Losing Vietnam (47 page)

Naturally, there was formidable air cover overhead, ready to suppress enemy actions if necessary. The integration of the protective cover with the helicopter flow was effected superbly, as was the execution of the scheduling. The evacuation helicopters adhered to adjusted schedules with precision. I recall either CINCPAC or Washington asking Blue Chip where one echelon of choppers was when it was only a few minutes off schedule. Such was the senior command interest, which incidentally took time to satisfy. Another factor of great importance was the excellent maintenance of the helicopters, which worked flawlessly.

The communists got their act together about 1100 hours and attempted to interdict LZ Hotel with rocket and mortar fire—but it was too late to affect the operations. The evacuation had already been conducted, without the U.S. forces, tactical air, or marine security having to fire a single shot.

Although Washington had initially recommended against a helicopter evacuation, the operation's success was due primarily to the element of surprise. The enemy, certain that any evacuation would be from Pochentong Airfield, was caught completely unaware by the use of an in-town landing zone and was thus unable to make any disruptive efforts until too late.
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The recounting of Operation EAGLE PULL by the USSAG historian, Capt. Norman Felty, summarizes succinctly the successful operation (see
appendix E
). On 12 April American president Gerald Ford released a press statement:

The Americans and Cambodians had both always hoped that if the military situation were to become stabilized, then the Khmer Rouge would be willing to negotiate. Many wished that Cambodian forces could hold on until the wet season in June, when the rising Mekong would flood its banks and permit convoys to run the blockades and the enemy ground forces besieging Phnom Penh would find their efforts much more difficult. This, of course, presumed that the United States would continue to provide essential funding and critical supplies. Therefore—notwithstanding the change in government, with Sukham Khoy assuming control as acting president—the Khmer fought on. The intensity of conflict in the days before the U.S. departure was the greatest of the war, exceeding the previous high point reached in the communists' initial 1975 dry-season assault, thereby accelerating the drawdown of ammunition.

By massing for its assaults, the enemy made excellent targets for the air force, which, despite the continued interdiction of Pochentong,
was providing effective close air support to the beleaguered ground forces. On 10 April, for example, in the important northwest sector, the 13th Brigade reported killing 150 KC north of Route 4, and the 45th Brigade claimed 550 KC killed, mostly by air attacks. Elsewhere in the provinces, friendly forces at Prey Veng and Takeo had successful operations, killing 125 and 69 KC, respectively. These losses, even if exaggerated, were excessive, and an indication that the enemy was using poorly trained troops to press its incessant attacks. The
Christian Science Monitor
's Dan Southerland noted, “What amazes some observers is that any (FANK) soldiers continue to fight, and some fight well.”
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Once the United States departed, taking Acting President Sukham Khoy with it, those brave souls who remained—almost all the Khmer leaders—had to organize their third government in as many weeks. A Supreme Commission of seven, composed of four military and three civilians led by Lt. Gen. Sak Sutsakhan with Prime Minister Long Boret as deputy, took over the reins of government. Their first decision was to defend Phnom Penh and the provincial enclaves by all means possible.
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President Ford, greatly impressed that these Khmer in positions of responsibility had stayed on, authorized the airlift to continue as long as the Cambodian government continued to resist the insurgents. FANK troops had retreated from their positions on the east bank of the Mekong River at Phnom Penh, and the Khmer communists could target Pochentong at will with artillery. The communists did not, however, shell Phnom Penh. Therefore, the airland option was no longer thinkable, not just because of the Pochentong interdiction, which the U.S. crews had continued to brave, but also because landings required U.S. controllers on the ground and U.S. cargo handler supervisors to unload the aircraft. U.S. personnel could no longer be brought into Cambodia. The Khmer were terribly disappointed that resupply had to be by airdrop; obviously the required supplies could not, in the long run, be delivered, even if they were available to call forward. Phnom Penh was running short of rice and needed about six hundred short tons per day to feed its swollen population. There was hardly any ammunition remaining for delivery, but all that remained in the pipeline
would be airdropped. At the bottom of the barrel, many ammunition line-item shortages were evident. Although no airdrop sorties were scheduled on 12 and 13 April, they recommenced on 14 April, with deliveries to Takeo, Prey Veng, Lovek, and Kampot. However, nothing was delivered to Phnom Penh, because the agreed-upon drop zone was inundated. With rice critically short at Phnom Penh and ammunition quickly running out, it was obviously only a matter of time until an insurgent takeover.

Southerland reported that the Khmer had expressed a sense of U.S. betrayal, as they were left with dwindling supplies and little hope of a negotiated end to the war.
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The feelings of the people were later given voice when President Sukham Khoy said, “The United States led Cambodia into this war, but when the war became difficult the United States pulled out.”

