Losing Vietnam (34 page)

The initial SCOOT program went into effect in January 1973 with five tugs and seven barges programmed to carry two thousand short tons of ammo per month. This quantity was woefully inadequate, thus placing primary reliance on airlift delivery. Security was such that there were large losses of cargo. The program remained in effect through December 1973.

The Expedited SCOOT program went into effect in January 1974. Its assets included seventeen tugs and twenty-one barges, and the program was to transport thirteen thousand short tons of ammo per month. Thus, it placed on Mekong convoys primary reliance for the delivery of not only ammo but all supplies to Phnom Penh, where the cargo was redistributed throughout Cambodia. Standoff barges were used to protect the ammo barges and the tugs. Since their inception, the improved protection resulted in no losses. The estimated annual cost was $12 million. Whereas previously only 25 percent of the ammo was shipped via the Mekong, the amount was increased to 75 percent under Expedited SCOOT.

Since all continental U.S. ammunition receipts were transported to Vayama, Thailand, by deep-water vessels, USSAG decided to offload as much of the ammo as possible at Vung Tau, South Vietnam, thereby saving both the deep-water vessel transport to Vayama and the four- to five-day barge trip from Vayama to Vung Tau. There was also much pilferage on the Vayama barge leg by Thai pirates. Thus SCOOT-T (T for transship) was initiated in July 1974.
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The SCOOT-T program assets called for thirteen tugs and fifteen barges (plus thirty shield barges) and was designed to transport eleven thousand short tons of ammunition per month,
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with savings of several millions of dollars that MEDTC then used to purchase ammunition and other essential supplies.
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By July 1974 the necessary storage level of ammo had been reached at Phnom Penh and the resupply was only necessary to replenish ammo usage. During the SCOOT-T period (July–December 1974) 96 percent of all Cambodian resupply was by the Mekong, 3 percent by airdrop, and less than 1 percent by airland.

All commodities that the Mekong convoys transported to Phnom Penh initiated their voyages in South Vietnam, with the exception of the ammunition barges loaded at Vayama and a few petroleum vessels from Singapore. Rice and general cargo were normally loaded at Saigon, petroleum at Nha Be, and ammunition at Vung Tau. The Mekong River transit distance from Saigon to Phnom Penh was 304 kilometers, of which only ninety-two kilometers were in Cambodian waters. Assembling those disparate cargoes, transported with different types of vessels, operating with different owners, and originating from different
ports was a headache, to put it mildly, and it was the responsibility of the tripartite deputies.

The basic idea behind the tripartite concept was that the nations of Southeast Asia could improve their resistance to the communist enemy attacks by coordinating their military activities.
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Soon after the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970, the United States began to show its interest in the newly created Khmer Republic by sending officers on fact-finding missions. U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the Khmer soon followed, with the joint Cambodian raids in May 1970. However, no basis for regular contact between the leaders of the respective military forces existed. In December 1970, General Weyand paid a call on Marshal Lon Nol in Phnom Penh, and, although the record is not complete, it appears that they discussed the concept of organizing regular deputy commander–level meetings between the armed forces of the three nations. In any case, such a meeting did take place in January 1971. Weyand was apparently dissatisfied; in his opinion there were far too many attendees. Apparently, however, he could not convince his counterparts that a three-man meeting, of just the deputies themselves, would work best. Since then, almost all tripartite meetings had forty to fifty attendees, including the deputies themselves, their immediate assistants, and the chiefs of the major joint staffs, as well as defense attachés of all three countries, representatives of other interested U.S. agencies, and other minor figures. To conduct the important discussions and agree upon decisions, the principals and their chief advisers normally met before or after the regular session in a group of about a dozen.

The next tripartite deputies' meeting took place in May 1971, at which time the deputies established a monthly schedule. Initially, the meetings were held at MACV headquarters in Saigon, but after the cease-fire agreement in January 1973 the venue was changed to Phnom Penh and the deputy COMUSSAG replaced the deputy commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam as the U.S. representative. The tripartite organization slowly evolved, and the necessary machinery to support the meetings was established. In late 1973 the
tripartite deputies were Maj. Gen. Thong Van Fanmoung of Cambodia, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Manh and Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho for South Vietnam, and myself, representing the United States. The tripartite deputies organization was as depicted in
figure 6
.

Figure 6. Tripartite Deputies Organization. (Source: Tripartite Deputies Working Group.)

There were four tripartite committee study groups: cross-border operations, coordination of intelligence, communications, and the Mekong air-ground-riverine operations. From the beginning, the U.S. representatives to these groups knew they were to facilitate the solution of their allies' problems and not direct the meetings or promote their own solutions. By late 1973, only the Mekong operation study group had regular U.S. representation. Lt. Cdr. E. M. Graham and Cdr. F. W. Cronin of the U.S. Navy were my senior representatives to these groups, and they did an outstanding job of coordination and assistance.

