Losing Vietnam (29 page)

The Pacific Command Intelligence Unit summarized the situation:

Congress's failure to adequately fund the conflict had, in the words of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, “deliberately destroyed an ally.” The United States abandoned South Vietnam, which it had projected into the global fight against communism.

After South Vietnam surrendered on 30 April, the communists moved swiftly to organize the South under a military management committee, whose priorities were establishing order, population control, and resettlement.
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To effect these goals, it organized the population into people's revolutionary committees at all levels. These steps were not unlike those taken by the Cambodian communists. However, in Vietnam the aftermath was definitely much less violent than in Cambodia. Although there were rumors of specific cases of retaliation against South Vietnamese officials and military, no general purge was noted. Still, the communists established many dreaded indoctrination camps, in which some senior military personnel were to languish for as long as eighteen years. According to information culled primarily from the press and communist news services, life in South Vietnam outwardly changed little. Apparently (after the dismantling of the South Vietnamese system), economic unity between North and South was the immediate goal, to be followed by complete political reunification.

From its inception, the war in Cambodia was closely associated with the conflict in Vietnam. The Khmer communist insurgency began as an offshoot of the North Vietnamese Communist Party in the late 1930s. Full-scale insurgency against the French, however, did not break out until 1947. After the French evacuated Southeast Asia in 1954, the communists were permitted to function overtly and did so until the early 1960s, when Prince Sihanouk began to crack down. The French had crowned him prince in 1941, at the age of nineteen, because they believed the fun-loving playboy was more controllable than his relatives. In 1953, Prince Sihanouk took control of Cambodia. Shortly thereafter, he stepped down from the throne, organized the Sangkum political party, and continued to govern the country as “the Father of Independence.”
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He sought political and economic ties with China, and although not a communist himself, he was partial to the North Vietnamese in their war with South Vietnam, collaborating with them to protect his own position and mollify his left wing. As a result, the United States cut off its economic aid to Cambodia. Sihanouk's leftist economic policies, associations with the Chinese and North Vietnamese communists, and repressive police measures caused unrest in Cambodia. In March 1970, peasants from the border area of the country demonstrated in Svey Rieng, demanding the Cambodian government take action to prevent the North Vietnamese from taking their farmland and precipitating border incidents with the allied forces. Additional demonstrations followed in Phnom Penh, in which the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese embassies were sacked. Sihanouk, traveling in Europe, threatened to punish the offenders upon his return. The government leaders were afraid for their lives, and on 18 March 1970
the Khmer National Assembly unanimously voted to depose Sihanouk, who, incidentally, had handpicked them. Lt. Gen. Lon Nol headed the government at the time.
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Lon Nol's government pledged to continue a neutral course in Southeast Asia, as long as the Vietnamese communists withdrew from Cambodian territory. He closed the port of Kompong Som to the North Vietnamese, thereby cutting off one of their major supply routes to South Vietnam's MR-3 and MR-4. The border areas of Cambodia and South Vietnam were significant sanctuaries for four communist infantry divisions and more than fifty thousand communist logistical support troops targeted against South Vietnam. Consequently, on 29 March 1970 the NVA/VC forces in the Cambodian sanctuaries initiated attacks against the Khmer military outposts. The thirty-five-thousand-man Cambodian Army, whose main mission until then had been to perform road construction and act as the palace guard, was no match for the NVA/VC, and it was decisively overrun. The North Vietnamese Army made serious advances toward Phnom Penh.

It became obvious that without assistance Lon Nol's pro-Western government would be overturned and Cambodia would become totally communist controlled. This would be a catastrophe for the United States, since in 1970 it was pulling troops out of South Vietnam and had initiated the Vietnamization programs for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. To alleviate the situation, President Nixon authorized the use of U.S. combat forces in cooperation with the RVNAF to make a strategic raid into Cambodian NVA/VC sanctuaries in the Parrot's Beak area west of Saigon. The Cambodian raid began on 1 May 1970 and was successful in that the North Vietnamese retreated, abandoning huge supplies and base areas. The amount of captured enemy equipment exceeded all expectations and probably set back enemy plans by at least the year or more that it would take them to resupply. It definitely bought time for the Vietnamization program, and it took the communist pressure off of the Cambodian armed forces.

Although some in the United States were upset with the Cambodian raid, many U.S. soldiers in Vietnam were very pleased. The Parrot's Beak was like a dagger pointing into our area. The North Vietnamese often would conduct surprise attacks out of the Parrot's Beak into South Vietnam, and when they were aggressively engaged
by our units would retreat back into Cambodian territory, where U.S. forces were forbidden to pursue them further. The raid into Cambodia definitely put such attacks on hold, thereby saving lives of our troops.

