Losing Vietnam (30 page)

The Khmer peasants were sturdy, rugged individuals able to withstand privation and difficulty. When well led, they were very heroic. Unhampered by an inexperienced officer corps such as the FANK was saddled with, the communists could promote their officers based on performance. Consequently, through a winnowing process the KC were able to staff their units by and large with intelligent and, in the latter stages, innovative officers with combat experience who demanded ruthless discipline from their soldiers. A major difference between the forces, then, was the quality of combat leadership.

The remnants of Cambodia's colonial peacetime officer corps, which had no combat experience, initially primarily composed the FANK leadership. Consequently, key leadership positions were unavailable to the younger combat-experienced officers, and this created a stifling situation. MEDTC stated that on its inspections it often found large-scale officer absenteeism. The Cambodian officers rarely conducted
inspections. They were notorious for padding their ranks with phantom soldiers. Lacking experience and professionalism, the leaders generally failed to seek innovative solutions to combat situations; their offensive tactics were often unimaginative and plodding. Whereas the enemy most often attacked at night, the FANK almost always initiated daytime attacks at mid-morning. Its fire coordination was poor, so that its firepower advantage was not optimized. On top of all this, FANK basic training lasted only six weeks, and much of it involved political indoctrination rather than protracted hands-on experiences, such as marksmanship, preparation of defensive positions, or night exercises. Therefore, the soldiers were inadequately prepared for combat, which led to high casualties and a high desertion rate. The communists, with their aggressive attacks, and the FANK, with their inept defensive posture, both created many casualties. This was a bloody war.

For the Khmer, the South Vietnam peace accords signed in January 1973 had the immediate effect of requiring the relocation of the MEDTC logistical base in South Vietnam to Thailand and the termination of Cambodian training programs being conducted in South Vietnam. With respect to logistics, however, the net effect was positive. Ammo resupply and air force responsiveness were improved, and there was no change in rice and petroleum product procedures. The transshipping of equipment and general cargo, particularly that transiting the Mekong, was made more difficult because Saigon was much closer to the Mekong waterway than Vayama, Thailand, was. Overall, the transfer of logistics went smoothly, and in the long run, particularly when the requirement for airdrop and airland of supplies arose, it was a blessing. The government's in-country training base consisted of five national training centers and fourteen service schools. The quality of in-country training, completely staffed by Khmer, improved as those who completed out-of-country training were assigned to the cadre. However, the constant enemy combat pressure precluded optimum attendance, and the field commanders' indifference to sending good people for training reduced the effectiveness of the program. This cost FANK dearly. Stateside training, which required English-language proficiency, was minimal, with only about 150 students per year. However, those young officers who attended the armor school returned knowledgeable and enthusiastic and led the new cavalry squadrons with élan.

In 1973, FANK did not have the manpower to fortify its defensive positions on Route 4, and the battalions of the newly formed 1st Division had less than 50 percent of their authorized strength during their first operation on this route. There was a serious chronic manpower shortage, particularly with the intervention battalions. Therefore, some amplification of the military personnel situation is necessary for a better understanding of the conduct of the war.

Combat capabilities were measured by the number and strength of battalions. The standard battalion size was 512 soldiers. Most of these were intervention battalions, under the control of the centralized joint staff (EMG), and territorial battalions, generally controlled by the military region commanders. There were also separate marine battalions, controlled by the navy, which protected navy bases and the Mekong at choke points, and separate air force battalions, which defended the airbases.

In July 1974 there were 91 intervention battalions,
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187 territorial battalions, and nine marine battalions. The aggregate number was 287, with an effective strength of 105,460 troops out of a total of 244,457. The total strength of the 91 intervention battalions was 27,868. At that time, the separate territorial battalions had 74,187 troops, and the marine battalions had 3,405 soldiers. The residual army strength—which included EMG headquarters, support troops, and the pipeline, but not the 20,488 men in the air force and navy—was 118,509 personnel.

