Losing Vietnam (56 page)

Author's Note
: U.S. Air Force evacuation and tactical aircraft in Thailand were on alert 11 April anticipating the command to execute EAGLE PULL, Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan for the Khmer Republic. Amphibious Ready Group Alpha (ARG ALPHA), with her flagship, the USS
Okinawa
, was on station just off the coast of Cambodia. ARG ALPHA, with Marine forces and helicopters of the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit, had been in position since 27 February when the alert status was increased for the possible evacuation operation.

It was reported that about 780 evacuees might be expected. The USS
Hancock
, with Marines helicopters placed upon her deck in Hawaii steamed at maximum sustained speed to take her position with ARG ALPHA. She arrived at 1800 hours on the 11th.

Conditions had eroded in the Khmer to such a point that options in the EAGLE PULL plan to utilize fixed wing aircraft and Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport were impractical. The Khmer Rouge had moved to within three miles of the airfield and were pounding it daily with about 40 rounds of 107 mm rockets and 105 mm artillery shells. Several Khmer nationals working at Pochentong with the American Airlift of supplies had been killed or injured by exploding rockets and artillery, and a few fires had been started. While resupplying Phnom Penh, no U.S. casualties or major damage to U.S. aircraft had occurred.

The Communist insurgents had strengthened their position around the capital city and appeared to be preparing for an all-out drive. A commercial C-47 had been hit by enemy fire during takeoff this day (11 April). It crashed while attempting to return for an emergency landing at Pochentong, killing the crew of five.

When the situation seemed to have become irreversible, U.S.
Ambassador John Gunther Dean requested through the Department of State that the Department of Defense evacuate the remaining U.S. citizens and designated aliens from Phnom Penh.

USSAG at Nakon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base received the “execute message” on 11 April.

The USSAG/7AF Tactical Air Control Center, “Blue Chip,” was a beehive of activity by 0400 hours on 12 April. Noncommissioned officers busily plotted the vast number of sorties that had been fragged for the day on 15 display boards. Weather personnel, after making last minute checks of Phnom Penh wind direction and speed, reported 2/8s cloud cover and an anticipated high temperature of 95 degrees—a perfect day, weatherwise.

Operations specialists carried out communication checks and verified sorties schedules with all involved organizations. All organizations were ready and all systems were operational.

USSAG Assistant Chief of Staff/Operations, Major General Earl J. Archer, Jr., evacuation force director, conducted a brief staff meeting about 0430 hours. “Okay, this is it!,” he told the fifty-man battle staff. “We've done our homework and the plan is in being, but we know that we can anticipate questions as the situation develops. I want you to be ready to provide the answers and keep us informed in the cab (Director's Room). There will be worldwide interest in what transpires today and rightly so.”

USSAG/7AF Commander, Lt. Gen. John J. Burns and USSAG Deputy Commander, Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr., (USA) arrived at the nerve center of the operation to exercise command and control.

The Airborne Command and Control Center, an Air Force C-130—“Cricket” launched from U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base at 0500 hours. EAGLE PULL was in progress!

An RF-4 took off from Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base at 0514 to make yet one more check of the weather conditions. Another C-130—“King” was airborne at 0609 hours from Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base. “King” would provide helicopter control, as well as search and rescue coordination should anyone have trouble during the events of the day. A variety of tactical aircraft was aloft.

At 0654, a four-man Combat Control Team left Ubon Royal Thai
Air Force Base aboard HH-53s belonging to the 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron. The team was inserted at Landing Zone Hotel (LZ “H”) at 0850 hours and joined the U.S. Marine Ground Security Force Command Group which was already in position. Colonel Sydney H. Batchelder led the command group. LZ “H” was a soccer field near the American Embassy. The field could hold three helicopters at one time. It was open on three sides and a four-story building bordered the fourth side.

Three minutes later, three CH-53s from the
Okinawa
landed carrying the first elements of the 360-man Marine ground support force. There was no way to anticipate what resistance the ground support force would face as it moved in to secure and control the LZ. But any temptations that anyone among the thousands who gathered to watch the evacuation might have had gave way when they observed the heavily armed Marines tactically deployed around the LZ.