One unwelcome side effect of this invasion was the antiwar demonstrations in the United States. In June, the Senate passed the Cooper-Church amendment,
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which, although rejected by the House, would be presented again later and ultimately would hamstring American military efforts to support Cambodia by not authorizing the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia or providing U.S. advisers to or for military forces there. Further, Section 756, PL 92-226, limited to no more than two hundred the total number of civilian officers and employees of the U.S. government and members of the armed forces present in Cambodia at any one time.
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One of the new Cambodian government's first actions was to request a reinstatement of aid, and Congress allocated $8.9 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP-CB) funds to support Cambodia for the remainder of FY 70. Subsequently, Congress authorized $185.0 million in Cambodian MAP funds in FY 71, $172.7 million in FY 72, $180.0 million in FY 73, $375.0 million in FY 1974, and $275 million in FY 1975.
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These funds were obviously to improve the Cambodian armed forces to ensure the maintenance of a neutral Cambodian government friendly to the United States that would in effect allow the Vietnamization program in South Vietnam to better proceed. The military assistance for Cambodia was to be implemented through the U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia.

The Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) was to determine the needs of the fledgling Cambodian military forces, arrange for the delivery of equipment and materials, and then report on the utilization of the U.S. logistical and training support. Unlike the DAO in Saigon, congressional dictate limited the MEDTC organization in number. It had seventy-four U.S. personnel in Cambodia and fifteen outside Cambodia in the joint liaison office at Samae San and Bangkok, Thailand. Like the DAO, it had army, navy, and air force divisions—plus one ammo and service division. MEDTC's
responsibilities were formidable, since the Cambodian armed forces were recently formed and did not have mature logistical or personnel systems. The grateful Cambodians referred to Maj. Gen. John Cleland at times as the “Lafayette of Cambodia,” for all the great support MEDTC provided. In February 1974 Cleland rotated and was replaced by the equally effective Brig. Gen. William “Jack” Palmer. USSAG supported MEDTC in operational planning, ammunition inventory and funds management and the Khmer Air Force airlift self-sufficiency program, but MEDTC itself accomplished the difficult on-the-ground implementations.

In addition to MEDTC, there was a U.S. military attaché office, comprising seventeen personnel with attachés from each military service. Col. Pete Burnell, the defense attaché, his successor, Col. L. B. Martin, and the other attachés also did a wonderful job. The reports of the assistant army attachés who made frequent visits to the field were invaluable in assessing the military situations. The naval attaché was vital in the planning for Mekong convoys, and the air attaché deserves great credit in the resurgence of the Khmer Air Force.

The March–May 1970 events initiated major efforts by the North Vietnamese Army to organize and field Khmer communist (KC) forces, whose purpose was to effect the overthrow of the government of the Khmer Republic (GKR), and by the United States to equip and assist the Cambodian armed forces (FANK) so that they could counter the enemy and protect the country. Should the FANK be successful, the final outcome of the Cambodian war would always be determined by the final situation in South Vietnam.

In 1970 and 1971, the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong gained control of northern Cambodia and most of the territory east of the Mekong. The communist forces received their basic grounding from a Khmer communist cadre trained in North Vietnam who returned to Cambodia in 1970. That year, the KC rapidly moved to consolidate their holdings in areas overrun by the NVA/VC. The North's primary objective was to reoccupy its sanctuary bases and ensure the control of its primary lines of communication, so essential to combat operations
in South Vietnam. It was quite content to have the KC pursue the war against the government, since this allowed it to concentrate on the war in South Vietnam. To ensure Khmer communist successes, the North Vietnamese provided cadres, training facilities, advisers, and, most important, military supplies and equipment.

Table 17.
Khmer Communist Command and Control Organizations (total entities identified at end of month)

Source
: “Khmer Communist Order of Battle Document,” DAO, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

The North Vietnamese controlled sufficient territory and population to allow the communists to conscript a regular army. Initially they formed village militias, which, after training, filled territorial units; and as the territorial units gained combat experience, they were formed into regular well-equipped main-force battalions. They communized the peasantry by ruthlessly imposing discipline and by indoctrinating the population. Those who rebelled were often executed. Offered the opportunity, thousands of Khmer escaped to government strongholds, while those who remained were captive to the iron grip of the communists.
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So, in three years, the KC evolved into an expanded, well-developed, battle-tested force equipped with modern weapons and was increasingly better supplied. The growth of the enemy is indicated in
table 17
. Note the doubling of forces between May 1973 and April 1974.

In 1970 and 1971, patriotic Cambodian youths flocked to the army to defend their country from the despised North Vietnamese. As the
young patriots rallied and local commands recruited, FANK grew to more than three hundred thousand men organized in more than five hundred battalion units. These soldiers had neither training nor equipment and lacked organization. The disparate group undertook several poorly planned and executed operations against the NVA/VC, which ended in a disastrous defeat in late 1971. In 1972 FANK was saved primarily by the U.S. Air Force's close air support.

Recognizing the necessity to reorganize the military into a standardized, better-equipped and -trained force, and working with the Cambodian joint staff, MEDTC designed a balanced MAP-CB–supported army force structure of 220,000 personnel. FANK established a 253,000 strength limit, the additional 33,000 men to be supported by payroll assistance only. The organization called for thirty-two infantry brigades and 202 infantry battalions. Twelve of the brigades were organized into four divisions of three brigades, and each division was supported by a 155 mm battery and an armored cavalry squadron. Each of the brigades also had a 105 mm battery.
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Lon Nol insisted upon forming a fifth division, the 9th Division “Palace Guard,” which diverted both personnel and equipment. Implementation of the planned force structure was not easy. However, with emphasis in early 1973 on the delivery and formation of artillery and armed cavalry troops, the force structure was almost completed.