Many units were still not fully filled. As a glaring example, the 7th Division Headquarters had an effective strength of 217.6 percent, versus the full (or authorized) strength, while its battalions had only 38.0 percent, and the headquarters were always overstaffed. This strength disparity was always a severe problem; although many efforts were made to do so, the combat battalions were never brought up to strength.

Those Khmer youth volunteering for military service, who made up about 85 percent of all new recruits, compared with the 15 percent who were draftees, generally opted for territorial units. They elected for service with units close to home because they wanted to stay near their families. Any decision to circumvent this would surely result in major desertions—which were too high as it was. Often, conscripted young men pulled strings to be assigned to FANK headquarters and
service support units. There were more than ten thousand troops in EMG headquarters alone. However, the air force and navy, with effective leadership at the top, had no problems recruiting and were generally always up to strength. The same was true for the armored cavalry squadrons.

The practice of reporting soldiers present for duty when they were off moonlighting, deceased, or nonexistent was common. Although the ambassador and MEDTC both repeatedly requested that FANK purge itself of the ubiquitous phantom soldiers, it was reluctant to do so—obviously, since such reporting was so common and the unit commanders lined their pockets with the phantoms' pay. The phantom soldiers and a huge desertion rate kept the actual strength of the intervention and territorial battalions below authorized numbers.

In October 1974, after the Cambodian government made an all-out effort to enforce conscription, the country's forces reached their manpower high point. There were 117,704 soldiers in 289 intervention, marine, and territorial battalions, but only 56.4 percent of the intervention battalions had effective strengths of at least 70 percent of the authorized strength. Units with lower than 70 percent authorized strength are considered marginally combat effective. By April 1975, only 13.8 percent of the 116 intervention battalions were at 70 percent. There was a continuous drawdown of the intervention battalions' effective strengths to 43.6 percent on 12 April 1975. FANK's severe 1975 casualty losses could not be replaced.
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As mentioned, the territorial battalions always had a much greater strength per battalion than the intervention battalions did. In early April 1975 their average strength, 358 personnel, was right at 70 percent while the intervention battalions had only 240 troops per battalion, or 47 percent. In other words, the territorial battalions had almost 50 percent more personnel than the intervention battalions, which bore the daily brunt of the enemy attacks.

MEDTC systematically collected manpower data, which USSAG collated to highlight these deficiencies. Brigadier General Palmer and his team repeatedly discussed the situation with the joint staff, as did the ambassador with the political leaders of the government—but to no avail. The chronic manpower shortfall in the intervention battalions, which were conducting most of the combat, was critical; it effectively
prevented FANK from seizing the offensive. The lack of adequate military manpower, and the reluctance to remedy the situation, was undoubtedly one of the major causes of Cambodia's defeat. The failure to enforce mobilization, the padding of headquarters, the system that allowed volunteers to serve at home (in the territorial troops), the phantom troops, and the high desertion rates together were a colossal manpower management failure.

MEDTC designed the force structure of the Khmer Air Force primarily for counterinsurgency missions. It had an authorized strength of about ten thousand and had no problems maintaining that level. Only about two thousand personnel were associated with the operational missions—that is, flying and logistic functions—and about eight thousand were in standard battalion units responsible for airbase defense. Squadrons were organized to operate each type of aircraft. There were two main operating bases (Pochentong and Battambang) and three forward operating locations (Kompong Cham, Kompong Chhnang, and Ream). In January 1975 the air force had 131 aircraft, of which 101 were operationally ready. That month it flew a remarkable 7,208 sorties, as compared to 5,134 sorties in January 1974.
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By 1975 the air force logistics system was capable of keeping up with the increased operational missions, even after Pochentong came under intense artillery and rocket fire. That in itself was an extraordinary feat. A U.S. Air Force detachment conducted Khmer training in FY 75 at the Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand, for both pilots and maintenance personnel.
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This realistic training, duplicating as much as possible the actual tactics and maintenance support required in Cambodia, raised the air force effectiveness to new heights. Air crews increased from ninety in January 1974 to 141 in January 1975.

