Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion, and Politics (28 page)

Islam in its Wahhabi form reinforced the Saud [family’s] struggle to unite all the territories of [central Arabia].75

Ibn Saud also consolidated his power in the Arabian peninsula by emphasizing his family’s genealogical relationship to the branch of the Arabian Anaza tribe which was one of the most well-respected, numerous, and powerful tribes in Arabia.76 He attempted to give the impression of caring about all of his subjects by allowing them, in theory at least, to come to him or his subordinates with hardships they may be experiencing that Ibn Saud’s government could potentially address.77 One of several ways that Ibn Saud attempted to express his religious authority was by bearing the title of Imam, which in the Sunni tradition refers to the person who leads prayers in a mosque.78 In addition to referring to Ibn Saud’s potential to lead Islamic prayers, the title of Imam represented Ibn Saud’s leadership in terms of standing for the “true Islam” and his commitment to protecting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.79 Ibn Saud and his allies hoped that this title would enable him and his emerging government to “cement the society of Saudi Arabia and sanctify the supreme state power.”80

Because Ibn Saud, his successors, and other members of the Saudi government gain much of their legitimacy from Islam, these leaders have had a complex, nuanced, tense, and contradictory relationship with the members of that nation’s ulema. In describing the relationship between Saudi governmental leaders and the Saudi ulema, Tim Niblock states that while the ulema has played a role in providing religious legitimacy to the Saudi government, the relationship between these two entities has

had a restrictive element – defining the parameters within which each has been able to move. The state, for its part, has had to act within the circle prescribed by the Wahhabi ulema so as to retain the support of this vital movement. Policies which might offend the religious sensibilities of the ulema have had to be avoided. But the necessary involvement of the ulema in the regulation of Saudi society has not been limited simply to influencing government policy. More significant have been the direct responsibilities devolved to the religious leaders enabling them to mould the character of Saudi society. Their control of the mosques (a powerful instrument for shaping public opinion) is natural, but they have also played a prominent role in the educational system and in regulating social conduct through the Committees for the Promotion of Good and the Prevention of Evil. The extent of their powers in these spheres has varied over time, but a powerful influence in shaping Saudi society has been consistently maintained.81

Thus, the leaders of the Saudi government and the ulema maintain a complicated and, at times, ambiguous relationship.

Ibn Saud and the Arabian Peninsula’s Oil

In the early 1930s, as Ibn Saud perceived that his power within Saudi Arabia was relatively secure, he embarked on a series of oil concessions to American oil companies. He chose to make these concessions to American, instead of British, companies because Saudi Arabia was surrounded by British colonies and dependencies on almost every side and Ibn Saud and other Saudis did not trust the British. One of the reasons that he gravitated toward the Americans was because, from his perspective, they had had no colonial ventures in the Middle East at the time.82 In 1933, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) received a major oil concession from the Saudi government. This agreement was to yield colossal profits for SOCAL and only limited financial gains for the Saudi government.83 One of the reasons the agreement was slanted heavily in favor of SOCAL was because the Saudi government had virtually no knowledge of oil exploration, drilling, refining, and export. Saudi Arabia, like other countries in the Middle East which would prove to be oil-rich, had virtually no experts or infrastructure in the areas that would enable them to profit directly from the natural resources within their own borders.

Thus, the Saudi government was wholly dependent on SOCAL for the harnessing of what was ostensibly Saudi Arabia’s own oil. Another reason that Ibn Saud approved an agreement that was apparently disadvantageous to Saudi Arabia was because his government was in dire need of money. The agreement with SOCAL enabled the Saudi government to receive limited financial benefits in the form of royalties and loans. The oil concession to SOCAL also exempted the company from all direct and indirect taxes which would have been levied by the Saudi government. This stipulation prevented the Saudi government from receiving massive amounts of income, while substantially increasing SOCAL’s profits.84

Commerce and revenue related to oil was to become an overwhelming factor in Saudi Arabia’s international standing and in the development of its society.85 Indeed, some segments of Saudi society not related to oil production suffered serious losses as a result of the economic processes that Saudi Arabia’s oil industry set into motion.86 For example, as the country opened its economy to imports, which benefited many of Saudi Arabia’s large-scale commercial interests, these imports played a role in almost completely destroying the handicrafts sector of the nation’s economy while damaging the agricultural and pastoral sectors. Concomitantly, during the 1950s there were stark declines in Saudi Arabia’s agricultural production. In addition, the lack of strong governmental policies devoted to developing and preserving local production caused traditional Saudis who had been involved in agriculture to suffer.87 Lastly, the royal family favored people in its own

clan. For example, when income tax was introduced in the kingdom in 1950, members of the Saud family were made exempt.88

As the Saudi royal family’s wealth and opulence continued to increase during the 1950s, some members of Saudi Arabia’s ulema (as well as others within the kingdom) began to criticize King Saud and the ruling family for their violations of basic Islamic principles related to such matters as favoritism, modesty, careful use of wealth, self-discipline, caring for the poor, and the responsibility of Muslim leaders to assure socio-economic equity.89 These criticisms, which many in the ulema leveled against the Saudi regime, were among the first set of Islamically-based critiques of the Saudi regime from within Saudi Arabia. Several of the grievances which al-Qaida and other Islamist groups in the late twentieth and early twenty- first centuries directed against the Saudi regime are very similar to those which some members of the Saudi ulema had formulated in the 1950s. Al-Qaida and other Islamist groups would come to strongly oppose future Saudi regimes for a number of reasons including those Saudi governments’ strong alliance with the West, the enormous gaps between rich and poor in the country, the extravagances of the Saud family, and their favoritism toward each other. Many of these elements came into existence largely because of Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth and its relationship with Western countries.

