Mike Guardia (23 page)

Although Bank and McClure were talented officers, their contributions to the development of Special Forces were neither as far-reaching nor as contemplative as Volckmann’s. Had Volckmann not written FM 31-20 and 31-21, McClure may have had no one to seek for adequate help or advice in developing an operational format for unconventional forces. Furthermore, the Army’s doctrine for counterinsurgency did not exist until Volckmann wrote it down. FM 31-20 gave the Army it’s intellectual, tactical, and operational foundation for counterinsurgency from 1950 until the present day. Likewise, FM 31-21 provided the inaugural framework and operational theory for Army Special Forces.

For the reasons outlined above, the title “Father of Special Forces” rightly belongs to Russell William Volckmann.

Portrait of Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann, 1957.

The Volkmann Family Collection.

Volckmann was neither the first nor the only American in the Philippines to organize a guerrilla movement; several others fled to the mountains in the wake of Japanese aggression. Yet, the common denominator among the majority of these guerrillas is that they ultimately failed— many of them dying within the first year and a half of combat. As many records were lost during the war, categorizing the other movements remains a difficult task. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that many units kept no records at all, especially considering the scarcity of paper.
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When Allied forces returned to the Philippines, the guerrilla records they received were written on a variety of odds and ends: newspapers, leaves, milk and cigarette cartons, and anything else that could be used as a writing surface.
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It is also likely that many of these phantom guerrillas either dissolved into larger units or were eventually snuffed out by the Japanese.

The only guerrillas that provide any useful information for historians today are those who left behind some record of their activity. The archival landscape is littered with the names of guerrillas who fought valiantly against the Japanese, but tragically did not survive the war. Where they failed, however, Volckmann succeeded. Among the more notable of the early guerrillas included Walter Cushing, Roque Ablan, Claude Thorp, Marcelo Adduru, and Ralph Praeger. There are several conflicting stories of how each man ultimately met his demise, but their tactical missteps collectively fall into six categories.

First, many of them tried to accomplish too much, too soon. Some began conducting guerrilla operations before the Japanese had even reached Bataan. While their initiative in bringing the fight to the enemy was commendable, it violated what is known as the Principle of Deliberate Delay.
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In this, they failed to wait until the Japanese had settled into a regular routine of occupation duty and a lower state of readiness.

Second, each of the early guerrilla movements maintained a limited geographic scope. By this, they did not extend their immediate regions. This was not necessarily problematic in the early stages of the war, but to affect any long-term impact on the Japanese, there had to be a synchronization of effort. Operating on a localized basis only facilitated the counterinsurgency efforts of the Japanese. If guerrilla activity became concentrated only within certain areas, the Japanese could easily redistribute their manpower to quell the localized resistance.

Third, these guerrillas had no means to retain any of the prisoners they captured. Rather than burden their operations by keeping track of prisoners, these guerrillas simply released them and moved their operations to another area.
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This tactical
faux pas
was one of the greatest liabilities to the resistance movement. A released prisoner would do little more than travel to the nearest Japanese garrison and report the guerillas’ last known location. Consequently, the Japanese would dispatch entire rifle companies into the landscape to intercept the “banditos.” Volckmann, however, not only retained his prisoners, he put them to work on his staff.
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Fourth, the early guerrillas had no effective means for dealing with spies and collaborators. With informers indistinguishable from the general population, many guerrillas simply treated the problem as unsolvable and hoped that the “fifth column” would never cross their path. Ralph Praeger, the guerrilla Captain who led remnants of C Troop, 26th Cavalry (Philippine Scouts) in Apayao sub-province, died in 1943 when collaborators betrayed the location of his hideout.
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Volckmann, however, knew that if he expected to survive the war, he would have to make the collaborators fear
him
more than the Japanese.

