Losing Vietnam (23 page)

On 10 March, six days after the initial attacks, the communists launched a massive artillery barrage against Ban Me Thuot. This was followed by a tank-infantry combined arms attack by the F-10 NVA Division and supported by the 316th NVA Division, which had clandestinely moved from Laos, and the 320th NVA Division. The RVNAF fought doggedly and inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. Tactical air support, along with the infantry, knocked out many enemy tanks. Notwithstanding the determined defense, the attacking forces overran Ban Me Thuot by the evening of 11 March. By achieving tactical surprise and committing three of its divisions supported by massive artillery and armor against an ill-prepared, numerically inferior force, the outcome was all but certain in favor of the North Vietnamese.

The North Vietnamese Army held off on its attacks by fire against
the RVNAF in MR-2 before the 10 March all-out attack, just as it had done with ground contacts. In the previous five weeks it had fired an average of four hundred rounds per week in MR-2, but between 10 and 13 March it fired over eleven thousand rounds—mostly at Ban Me Thuot, overwhelming the defenders. The intensity of enemy attacks by fire also greatly increased in the other military regions between 7 and 20 March.

Although it initially concentrated on MR-2, the 1975 general offensive was a countrywide North Vietnamese coordinated effort. From 8 to 10 March, enemy activities, contacts, ABFs, and terrorism in every military region were at or near their all-time highs since the cease-fire.
¹⁰⁰

The combat intensity countrywide of 104,307 for 7–20 March was more than 2.7 times greater than the average of the five preceding weeks. It was obvious that the enemy's major dry-weather offensive had been initiated. The loss of Ban Me Thuot, a major provincial capital, coming on the heels of the loss of Phuoc Long, stunned the South Vietnamese and precipitated several hasty, unplanned, disastrous decisions by President Thieu.

Thieu had for some time realized that his military was overextended everywhere, with no defenses in depth and, in reality, no strategic reserve. The reduced military assistance had greatly affected combat capabilities. With the loss of Phuoc Long Province and the inevitable loss of Darlac Province, he now resolved to redeploy his forces so as to defend only the most populated and economically viable regions, that is, MR-3 and MR-4.

On 11 March, unbeknownst to the U.S. embassy and military personnel, President Thieu held a meeting to discuss this major change from his previously implacable “defense of all territory” to a “truncated defense.” His idea was reasonable, but his timing was atrocious. A redeployment of forces during a slack period would have been extremely difficult—but to do so under pressure was all but impossible. Such a major endeavor would take careful and detailed planning. We were told subsequently that President Thieu informed Lieutenant General
Truong on 13 March about his plan to evacuate the highlands, at which time Thieu also told him to prepare a plan for the evacuation of MR-1. Then on the next day Thieu flew to Cam Ranh—accompanied by General Vien, Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, and Lieutenant General Dang Van Quang—to meet with Major General Phu, the II Corps commander. Phu briefed the group on the current situation—that is, he told them that QLs 14, 19, and 21 had been effectively cut, isolating Ban Me Thuot, which had been overrun, as well as Kontum and Pleiku. Given the current status of forces and the necessity to clear the routes, it was doubtful that the South could retake Ban Me Thuot.

Map 4. The Battles for MR-2. (Source: Maj. Gen. Ira A. Hunt Collection.)

President Thieu then ordered Phu to redeploy the troops at his disposal at Kontum and Pleiku and the 22nd Division in Binh Dinh
Province to retake Ban Me Thuot. Phu, when asked how he would accomplish this, said that to retrograde his troops from the highlands he would use LTL-7B, a small secondary route that branched off of QL-14 twenty miles south of Pleiku and ran some 150 miles to Tuy Hoa on the coast. He would then reassemble his forces at Nha Trang and drive up QL-21 to recapture the city. This planned withdrawal was to be considered secret and the VNAF was not fully integrated into the withdrawal planning. Phu hoped that surprise would allow his forces to reach Tuy Hoa before the enemy caught on and reacted.
¹⁰¹

Such was the stuff dreams are made of! Phu returned to Pleiku and, we were told, drafted an outline plan. The order to evacuate was issued on 16 March, without any in-depth planning. Phu turned the operational responsibility for the corps' withdrawal over to a newly promoted subordinate, and he and elements of the II Corps forward command post immediately flew to Nha Trang.

The Americans first learned of this momentous decision when the RVNAF began its retrograde movement from Pleiku. Only then did the joint staff discuss the situation. Our aerial reconnaissance documented the withdrawal. Route LTL-7B was a narrow road, overgrown in many places with brush, and it had several bridges out. When the civilian population sensed what was occurring, it panicked and joined the exodus en masse. The convoys backed up at the town of Cheo Reo, waiting for army engineers to build a pontoon bridge over the Ea Pa River. A 19 March aerial photo of LTL-7B showed a huge backup of vehicles there: 26 armored personnel carriers, 45 tanks, a pair of 175 mm guns, 14 engineer vehicles, 669 military trucks, 279 civilian vehicles, and 53 unknown ones.

As the retrograde progressed, more and more vehicles became mired at the fords (see
photo 2
). In fact, MR-2 lost all of its newly issued M-48 tanks in the mud. Ultimately, the enemy caught up and attacked, creating heavy military and civilian casualties. Pursued relentlessly by the 320th NVA Division, on 27 March the tattered troops and fleeing families and refugees finally made it to Tuy Hoa.
¹⁰²
Out of twenty-six thousand soldiers, fewer than six thousand made it to the coast from Pleiku and Kontum.

