vote had special internal ramifications. The Khmer Rouge began to assert its control over GRUNK, no longer hiding behind Sihanouk, and the communists' rhetoric became much more strident. Communists no longer mentioned Sihanouk's name, and they methodically removed the pro-Sihanouk personnel.

I had many interesting experiences traveling about Southeast Asia during these times, and I must relate one of them. One morning I was to attend a meeting at Siem Reap. The city is near the ancient temple complex at Angkor Wat, which, as it was in communist territory, I had no chance to visit. So, flying over the ruins of the ancient place, I was engrossed with the scenery. As the aircraft descended to land at what appeared to be a temporary landing strip nearby, I noticed the soldiers along the runway staring at the aircraft in disbelief, their mouths wide open. The instant I saw their checkered red and white scarves, I knew they were enemy troops guarding the airstrip, and I yelled to pull up—from only ten to fifteen feet off the runway. Obviously, the pilot had chosen the wrong airstrip. We subsequently landed at the Cambodian Air Force airstrip at Siem Reap.

In the year between March 1973 and March 1974, the enemy cut Route 4 twenty-eight times. The longest period the highway was opened after 15 August 1973, when the United States terminated close air support, was the nine days between 17 and 26 October 1973. The longest period it was closed was the sixty-two days between 11 January and 13 March 1974.

So, in May 1974 USSAG noted to MEDTC that the many small friendly positions deployed along Highway 4 were highly vulnerable and could easily be isolated and overrun, resulting in unnecessary additional losses of personnel, equipment, and ammunition. The communists were particularly anxious to capture some of the 105 mm howitzers deployed and would target these locations with large forces to obtain easy victories and add to their weapons inventory. We recommended that the military situation could be strengthened and losses cut by consolidating positions along Route 4. The FANK did consolidate into several strong, defendable enclaves; one of these was Kompong Seila. Consequently, Route 4 was closed, requiring Cambodian logistical resupply to be effected solely via the Mekong and by aerial measures.

Kompong Seila was 126 kilometers southwest of Phnom Penh on Route 4. Shortly after the consolidation of FANK forces in March 1974, it came under a siege that lasted until mid-January 1975 and was one of the little-known stories of the Cambodian war.
²⁰⁴
The continuous siege, dating from May 1974, established a record for the Indochina wars, eclipsing the fifty-six days of Dien Bien Phu and the ninety-six of An Loc. The story of the heroism and suffering of the men, women, and children of Kompong Seila is a noble chapter of this tragic war. The enclave did not want to provide info to the enemy, so for months it sent only cryptic radio messages. Because of the necessity for a continuous airdrop of food and ammunition to the enclave, we had followed the situation as closely as possible. The U.S. Air Force delivered about four hundred short tons of ammo and a hundred short tons of rice each month. MEDTC and USSAG had considered possible relief operations to evacuate Kompong Seila since early November 1974. However, in mid-January 1975 the communists broke contact, and FANK was able to evacuate. At that point there were still some eighty-eight hundred civilians in beleaguered Kompong Seila, plus eight hundred military effectives.

During the many months this valiant garrison had been cut off, it sustained extremely heavy enemy attacks, both on the ground and by indirect fire. It often received a thousand rounds of incoming artillery, rocket, and mortar fire in a single night. Obviously, friendly casualties had been very high. There had been 390 military killed in action, 200 wounded, and another 200 hospitalized for other illnesses, malaria, and the like. No figures were received on civilians killed and wounded, though there were many.

In early 1975, when Kompong Seila was finally abandoned, the garrison troops were inserted into the northwest sector of the Phnom Penh perimeter that was under relentless attack by the enemy. The Kompong Seila forces had not been paid for several months, and when the paymaster showed up short of money (probably siphoned off to pay for ghost troops), an argument ensued and he was killed. The frustrated troops proceeded to cut out the heart of the paymaster and serve it up for lunch. This reported act shocked Phnom Penh. Obviously, the troops who had suffered so much lost their cool when put upon. It was hard to imagine these usually unimpulsive people reacting so violently.

In July 1974, when the fortunes of FANK were at their highest, the Khmer government appealed to the communists to commence peace negotiations without any prior conditions.
²⁰⁵
There was no response. In late November 1974 the military situation in Cambodia was still most favorable to the Cambodian government, even though the government knew that the U.S. funding situation was critical, requiring major ammunition conservation efforts and a large reduction in the procurement of other supplies and equipment.
²⁰⁶
This was the best of times for Cambodia to try again to initiate negotiations with GRUNK, which it did. Unfortunately, the communists reacted by becoming more intransigent. The window of opportunity had passed, though Cambodia, unlike South Vietnam, had seriously attempted to negotiate a peaceful solution.

The military situation at the end of 1974 was a stalemate. Both armies had greatly improved their capabilities during the previous year. Intelligence reports indicated that the communists intended to maintain the offensive by an all-out coordinated attack on Phnom Penh in early 1975. The country's future looked ominous: without additional
U.S. supplemental funding, the Cambodian forces would rapidly deplete their dwindling military arsenal.