Fifth, some guerrillas agitated the local Filipinos rather than solicit their help. This may have been the reason behind Claude Thorp’s demise. Thorp, a Lieutenant Colonel, was unique among the USAFFE guerrillas in that he was the only one specifically tapped by a higher authority to conduct guerrilla warfare after the Fall of Bataan. Whether it was MacArthur or General Jonathan Wainwright (MacArthur’s second-in-command) who ultimately gave the authorization, Thorp nonetheless disappeared into the Zambales Mountains to organize a resistance among the displaced Americans in Western Luzon. According to Blackburn, however, Thorp’s temper and condescending attitude earned him the hatred of the local civilians and the wrath of the Hukbalahap. Disgusted by his attitude, local civilians shunned him and one eventually reported Thorp to the Japanese. If this is true, then Thorp’s behavior was undeniably self-destructive—especially in light of USAFFE’s humiliating defeat and the circumstances of the Japanese occupation. He was captured in August 1942 and summarily executed a year later.
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Finally, many of the resistance leaders’ organizational skills were so bad that their guerrilla movements collapsed under the weight of their own mismanagement. A representative sample of this is the MosesNoble operation.
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In his diary, Volckmann never openly indicted the colonels for their lack of planning. Blackburn, however, was never at a loss for words concerning Moses and Noble’s missteps. Accordingly, Blackburn indicated that the colonels’ mistakes were ones that he and Volckmann strove not to repeat.
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The only guerrilla whose fate remains a mystery is Roque Ablan, the provincial governor of Ilocos Norte. Rather than surrender to the Japanese in Vichy-ite fashion, Ablan foraged a nearby Philippine Army camp for arms and ammunition. Arming his governor’s staff, he took to the wilderness and began launching raids against Japanese outposts. Although spies repeatedly betrayed the location of his hideouts, he managed to escape the Japanese fury every time.
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However, after his last escape in early 1943, Ablan simply disappeared. There is no official record of him beyond February 1943.

Cautious not to duplicate the mistakes of his predecessors, Volckmann exploited the geography of North Luzon as a critical element to his success. Hideki Tojo commanded a fearsome army, but it was one that operated on a finite amount of resources. Petroleum, ores, and steel were the Achilles Heel of Japan’s war machine. An economic power in their own right, the Japanese relied heavily on Western imports to satisfy their industrial needs. This condition heavily influenced Imperial war policy: to maintain its conquest of the Pacific, Japan had to seize key points of industry without interference from the U.S. Navy. Manchuria and Borneo were the first areas targeted under this policy.
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Japan eyed the Philippines for the same reason. There were 7,107 islands in the archipelago, but Luzon was the priority target. The largest of the Philippine islands, Luzon was home to the nation’s capital and the heart of Philippine industry—with the northern provinces housing the region’s only mining network. What the Japanese had accomplished in Manchuria, they hoped to repeat in Luzon: control of the mineral resources. During the campaign, the Rising Sun scattered throughout the Philippines, but the bulk of the occupation force remained in and around North Luzon.
⁴²⁴

Strategically opportunistic views of the Philippine Islands, however, were not one-sided. The Allies, too, saw the Philippines as critical. Victory meant denying the Japanese an important resource enclave in the Pacific. If the flow of raw material continued, Japan would still have an outlet for making tools of war. Retaking North Luzon, therefore, meant closure of the nearest Japanese mineral reserve.
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Unwittingly or not, Volckmann found himself operating in one of the most strategically critical areas of the entire Pacific War.

Volckmann wisely kept his base of operations in the Cordillera Central of North Luzon. He had no concern for the region’s mineral resources or what the Japanese could gain from them; the decision to remain in the mountains was a function of pragmatism and utility. The central and southern parts of the island were plains that allowed easy access for Japanese foot patrols. The mountains, on the other hand, provided significant cover and numerous hiding places. The rugged terrain restricted enemy patrols to the narrow network of mountain passes. With enemy patrols often confined to a single column, their movements became slower and made them more susceptible to ambush. Conversely, the Cordillera was ideal terrain for Volckmann and his guerrillas—the mountain crevices and ridgelines offered enviable redoubts against enemy camps and patrol lanes.

In the spring of 1944, General Tomiyuki Yamashita assumed command of the Fourteenth Army. Shortly thereafter, he reorganized the entire defense scheme on Luzon. Drawing his forces away from the coast and the central plains, he consolidated his forces within the Cordillera Central of North Luzon.
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Yamashita recognized that this action would draw the Americans into a prolonged campaign to dig his forces out of the mountains. It could be done, but not without severe losses to the Americans. What Yamashita did not know, however, was that his new defense plan put him right in the middle of Volckmann’s guerrilla network.
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In the radiograms, Volckmann made clear his intentions to continue the guerrilla war as an extension of the conventional fight against the Japanese.
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As mentioned previously, he did not subscribe to the notions of guerrilla warfare operating on a localized basis, conducting intermittent raids and ambushes while hoping for the Allies’ eventual return. Instead, he considered the feasibility of an operation that would employ guerrilla tactics and intelligence in conjunction with conventional forces. In doing so, he discovered the martial nexus by which guerrilla warfare was most successfully employed. Guerrillas were capable of going into places that conventional forces could not go, gathering information that conventional forces could not obtain, and employing assets on the ground that the Allied forces did not have.

