Losing Vietnam (33 page)

Table 20.
MAP-CB Funding (millions of dollars)

Source
: Message, “FY75 CB MAP CRA Funding,” 191048Z June 1974, CHMEDTC, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

The funding situation was dire, and all concerned hoped for additional funding. But what if Congress refused to approve a supplemental? Obviously, Cambodia would have to attempt to survive with the funds in hand—in which case, only the basic tools of war could be requisitioned: ammunition, petroleum, and medical supplies. More than 80 percent of available funding was by necessity spent on ammunition. Distressingly, there could be no funds for uniforms, field gear, or the replacement of combat equipment losses. Now that the packaging, crating, handling, and transportation costs came off the top of approved funding, it was mandatory that these expenditures be held to a minimum. That meant reduced airland supply, which was expensive. Stockage levels had to be expertly managed to preclude airland calls forward when supplies were low. The Mekong resupply must be cost effective and have no ammo barge losses. It is clear why in August 1974 the logistical management of ammunition and the Mekong convoys were so important. FANK had its back to the wall, and all concerned were doing their best with the meager funds they had been given. Cambodia's only hope, like South Vietnam's, was for the U.S. Congress to have a change of heart and approve a supplemental.

The 19 December 1974 congressional authorization was absolutely shocking. It required a massive reduction in ammo utilization. Consequently, in its guidelines for ground ammunition, MEDTC recommended draconian cutbacks, effective 1 January 1975—the day the communist dry-season offensive commenced. The total recommended cost allocation was $650,000 per day, and the total daily tonnage was 290 short tons, the limit CINCPAC had recommended in June 1974.

These guidelines meant major reductions in ammo expenditures just at the commencement of the dry season's increased combat intensity. When confronted by the enemy, the soldiers always used every
means possible to fight back, and they would, when necessary, expend their basic loads of ammunition, which they fully expected would be replenished. The individual soldier was not rationed. Could there be some method of munitions management to ensure the discipline necessary to reduce consumption this much without completely demoralizing the armed forces or endangering the combat soldier? Obviously, the answer was
No!
Ammunition would continue to be consumed to meet the level of combat intensity. Therefore, without a supplemental congressional authorization Cambodia was doomed—it would run out of ammunition.

Even though the level of combat had increased, the Cambodian soldiers made great strides in conserving ammunition between 30 January 1974 and 15 November 1974. However, this was in no way proportional across the board. The army made appreciable reductions in artillery, but only a small reduction in mortar use. Consequently, the cost of a day of supply of mortars increased by 10 percent, from $2,315 to $2,553 per ton, as mortars became the primary cost category. However, conservation still brought substantial cost savings. More important, conservation measures create different tactical patterns, so it is vital to continually review consumption patterns to ensure that artificial constraints do not affect battlefield performance (see
table 21
).

Between the end of January and the middle of November 1975, Cambodia's ground forces cut back daily expenditures greatly, particularly in artillery (from 20,493 rounds to 6,149 rounds) even though the intensity of combat had increased. In January 1974, FANK fired
0.7 mortars for each artillery round, but in November 1974 it fired two mortars for each artillery round—a huge change in tactics. It is important to note that the intensity of combat had reached a new and much higher plateau, and when a soldier's back is to the wall he will use all the ammo available to him to fight. And rightly so.

Table 21.
Analysis of Cambodian Daily Expenditure Rate of Ammunition

Source
: Message, “SEA Ammunition Perspective,” nine sections to multiple addressees, 131930Z December 1974, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

The conservation factor for the total conservation period of 26 June 1974 to 24 March 1975 was 86 percent. However, from 1 October 1974 to 24 March 1975, during which period the 1975 general offensive was fought, FANK was 18 percent below the computed allowance. Ambassador Dean, MEDTC, and the joint staff had much more command interest in ammunition conservation than their counterparts in Vietnam because the ground ammunition supplies were visibly critical.

During the conservation period, the army consumed 2,164,000 fewer 105 mm rounds than it had during the base period of 2 January to 25 June 1974. However, to offset this large reduction in artillery, FANK fired over 600,000 more mortar rounds than it had during the same base period. Considering the artillery and mortar mix and the various types of rounds (high explosive, illuminating, smoke), the conservation efforts amounted to a huge saving of $76 million, or 47 percent of the FY 75 $160.4 million ammunition budget.

Cambodia's combat intensity peaked at 83,441 in the first week of January and remained high each week thereafter during the Khmer communist dry-weather offensive.
Figure 5
compares the FY 75 combat intensity factors for South Vietnam and Cambodia and vividly displays the dry-season high points.

