Losing Vietnam (26 page)

Most people did not know that the future of Cambodia depended almost entirely on the viability of South Vietnam because the Mekong convoys, so essential to the lifeblood of Cambodia, originated in Vietnam and were escorted initially up the Mekong by the Vietnamese Navy.
However, the entire planning process was slowed because the American embassy in Saigon was revising its emergency and evacuation plan. Coordination meetings were held at NKP on 26–27 June and again in Saigon on 1–3 July. On 30 July 1974, a draft USSAG/7AF CONPLAN 5060V, called TALON VISE, was forwarded to CINCPAC for approval. It planned for approximately ten thousand evacuees. In late September 1974, we were informed that coordination difficulties (navy originated) had arisen over certain command relationships and thus early approval no longer seemed likely. Then, on 12 December 1974, CINCPAC directed that CINCPAC Fleet assume responsibility for the preparation and implementation of the evacuation plan for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam not later than 1 June 1975, when Headquarters USSAG was to be inactivated. CINCPAC obviously did not view the military situation in Vietnam as being as critical as we did. (It was sometime early that month that they had returned our Vietnam assessment briefing as being much too pessimistic.)

Since USSAG/7AF was to retain the responsibility for evacuation planning until 1 June 1975, Lieutenant General Burns requested CONPLAN approval so that the tasked units could prepare supporting plans. The plan was accepted, subject to directed changes that included the redefined command relationships, and on 26 March 1975 the revised plan was sent to all concerned.

The situation in Vietnam was deteriorating rapidly with the withdrawal of the South Vietnamese from the central highlands, and the pace of planning activities increased greatly. The evacuation plan consisted of four options: first, ambassadorial control, using either civilian or military transportation assets, or both; second, military control, using fixed-wing aircraft; third, military control, using sealift assets; and fourth, military control, using a combination of fixed-wing, sealift, and helicopter assets. On 14 April, CINCPAC directed development of detailed plans for the evacuation of fifteen hundred, three thousand, six thousand, and two hundred thousand personnel. The plan for the evacuation of two hundred thousand was called option five.

Lieutenant General Burns was the coordinating authority for any emergency evacuations conducted in Southeast Asia. Under his command, the air force, navy, and marines had just completed the flawless evacuation of Phnom Penh on 12 April. So, at the 15 April
major planning conference held at Headquarters USSAG there was a strong feeling of confidence that the planning for the evacuation of Saigon would also go well. The detailed planning based on the Saigon enclave did not begin in earnest until 2 April 1975, and then, because of the uncertainty as to the potential number of evacuees, an open-ended plan was required. In this case, the presence of representatives from both the fleet and the marine ground security force working in conjunction with our planners was absolutely essential to the time-compressed development of a workable plan. We maintained this joint planning group throughout the actual evacuation. On 15 April, the name for the South Vietnam evacuation was changed from TALON VISE to FREQUENT WIND.
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The lack of even reasonably accurate estimates of the number of evacuees, coupled with the requirement to submit proposed plans to handle different estimates on both the numbers to be evacuated and the method of evacuation, swamped the small planning staff at NKP. Changes in the details of aircraft flow and integration as well as the time to complete the evacuation were continuous. The undetermined length of the operation required the integration of supporting air forces (air force, navy, marine) to protect the helicopters, ground support forces, and evacuees. It was assumed that the evacuation would be accomplished in a daylight period of twelve hours.

To provide an idea of the number of potential evacuees, Ambassador Martin sent a cable to Secretary of State Kissinger in Washington, D.C., on 14 April (one day before the planning conference) that gave the total number of evacuees as 175,533—that is, 4,765 American citizens and 170,768 aliens.
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All four military options were completed and approved by CINCPAC: Option IV (helicopter) on 11 April, Option II (fixed wing) on 20 April, Option III (sealift) on 21 April, and Option V (200,000 evacuees) on 25 April. The operational plan now in place possessed the flexibility necessary to accommodate the changing tactical situation and the fluctuating number of potential evacuees. No one could envision how vital this flexibility would become.

At the end of March 1975, there were appreciably fewer American citizens in South Vietnam than there had been the previous summer.
The termination of DAO support contracts in September 1974 as a consequence of reduced funding had resulted in hundreds of U.S. contract personnel returning to the States. On 31 March, the American embassy estimated there were about eight thousand American citizens in country. It started the evacuation of American citizens at that time, and by 23 April the number was just 1,681, of which only 179 were dependents.

In early April a relief group in Saigon sheltering orphans of mixed parentage received permission to fly the children on military aircraft to the States. Only hours before the plane was scheduled to depart, the relief group recognized that the infants and very young children needed adults to hold them while in flight. I was at the DAO when it received a frantic call asking for female employees to volunteer to accompany the flight. There had been artillery fire just over twenty miles north of Saigon for weeks, and the office workers needed little persuasion to leave. Maj. Gen. Homer Smith authorized them at the DAO to volunteer to assist the orphans. These wonderful women rushed off to pack and ready themselves for their return trips home. Air control informed us that the rear door of the C-5 blew out shortly after takeoff and the crippled plane was making a valiant attempt to return to Tan Son Nhut airfield. We rushed to the window to watch the approach, only to see it crash about a mile short of the runway, killing half the passengers on board, including thirty-six of the thirty-seven escort volunteers. This terrible tragedy cast a pall over the DAO. Fortunately, it was to be the only major accident in the continuing evacuation from South Vietnam.

On 19 April, Admiral Gayler flew to Saigon to assess the situation. During the meeting with Gayler and the DAO staff, I received a note stating that General Vien wished to see me on an urgent basis. I requested that Major General Smith accompany me for any discussion with Vien. Gayler agreed and excused us, and we met with Vien at 1630 hours on 19 April.