Each of the three USAFIP-NL combat operation phases made a critical contribution to Yamashita’s defeat in North Luzon. Luzon itself was a vital target for both Axis and Allies. It not only housed the largest of the Japanese occupation force, it was the economic and industrial nerve center of the Philippines. In paving the way for MacArthur and the Sixth Army to land in North Luzon and receive intelligence regarding enemy dispositions, Volckmann and the USAFIP-NL performed an invaluable service to the Allied cause. Through each of USAFIP-NL’s combat phases, Volckmann eroded the Japanese Fourteenth Army until it was virtually useless as a fighting force.

The first phase of operations set the tone for the rest of the campaign. Defeating the Japanese obviously required a working knowledge of their strengths and capabilities; Volckmann’s intelligence-gathering methods reflected this. Aside from knowing the enemy’s combat capabilities, one must also understand their logistical and support apparatuses. This is obviously why Volckmann collected information about enemy supply and fuel depots. As Volckmann did not yet have the resources to conduct open warfare against the Japanese, synchronizing strikes and sabotage on key targets had to suffice.

The second phase arguably had the most devastating impact on Yamashita’s forces. Although the third phase marked the termination of hostilities and the Japanese surrender, the second phase saw the breakdown of Yamashita’s formidable defense structure. Within each of the five regimental districts, Volckmann saw an opportunity to close down a vital component of the Japanese war effort in North Luzon. Some of these opportunities were limited in their scope, but others had more strategic implications. For instance, the 11th Infantry—under Blackburn’s command—seized the port of Aparri, the last Japanese naval base in North Luzon. As piecemeal as the Japanese resupply would have been, seizing Aparri meant that Yamashita’s men were now permanently cut off from the motherland. Incoming Japanese ships would no longer have a safe entry point on North Luzon. Capturing the enemy airfield at Gabu gave the Americans an operational landing zone and refuel station for long-range bombers en route to Okinawa. The creation of this Allied airstrip behind enemy lines facilitated the “island hopping” campaign, for it gave bomber pilots a staging area with greater proximity to the Japanese homeland. Finally, the 66th Infantry’s gallant raids in Lepanto-Mankayan wrested from Yamashita’s hands the largest mineral reserve in North Luzon.

The third phase was critical in the sense that it not only brought Yamashita out of the mountains, but it highlighted the efficacy of guerrillas and conventional forces in combined operations. General Kruger gave his Division Commanders in Luzon explicit instructions to offer unconditional support to Volckmann’s guerrillas and coordinate all offensive maneuvers based on Volckmann’s information.
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This circumstance became one of the intellectual cornerstones for Volckmann’s ideology on the Special Forces. While developing the framework for special operations, Volckmann correctly forecasted that, in future conflicts, guerrilla-style units would operate most effectively when combining and synchronizing their efforts with conventional forces.
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This observation extended not only to combat operations, but to intelligence sharing as well.

Volckmann’s legacy, therefore, is one of exceptional leadership and foresight; the impact of his actions stretch far beyond their immediate consequences. Volckmann’s ability to synthesize the realities and necessities of guerrilla warfare led to a campaign that eroded a formidable adversary and paved the way for an Allied victory. Had it not been for Volckmann, the Americans would have gone into North Luzon without solid intelligence, thereby reducing their efforts to a “trial-and-error” campaign that would have cost more lives, materiel, and potentially stalled the pace of the entire Pacific War. His actions in this regard saved more lives and facilitated the speed with which the Philippine Campaign was brought to a close. Furthermore, these guerrilla tactics and strategies gave Volckmann a practical foundation upon which to build a cohesive framework for special operations units. Unlike many of our nation’s policy makers and military leaders, Volckmann did not develop his positions based on abstract, theoretical notions of what
might
work in a given scenario. To the contrary, Volckmann already had the practical experience to know which methods would produce results.

Authoring two Army field manuals: FM 31-20
Operations Against Guerrilla Forces
and FM 31-21
Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare
, Volckmann codified the Army’s first doctrine for special warfare and counterguerrilla operations. Taking his argument directly to the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, Volckmann outlined the operational concepts for the Army Special Forces. At a time when U.S. military doctrine was conventional in its outlook, Volckmann marketed the ideas of guerilla warfare as a critical and strategic force multiplier for any future conflict.

