Magnificent Delusions (34 page)

The US decision to withhold military supplies from both Pakistan and India was based on past experience. Both countries had previously obtained US weapons to defend themselves against communist aggression. Both had used them only to fight each other. In Pakistan's case American military assistance had been expected to create a greater sense of security; instead, it had enhanced Pakistan's willingness to start military confrontation. The United States had also discovered the limits of its leverage in getting Pakistan and India to settle their issues over Kashmir.

At the time Bhutto asked for military equipment in return for bases, US policy makers prioritized avoiding conflict in the subcontinent. The United States had entered a phase of détente with the Soviet Union, and US intelligence on Soviet moves was generally good. The United States knew that Pakistanis felt threatened by India, but they did not agree that the Soviets threatened Pakistan.

The United States was also aware that Bhutto felt exposed to Pakistan's military establishment—a menace that could increase if he failed to get the generals what they wanted. But the Americans calculated that the chances of avoiding war in South Asia would increase if the United States refused to induct more arms into the region than otherwise.

The US refusal to resume military supplies was intended to force a policy reappraisal in Islamabad; instead, it invigorated Pakistan's search for economic and military assistance from other sources. The rise in oil prices immediately after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war had enriched Iran and Arab oil producers' coffers. The sheikhdoms in the Gulf region had thus emerged as fully independent countries, with cash on hand and little infrastructure. Their militaries and police forces had yet to get off the ground. On his return from the United States, Bhutto started working on schemes for Pakistan to benefit from the Middle East oil boom.

During his meeting in Washington, Bhutto had proudly told Nixon and Kissinger that he had accomplished the difficult feat of simultaneously maintaining good ties with Iran and the Arabs. Pakistan, he had said, maintained good relations with the Arab states “even with the new messiah in Libya,” a reference to Muammar Qaddafi. “Pakistan has had some pilots in Libya until they were asked to take off against the Sixth Fleet and we told them nothing doing,” Bhutto confided.
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He wanted to make sure the Americans did not interpret negatively his links with anti-American Arab governments.

Then, in 1974, Pakistan hosted the second summit meeting of Muslim heads of state at Lahore. Amid much fanfare, kings and presidents of thirty-five Islamic countries and the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) assembled to give life to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), originally formed five years earlier. For many Pakistanis it was the realization of their long-held dream of Pan-Islamic leadership.

Bhutto used the occasion to recognize Bangladesh, as Islamic countries' support for this decision helped him overcome opposition from domestic ultranationalists. He also benefited from being at the side of every Muslim king and potentate, and he developed close ties
with most of them. One of the special relationships forged as a result of the Islamic Summit was with Saudi Arabia. Within a year that country provided Pakistan with an interest-free loan of $100 million.

The Saudis made generous contributions toward charities and the building of mosques. When Pakistan faced a balance of payments crisis in 1975, Arab countries and Iran chipped in $770 million for Pakistan and pledged another $391 million in support of specific projects.
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The Saudis also gave a grant of $30 million in addition to a soft loan of the same amount from the Saudi Development Fund.
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In return Pakistan flattered the Saudi royal family by naming towns, roads, schools, and mosques after them. During a six-day state visit, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia referred to Islam as the “indissoluble bond of unfailing strength and indestructible solidarity” between the two countries.
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Pakistan also started exporting skilled and unskilled workers to Middle Eastern countries. These workers earned wages much higher than they could in Pakistan. Their hard currency earnings, when converted into Pakistani rupees, enabled their families to live better than others could. The government then added a few sweeteners to the prospect of a tough life in the desert: overseas workers were allowed tax-free import of consumer goods that were otherwise exorbitantly taxed.

Manpower export had the potential to reduce Pakistan's dependence on foreign aid and provided Pakistan with a new source of foreign exchange. It was also a bonanza for the families of those working in the Gulf. However, it also powered consumption and some construction instead of becoming the source of investment in Pakistan's industrialization.

Further, Pakistan's bloated government and ever-expanding military needs did not allow dependence on external assistance to end. By the time Bhutto was removed from power in 1977, remittances had risen to nearly half a billion dollars. In subsequent years worker remittances continued to rise, reaching $14 billion in 2012. But even with increasing remittances, Pakistan has continued to seek aid not only from the United States and Western industrialized nations but also from the Arab countries that Bhutto had wooed.

The availability of petro-dollars helped Pakistan, at least in the short-term, to deal with its military supplies problem. Pakistan signed agreements with Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait to open Pakistani military training institutions to their country's officers. In exchange for cash or arrangements to pay for military equipment, Pakistan also offered military advisers and trainers for several countries. As a result, within the first year there were 893 Pakistani advisers and 914 military trainers in the Middle East.
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The military manpower deals were sometimes transformed into barter arrangements to buy hardware Pakistan needed. Libya gave Pakistan $200 million to purchase arms in return for Pakistani pilots for the Libyan air force. Abu Dhabi funded Pakistan's purchase of thirty-two Mirage V fighter aircraft from France at a cost of $330 million and contracted Pakistani crews to fly twenty-four for its own air force.

But the potentially largest Arab-backed military purchase never came to fruition. Saudi Arabia offered to fund Pakistan's purchase of no American A-7 fighter bombers, which would have cost $200 million. But by that time the United States had become concerned about Pakistan's covert nuclear weapons program. The United States demanded that Pakistan withdraw its decision to purchase a $150 million nuclear waste reprocessing plant from France before it would consider selling the A-7S to Pakistan.

WHEN INDIA ANNOUNCED
on May 18, 1974, that it had tested a “peaceful nuclear device,” Americans were preoccupied with controversies related to the Watergate scandal. Although the timing of the test may have been a shock, the United States had been tracking India's nuclear program for a while. Soon after the Bangladesh war, in February 1972, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had sought the CIA's opinion on the possibility of an Indian nuclear test.

The INR director, Ray Cline, had written in a report forwarded to CIA Director Richard Helms that “India probably has undertaken research directly related to the development of nuclear weapons, and may well have fabricated one or more nuclear devices.”
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India apparently had fifty to sixty kilograms of plutonium at the time, produced in its Canadian-Indian Reactor, US (CIRUS) facility at Trombay. This would serve as fissionable material for devices, which the Indian government wanted to test as peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs).

The United States and Canada had assisted India in building the CIRUS reactor, and India's agreements with both countries restricted it to peaceful purposes. But the agreements did not provide for inspection or verification procedures to determine the uses for CIRUS-produced plutonium. Moreover, Cline pointed out, the language of the agreements did not specifically preclude “peaceful” nuclear explosions. India had not accepted US and Canadian interpretations of these agreements as precluding all nuclear explosions on the grounds. In the North American reading, any such explosion would be identical to a nuclear weapons test.

“Regarding the prospects of an Indian decision to proceed with a nuclear test,” Cline had stated that in his judgment, “such a decision is unlikely during the next few months and may well be deferred for several years. The political and economic restraints would appear—in the near term—to outweigh the international political or military benefits which could flow from becoming the world's sixth nuclear power.”
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His assessment was based on the fact that India still lacked a viable delivery system for nuclear weapons. A nuclear test conducted several years before having the means to deliver an atomic bomb would be of “very limited military value.” Although the tests might confer a new status on India and “the immediate reaction of the Indian populace could be quite favorable,” Cline observed, the long-term costs could be very high. India would have to divert resources from critical domestic programs and could lose foreign technical assistance.

The US intelligence community had precise information on India's capabilities in producing plutonium as well as about the facilities where it was produced. It also knew that several aircraft in the Indian Air Force could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons. According to Cline, these included Canberra light jet bombers as well as Mystere IV, Hunter, SU-7 FITTER, and MIG-21 FISHBED fighters. But he anticipated that “the Indians would have some difficulty developing a nuclear weapon suitable for delivery by the fighter aircraft.”

The B-57 Canberra, for example, had a four thousand-pound payload. It could carry a nuclear bomb, but it did not possess “sufficient range capabilities to constitute a strategic threat to China.” India would require a longer range bomber, which it was unable to produce immediately. The United States and other producers would probably impose restrictions on exporting long-range bombers to India right after nuclear tests. The Indians would most likely try to acquire a strategic missile system. Cline's conclusion in 1972 was that although India could conduct a nuclear test, it most likely would not do so. He inferred that the prospect of international sanctions would outweigh the increased status and the political and military gains of demonstrating a nuclear weapons capability with no delivery system in sight. The only overriding factor in this evaluation could be if Chinese-Indian tensions resumed, coupled with a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations. Interestingly, there was no mention of Pakistan as even being a factor in India's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. For example, the B-57 Canberra bombers, which Cline cited as a possible delivery vehicle, could reach Pakistan even if they could not strike China. But the Americans saw India's nuclear program only in the context of China and did not take likely Pakistani reaction into account when they initially discovered India's plans.

Two years later, when India conducted its tests, Pakistan protested the loudest. The American media also found India's explanation for the test—that it was solely for peaceful purposes—”galling.” In an editorial titled, “India Joins the Club,” the
Los Angeles Times
said, “The world cannot easily forget New Delhi's waspish comments on
the uses and abuses of power by other nations, the sanctimonious protests of international virtue.”
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The US embassy in Delhi attributed the timing of the test to India's need for a psychological boost. “India has exploded a nuclear device at a time when India is in deep economic difficulty,” it reported. The government was contending with “a rising tide of disillusionment and discontent, corruption, mismanagement, labor indiscipline, rampant inflation.” Food shortages and the impact of the high cost of crude oil had led to “dismal economic performance and severe political unrest.”

Indian leaders sought to re-create the “atmosphere of exhilaration and nationalism that swept the country after 1971.” They had just wrapped up an agreement with Pakistan and Bangladesh on residual issues from the Bangladesh war. A nuclear test was therefore the next step to make Indians feel that they were citizens of a stronger nation.

Any international backlash, condemnation, and retribution to the test would help Indira Gandhi's government appeal to “chauvinist feeling” at home. “The picture of a government embattled and standing up to foreign abuse could be quite useful to the Indian leadership today,” US diplomats in India concluded.
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