Communications security was poor on both sides—but particularly for the communists. They talked by radio about every conceivable situation and problem. Until early in 1974, a U.S. airplane sweep of the area picked up dozens of daily communist communications. The communists were a formidable force, but they did have problems—low morale; malaria; lack of ammunition and replacements; soldiers who were wet, hungry, and afraid of artillery and air strikes; and the list goes on. Nevertheless, their leaders' harsh discipline kept the units together. There was always the fear of corporal retribution to the communist soldiers or, more important, to their families.

There was one communist leader in charge of an area south of Phnom Penh, KC MR-607, who would critique his own performance after every battle, and he always lost the battles. When he came up on the air, we would laugh, knowing that the FANK had bested the enemy again. I often thought afterward that if this were in the U.S. military, with its zero tolerance for error, he would have been long gone. However, he learned and improved, and his command played a major role in closing the Mekong, the strategic move that in reality won the war. The KC military regions are shown on
map 9
.

We obtained several types of information by communications intelligence. For instance, a report of the Route 4 battlefield committee (southwest sector) intercepted on 6 May 1974 indicated the enemy had many wounded personnel: 1,820 were seasoned troops, 388 were women, and 761 were young men. At the same time, a message from Ran Koh Kong to Mok (southwest sector) stated: “On 6 May we captured a boat belonging to Thieu and Ky's government and seven persons including a district chief. They have been killed.” Finally, in mid-November we learned that the Khmer Communist Party Central Committee had decided to launch coordinated attacks against Phnom Penh in late December. Once they were launched, the campaign would be continued vigorously. However, the initiation of attacks was delayed
when the KC found that many of the troops were concerned with the lack of medicine, separation from families, unfamiliarity with the terrain, insufficient food, and the reorganization of their units under a new chief.

In November and December 1974 an interesting phenomenon occurred in KC Region 405, indicating a consolidation of Khmer Rouge leadership over the insurgency (see
map 9
). Ta Mok, the Region 405 commander, ordered more than thirty battalion-level political and military officers arrested and imprisoned on unannounced charges. All of the arrested officers had been trained in North Vietnam; the Khmer communist leadership was obviously attempting to purge its ranks of North Vietnamese influence.

FANK also had lapses in communications security, sometimes with serious consequences. On 9 April 1975, for the second time in three days, enemy radio operators succeeded in causing friendly artillery to fire on their own troops. The enemy called an artillery battery and directed it to fire on a communist unit in the vicinity of the 23rd FANK Brigade. Since the joint staff fire support unit sometimes called artillery units directly, without going through control headquarters, and also the command included the correct code word, FANK fired on a friendly unit. This caused the 23rd FANK Brigade to break.

In early December, the enemy-controlled radio summarized their activities against Mekong shipping, noting the importance of the waterway as the government's main line of communication for food, fuel, and munitions. The broadcast said, “If the lower Mekong is ever blocked, the clique would be choked to death.” This really telegraphed one of the communists' main objectives for the dry season.

During December, enemy forces disengaged from the wet-season battlefields and made final preparations for their 1975 dry-season campaign. Communist command authorities convened several regional and inter-regional meetings to coordinate attacks. In all areas of the country, local communist leaders conducted extensive personnel recruitment programs. They stockpiled material resources such as rice and ammo in forward areas. Most important, the enemy was shifting its forces from the outlying areas to the Phnom Penh and Mekong battlefields.

Although there were excellent signs of enemy troop transfers and
plans in the upper Bassac and along the Mekong, there were few firm indicators of enemy plans north and west of Phnom Penh. However, intelligence reports did reveal significant relocations of high-level communist leaders. On 9 December, Ta Mok, the southwest region party secretary, moved from the vicinity of Pich Nil Pass to the Amleang
area northwest of Phnom Penh. On 27 December, intelligence reports indicated that the Khmer communist central party secretary was approximately forty kilometers northwest of Phnom Penh, the same area from which he had directed the 1974 dry-season offensive. The following day, intelligence reports indicated that the northern region party secretary and the special region northern commander were in the same area. Thus, by 28 December initiation of major enemy activity appeared imminent.

Map 9. KC Military Regions. (Source: FANK, Cambodian Joint Staff, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.)

On 31 December, I was in Bangkok when more meaningful intercepts by units in the Bangkok area kept occurring. All afternoon I was on the secure phone. By early evening it had become definite that the Khmer communists were going to launch an attack against Phnom Penh on 1 January. Although we already had sufficient intelligence to indicate that an attack was imminent, these latest interceptions made it absolutely certain. In order to convey this latest information to Phnom Penh I went to the American embassy, where they had a secure bubble with a connection to Phnom Penh, and passed on the latest information, which corroborated previous intelligence. MEDTC informed FANK, and before midnight Fernandez ordered his forces to general alert. Cambodian troops were ready when the enemy attack began.