The Marines helicopters lifted off 13 minutes later carrying the first 123 of the 287 persons to be evacuated. The smaller than expected number of evacuees was accounted for, in that many persons had left the besieged city in recent days aboard contract C-130s returning to Thailand after delivering supplies to Phnom Penh.

A second wave of choppers quickly extracted 68 persons. No passengers were ready to board when the third wave landed and, not wanting to remain on the ground needlessly, they returned to the
Okinawa
empty.

At 1000 hours, the fourth wave of choppers lowered into LZ “H.” Among the passengers boarding these three aircraft was Ambassador Dean. They were off the ground by 1015.

The ambassador reported that all U.S. personnel who wanted to leave the city had been evacuated and the Marines immediately started extracting the ground support force. The first two waves of choppers removed Marines swiftly and without incident. Then at 1050 hours—exactly two hours after the evacuation had begun—LZ “H” reported incoming rockets.

The 14-member ground support force command group and the embassy evacuation coordinator still remained on the ground, but the last wave of Jolly Greens, HH-53s, had to wait for a pause in the incoming fire to extract them.

Then came an unnerving silence in Blue Chip. At 1101, the HF radio frequency—the communications lifeline—went out. Five seconds later it came back on, but those were a long five seconds.

Shortly, “Cricket” reported that the choppers had gotten in and that all Americans had been cleared from the landing zone at 1115 hours.

EAGLE PULL operations on the ground in Cambodia had lasted two hours and 25 minutes. Sighs of relief were audible throughout Blue Chip. Smiles began to spread across the faces of seasoned combat veterans.

No shots had been fired by the Marines, who had encountered only minimum indirect fire, and no tactical airpower, though visibly present, had been required. At 1243 hours, upon learning that all EAGLE PULL aircraft were over friendly territory, General Archer directed all aircraft still airborne to return to their home base. EAGLE PULL had been executed!

—Captain Paul Felty,

USAF USSAG Historian

1
. Col. Vo Dong Giang (NVA), Weekly News Conference, 21 August 1974, Compound, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, South Vietnam.

2. “Protocol, Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” 27 January 1973, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.

3
. Terms of Reference, USSAG/7AF, 1973, Headquarters CINCPAC, Hawaii.

4
. Col. John P. Vollmer, “End of Tour Report,” 12 May 1976, Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

5
. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 30 June 1973, Washington, D.C.

6
. DAO Position Paper, “US Military Assistance Objectives in the Republic of Vietnam,” 15 November 1974, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

7
. “Quarterly Review and Analysis,” DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

8
. “Communists' Assessment of the RVNAF,” November 1973, JGS J-2, Saigon, South Vietnam.

9
. “Enemy Capabilities versus RVNAF Potential,” December 1973, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

10
. Gen. Phillip R. Davidson,
Vietnam at War
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988).

11
. “Enemy Activity, Friendly Activity, Logistics,” August 1974, J-4, JGS, Saigon, South Vietnam.

12
. Agent Report, “COSVN Briefings of Key Cadre of Subordinate VC Military Regions,” Field No. FVS-32, 855, 6 September 1973.

13
. COSVN Resolution 12, Lao Dong Party Resolution 21 disseminated in South Vietnam, North Vietnam.

14
. “COSVN Resolution for 1975,” interim resolution closely tied to COSVN Resolution 12 of 1974, Issued by Lao Dong Party, North Vietnam.

15
. Agent Report, “COSVN Estimate of US Intentions in South Vietnam,” Field No. FVS-12, 855, 6 September 1973.

16
. Working papers, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

17
. Chronology, “NVA/VC 1975 General Offences,” 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

18
. Message, “RVNAF Order of Battle,” 161723Z January 1975, DIA, Washington, D.C.

19
. Briefing, “Briefing on the Military Situation in South Vietnam,” 2 October 1974, JGS, Saigon, South Vietnam.