It is of interest to compare Cambodian and South Vietnamese combat intensity factors and their total ground ammunition expenditures. South Vietnamese artillery ammunition expenditures for FY 75 were double that of the Cambodians, yet the ARVN CIF was only 53 percent greater. As a percentage of the cost of a day of supply, you find the artillery expenditures were 54 percent in South Vietnam, and only 28 percent in Cambodia. FANK greatly increased its mortar use while cutting back on artillery expenditures, which largely accounts for the disparity. Therefore, to me it was of great interest to compare the combat intensities in South Vietnam with those in Cambodia and then to compare the total tonnage of all ground ammunition consumed by both armies. I chose the wet season of 1974 because during it there were
no major campaigns by the communists and ground ammo consumption data was available for the twenty-six-week period. It should be instructive to see if there were any major differences in relative ammo expenditures.

Figure 5. Combat Intensity, in Tens of Thousands, by Week. (Source: “Republic of Vietnam Ammunition Conservation Study,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand; “Khmer Republic Ammunition Conservation Study,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.)

The combat intensity factors for the twenty-six-week July–December 1974 period in South Vietnam was 46,409 and 24,198 in Cambodia. The ground ammo consumption for the same period for the ARVN was 113,526 short tons, and 59,315 short tons for the FANK. The respective ratios of ammo consumption to combat intensities were then:

With respect to their combat intensities, the two armed forces were expending ammunition at identical rates. Therefore, if one presumes that the responses to a given level of combat intensity should be the same by both armed forces, then the combat intensity factor was indeed an adequate measurement tool.

Utilizing the combat intensity factors as a guide to reasonable firepower responses to enemy initiatives—and accepting that ammo conservation did adversely affect morale and did reduce combat effectiveness—the key question is, “Were the ammunition conservation programs in South Vietnam and Cambodia effective in reducing expenditures from the levels of usage during the base periods?” The answer is unequivocally that the conservation programs in both countries were very effective—much more so than generally realized.

Both countries reduced their ammunition consumption substantially, for which they paid a definite price. If the rates of artillery consumption in effect during the six-month base periods had been continued, then each would have expended over 2 million more artillery rounds than they did with conservation, which gave cost savings of $110 million for South Vietnam and $76 million for Cambodia. As a consequence, when the all-out communist 1975 dry-season attacks began, both countries had more ammo stocks available, which were then rapidly drawn down as the result of the large increases in ammunition consumption rates—that is, the intensive combat rates. Had both forces not conserved ammo, then they both probably would have run out well before January 1975. Thus, by conserving ammunition, they both prolonged the wars and the killing, wars they had no chance of winning because the U.S. Congress refused to authorize adequate funding for ammunition and other combat supplies.

As it was, even with conservation, if the military in both countries had hung on and fought the communists, they both would have completely run out of ammunition within days of their capitulation. The people of South Vietnam and Cambodia could not, and would not, believe that the United States would stand by and abandon them—so they fought on, anticipating forthcoming U.S. air power and supplemental funding. Their faith was misplaced.

The two main military priorities were always, first, to defend the Phnom Penh enclave, since the capital region, with its seat of government and its population of 3,250,000, was in fact the heart of Cambodia, and second, to maintain the Mekong River line of communications. With all the landlines severed, without the Mekong the crucial logistical support items of food, fuel, and ammunition could not be delivered to the capital enclave in sufficient quantities and Phnom Penh would surely fall to the communists. Logistical airlift support could substitute for the Mekong for short periods, but certainly not for any extended time. A major U.S. effort, then, was to assist the Cambodians in keeping the Mekong open so that Phnom Penh and Cambodia could survive. The efforts to maintain the critical Mekong line of communication, the “lifeline of Cambodia,” were little known but vital.

The United States initiated the logistical program to Support Cambodia Out of Thailand (SCOOT) to provide vital ammunition supplies to the Cambodian armed forces via the Mekong River from Vayama, Thailand, to Phnom Penh.
¹⁶¹
The transportation of ammunition was a strictly military function, to be fulfilled by both aviation and water-borne assets. However, two factors became obvious: one, the amount of ammunition required was far greater than the programmed water assets could transport, therefore requiring major airland support, which was, of course, much more expensive; and two, other logistic supplies besides ammo were critically required. Consequently, the SCOOT assets had to be increased to carry the required supplies, thereby reducing airlift requirements, and an administrative and security system for the waterborne Mekong River convoys was required to integrate all supplies and transport them safely. The tripartite deputies assumed the vital administrative and security operations.