Losing Vietnam (52 page)

In early 1975, the coalition government appeared to be operating satisfactorily, with cooperation between the Vientiane side and the LPF in carrying out the various governmental projects.
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However, the LPF managed to covertly spread student dissension in Ban Houei Sai and Thakhek (just across the Mekong River from Nakhon Phanom), where the LPF used its forces to quell student demonstrations although they were within the Vientiane side's zone. But generally, the situation was quieter and both sides were making progress in the effective functioning of the PGNU.

In Laos, the developments in Cambodia and South Vietnam, although they had no immediate military consequences for the nation, did embolden the LPF with the possibility of adopting much tougher positions and produced a serious despondency on the Vientiane side.
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The subsequent falls of Phnom Penh and Saigon very negatively affected the morale of the Force Armée Royales officers.
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Since the agreement, U.S. military assistance had fallen from $274.7 million in FY 73 to about $80.0 million in FY 74. Junior RLG officers were more concerned with the lack of strong leadership in the army than the reduction of U.S. aid and presence. Just as in Cambodia, here they also contrasted what appeared to be a disciplined communist force supported by the North Vietnamese with their own less disciplined organization.

As anticipated, LPF militant actions did increase. On the morning of 9 May, several organizations had assembled in Vientiane at the Monument for War Dead, when a group of 150 students began marching around it with signs and banners chanting slogans, among them, “Americans Go Home, Down with the CIA.” They marched to the American embassy, where, under cover of rocks and bricks, several scaled the embassy gates and tore down the American flag.
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That started a series of events that culminated on 13 May with an attack on the USAID compound in Luang Probang, where the protesters broke windows and destroyed whatever they could get their hands on.
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All Americans employed by our government left that city. On the same day, demonstrations spilled over to Savannakhet, where USAID employees and dependents were held hostage.

At a 14 May PGNU cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Phouma accepted the resignations of most of the key Vientiane cabinet members: the foreign minister, defense minister, deputy public works minister, and deputy foreign affairs minister. Additionally, Gen. Vang Pao (the MR-2 commander and the director general of the defense ministry) also resigned.
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The Vientiane side of the coalition government collapsed overnight, largely because it had little political foundation. When faced with the ominous combination of events—the collapse of Cambodia and Vietnam, the LPF militant pressure, and demonstrations in which cabinet members were attacked by name—they had had enough.
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The LPF moved additional troops into Vientiane, bringing the estimated number of Pathet Lao troops in the capital to ten thousand. By 23 May, the LPF wielded almost total military and political control of the Vientiane side's zone.
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That day, the United States prudently began an emergency airlift evacuation of all dependents and nonessential personnel.
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A week later there were 147 government-associated Americans in Vientiane, and by 28 June the number was to be reduced to fifty-six. All thirty-three USAID personnel and fourteen of the twenty-one DAO personnel were to be evacuated. By mid-June, the LPF had completely reduced the Vientiane leadership and had commenced the integration of its personnel into all levels of governmental offices. It had also established control of the Forces Armées Royales and installed its own troops in all provincial capitals. The reeducation of military and civilians alike had commenced.
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On 26 June, the embassy informed the PGNU that the United States had decided to terminate USAID.
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The PGNU promptly responded by asking for all materials held by USAID and the DAO and the departure of all civilian and military personnel attached to these organs of assistance. The U.S. presence in Laos was being greatly reduced.

Now that the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies had triumphed in Laos, it was difficult to forecast what type of society would emerge. The LPF said it would continue a coalition government. Since the fighting was over, it could turn its attention to healing the wounds of war and improving the economy, which was in tatters.
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The withdrawal of the United States and the cut in aid would have serious economic consequences.

“Red Prince” Souphannouvong, a leader of the communist element and half-brother of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, said the LPF would survive on its own. Now that the communist revolution in Laos was completed, one thing was obvious: the United States no longer had influence in Indochina.

I left Southeast Asia to return to the States on 4 July 1975, with very mixed feelings. On the day we Americans were celebrating the birth of our nation and our freedoms, the heavy yoke of communism had brutally suppressed the freedoms of the people in Southeast Asia. Already there were mass killings going on in Cambodia, and indoctrination camps were established in Vietnam. It appeared the American sacrifice of lives and treasure had been in vain. Had the United States continued to adequately support its allies, though, it would not have needed to end this way.

Today's Afghanistan situation is similar in many respects to the one in Southeast Asia in the 1970s. By 1970, the American people had tired of the Vietnam War and were clamoring for a withdrawal of our forces. So our government decided to build up South Vietnam's military capabilities so that it could protect itself from communist aggression—the “Vietnamization Program.” It took several years of huge military equipment and supply transfers to enable the Vietnamese forces to become self-sufficient. By early 1973, the cease-fire with the communists had been signed and the United States withdrew all its forces, leaving in place the enemy troops in South Vietnam. However, in reality there was no cease-fire and the communist aggression continued unabated. With strong political leadership, the U.S. funding support for South Vietnam initially was adequate, and the country fared very well. However, the U.S. leadership changed, and the communists became more aggressive. Concurrently, the U.S. Congress drastically reduced its funding to the extent that South Vietnam could no longer adequately protect itself, and both South Vietnam and Cambodia fell to the communists. This was indeed a sad ending for all the blood and treasure we had expended.

Today, many Americans clamor for a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. To facilitate a possible withdrawal, our government has initiated what I term an “Afghanization Program.” As we did in Vietnam, we are expeditiously supplying and training the newly formed Afghan army and police. Ultimately, the government of Afghanistan will determine that its forces will be able to control the internal conflicts by themselves and, as in Vietnam, the United States will gradually withdraw its forces, leaving the insurgents in place to continue their disruptive efforts. With strong political leadership, the United States has thus far adequately supported the Afghan forces. How long will Congress continue to provide our support? Will Congress reduce funding and our military support to a grossly inadequate level, as it did in Vietnam? If this is the case, an unstable regime will surely take over, and again, as in Vietnam, our expenditure of blood and treasure will have been for naught. If, however, Congress continues to support Afghanistan adequately, then possibly there could be a stable, friendly country, and democracy might flourish.

The lesson to be learned concerning the defeats of South Vietnam and Cambodia is that U.S. military aid to embattled nations must be matched by our country's political strength and popular support to ensure a positive outcome. Lacking this resolve, military assistance will inevitably be withdrawn, thus abandoning the embattled nations to their fates.

The generic types of incidents considered are ground contacts, attacks by fire, mine and booby trap incidents, terrorism, sabotage, and political incidents. Each of these can be further decomposed into either enemy- or friendly-initiated.

The definitions used for the purpose of data processing, and interpretation of the data are given as follows: