Losing Vietnam (38 page)

It was obvious that the Cambodians enjoyed both tactical and strategic superiority in mobility, that is—trucks, armored personnel carriers, and aircraft and riverine assets versus the communists' “shank's mare” and elephants.

In April 1974, Ambassador John Gunther Dean replaced Chargé Thomas Enders. Dean was credited with bringing about a negotiated settlement to the civil conflict in Laos, and many, particularly the by now war-weary Cambodians, had high hopes that he might work some magic and broker a negotiated settlement in Cambodia. The word was that Secretary of State Kissinger had instructed Dean to maintain a strong hand in support of U.S. interests, which meant strengthening the government so it could survive and continue to fight the communists until they could be brought to the negotiating table. The pragmatic Dean realized the importance of energizing FANK so it could obtain the upper hand in the current stalemated military situation. Recognizing this, Headquarters USSAG proposed a “think piece” reviewing the current situation and proposing a concept of strategic mobility that, if implemented, would materially assist Cambodia in reacting to the upcoming enemy initiatives.
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General O'Keefe forwarded the study in May.

It is important to note that after being repulsed at Phnom Penh, the KC overran Oudong at the end of March and Kompong Luong in April, both towns situated on the key Route 5 line of communication.
Thus, the FANK was hard-pressed to protect provisional targets or even execute the third phase of the dry-weather campaign—to open Route 5 to provide access to the agricultural area of Battambang/Pursat. At this time Kampot, Prey Veng, and Lovek were under siege.

USSAG noted that the primary objective of enemy forces was the capture of Phnom Penh. The second major assault on Phnom Penh, in January 1974, greatly exceeded the May 1973 attack: the enemy used more artillery, rockets, and ground troops in multipronged but uncoordinated attacks. There was little doubt that the enemy would attack again, and in greater strength than previously. Subsequent to the major attacks on Phnom Penh, so as to maintain the initiative and keep the pressure on the government, the enemy had always mounted selective assaults against major provincial capitals. It continuously interdicted the main communication routes.

The Cambodians' military strategy was the obverse: to defend Phnom Penh, protect provincial capitals, and keep the lines of communication to Phnom Penh open. Their first priority, mirroring the communists', was to defend Phnom Penh, which also meant protecting Pochentong Airbase and the Mekong, the two absolutely vital means of resupply.

Looking to the combatants' strengths and weaknesses, the enemy had expanded its force structure, improved its combat capability, and obtained increasing levels of material support from North Vietnam. Its personnel strength had doubled to more than sixty thousand in a year, and to improve command and control it created three divisions and doubled their battlefield commands, regiments, and battalions (see
table 17
). On the battlefield, the enemy had exhibited a higher degree of leadership and initiative at all levels and demonstrated an aggressive offensive spirit. These improvements in material support aside, the enemy's most significant weakness was his limited ability to support forces in sustained combat. The lack of both tactical and strategic mobility also limited enemy capabilities.
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The Cambodians' major strengths were firepower, strategic mobility, and sustaining power. The FANK had recently greatly improved
its coordination and integration of air, artillery, and naval gunfire in support of operations. The armored personnel carriers also had added shock effects. The close air support had materially improved, and the navy provided effective support for marine forces operating along riverbanks. Just as important, the air force, with its C-123s, and the navy, with its naval assets, provided the capability to deploy forces and equipment rapidly in response to enemy initiatives. The GKR's current advantage in sustaining power depended solely on continued U.S. logistics support. FANK's major weaknesses remained its progressively deteriorating personnel situation, lack of leadership and command initiative, weakness in the planning and execution of operations, and failure to capitalize on its advantages in mobility.

The USSAG staff conducted an operational analysis of the major battles in Cambodia, separating them into government successes and losses.
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On the one hand, where FANK did not reinforce or attempt reinforcements and where there was also a paucity of artillery firepower, it lost. In every case, the losses occurred in twenty-three days or less. On the other hand, where it did reinforce and where there were adequate artillery tubes, they were successful. The successful battles lasted thirty-seven days or longer. When FANK put up a serious fight, the enemy could not logistically sustain the contact and withdrew.