In the summer of 1974 the air force was fully competent to support the immediate transfer of troops from Phnom Penh to outlying surrounded enclaves. In fact, it had been effectively supplying much-needed ammo and other supplies to enclaves on a daily basis by both airland and airdrop. There had been significant improvements by the air force in all areas. The most impressive improvements were in command and control and tactical operations coordination.
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During January 1975, 62 percent of all strike missions were controlled, and
the air force began to use an airborne command and control system for complex joint operations.
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The operationally ready rate for the T-28 aircraft was 79 percent, compared to the U.S. Air Force standard of 71 percent.
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There were still problems in management, logistics supply, and maintenance. However, effectiveness had increased to the point that FANK attempted no major Mekong convoy or ground maneuvers without precoordinated direct air support. The C-123 squadron airdrops were instrumental in the survival of enclaves, and were a prime determinant in the army's ability to deploy sufficient intervention forces into the Phnom Penh perimeter to stop the determined communist offensive against the capital. Although not self-sufficient, the air force was striving toward that end. Its improvement since the end of the American bombing in August of 1973 had been truly dramatic.

The main deterrent to optimizing air force assets was the poor coordination between air force and army units—that is, the army's failure to comprehend and effect joint operations. Although matters improved in 1975, joint operations certainly were not routine. Naturally, the failures of coordinated actions at the upper echelons were exacerbated at the lower unit levels. In the matter of coordinated fire support, the Khmer suffered greatly because U.S. law prevented American advisers from training troops in country. The fluid tactical situations rendered air-ground coordination and cooperation much more difficult in the final months of the conflict.

Nevertheless, the accolades Ambassador John Gunther Dean gave Brig. Gen. Ea Chhong, the dynamic air force commander, and his force were certainly warranted; he paraphrased Winston Churchill's comment on the Royal Air Force, “Never have so many owed so much to so few.” After the United States vacated Phnom Penh, the Khmer Air Force was the last effective fighting force in Cambodia. It continued to attack numerous communist units advancing in the open until they had overrun Pochentong and destroyed the stocks of fuel. Then it retrograded its flyable assets to Thailand. The Cambodian Air Force's determined resistance at the end sharply contrasted with the South Vietnamese Air Force's almost total capitulation.
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The Khmer Navy (MNK) was authorized 15,461 personnel (including the marine units) and had been issued about 208 vessels of all
types.
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Within this organization, there were twelve battalions of naval infantry (battalions of fusilier marines) whose mission was to defend major naval installations and occupy key choke points along the lower Mekong River. Before January 1975 the navy had lost twenty-eight craft from enemy action.
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However, in the 1975 dry-weather campaign one of the communists' main thrusts was to interdict both the Upper and Lower Mekong River in an all-out effort to strangle Phnom Penh. The river craft constantly escorted convoys to and from the vital enclave of Neak Luong as well as from South Vietnam in January. Navy craft and crews sustained constant and heavy attacks by fire from the enemy dug in on the riverbanks. Navy and marine casualties were high. The navy lost forty-five craft, and, more important, more than 70 percent of their riverine operators were casualties. The MNK was exhausted, having lost more than 25 percent of its operating assets in less than 3½ months. Therefore, Rear Adm. Vong Sarendy, perhaps the strongest of the Cambodian military leaders, stood his forces down and reorganized them. Although it was actively operating until the end, the MNK had lost all capabilities for offensive operations.

Although similar in many ways, the wars in Cambodia and South Vietnam were entirely different because of cultural and economic matters. The political leaders of both countries attained their positions as the result of coups. Both were senior military officers who used the armed forces for military and political purposes. Both promoted to positions of responsibility officers whom they were certain would be loyal, and sometimes these men were not capable. In important matters, both presidents often bypassed the joint staffs and gave orders directly to the commanders. This compromised the staffs, rendering them less effective. Similarly, whenever the joint staff of either country issued an unpalatable directive, its senior commanders bypassed these and went directly to the president.