Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (35 page)

Yet the tendency to mobilize all elements of power within the hands of the government, and to institute orthodoxy, is one that should not be underestimated.
⁴²
The government attempts to maintain orthodoxy through censorship and control of the distribution of information in any form, and by limiting the ability of people to gather together in public without government permission or surveillance. The reasons for such rigid control relate to the suspicions held by the regime, based on what has happened in the past, that the media will strongly criticize the administration, and that the private sector will go out of control and perhaps fall into foreign hands if not kept tightly constrained.

The regime is deeply concerned that personal interests will undermine wider interests, because it knows well that in Myanmar loyalties are personally based and are not oriented towards institutions, and that this has been the tendency throughout Burmese history.
⁴³
When power and authority are conceived as having a personal orientation, it is predictable that factionalism will become a problem.
⁴⁴
As power is focused on one person as a leader, an entourage develops; orthodoxy is expressed in terms of loyalty toward the leader, and toward his or her programme, and becomes a requirement. Of course, if that leader is purged, it can happen that a particular organization is decimated, as Military Intelligence was in 1982, and again, it seems apparent, in October 2004. In present-day Myanmar, attitudes of factionalized distrust permeate the political environment, and make national reconciliation extremely difficult to achieve.

These tendencies are coupled with a sense of hierarchy that is reinforced by a military command system (but which is pervasive even without that
reinforcement), and this virtually makes it essential that advocacy groups which are a part of civil society (even though civil society has expanded under the SLORC/SPDC) will come under close scrutiny by the state.

Thus there is likely to be a strong sense that civil society should not threaten the unity of the state — which has been the cardinal priority of the military since independence — and that any divisiveness, whether ethnic or political or even programmatic, where the accomplishments, motives, or benevolence
(cetana)
of the state are questioned, is unlikely to be long tolerated.

The inclination towards orthodoxy has also been apparent within the National League for Democracy and among some of the dissident groups, both internal and expatriate; these groups have shown a tendency to splinter along personal grounds and will not tolerate dissent. Some members of the NLD were expelled for being “traitors” to the cause when they differed with NLD leaders on policy issues. There have been recent calls for the expansion of the NLD Central Executive Committee and for the inclusion of younger leaders to diversify power and bring in new ideas.
⁴⁵
The student and expatriate opposition has split along both factional and ideological grounds. Some students in revolt have been executed by their comrades for supposedly being spies for the military. Frequently, opposition members living abroad as well as opposition supporters from academic circles, whose positions fall outside the established political parameters, are accused of being “spies” or in the pay of one side or another.

Some of the ceasefire groups have encouraged the same sorts of rigidities as did the military regime. South wrote:

Rebel leaders tended to discourage the expression of diverse opinions, and socio-political initiatives beyond the direct control of the militarized insurgent hierarchies were generally suppressed. One consequence was the endemic factionalism of Burmese opposition politics, with most groups unable to accommodate socio-political (or personality) differences among their members; another was the suppression of pluralism in ethnic opposition circles, and the development of rigid political cultures in nonstate controlled areas.
⁴⁶

As Christina Fink has written, “Even members of the pro-democracy movement find it difficult to develop the openness and tolerance required of a democratic culture... Rigid thinking, hierarchical power structures and a culture of mistrust have characterized not only the
military regimes but, in many cases, the opposition groups as well”.
⁴⁷
She notes that constructive criticism is often viewed as a challenge rather than a contribution.

Any euphoria among observers that civil society organizations, as vital as they are to pluralism and the eventual formation of some sort of democratic structure in that state, will eschew these tendencies that pervade the society is to be avoided. If other countries are any indication, civil society organizations retain many of the same characteristics as those of the states in which they operate, albeit on a smaller scale. Such groups are often highly nationalistic, and insofar as they have even limited impact on policy, may move state policies and programmes away from more international involvement and influence.

The Burmese have exhibited considerable individualism, autonomy, and even independence in periods when the central authority has broken down, such as toward the close of the AFPFL period in 1958 and during the “Rangoon spring” of the summer of 1988 (not to mention the period shortly after independence when various Burman para-military groups went into revolt), but Burmese governments evidently fear such manifestations. This is evidenced by the civilian “invitation” to General Ne Win to form a Caretaker Government in 1958 in order to prevent civil war, and by the repeated statements from the military that the coup of 18 September 1988 was justified to prevent the chaos and anarchy (in their view) that had developed. The military regime has many fears: there is a constant dread of separatism among the minorities; fear that “federalism” would turn out to be the first stage of inevitable attempts by various groups to leave the Union; and fear that the private sector of the economy may fall into foreign hands (either based inside the country or external). All these mean that the pressures to maintain strong central or unitary control are indeed powerful. These attitudes are tragic, if understandable, within the Burmese context.

This is not to imply that these forces are fixed and cannot be eroded through good governance and an understanding external environment, but the pressures that they impose on the process of national reconciliation are massive. Any process toward political, social, ethnic, or any other form of reconciliation must take these issues into account if it is to succeed.