Vien had just returned from the palace, where he had had discussions with President Thieu. The president was extremely pleased with the information that he had received from Minister Hung, in Washington trying to obtain military and economic assistance. Hung had related that events in the Senate Armed Services Committee meeting
indicated that South Vietnam would receive about $375 million in assistance. We mentioned that this, of course, was good news but that in all probability the military situation had deteriorated to the point that primary consideration should be given to the current tactical situation. Vien agreed that the assistance was probably too late. He was personally perplexed that the president did not seem to grasp the seriousness of the deteriorating military situation but explained that he had briefed the new minister of defense in great depth concerning the situation on Friday, 18 April. That morning Minister Dong had told him that he had explained the seriousness of the Vietnam situation to President Thieu. Yet, Vien said, the president did not refer at all to the military situation and seemed to be ignoring it. This was not a good sign; Thieu always had his hand heavily in all military matters.

The conversation then turned to evacuation. Vien understood that the Americans had a plan whereby helicopters would pick up personnel at the race track and at Newport, the port facility. Major General Smith confirmed that we were preparing to evacuate Americans and their dependents. Vien stated that as a soldier it was his duty to stay with the troops, but he was hopeful that Vietnamese military dependents could be evacuated as well, and said that as long as the United States provided a large number of Vietnamese with the means of evacuation, we could expect cooperation. He requested that after a governmental breaking point the United States remain offshore from Vung Tau for at least two weeks with platforms to pick up Vietnamese people, who would reach them either by swimming or by boat.

Vien reiterated that these discussions were extremely sensitive and should not be shared with others. We asked him if he had talked about evacuation plans with anyone else. He said he had not done so yet but that he could trust Lieutenant General Khuyen and Brigadier General Tho. He said, though, that he could not rely on the marines. We asked if we could strongly rely on the airborne forces for assistance. He replied that this was very important and he would have to think about it for the next few days. We agreed to meet again on Tuesday, 22 April, to pursue the matter further.
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Afterward, Smith and I relayed the substance of the meeting to Admiral Gayler. I was distressed to learn that the president was still mentally relying on a supplemental and that he did not grasp the seriousness
of the situation. Gayler allowed that the navy could and would stand by offshore of Vung Tau. We also thought that if the families of key military personnel could be evacuated, then the RVNAF could stay and fight. As a consequence, these families were integrated into the American embassy/DAO plan to use safe houses to marshal personnel the evening before and then guide them to the aircraft at Tan Son Nhut. So, on 21 April 1975, in coordination with the ambassador through the DAO, USSAG/7AF scheduled an around-the-clock evacuation from the airfield using C-130 and C-141 aircraft. Between 21 and 28 April, 170 C-130 and 134 C-141 sorties evacuated 42,810 personnel. The last C-141 flights were on 27 April, CINCPAC having terminated them because of increasing small arms fire around the airfield.

On 24 April, the JCS authorized CINCPAC to direct the execution of Options II, III, and/or IV when the ambassador requested. The operational units completed FREQUENT WIND force deployments on 27 April, and Headquarters USSAG directed the forces to assume a one-hour readiness posture in anticipation of execution on 28 April. However, CINCPAC made no decision to execute, and the forces reverted to a six-hour posture.

This was a huge undertaking and many forces were available for the operation:

The situation at Tan Son Nhut began to deteriorate rapidly. On 28 April, at 1800 hours, a flight of three A-37s equipped with MK-82 500-pound bombs attacked the flight line area. Six bombs hit the VNAF parking area, destroying numerous aircraft, at least three AC-119s and several C-47s. The enemy used dive-bomb tactics, with an estimated roll-in altitude of five thousand feet. The VNAF believed that the A-37s were piloted by captured South Vietnamese pilots.

Two C-130s from Clark AFB in the Philippines landed at about 2030 hours and loaded about 360 passengers and departed without incident. At the same time, the flow of C-130s from Clark AFB was reinstated under the previously scheduled Option I evacuation airlift. Between 0100 and 0330 hours on 29 April, the first three C-130s arrived from Clark. Two of the three were loaded with passengers, and the third was getting ready to pick up passengers, when at about 0400 hours the enemy began an intense rocket attack. The taxiing USAF C-130 was hit and set on fire while on the ramp near the Air America operations. The crew of the destroyed aircraft boarded adjacent aircraft, and the two remaining craft departed without injuries to crew or passengers.

At 0625 hours, COMUSSAG/7AF directed the launch of all U.S. Air Force support aircraft (tankers, radio relay, airborne command and control) to provide communications and control for the C-130 operation, even though Option II had not yet been directed. All indications were that Option II was imminent, and the Seventh Air Force launched C-130s from Clark in anticipation of execution. However, due to the chaotic conditions at Tan Son Nhut, the C-130s never landed and COMUSSAG/7AF ordered them to withdraw and return to base at about 0730 hours.

During the earlier attack by fire, two enemy rockets hit the gate guarding the DAO compound, killing two embassy marine guards.
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The attack by fire continued for several hours, with about forty rounds per hour of 122 mm rockets and 130 mm artillery hitting throughout the airport complex. Then, to make matters worse, senior Vietnamese Air Force officers panicked and closed up shop, and several F-5 pilots jettisoned their fuel tanks and armaments on the Tan San Nhut runway as they hastily departed for safe havens in Thailand instead of attacking the surrounding enemy forces, thus precipitating the closing
of runways and effectively precluding additional C-130 evacuations. In addition, one F-5 with engines running was blocking the entrance taxiway to the Air America operations ramp and passenger-loading area. About forty vehicles and several hundred local nationals occupied the runway area, trying to board two VNAF C-130s attempting to take off. To top it off, a South Vietnamese gunship was hit and destroyed near the northern perimeter of Tan Son Nhut.