Working groups would meet during the month to review the situations, discuss problems, and make recommendations. When important matters were not resolved here, they were elevated to the deputies. The monthly meetings had a standardized format. The meetings always
commenced with a summary of the military situation in South Vietnam, followed by the one in Cambodia. Then there were discussions of the four working groups, always with the air-ground-riverine Mekong operations (the most important) first. All briefings were published in English, French, and Vietnamese and distributed to the plenary participants in folders. The intelligence and operational situation summaries prepared by the RVNAF and FANK were of inestimable value, as they provided us with insights as to how our allies perceived the military situation. In late 1974, Maj. Jerome Pogorzelski, U.S. Army, and Maj. Barnard Caradec, U.S. Air Force, pulled all this paperwork together for the American side.

FANK's presentation at the 7 February 1975 tripartite meeting illustrates the importance of receiving briefings on the military situations in their respective countries.
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FANK summarized the military situation around Phnom Penh during the period between 7 January and 3 February 1975:

It concluded:

There was no question that FANK had dealt the communists a stunning defeat in the northwest sector of Phnom Penh in January 1975. However, the Mekong situation was a disaster: the enemy controlled the riverbanks, and in January and early February the convoys lost three petroleum tankers, two cargo vessels, four tugs, and a self-propelled barge. It was difficult for us to make the Cambodians realize the criticality and to respond quickly and in force at the Lower Mekong. The lack of a sense of urgency foretold the eventual outcome. FANK's aggressiveness was about depleted. They were worn down.

By far the most important function of the tripartite deputies was the security of the Mekong. This was a most complex issue, more so since late 1973, when the resupply of Cambodia via the Mekong was greatly increased. Coordination involved three countries, many ministries, dozens of organizations, and complex contractual relationships. We gradually unsnarled the complex problems of the Mekong convoys, but not until we expanded our charter from resolving only military issues to investigating the economic and political ones.

Obviously, communications is the foundation upon which information is reciprocated. Initially, it was hard to obtain compatible equipment and then get the South Vietnamese and Cambodians to utilize it. In April 1974, the respective forces accomplished a successful test of the Cambodian MR-6/South Vietnamese MR-4 link. Thus, the two adjoining military regions could and did communicate. In January 1975, the chief of the South Vietnam study group notified his counterpart that, according to recent intelligence reports, the communists had succeeded in intercepting and deciphering FANK's radio communications. FANK did not act quickly on the information, so, unfortunately, the Khmer communists were able to relay firing data to FANK artillery units, who, as a result, fired on their own troops.

Since both militaries were most interested in order of battle data, exchange of intelligence was an ongoing affair. Both were particularly concerned with establishing Cambodian liaison detachments at South Vietnamese border outposts as well as having liaison officers with the
respective J-2s. By August 1974, they had quadrupled daily radio contacts, were exchanging intelligence daily, and had senior officers visiting regional counterparts. As an example, in January 1975 the FANK disclosed intelligence information concerning the appearance of North Vietnamese tanks in the area south of Krek.
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The major effort of the cross-border working group was to prepare an agreement for the coordination of border operations that included concerted and unilateral operations, fire support, and the repatriation of Khmer refugees.
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The border areas saw many serious combat incidents. In the border areas, the FANK and the RVNAF eventually took on the 1st NVA Division and decimated it to the extent that it was deactivated and the remaining troops transferred to communist units in the Tay Ninh sector.
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By keeping communications open, exchanging military intelligence on enemy units and activities, and militarily cooperating in operations in the border areas, South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces kept both the North Vietnamese and the Khmer communists off balance and attrited them. Most important, however, the tripartite deputies smoothly effected the ground, air, and naval cooperation and coordination necessary to provide security for the Mekong convoys.

The Cambodian military also required petroleum products, of course. In less than a year, FANK's vehicle density went from eight hundred vehicles to more than five thousand in 1974, to say nothing of the necessity for aviation gasoline and kerosene for the air force and diesel fuel for the navy.
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The disruption and destruction of the countryside resulted in a major reduction in the production of rice, Cambodians' staple food; thus both Phnom Penh and the enclaves had become totally dependent on the United States for resupply. In addition, there was also the requirement to supply general cargo—the trucks, tools, and other necessities to operate both the military and the economy. Although the procurement of foodstuffs was USAID's responsibility, the delivery of life-saving rice to Phnom Penh and to the enclaves was mostly the responsibility of the U.S. military—either by Mekong convoy or airland/airdrop.

The provincial enclaves under siege could be resupplied only by airland and airdrop. The Khmer Air Force kept these enclaves resupplied from depots in Phnom Penh, but the U.S. Air Force and their contractors contributed all out-of-country cargo. Whenever stocks were dangerously low or there was an emergency requirement, supplies were normally airlanded at Phnom Penh. However, the most important line of communication by far was the water movement of cargo up the Mekong River from South Vietnam. Deep-water vessels could use Kompong Som, and the three maritime provinces were generally resupplied from there. But with Route 4 interdicted, these supplies could not be moved inland. Although Headquarters USSAG had no responsibility for the purchase and call forward of supplies and equipment, we had full responsibility for the coordination of all transport.