Losing Vietnam (39 page)

Putting coup rumors aside, the greatest item of interest for Cambodia in the late summer of 1974 was the political battle at the United Nations to determine which government the body would recognize—Lon Nol's or Prince Sihanouk's. Much depended upon which entity controlled the most population. Prior to the war Cambodia had been a peaceful agrarian society. Its last census, taken in 1962, indicated a population of 5,728,711. Its capital, Phnom Penh, was the only city with a population greater than a million. Battambang and Kompong Cham were two medium-sized cities, but the provincial capitals had only ten thousand to fifteen thousand inhabitants each. In 1970, at the outbreak of hostilities, great numbers of the rural population, even whole towns, abandoned their homes and farms. As the fighting became progressively more intense, thousands more were displaced. Most sought safety in and around government-controlled district and provincial capitals. The displaced initially could resume farming on unused areas at the edge of the enclaves where they sought refuge, so they were in great part self-sufficient. Those who remained in place under communist rule quickly became disenchanted, as the communists uprooted entire villages and towns and forced the inhabitants into the countryside, where it was easier to control them and exploit them economically. Many died as the result of harsh treatment. As a consequence, large numbers of the rural people attempted to flee to enclaves under Cambodian governmental control. The refugee situation became desperate; the large mass of people could no longer support themselves—they had no livelihood, no housing, no hope.

As the communists became more aggressive and cut the land lines of communication, many of these enclaves—such as Kompong Thom, Svey Rieng, Takeo, Kompong Seila, and Prey Veng—could only be resupplied by air. Whenever the Cambodian forces became aggressive and reclaimed territory from the enemy, great numbers of Khmers voluntarily fled the communist-controlled areas and sought haven in the government-controlled enclaves. Several hundred thousand liberated
rural Khmers sought refuge in controlled territory in 1974. The disruption of the war dramatically reduced rice production, and the rampant inflation increased the already demand-driven prices so that many Khmer people were starving. In 1972, to alleviate this situation, the USAID personnel initiated a program to provide immediate food, shelter, and health supplies and began a resettlement program. AID was successful in distributing rice to the enclaves, and the sustenance drew ever more refugees. With this massive displacement of people, it was important to know who controlled what: far from the conflict within Cambodia, the communists were fighting for the UN's Cambodian seat. In addition to charging that Prince Sihanouk was the head of the rightful government of Cambodia, the communists claimed to control the majority of the population and territory.

It was therefore of U.S. interest to have a determination of the population situation. Headquarters USSAG was primarily interested in the enclave populations, since military resources were involved in transporting essential supplies to Cambodia. So, in mid-1974 General O'Keefe called for a study on population and territorial control in Cambodia. Since access to communist-controlled areas was not possible, USSAG had a unique resource—tactical reconnaissance. Our staff studied reconnaissance photographs in an effort to measure levels of activity in both urban and rural areas and made a special attempt to differentiate between government- and communist-controlled areas. Photography covering twenty-five Khmer communist and North Vietnamese-controlled cities and villages, nine government-controlled cities, and several rural areas under both friendly and enemy control were utilized. In July 1974 USSAG disseminated the “Khmer Population Study,” which Capt. Jerry Pickar, 1st Lt. James Lord, and 1st Lt. Glenn Brazelton prepared, to all concerned.
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This seminal study's conclusions were of inestimable value to those following the Cambodian conflict. The study summary follows:

The densely populated capitol region (SMR) included 3,250,000 people. The other major populated area was Battambang Province (MR-3), which, because of its rice-producing capacity and transportation connections to Thailand, was self-sufficient. It had a population of 1,650,000. A breakout of area and population control showed Phnom Penh and Battambang Province (MR-3) contained 4,420,000, or 83 percent of the population under Cambodian government control; the rest under GKR control were almost all in the provincial capital enclaves.

From a military standpoint, an item of major importance was whether the communists had a sufficient reservoir of manpower to both replace their large number of casualties and allow them to still control the countryside. According to the 1962 Khmer census, 44.6 percent of the population made up the labor force—51.1 percent of all males and 38.8 percent of all females. Applying this percentage to the 2,200,000 people under communist control would suggest 980,000 were available for military service—more than sufficient untrained manpower. To improve the effectiveness of this reservoir, the enemy established 153 training centers throughout its territory to provide rudimentary military skill training.