Consequently, the Cambodian government desperately sought a cease-fire, hoping to establish negotiations. After the U.S. exodus, the communists let up in their attacks, particularly on Phnom Penh. On 8 April 1975 a communications intercept of a communist message stated:

On 14 April, an air force T-28 aircraft flown from Pochentong by a deserter dropped two bombs on the FANK headquarters building, killing seven.
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A review of the Phnom Penh and Saigon endgame situations revealed how similarly the events of the final days at each location
played out. This traitorous bombing act initiated a series of events that culminated during the evening of 16 April when Long Boret, Lon Non, Chhim Chun, and Thong Lim Huong capitulated. Lon Non and Chhim Chun then went to the Ministry of Information to broadcast an appeal to troops to stop fighting. Shortly afterward, Maj. Gen. Mey Sichan, speaking for the government, broadcast the decision to surrender in a recorded message our signal unit monitored in Bangkok. As Sichan, delivering Lieutenant General Sutsakhan's message, said, “I myself and the committee of the armed forces will make a decision with the delegation from our brother side about a way to bring peace to our country.” The Khmer Rouge broke into the address: “We did not come here to talk.” And the interrupter said, “The Lon Nol clique and some of its officers should all be hanged.”
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The Khmer Rouge then appealed to citizens and troops all over the country to lay down their arms and cooperate with the insurgents. Khmer Rouge leaders had earlier warned the government and other politicians to leave the country for their own safety.

On 15 April, our intelligence group in Bangkok informed us that in the event of the imminent collapse of Phnom Penh and the impossibility of extraction by air, the Khmer chief of naval operations, Rear Adm. Vong Sarendy, as well as other naval officers, would embark on the Mekong in navy craft in an attempt to escape the communists by exfiltrating into South Vietnam.
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Intelligence provided us with the frequencies and call signs of the PRC-25 radios aboard the three craft. The message went on to say that the situation in Phnom Penh was deteriorating rapidly and the fall of the city was expected the next day.

Headquarters USSAG had always maintained direct radio contact with both the joint staff operations center and the navy headquarters, which enabled us, in our tripartite hat, to keep abreast of critical situations, particularly with respect to the Mekong convoys. So on the morning of 16 or 17 April I was surprised when Blue Chip informed me Rear Admiral Sarendy was on the radio and wanted to talk with me. Sarendy said, “My dear friend General Hunt, My officers and I are here at naval headquarters, and the communists are entering the city. It is only a matter of hours and they will be here. In the name of our close relationship and our good friendship I ask you to send a helicopter to extract us, or we will all be killed.” I replied that I understood his
situation and his request at this time but USSAG did not have the authority to dispatch a helicopter to Cambodia. I told him I would ask higher-ups for permission. Though we did not hold out much hope, we immediately called the American embassy in Bangkok to see if they could obtain permission to dispatch a chopper. It would have been a risky venture, but Cambodian Air Force helicopters had been operating in and around Phnom Penh for days without any mishaps. Within two hours we received word that U.S. assets were not to enter Cambodia. So, with a heavy heart I had to tell him we could not dispatch a helicopter. I suggested that he use naval assets to escape. He replied that they would surely die. He did not get off the net and left the radio open.

Admiral Sarendy was the most dynamic of all the Khmer military leaders. Until the last days, when both personnel and equipment had been so greatly attrited, the navy had been a formidable and valiant force. This very personal final conversation with him was extremely difficult.

Following the official declaration of surrender, the government officials took their cars to the Phnom Penh stadium, where air force helicopters were waiting for them. Long Boret and Thong Lim Huong boarded one helicopter and were preparing to depart when Long Boret's family arrived. The two men descended from the helicopter to help the others aboard, but the helicopters suddenly took off. As they ascended, passengers in the crafts could see enemy troops take Thong Lim Huong and Long Boret, along with Long Boret's family, into custody.
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Those officials who did manage to land at Samrong said Lon Non and Chhim Chun were also captured but they were not sure of the circumstances.

Long Boret had been the glue which held together several of the Cambodian governments. He was an exceptional man who served his country well until the very end.

We received debriefs from several sources as to the events of 17 April.
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Khmer communist elements entered Phnom Penh that morning from several directions, and the situation quickly became confused, with various communist factions issuing orders and nobody apparently in
overall charge. People stood on the sidewalks, waving to the insurgents. White flags and banners flew from every building in the city. We were told that the joint staff had ordered the display of white surrender flags, and friendly military vehicles could be seen flying theirs. The square in front of the American embassy was filled with hundreds of cheering people waving white flags. But the cheering did not last long.

On 18 April, the Khmer insurgents forced the entire population of Phnom Penh to leave the city. On the outskirts, the people were forced to go in different directions; however, the communists did not seem to have any organization or method in determining the directions people took. Anyone who refused to obey instructions immediately was shot on the spot. For the first several days, the enemy gave people evacuated from Phnom Penh no food or water. They had to subsist on whatever they had carried with them or could beg from villagers along the way. After the first two or three days' walk, the route was littered with dead bodies. Many of these people had been shot, while others seemed to have died of natural causes. No one was burying the dead.

I spent several hours discussing the Cambodian situation with one of the French doctors who worked at the Phnom Penh hospital. He told me that the communists had shown up at his hospital and immediately evacuated everybody. He had just finished an amputation of a soldier's leg, and they made the soldier get up and vacate. Obviously, the man died shortly thereafter.

About a thousand foreigners had sought refuge in the French embassy. The doctor said the sanitary situation there was deplorable; he and his medical associates were kept busy trying to maintain the health of this group. The communists entered the embassy to remove all Khmer. After three weeks, all foreigners there finally were loaded into vehicles and taken on a several days' journey to Thailand. Phnom Penh was completely deserted, as were Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, and Battambang, the cities they passed through along Route 5 on their evacuation. They were all ghost towns.
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