Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (33 page)

Following the military coup of 1962, as Ne Win forced the country into its socialist straitjacket, businesses and most organizations (for example, private schools) were nationalized, forced into the service of the state, or politically neutralized. It is true that some locally autonomous organizations, such as church groups and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) continued to function, but they were most circumspect in their activities and statements. This is not to say that at some local levels people did not form some groups that served their needs, but these seemed to have been informal means to deal with very local problems. Advocacy groups were co-opted, neutered, or eliminated. In that sense, then, the above quotation is accurate for registered advocacy organizations.

The exception to this pattern was the
sangha,
which for years the government had tried to control by registering all monks, because insurgents and criminals could quietly don a yellow robe and essentially become immune to identity or arrest. It was not until 1980 that the state succeeded in registering the
sangha.
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Even then, with the hierarchy and
organization firmly under the control of the state, at the village level people did gather together to perform religious rites and social activities in an autonomous manner. In that sense, because it was part of the mainstream of Burmese culture, some civil society activities and groups continued to function and were important in the society.
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Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Brian Heidel have demonstrated that even in that dour period, at local levels, and often surreptitiously, there existed organizations that were not ephemeral and that operated beneath the government’s ideological radar screen.

Organizations that purported to have some national influence or advocacy role, however, were taken over in the service of the state. Eventually, after some dozen years of rule by decree, during which all political activity was banned except for the formation of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, which operated under military domination and control, the constitution of 1974 mandated a single-party mobilization system that virtually destroyed any possibility for the existence of an independent media, an influential private for-profit business sector, or a non-profit sector (except for established religious organizations that came under increasing intelligence scrutiny).

During the 1988 “Rangoon spring”, the period of late July–early August and before the coup of 18 September 1988, when state authority eroded and then virtually disappeared, there was a flowering of all kinds of independent civil society groups and media outlets that reflected a release from the stringency of authoritarian rule.
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This was, however, short-lived.

Since that time, under the SLORC and the SPDC, there has been a growth in NGO activities of various kinds; both indigenous NGOs and international NGOs have mushroomed. Heidel estimates that there are some 214,000 community-based organizations throughout the country, and he believes that in per capita terms Myanmar rates highly in comparison with similar states in the region. He has conducted the only survey undertaken so far, and although this is admittedly incomplete, he extrapolates from the groups he has consulted. He believes that there are some 270 indigenous NGOs in the country. Of these, 48.1 per cent are religious, 23.7 per cent are parent-teacher associations, and 20.9 per cent are social groups.
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Another list specifically indicates that there are sixty indigenous NGOs in Yangon that conduct activities in other areas.
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Religiously oriented NGOs have been a vital element in civil society.
Although Christian groups have predominated, Buddhist, Muslim, and Hindu philanthropic organizations have continued to exist and service the needs of their clientele.

Although Heidel’s research has revealed that civil society has been expanding even under the auspices of a government that has been rigid in many ways, political advocacy groups at a national level are still essentially proscribed. The BSPP and successive military regimes have in effect prevented the development of such advocacy organizations. The political, social, and legal restrictions on the operation of such groups are still in place and are substantial. As Zunetta Liddell observed, “Overall, the prospect for the development of civil society in Burma is grim.”
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Yet, because the state has not succeeded in supplying needed goods and services to the population, poverty and deprivation have increased; and as they have increased, so has the need (and opportunity!) for various programmatic NGOs grown. Indigenous organizations have been supplemented by NGOs from abroad.

Returning to the author’s quotation at the beginning of this section, it must now be asserted that only the advocacy groups have been “murdered”, and even among them, many have existed virtually underground. However, this situation may be evolving.

International NGOs play a special role in Myanmar. Those with resident in-country staff number in the dozens and operate in a wide variety of fields, including health, education, agriculture, micro-credit, and rural development.
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They are of varied nationalities and some operate under UNDP auspices.
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They supplement state-provided services, or offer services that the state has found it impossible to provide or that the state has, for whatever reason, ignored. In some sense, these groups both assist the people to improve the quality of their lives and the state to achieve some of its longer-range social plans.

Some international non-governmental organizations strive to influence Burmese nationals who have fled the country as well as those who have remained behind. These include international humanitarian organizations (often that have some religious affiliation) that work both internally and externally to supply social services; expatriate Burmese advocacy groups
bent on “regime change” in Myanmar; and international human rights advocacy organizations. Each has its own perceived niche and role.
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The government has been often suspicious of international NGOs, and rather than create a transparent and generally applicable set of administrative rules under which each might operate its own programmes, the state has dealt with each separately. This writer in 1994 attempted to convince the SLORC that such a set of rules would be in the interests of all concerned, including the Burmese people, but to no avail.
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As a result, some NGOs operate under memoranda of understanding (that is, an official, written mandate to operate) and some on the basis of verbal assurances.
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This reduces the effectiveness of such groups, which must spend inordinate amounts of time dealing with bureaucratic regulations that are often unclear and may be subject to inconsistent interpretation.