In the course of writing this book, fellow historians asked me about a publication known as the
Small Wars Manual
. Published in 1935 by the United States Marine Corps, its pages contain guidelines on how to combat irregular fighters in operations other than war. The manual described tactical and psychological considerations not dissimilar from Volckmann’s FM 31-20.
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Accordingly, they asked whether or not Volckmann had referenced the
Small Wars Manual
while developing
Operations Against Guerrilla Forces.
It is possible that he had, but more likely that he had not.

Arriving at this conclusion requires a comparative study of the Army and Marine Corps. Both share a certain degree of operational overlap, but the two services often develop their own doctrines independent from one another. As per their original doctrine, the Marine Corps is a light, lean, and agile force not intended for sustained operations too far from the parent fleet. By virtue of their size and agility, the Marines possess neither the firepower nor the logistical wherewithal to project their forces over large areas for an extended period of time. The Army, by contrast, operates within a framework that calls for sustained combat power and the occupation of key terrain across multiple environments. To accomplish this end, the Army employs a greater logistical and supply apparatus.

The distinction between Army and Marine capabilities undoubtedly influenced the concepts written in the
Small Wars Manual.
“Small wars” represented conflicts that the Marine Corps seemed the most capable of handling. By definition, “small wars” were low-intensity conflicts against asymmetrical opponents and did not require any protracted force commitment. Consisting of small-scale rebellions and punitive expeditions, the
Small Wars Manual
treated these operations in a vein similar to law enforcement. In fact, the manual’s protocol directed Marine commanders to work closely with the local police.
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Volckmann, however, did not contextualize counterinsurgency strictly within the realms of low-intensity conflict. He saw counterguerrilla operations as part of a larger conflict wherein enemy guerrillas could either: (1) operate in conjunction with regular forces, or (2) become large-scale forces in their own right, capable of sustained harassment against an occupying army. Both contingencies necessitated a force structure beyond what the Marines could single-handedly provide.

Perhaps the Marine Corps kept the
Small Wars Manual
within their own doctrinal community while the Army maintained its conventional outlook. Nonetheless, before FM 31-20, the Army had no established protocol for guerrilla warfare. Reviewing Volckmann’s literature on counterinsurgency, it is apparent that he at least
thought
he was starting from scratch. In any event, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that Volckmann ever read the
Small Wars Manual
or even knew of its existence.

As corollary to his work in developing the Special Forces concept, Volckmann made a significant contribution to the development of tactical air support and air control operations. From the practical aspects of his work in Luzon, Volckmann demonstrated the need for coordinated air support to beleaguered ground units. This need was so great that the Air Force not only incorporated the forward air controller concept into its doctrine, but also specifically called on Volckmann to assess the potential of air support in unconventional warfare.
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Also, Volckmann was the first to advocate the use of the newly devised helicopter in air-ground warfare. In the wake of the Army Air Forces’ dissolution, Army Aviation became the military’s premiere rotary-winged force. To Volckmann, the helicopter had two advantages that fixed-wing aircraft did not. Unlike the airplanes that had supported him in North Luzon, helicopters could hover. Also, preparing a helicopter landing zone (LZ) was not nearly as difficult. Instead of the mile-long airstrips that required a full contingent of combat engineers to prepare, creating a helicopter LZ required nothing more than an infantry squad with a few pounds of TNT. Expressing the potential of helicopter-based combat in FM 31-20, Volckmann’s ideas paved the way for what is known today as air cavalry.

Furthermore, as America’s involvement in Vietnam grew deeper, the Army distilled Volckmann’s manuals into one comprehensive guide for fighting the Communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia. This subsequent field manual underwent several iterations, and became the operational guideline for tactical forces on the ground. His Rand Corporation and FM 31-20 discussions of helicopter support sold the Army on the need for airmobile units. Subsequently, air cavalry saw widespread implementation during Vietnam.

In light of his many accomplishments, however, Volckmann was not infallible. An innovator of any type is bound to make mistakes, and Volckmann was certainly no exception. For instance, killing enemy spies was necessary to survive the war, but Volckmann’s methods often went too far. Instead of simply shooting collaborators, Volckmann gave his guerrillas a “blank check” to dispose of them in whatever manner they pleased. Many informers were hanged, mutilated, dismembered, decapitated, and burned alive—one was even beaten to death with a crowbar. Although Volckmann did not participate in any of these atrocities, after the war, some Filipinos lobbied their government to put Volckmann and Blackburn on trial for war crimes. However, the official decree from Philippine President Manuel Roxas—which currently hangs on the wall in Blackburn’s home office—exonerated USAFIP-NL and accepted the elimination of spies as a necessary evil in war.
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