20
. “South Vietnam Threat Assessment (January–June 1975),” November 1974, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

21
. Report, debrief from ralliers, “NVA Problems,” August 1974, 500th Military Intelligence Detachment, Saigon, South Vietnam.

22
. “Khmer Population Study,” July 1974, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

23
. President Nguyen Van Thieu, briefing to Vietnamese officers, 11 May 1974, Saigon, South Vietnam.

24
. Maj. Gen. Ira Hunt, memorandum for General O'Keefe, orientation visit to DAO Saigon and RVN JGS, 23–24 October 1973, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

25
. Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen,
The RVNAF
(Washington, D.C.: Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1978).

26
. “Quarterly Review and Analysis,” 2nd Qtr FY74, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

27
. “Logistics,” August 1974, J-4, JGS, Saigon, South Vietnam.

28
. “RVNAF Modernization Requirements,” 1973, OP-523-73, J-3, JGS, Saigon, South Vietnam.

29
. Position paper on South Vietnamese force levels, 19 November 1974, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

30
. Message, “Command and Control of VNAF Air Assets,” 29 April 1975, 7602 AINTELG, Fort Belvoir, Virginia/INP.

31
. “Destruction and Damage of Enemy Tanks in SEA,” 29 October 1973, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

32
. Memorandum, “Improvement of Capability for Countering Enemy Tanks,” 7 December 1973, JGS, Saigon, South Vietnam.

33
. Col. W. F. Ullmer, Team Chief, “Trip Report, Technical Assistance Team—Visit of 12–16 November 1973,” 16 November 1973, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

34
. Fact sheet, “Background, ARVN Armored Units,” December 1973, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

35
. “Combat Vehicle Status (26 Nov 73),” 26 November 1973, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

36
. Presentation, “GVN Defense Efforts in 1974,” Minister of Defense, Saigon, South Vietnam.

37
. Message, “DAO Quarterly Economic Report, Oct–Dec 1974,” 080051Z February 1975, DAO, Saigon.

38
. “Economic Stress,” July 1974, DAO Economic Section, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

39
. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, briefing, “Organization and Assessment of Enemy Forces in MR-1,” 10 April 1974, CG MR-1, Da Nang, South Vietnam.

40
. Maj. Gen. Ira A. Hunt,
The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam: Unparalleled and Unequaled
(Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2010).

41
. Capt. Richard L. Hutchings, memorandum: “General Definitions and Processing Ground Rules for Combat Analyses,” 2 December 1974, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

42
. Analysis, “Summary of Ceasefire Statistics,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

43
. File, “Report on Terrorism in the GVN,” November 1973, Saigon, South Vietnam.

44
. Message, “Summary of RVN Activity” (daily, 30 June 1974–21 April 1975), Chief of Operations and Plans Division, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

45
. “Daily Summary of Major and Minor RVNAF Incidents,” JGS via DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

46
. Gen. Cao Van Vien, report to the president, “Implementation Results of Improvement and Upgrade of Territorial Forces in MR-4,” 13 October 1974, Chief of JGS/RVNAF, Saigon, South Vietnam.

47
. Document, “Hamlet Evaluation System (HES),” MACV Doc DAR R70-79, 1 September 1971, MACV, Saigon, South Vietnam.

48
. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), Report 1973–1975, Office of the Prime Minister, 28 March 1975, Saigon, South Vietnam.

49
. Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho,
Pacification
(Washington, D.C.: Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1977).

50
. Message, “Intelligence Information Report” (COSVN Directive 4, New Strategy), 100236Z September 1974, DAO, Saigon, South Vietnam.

51. USARPAC Regulation No. 710-15, “Ammunition Supply Rates, Southeast Asia,” 24 May 1974, USARPAC, APO 96558, Honolulu, Hawaii.

52
. “Republic of Vietnam Ammunition Conservation Study,” June 1975, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

53
. Memorandum, “Ammo Conservation,” No. 2562, Central Logistics Command, JGS, Saigon, South Vietnam.

54
. Message, “SEA Ammunition Perspective,” nine sections to multiple addressees, 131930Z December 1974, Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.