In addition to their value in supplying goods and services, international NGOs also provide a counterpart, and role model, for the local organizations through which they work and for local staff. Thus, indirectly but importantly, they assist in building local civil society organizations, and they train individuals who may have a key role in the local context (and sometimes in an international context) and who can carry on the work through indigenous groups at some future date. In this way the international NGOs may be helping lay the groundwork for some form of national reconciliation.

Expatriate advocacy groups are devoted to the re-establishment of civilian rule in Myanmar and the retirement of the military from the political arena. Most do so through supporting recognition of the results of the May 1990 elections — that is, the installation of the NLD as the government in power. Although there has been some attrition of the vehemence of this position as the years have passed, these organizations (often supported by other international organizations, such as the Soros Open Society programme and the US Congress) still engage in strong media campaigns through their own media outlets, which have proliferated, as well as through the established international media.

Some among them believe that the National Convention to draft a new constitution (which began in 1993, and after several starts, resumed in December 2005) provides perhaps the last chance to influence military policy and a new government, and have therefore advocated joining that process toward national reconciliation. Others have strongly disagreed, and the debates between various groups have been vigorous and
vituperative.
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Should a new civilian or “civilianized” government come into power, be stabilized, and be generally accepted internationally, these organizations would likely lose the most.

International human rights organizations have characterized the Myanmar government as one of the world’s most repressive regimes. They have attempted, with considerable success, to mobilize international public opinion in support of their aim of getting the military regime to step down. The cause has struck a chord among the international community, in part because the situation of the country is presented simplistically and without ambiguities, in part because of the parlous state of the Myanmar people, and in part because it is believed that regime change is possible. Yet, if one looks at history, the BSPP period was as authoritarian as the present (or even more so), but was less subject to international scrutiny, because the society was essentially closed to external contacts, because the international public and private mechanisms for monitoring human rights were less developed,
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because the massacres of 1988 had not taken place, and most importantly, because there was no iconic figure like Aung San Suu Kyi with whom to identify. These factors have changed the nature of Burma/Myanmar’s foreign relationships, and especially of its relationship with the United States.

The importance of the NGO communities working on the periphery should not be ignored.

Although their [indigenous and international NGOs and their local staffs] access to the most needy rural populations (including internally displaced persons) is highly restricted, and the political aspects of their programmes are usually obscured by a humanitarian-welfare gloss, these pioneer NGOs have played an important role in the development of civil society networks, under the most difficult and repressive of conditions.
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Policy-makers — both those concerned with humanitarian assistance and the plight of the poor, and those concerned with either the withdrawal of the present military government or its continuation — have to make a judgment, which often is not articulated, concerning the roles of both indigenous and international NGOs in Myanmar. For those who believe that the present military regime should withdraw, change, or evolve into something else, the operations of both types of NGO provide added
legitimacy to the government. As Alagappa has indicated,
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one of the elements that contributes to the legitimacy of a government is the provision of basic and appropriate services to the populace (what he terms the “performance” criterion). In this respect, the present government of Myanmar has failed. However, that failure has been somewhat mitigated in certain areas through the operations of the international and domestic NGO communities.
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At the same time, the very existence of local NGOs, and the presence and operations of the growing numbers of international NGOs working or seeking to work in Myanmar, also legitimate the government. Aung San Suu Kyi has written, “Whether it is governments, United Nations agencies, or international NGOs, any help they give Burma should be conditional on progress toward democratization.”
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The question is whether the activities of international NGOs can assist in moving the country toward democratization, or whether their assistance should be contingent on prior movement. Insofar as the international NGOs that operate in-country and abroad are seen to support liberalization of the regime as well as the aspirations, if not the operations, of the opposition, this is used by the military regime as a means both to de-legitimate the NLD, for being the “axe-handles” (or tools of foreign interests), and to legitimate itself by appealing to the Myanmar people’s strong sense of nationalism, which often borders on xenophobia. Local NGOs, now growing in numbers, can also provide a sense of legitimacy for the state, and indeed have been helpful in acting as go-betweens in some delicate negotiations between minority groups and the central government.

If one accepts as accurate the statements by the SLORC/SPDC that their goal is movement, at their own pace, toward “democracy” (whether “disciplined” as they have indicated, or otherwise), then fostering the growth of civil society will prove to be in their (as yet unrecognized) long-range interests, even if they are dubious about its shorter-range impact. Both indigenous and international NGOs, through their presence and their work, can eventually help to legitimate any government that comes to power.

It is also evident that the idea of allowing the populace to organize legal gatherings for any non-state approved purpose (even if the purposes are not anti-state) causes a degree of anguish in present government circles. Yet the development of pluralism, despite all the dangers that any
authoritarian government would perceive, is something that would actually be in the interests of the state. Without a capacity for the legal, peaceful expression of diverse opinions, there is great potential for outbreaks of intense violence when significant elements of the populace consider that conditions are no longer tolerable, as has been witnessed in many societies and in Burma in 1988. A prescient state would be wise in its own interests to allow the development of pluralism that could mitigate potential chaos. If, as the SLORC/SPDC has charged, it was the chaos of 1988 that “forced” the military to take over (although there are many who question this justification), then prudent management would suggest that it would be wise to establish channels for the expression of popular opinion.
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