During this period, the North Vietnamese were also driving to the coast along the two major east-west highways, QL-19 in the north,
which connected Pleiku to Qui Nhon, and QL-21 in the south, which connected Ban Me Thuot to Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang. (See
map 4
.)

Photo 2. Tank Mired in the Mud. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, photo file.)

In the north, the 22nd ARVN Division met the 3rd NVA Division at Binh Khe, and a vicious battle ensued. The 22nd was well supported by the air force, and together they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The division fought a stubborn defense, but when the 95B NVA Regiment reinforced the 3rd NVA Division it had to fall back, and the Vietnamese Navy evacuated it from Qui Nhon. The division commander had turned himself into the hospital sick, so his assistant, Colonel Leu Tho Cuong, provided the essential leadership for the 22nd's stiff resistance. This well-disciplined division was to fight again later at Saigon.

In the south, two North Vietnamese divisions pursued the 23rd ARVN Division down QL-21. To stem the tide, the JGS offloaded the 3rd Airborne Brigade—on its way by ships from MR-1 to Saigon—at Nha Trang, and with two battalions of the 40th Infantry set up a blocking position on QL-21 at Khanh Duong. In the ensuing battle, the 3rd Airborne Brigade was chewed up and, with the remnants of the 23rd Division and 40th Infantry Regiment, fell back to Nha Trang. Obviously, there was no further thought of retaking Ban Me Thuot.

The five ranger groups and the logistical troops retrograding from
Pleiku down Route LTL-7B, which had also fared very badly, also straggled into Nha Trang, where the navy evacuated them and the other troops from MR-2 on 2 April. The evacuations from MR-1 and -2 would have been much more effective if the navy had had the six FY 75 tank landing ships deleted for lack of funding.

According to the joint staff, upon entering the port of Nha Trang the commander of an artillery unit seeking to evacuate his men found it free of both enemy and friendly troops. However, the city was under siege by a large number of military and civilian convicts who had been released from local jails amid the confusion of earlier troop withdrawals. With several on-the-spot executions of criminals engaged in various forms of terrorism, looting, and rape, the colonel reestablished control and discipline within the city. Subsequently, he reestablished communications with the JGS, whose members were dumfounded because Nha Trang was supposed to be under enemy control.
¹⁰³
Granted, there was great confusion during the ill-planned hasty withdrawal, but it appeared the majority had little stomach for putting up defensive positions and fighting, although several units fought very bravely.

President Thieu's decision to evacuate the highlands under pressure was poorly made. Yet on 14 March, when Phu received his orders, there was little pressure on Pleiku and Kontum. A review of estimated troop dispositions in MR-2 prior to the initiation of the dry-weather offensive indicated there was a minor buildup of communist combat forces from thirteen to sixteen infantry regiments. Considering that MR-2, and specifically Ban Me Thuot, was a prime objective in the initial communist offensive, the increase of one North Vietnamese division (three regiments) was not overwhelming. Phu had time to prepare detailed evacuation plans, to notify the air force so as to gain maximum air support, and, most important, to provide the bridging necessary to utilize Route LTL-7B. Not only did he not do his proper staff work, but he left the area in the command of a subordinate and withdrew II Corps Headquarters to Nha Trang. North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, referring to General Phu, said, “He was an ineffective general who enjoyed no confidence within military circles.”
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The results were catastrophic. MR-2 lost more than 75 percent of its soldiers, almost all of its heavy equipment, and all of its supplies and ammunition.
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From psychological and political points
of view, this loss's profound effect on the South Vietnamese was immeasurable. The nation was in shock.

According to the USSAG order of battle, the enemy buildup of combat forces in MR-1 between January and March was only one infantry regiment and one artillery regiment. Previously, the MR-1 troops had successfully held their own. Past successes aside, however, we now know that President Thieu made his fateful decision to redeploy forces from MR-1 and -2 on 11 March. The next day, he ordered the airborne division to redeploy from northern MR-1 to Saigon. He and the JGS intended to also redeploy the marine division so the two elite outfits could concentrate as the strategic reserve to protect Saigon. On 13 March, he met in Saigon with Lieutenant General Truong, the I Corps commander, and informed him of his decision and ordered him to prepare an evacuation plan. This was one day before he briefed Major General Phu. At that time, Truong said he was concerned that the withdrawal of the airborne division would seriously weaken his defensive posture in Quang Tri Province and asked that the scheduled departure be postponed from 18 March to 28 March. However, the 3rd Airborne Brigade was loaded on ships on 18 March only to be offloaded two days later at Nha Trang to help block the enemy attacking down QL-21. As events unfolded, this plan to constitute a strategic reserve went awry, greatly weakening the army's capability to resist the enemy in MR-3 later.

The recall of the airborne and marine divisions had always been foremost in the minds of the joint staff members. Some pundits said the order was given to embarrass Truong, whom many favored as a replacement for President Thieu. Such speculation was ridiculous; the withdrawals of those two units were, of course, a military necessity.

Thieu intended to hold Da Nang at all costs. The military situation in MR-1 was stable for a week, providing plenty of opportunity for careful and detailed planning, which did not occur. As was the case in MR-2, there was not a major increase in the estimated enemy forces in MR-1 prior to the initiation of the dry-season offensive. MR-1 probably could have withstood the enemy attacks, had President Thieu not been spooked by the loss of Ban Me Thuot and ordered the withdrawal of the airborne division. However, once the civilian population in Quang Tri saw the withdrawal, it began to leave, in a trickle, toward Hue and
Da Nang. In time, this exodus became a torrent of panicked refugees, which seriously interrupted military activities. Many soldiers with families in the area deserted to ensure their families' safety.