Looking to the current military situation, in reacting to the enemy's attacks against outlying population centers FANK had deployed seven intervention brigades from Phnom Penh and the Mekong. This left the balance of force in these two key areas about equal. The communists had forty-eight battalions within thirty-five kilometers of Phnom Penh and they could quickly introduce reinforcements from outlying areas. The northwest and southwest sectors of Phnom Penh were both dangerously weak; neither could likely withstand a major enemy attack. So there was an urgent need to reinstate the Phnom Penh defense plan as well as to take aggressive action against the enemy at Lovek, Prey Veng, and Kompong Thom, which were under attack and did not have sufficient artillery support.

Considering these strategic strengths and weaknesses, it appeared
necessary to modify the current situation to provide an effective governmental capability for countering enemy initiatives in outlying military regions while maintaining adequate security around Phnom Penh and along the Mekong. Our concept of strategic mobility capitalized on Cambodia's strengths by emphasizing the roles of intervention forces, firepower, and mobility.
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First, the ninety-one battalions of intervention forces, whose average strength was only 295 men, had to be brought up to full strength and centralized in the Phnom Penh area. Second, the previously submitted modified Phnom Penh defense plan had to be implemented. Last, plans had to be formulated to respond decisively to enemy threats against outlying military regions by employing sufficient intervention forces, firepower, and mobility to counter the enemy. In April 1974, the military region commands had 182 separate battalions, whose average strength was about four hundred men. There was a general balance of forces between the FANK and the enemy at the provincial capitals; thus, reinforcements should be able to stabilize the combat situation and in some cases defeat the enemy. This simple and affordable plan would ensure an effective defense of the Phnom Penh capital military region and, when the security situation permitted, would provide a responsive capability for reinforcing threatened outlying population centers. The concept of strategic mobility depended greatly on the air force's and navy's abilities not only to quickly transport intervention units to the locales undergoing attack, but also to provide additional lethal firepower.

The distribution of friendly and enemy battalions within radii of twenty-five kilometers of provincial towns and thirty-five kilometers of Phnom Penh as of 30 April 1974 indicated that 80 percent of friendly battalions were located in these major population centers, whereas only 70 percent of the enemy forces were.
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The communists required a large force just to keep the lid on the very restless natives—they used forced communization, harsh discipline, and impressed labor. They had to maintain strict control of the countryside to provide a constant influx of impressed young men and women to expand their combat forces and to make up for the severe casualties the FANK inflicted upon them.

The army did make incremental progress in increasing the strength of the intervention battalions, reaching an all-time high average of 362 soldiers in ninety-four battalions in October 1974, and it did implement
the Phnom Penh defense plan. But, more important, it implemented phase 3 of the 1974 dry-season plan and attacked up Route 5 and recaptured Kompong Luong, lifted the siege of Lovek, and in July retook Oudong. These actions cleared the Tonle Sap. Some of these battles took a major toll on the enemy, particularly in its counterattack at Oudong when more than two hundred were killed. As the dry season came to a close, the government had successfully defended and repulsed major enemy efforts against Phnom Penh, Kompong Cham, Kampot, Lovek, and Prey Veng. Morale had improved, and optimism had replaced pessimism for the time being.
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In a June 1974
New York Times
article, David Shipler summarized the Cambodian situation from an observer's point of view.
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He saw the record at the ending of the dry season as slippage for the Cambodian government and disappointment for the insurgents. He pointed out that by its continuing existence, the government defied the previous August's prognostications that it would not survive without U.S. bombing and put an end to predictions of imminent communist takeover. The rebels had cut Phnom Penh highway links but had not stopped Mekong traffic, and they mismanaged some offensives. Most analysts believed that the rebels' inability to cut the Mekong lifeline was a major failure. Some credited Cambodia's survival to “new-found” military skills. Both sides benefitted from U.S. military aid: the government got deliveries, and rebels captured arms. He characterized the war as having no victories or defeats, just slow, unrelenting deterioration in Cambodia's military, economic, political, and psychological facets. Politically, the country was torn by internal dissent, but the military was the real power and not politically restive under Lon Nol. Psychologically, the communist-led troops were demoralized but not panicked.