The October 2004 dismissal of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt has created a period of uncertainty concerning the operation of non-governmental organizations in Myanmar, since it has been believed that he was an
advocate of their presence. At the time of writing this paper, it is too early to predict how such groups will fare under the reorganized SPDC regime.

The importance of civil society in the reconciliation progress, in the internal and external legitimacy equation, for the delivery of urgently needed goods and services, and for the development of pluralism and, eventually, some form of democratic governance, should not be underestimated. It is in the interests of all parties involved in contesting the legitimacy of the present government, and to the ordinary people (who suffer the most), that the state should encourage, rather than simply allow, the rebuilding of responsible national indigenous groups that can contribute to the building of the pluralist society that is so badly needed. As the state (which has never publicly denied that it cannot deliver basic services to its diverse peoples) continues to pursue economic and social policies that cause needed services to atrophy or decay, the role of civil society in all its forms becomes even more important.

Myanmar’s government has believed that its emphasis on developing infrastructure has been of vital importance but has not been internationally appreciated. Whatever the eventual worth of such development, concentrating talent, organizational capacity, and funds on such projects in a society with limited resources cannot but continue to impoverish the people. Recognition of the obvious impoverishment should have provided an impetus for the state to encourage more civil society involvement to help fill immediate needs.
⁴⁸

There is evidence that since 1988 there has been a growth of civil society in terms of both community-based organizations and national organizations, while the number of international NGOs operating in the country has markedly increased. What does this mean? Does this mean a growth in social capital — that trust has increased in the society? At the national level? At the local level? Or does it mean that among the population there is an increasing sense of desperation because the government has not been able to provide needed goods and services, so the people must fend for themselves, and that this accounts for the spurt? Or is it an accepted means of indicating that the military in government has been inadequate, and thus it is a form of protest against the military administration? Or all of the above? We do not have the
answer, but whatever it means, it is an opening toward a very limited and controlled elemental pluralism that should not be ignored, and indeed should be encouraged and expanded. Under any government, the potential contribution civil society could make to Myanmar/Burma is enormous, and all internal and external parties should contribute to its development.

National reconciliation, the immediate goal of ceasefires, dialogue, and the growth of civil society, seems still a distant hope, but one toward which every effort should be made. Compromise, an essential element of any such outcome, is an attitude that needs encouragement. The objective should be the quality of life of the people, for only with its improvement will the reputation of the military be salvaged, the struggle of the opposition be legitimated, and the position of the minority peoples be recognized.

¹
   For example, the debate in South Korea on the existence and origins of civil society in that country has gone on for some years in both the Korean and English academic environment.

²
   The attempted suppression of Falun Gong in China is a case in point.

³
   The country under discussion is often referred to as “Burma/Myanmar”. In this paper, the author has used “Myanmar” to refer to the country in the period after 1988 (although the name change occurred in 1989), “Burma” to refer to the country before 1988, and both to indicate continuity. No political implications should be drawn from this usage.

⁴
   For example, see Francis Fukuyama,
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
(New York: Free Press, 1995). Also, Robert D. Putman,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). For an earlier study, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,
The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁵
   It is not inconsequential that many minority organizations in Myanmar are devoted to the pursuit of their minority’s language and literature, both of which have generally been suppressed, and which embody some of the core values on which this identity is based.

⁶
   See David I. Steinberg,
Burma: The State of Myanmar
(Washington, DC: 2001), p. 121, n. 3, for a personal communication from Michael Aung-Thwin on this point.

⁷
   Such legislation includes the
Organization of Association Law
(1988); the
Partnership Act
(1932); the
Cooperative Society Law,
as amended (1992 from
1970); and the
Code of Civil Procedure
(1908). See Brian Heidel, “A Cubit a Day: Progressing Civil Society in Myanmar”, Draft paper, p. 40.

⁸
   In the Myanmar context, Myanmar Economic Holding Corporation Ltd and Myanmar Economic Corporation, both incorporated as private sector activities, are completely controlled and operated by the military, and thus for our purposes should be considered as state-sector institutions.

⁹
   There are said to be 67,696 villages and urban wards in Myanmar. See Brian Heidel, “A Cubit a Day: Progressing Civil Society in Myanmar”. Draft paper, also PowerPoint presentation, UNICEF, Yangon, April 2004, p. 9.

¹⁰
   For a study of this phenomenon, see Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Civil Society in Authoritarian Burma: Skirting the Regime’s Rules”, in
Civil Society and Political Change in Asia,
edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 389–418.

¹¹
   See, for example, International Crisis Group (ICG),
Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society,
Asia Report No. 27 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 6 December 2001). The ICG report considers that there is little likelihood of civil society organizations engaging in “regime change” or overthrowing the government. A later report advocates development of civil society in border areas. See International Crisis Group,
Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas,
Asia Report #82 (Yangon and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 9 September 2004). Ashley South is concerned about civil society in a transition; see Ashley South, “Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon”, Draft paper, n.d. This essay is not concerned with revolution, but with reconciliation.