During much of the 1960s and 1970s, under the leadership of King Faisal and King Khalid, the Saudi state’s political leadership was in a position to set the priorities for the kingdom’s future. The consolidation of the Saud family’s rule together with the country’s steadily increasing oil revenue positioned the government to implement policies that stood to benefit increasingly large segments of the Saudi populace. The government implemented large-scale policies that involved economic and social development as well as legal and administrative changes. These actions expanded the state’s leadership and influence in Saudi society. Consistent with these approaches, the government provided subsidies and welfare benefits to Bedouins and other Saudi citizens in non-urban areas. At the same time, the government continued to reinforce the importance of Islam within most of the affairs of the Saudi state.90

An Islamic Socialist State

Between 1963 and 1975, the Saudi government established a wide range of government ministries (such as the Ministries of Information, Justice, Higher Education, Public Works, and Housing, among others) in its efforts to expand its influence and provide some of the benefits of the nation’s oil wealth to the broader Saudi populace.91 During the 1960s, the Saudi government created the foundation for its social welfare system which would eventually offer

free government-supported education, health care, and unemployment and retirement benefits to every Saudi citizen.92 This system had the advantage of serving some of the basic needs of Saudi citizens while potentially creating a level of loyalty to the Saudi state that might lower the likelihood of revolts, Islamic and otherwise, against the government. The Saudi government also explained that this social safety net exemplified Islamic principles of compas- sion, generosity, justice, and the welfare of the Islamic community.93

The Saudi government attempted to increase the citizenry’s dependence on the state in other ways also. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s there was a sharp increase in the numbers of Saudis employed by the government. When government employees expressed grievances against the Saudi state or society, whether or not these grievances were based on Islam, these individuals often lost their government jobs. This tactic enabled the Saudi state to lessen the likelihood of certain forms of opposition, including resistance from Islamists.94

By the end of the 1970s, the Saudi state and Saudi society had been substantially changed. The Saudi government had created a centralized state, based on the government’s understanding of Wahhabi principles, with a capable administrative machinery in place. The expansive Saudi social welfare system operated in a way that enabled it to provide benefits directly to Saudi citizens. This arrangement engendered the loyalty of large segments of the Saudi populace to the state. During this period, these kinds of measures usually provided the Saudi state with some protection from Islamist opposition.95

Islamist Opposition to the Saudi State

In spite of the Saudi government’s broad-ranging efforts to obstruct rebellion by Islamists within the kingdom, a group of Saudi Islamists seized the Great Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. This siege lasted two weeks. Juhayman al-Utaybi (1936–80) and the 200 to 300 men who accompanied him expressed several grievances against the Saudi government, which included this Islamist group’s: (1) desire to overthrow the Saudi royal family because of their misuse of wealth; (2) objection to the Saudi system of government which is based on monarchy, a system of government for which there is no basis in the Quran or Hadith; (3) belief that legitimate Muslim rulers are elected by Muslim believers and those leaders must reject oppression; (4) conviction that all non- Sunnis should be barred from the hajj and any participation in state affairs; and (5) belief that the state must discontinue all relationships with Western countries and operate in a manner that is completely independent from them.96 The soldiers in the Saudi military, who solved this crisis by killing some members of al-Utaybi’s group while imprisoning others, attempted to move against this group carefully so as to minimize damage to Mecca’s Great Mosque, which is Islam’s holiest site.97 While the actions of al-Utaybi’s group

were not supported by many Saudi citizens (largely because they involved seizing Islam’s holiest mosque), the protest represented a significant manifestation of Islamists’ grievances against the Saudi state. By the early 1990s, Usama bin Laden and al-Qaida would come to express grievances very similar to those of al-Utaybi and his group.98

As a result of the seizure of the Great Mosque, the Iranian revolution, and unrest in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province (which has a substantial Shiite population), between 1980 and 1985 the Saudi government implemented a sweeping development plan that involved the reassertion of Islamically- based policies such as the construction of new mosques, the revitalization of strict Islamic education in the nation’s schools, the renewed enforcement of austere Islamic moral codes, and the strengthening of restrictions on the role of women in the workplace. King Fahd also gave himself the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” as a way of highlighting the Islamic character of his position as the leader of Saudi Arabia. These measures were intended to exhibit the Islamic legitimacy of the regime in the face of Islamist opposi- tion, while tightening the central government’s control over various aspects of Saudi society.99

There was another aspect of long-standing Saudi government policy, which, while attempting to increase the Islamic legitimacy of the Saudi government, may have had the countervailing effect of strengthening the Islamists. During extended periods in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the Saudi government allowed certain Islamists to teach in Saudi universities, all of which were supported by the Saudi government. Some of these Islamist teachers, including several Egyptians, engaged in strident critiques of the Saudi government. These teachers often advocated the overthrow of the Saudi government and the establishment of a new government in Saudi Arabia that reflected Islamic modesty in terms of the use of its wealth, its equal distribution of wealth, and its independence from Western countries, among other principles. These teachers were one kind of catalyst behind certain Saudi Islamists who were opposed to the Saudi government. Indeed, two such Islamist teachers who taught in Saudi Arabia, Muhammad Qutb, who was the brother of Sayyid Qutb, and Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian Islamist intellec- tual, were influential mentors of Usama bin Laden.100 The ideas that these Islamist teachers conveyed to Bin Laden figured prominently in his ideas as he developed his anti-Saudi doctrines both during and after the first Gulf War.

Saudi Arabia and the First Gulf War (1990–1991)

Indeed, the first Gulf War was another significant event in the Saudi government’s history and in its relationship to Islamists, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. The first Gulf War also constituted a momentous threshold in terms of Usama bin Laden’s thinking and the