Mike Guardia (24 page)

Volckmann also didn’t understand the Filipinos’ cultural inclinations for vengeance. Often, the indigenous guerrillas would settle their vendettas by claiming that their personal enemies were spies, thereby providing a justification for murder. Volckmann tried to control this by seeking multiple sources to verify someone as a spy, but personal vendettas still accounted for a significant number of deaths.
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In addition, at times, Volckmann also proved himself as not being the best judge of character. His appointment of Captain John O’Day stands as a testament to this. O’Day had been a miner before the war and held various positions throughout USAFIP-NL, including a brief stint as the commander of the 66th Infantry. On one occasion, he nearly got Volckmann killed as a result of false reporting—for example when he claimed a particular area had been secured when in fact, it had not. When O’Day burned and plundered an entire village because one of the residents was thought to be a collaborator, a fed-up Volckmann relieved him of command.
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Although Volckmann conceded that eliminating spies was a necessary evil, his termination of O’Day’s command indicated that there were boundaries that he would not cross. Clearing the area of spies and collaborators was a priority mission, but Volckmann sought to minimize collateral damage against the innocent.

Robert Lapham emerges as Volckmann’s strongest critic. Lapham, a 1939 graduate of the University of Iowa, was an officer in the Army Reserve until his activation in June 1941. Originally assigned as a company commander in the 45th Infantry (Philippine Scouts), Lapham, too, fled the Japanese onslaught in Bataan. Building his group of raiders, the
Luzon Guerrilla Army Force
(LGAF), Lapham began conducting a few small-scale raids in the Central Plains area of Luzon. He and Volckmann had met previously during the latter’s trek to North Luzon. At the time, Lapham was bedridden at his base camp with a high-grade fever. Volckmann indicated that he was on his way north to begin coordinating with the remaining USAFFE elements in Mountain Province. When Volckmann assumed command of USAFIP-NL, he tried to absorb LGAF and organize them into another military district with Lapham as the district commander. Lapham, however, solidly rebuffed him. But instead of punishing Lapham or attempting to force his compliance, Volckmann simply let the matter pass and focused his energies on Yamashita.
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Although some of Lapham’s grievances against Volckmann are legitimate (i.e. allowing brutal treatment of collaborators and his failure to control subordinates like O’Day), many of them appear to stem from petty jealousies. For example, he castigated Volckmann for keeping his base of operations in the cordillera of North Luzon.
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He claims that his base of operations in the Central Plains produced better results, but this appears not to have been the case. The Central Plains did give Lapham greater overall mobility but, by the same token, it did likewise for the Japanese. Lapham constantly had to relocate his command posts to avoid the threat of enemy patrols.

Moreover, he claims that Volckmann’s record keeping practices were unwise in the sense that it jeopardized the civilians who worked for him. What Lapham did not realize, however, is that Volckmann used the “call sign” system as a means to safeguard their anonymity. Lapham also claims that Volckmann kept records for the sake of his own aggrandizement after the war.
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Volckmann, however, was a creature of habit, not egotism.
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Keeping detailed records is a well established part of military protocol. Volckmann needed to maintain adequate records to validate the claims of his organization, keep track of receipts, and maintain personnel rolls. Finally, even though Lapham indicts Volckmann for his treatment of the Filipino collaborators, he quietly admits that he, too, engaged in similar activities to neutralize threats from the “fifth column.”

Even some within Volckmann’s own circle have criticized him. Rob Arnold, who commanded the Third District, USAFIP-NL, admits that he was not impressed by either Volckmann or his whole operation. His complaints include a lamentation that Volckmann’s GHQ Staff seemed more interested in pursuing relationships with the native women than doing their jobs as guerrillas.
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But as Ray Hunt (who served with Lapham in LGAF) concedes, “Arnold had a sour nature; he regarded guerrilla operations as senseless; and when he stumbled into Blackburn’s camp in the spring of 1943 he was weak and sick.”
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Thus, it remains debatable what motivated Arnold to criticize his leader and the North Luzon guerrilla force—especially considering the tactical victories enjoyed by the 15th Infantry throughout 1945.

After Volckmann left OCPW, he completed a course of study at the Army War College and went on to serve as the Director of the Special Operation Division, U.S. European Command. In this capacity he oversaw the development and implementation of training for Special Forces units in Europe. Also, as part of a Cold War diplomatic mission to Iran, Volckmann prepared a brief for the Shah and his top military commanders marketing the efficacy of special operations forces in a time of war. As a consequence, the Iranian Army adopted its own Special Forces apparatus similar to the American design.
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In 1956, at the age of 45, Volckmann became one of the oldest persons in Army history, up to that point, to complete parachute training at the Basic Airborne Course in Fort Benning, GA. This was a requirement needed to assume his next duty position: the Assistant Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.
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As it were, this was Volckmann’s last assignment before retiring. After spending scarcely a year with the 82nd Airborne, Volckmann retired as a Brigadier General in July 1957. Returning to his hometown of Clinton, Iowa, he took over the family business: the Volckmann Furniture Company—a manufacturer and retailer of fine furniture. In 1977, after selling the company’s interests to the Ethan Allen Company, Volckmann retired for good. Splitting his time between two homes—one in Clinton and another at a golfing community in Harlingen, Texas—Volckmann quietly lived out the rest of his years. He died on 30 June 1982 at the age of 70.
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Overall, despite Volckmann’s missteps in the Philippines and those who have tried to discredit or downplay his accomplishments, he emerges as a forgotten hero whose legacy is one of critical importance. Had it not been for Russell William Volckmann, the Allied resistance movement in North Luzon may have very well collapsed by early 1943, and the isolated guerrillas would have been systematically destroyed by the Japanese. Given the comparative resources of the Japanese and American militaries, the Allies would have retaken Luzon eventually, but not without an extreme loss of life and a Pacific War stalled by a quagmire in the Philippines. Had it not been for Russell William Volckmann, the operational framework for the counterinsurgency doctrine and the Army Special Forces may not have ever surfaced. For these reasons, Russell William Volckmann commands a unique and noteworthy place in America’s military history.

By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved 9 July 1918 (Bulletin 43, 1918), the Distinguished Service Cross was awarded by the Commanding General, United States Armed Forces in the Far East, on 21 January 1945 to the following named officer:

Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, (019537), Infantry, United States Army.

For extraordinary heroism in action in the Philippine Islands from 9 April 1942 to 20 January 1945. Having escaped from the enemy on Bataan on 9 April 1942, this officer made his way through the enemy lines to Northern Luzon, Philippines, where he has since organized, encouraged, and directed sectors of continued resistance and developed detailed information on enemy dispositions and movement throughout the area, thereby assisting materially in the campaign of liberation. In demonstrated exemplary courage and devotion to duty he has inspired the officers and men under his command to perform service of great value under the most difficult conditions.

Entered United States Military Academy from Iowa.

By command of General MacArthur:

Richard J. Marshall,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.