How the communists maintained their control is of interest. From the time of Prince Sihanouk's overthrow until mid-1974, for example, the Khmer communist insurgency went through three phases in KC MR-203 and MR-304 (northeast and southeast of Phnom Penh). The massive Vietnamese invasion that culminated in the disastrous defeat of FANK during the CHENLA II operation dominated the first phase (1970–1971), during which the NVA/VC established an administrative apparatus dominated by persons who had been trained in North Vietnam. It also set up training and indoctrination centers for the cadre who would make up the Khmer communist military leadership, some of whom had served in NVA/VC military units, and established lines of communication for delivering military equipment.

Phase 2 began in early 1972, with the withdrawal of North Vietnamese main force units. Those Cambodians who had been trained in
the indoctrination centers were the cadre for KC military units. Each battalion had ten or twelve North Vietnamese advisers. The Khmer communist administrative committee then established territorial hierarchical control—regions, sections, districts, villages. As soon as the governmental apparatus was operating, it formed many associations under the banner of Prince Sihanouk to obtain popular support among the peasants. This effort was successful, and it had little trouble obtaining recruits to fill out the army. Phase 2 ended in mid-1973 when the enemy battalions had been trained and equipped and were prepared to launch large-scale main force attacks against government-controlled areas.

The third phase saw the enemy throw off the facade supporting Sihanouk, which initially was necessary to rally the peasants, and have the real Cambodian communists take control in name as well as fact. Most villagers had believed that the revolution's goal was to return Prince Sihanouk to power. Before this, there were no actively enforced social or economic programs; people conducted their lives democratically. Now everything changed, and the communists enforced highly restrictive control over the population. Villagers were forced to join communes; they could not travel outside their villages; they were forbidden to marry; and many were forced to join the military. Whenever they objected, they were forced to relocate to the countryside. Many were summarily executed by stabbing. Moral failures and improper personal conduct, particularly indiscretion with the opposite sex, were regarded as serious offenses, and those guilty were often executed.

The Khmer were predominantly Buddhist, and in the early phases of the communist revolution the communists patronized the Buddhist religion and its monks. In phase 3 the communists imposed severe restrictions on religious practices and traditional ceremonies. They destroyed temples and defrocked monks and forced them to join the military. In one major enemy attack, the communists forced monks dressed in their saffron robes to stand in the front ranks and advance—an unusual method of eliminating them.

Perhaps the most oppressive factor was the rigid communal existence. Within the communized villages, men were separated from women and then all were divided into age groups. Each group was assigned tasks to support agricultural production. They worked, ate, and slept in accordance with a strict schedule. There were only two
methods of relief from this life: join the army, or escape to Cambodian government–controlled territory. Since the peasants believed either alternative would end in death, they stayed put and miserable. Obviously, this phase of the communist education outraged a majority of the population. The people's original sympathy for communist goals turned first to apathy and eventually to hatred of the KC. They had been promised democratic equality and had become victims of a harsh, godless dictatorship.

Therefore, it was no wonder that whenever FANK initiated military operations to reclaim lost territory, they received disaffected peasants by the thousands. This swelled the population under government control—but it also added to the burgeoning refugee problem. As an example, in September 1974 Capt. Kenneth Bowra, U.S. Army, reported that an enemy company in the Kompong Speu area had rallied to the government. The unit strength was ninety-two soldiers, of whom seventy were males between the ages of eighteen and forty, twelve were females, and ten were boys between the ages of eight and twelve. Their weapons included M-16s, AK-47s, M-2 carbines, Chinese weapons, 60 mm mortars, and M-26 grenades. Also included was a PRC-10 radio. All were basically uneducated, simple farmers disenchanted with the communists. The communists' harsh discipline had molded a mixed group with disparate weapons into a military unit, yet its communist ideology failed, and when enticed by a government agent they rallied.

There should have been no doubt in any observers' minds as to exactly what treatment to expect from the Khmer communists whenever they successfully occupied territory and subjugated the population. They maintained control over a large area by exercising brutal force; yet there was no question but that the Cambodian government's control over a much smaller area included two-thirds of the population.
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