In mid-July Ambassador Dean critiqued the situation somewhat differently:

There was no doubt that FANK had assumed the initiative and had recently won several major battles around Phnom Penh and several provincial capitals, severely attriting the enemy. Unquestionably, the end of the 1974 dry season was the high point of the war for FANK.

It was always amazing to me to see how much the MEDTC organization of Major General Cleland and Brigadier General Palmer accomplished with a military staff of only seventy-four. The relatively inexperienced Cambodian joint staff was not yet capable of providing effective war plans, nor did the overworked MEDTC have the time to undertake this heavy planning effort. Consequently, in November 1973, at MEDTC's request, Headquarters USSAG had prepared a draft dry-season plan for its consideration, to present to the joint staff. In late May 1974, Palmer requested that our staff prepare a wet-season plan similar to the previous dry-season one. MEDTC listed as important priorities defense of Phnom Penh, maintenance of the Mekong line of communication, opening and securing of a surface route from Battambang to Phnom Penh, and defense of provincial capitals and population centers.
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It also listed several important points to be addressed: a preparation phase, the missions of the navy and air force, and the Phnom Penh defense.

Once the plan was developed, MEDTC reviewed it and Ambassador Dean approved it. At that time, MEDTC presented it to Lieutenant General Fernandez and the joint staff and finally to President Lon Nol.

Subsequently, USSAG assisted MEDTC in preparing a dry-season plan for the period 15 December 1974 until 30 June 1975. It considered two enemy courses of action: first, that the enemy concentrates its force for a major effort against Phnom Penh and the Mekong Special Zone; and second, it continues its strategy of attacking enclaves and provincial capitals.
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In the summer of 1974 Cambodia seized the offensive, and by July it had built up considerable momentum. This was the high point of the war. In June it recaptured the strategic town of Kompong Luong, and its breakout of Lovek enabled ten thousand refugees to be evacuated.
By July, FANK had breached the last enemy defensive line northwest of Phnom Penh and had retaken the historically important city of Oudong.
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Lon Nol, enjoying the success, invited General O'Keefe and myself with our wives, who were living in Bangkok and whom we rarely saw, to visit at the presidential residence for a luncheon on 27 July. We first called upon Ambassador Dean at the embassy and then, with the ambassador and Brigadier General Palmer, went to the residence, Chamcar Mon, where we were given a briefing by the Khmer on the recently approved wet-season plan. After that, the ladies, who had been on a sightseeing tour, joined the group for lunch. All of the senior Khmer military were present, as was Prime Minister Long Boret. O'Keefe gave an excellent lead-in to a toast to the president and the Khmer Republic. There was a sincerely warm feeling, and the Khmer were deeply appreciative of the U.S. assistance in their conflict. Our wives' presence was a positive signal to all that Phnom Penh was safe and internal affairs were normal.

Although the military situation in Cambodia was at its high point and internal affairs were normal, the capital was always circulating rumors and conducting intrigues. At the end of August 1974, military initiatives around Phnom Penh came to a virtual halt because of the heavy rains, which caused extensive flooding. With military action at a standstill, the local Phnom Penh newspapers filled their space with an increase in local gossip. There was always a certain amount of unrest in Cambodia: civilian unrest resulting from increased prices, military unrest stemming from pay shortfalls, and student/teacher unrest. Several of the press reports alluded to a possible coup, but this time such rumors appeared baseless. Nevertheless, we queried the Phnom Penh Station to see whether there was any substance to it. They replied: