Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (39 page)

Let us give our driver a hypothetical name, Naing Lin. Was the logic something like this?
“The roads are bad, that’s not my fault”, says Naing Lin to himself. “If they were in better condition, my car would not have broken down. I am going to sleep in the middle of the road as a form of protest, and to hell with everyone else.”

Or perhaps it was more like this.
“I can’t do anything until the owner of the car gets here from Mandalay, so I’ll just leave it here and have a little rest. The only shade is here behind the car in the middle of the road. That’ll do.”

Or perhaps Naing Lin was an inherently shy man and his response was a little more helpless.
“I don’t know what to do. I can’t fix this and I am a little too
‘ah na de’
to ask anyone else, so I’ll contact my boss. No, not even that! Perhaps I’ll just wait here on the roadside and have a little nap. He’ll know something has happened when I don’t turn up!”

Of course, it is useless to speculate, as we will never really know the answer to the question, but more interesting, I think, was the fact that the
lines of traffic kept inching past the sleeping driver, and I did not see one person stop to ask what the problem was and if there was anything that could be done to help.
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Again, speculation could elicit a number of possibilities: people felt too mechanically incompetent to offer help; earlier drivers had tried to help but the driver wouldn’t wake up, or perhaps did not care or couldn’t be bothered. Whatever the reason though, for me, after spending some time contemplating the situation, the sleeping driver presents a metaphor for what is happening in Burma/Myanmar in relation to civil society, and that metaphor has relevance for the debate, thinking, and academic pondering over the growth of civil society in Myanmar.

First, our friend Naing Lin was solitary; there was no one to help, he had given up and was waiting for someone else to get him out of the spot. Many in Burma/Myanmar are like this, and one cannot blame them, they have little choice. Second, the passing parade was reluctant to help, unwilling to get involved; people were mostly concerned with getting to where they wanted to go and, once past the obstacle, did not really consider the plight of others. Third, take Naing Lin, the silent protester — a lone voice in the wilderness, “I am not going to take this any more”. But then, what to do? — is lying on the road enough?

However one looks at this situation, the fact is that much of the debate on civil society in Burma has neglected or ignored the voices of the majority — those who do or will make up civil society — much as our friend Naing Lin was neglected by the passing parade of drivers. Instead, our thoughts and actions have been directed towards the major political players who, whilst undeniably important, do not in themselves constitute civil society. In order to understand the nature and role of civil society in Burma/Myanmar more clearly, therefore, this paper will:

1.   Look at past thoughts and writing on civil society in Myanmar and come to some conclusion as to what civil society might mean in the Myanmar context. This will include some analysis of such terms as “participation: and “empowerment”, which are often used in the discourse of development organizations presently in the country;

2.   Give an update on some of the increasing number of local and international non-government organization programs in the country;

3.   Analyse some specific examples of both local and international NGO (INGO) programs that could be regarded as an active part of
developing civil society, and argue that there is indeed a rich and potentially capable network of community-based groups and individuals who have begun to respond to issues both social and economic that impact on the lives of many of the poor and dispossessed in the country;

4.   Make recommendations as to how both local and international organizations might work together more effectively to develop further space for the participation of “ordinary people” in the growth of civil society in the country.

“Civil society” is a term that covers a multitude of definitions, not all wholly applicable to the Burma/Myanmar context. James Manor, Mark Robinson and Gordon White suggest that:

In normative terms, civil society has been widely seen as an increasingly crucial agent for limiting authoritarian government, strengthening popular empowerment, reducing the socially atomizing and unsettling effects of market forces, enforcing political accountability and improving the quality and inclusiveness of governance.
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This implies that civil society does not exist as a result of good governance or as a pre-condition to it. It is a separate entity, and a reflection of the needs — both social and political — of any given community or society. Whilst acknowledging the many inherent problems in providing a conclusive definition for the term, civil society can be seen as:

An intermediate realm situated between state and household, populated by organized groups or associations which are separate from the state, enjoy some autonomy in relations with the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests, values or identities.
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Within this definition civil society can be seen as playing a number of roles:

1.   Representation of the interests of specific groups in relation to government and to other sectors of society

2.   Mobilization of social actors to increase their consciousness and impact

3.   Regulation and monitoring of state performance and the behaviour and actions of public officials

4.   Developmental or social action to improve the well-being of their own or other constituencies.

Thought and analysis about civil society in Burma/Myanmar is not new. A conference hosted by the Burma Centre Netherlands (BCN) and the Trans-National Institute (TNI) in December 1997 was titled, “Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs”. Whilst it is some time ago that this conference was held, it is indeed interesting both to see if any progress has been made since then, and to use existing definitions as a starting point for analysis of the present situation.

David Steinberg noted in his conference paper that, in theory, civil society:

1.   Is made up of institutions and groupings outside government;

2.   Is a necessary part of democracy and an important element in democratic tradition;

3.   Is an essential element of political pluralism — which enables the diffusion of power (away from the state) and is characteristic of modern democracies.
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Steinberg suggested, however, that civil society in Burma/Myanmar should be seen in a different light.

[Civil society is] composed of those non-ephemeral organizations of individuals banded together for a common purpose or purposes to pursue those interests through group activities and by peaceful means. These are generally non-profit organizations, and may be local or national, advocacy or supportive, religious, cultural, social, professional, educational, or even organizations that, while not for profit, support the business sector, such as chambers of commerce, trade associations etc.
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This significantly broadens the understanding of what many may see as real civil society; given the realities of Burma/Myanmar, small, even individual, actions that contribute to social, economic, and political change can be seen to be manifestations of civil society in an embryonic stage.

Mark Duffield says of civil society that “At best it is an ill-defined space between the family and state in which plural civic institutions hold sway.”
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Martin Smith, himself a contributor to the TNI conference, suggests that there is a sense of ambiguity around the term, though it is clear that
humanitarian organizations equate civil society with such things as the development of capacity, social mobilization, participatory planning, and empowerment. It should be acknowledged, too, that Smith argues that it is necessary to take into account the past decades of internal strife and ethnic conflict as a part of any discussion of civil society.
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Whilst this is indeed a vital aspect of the overall picture, a thorough analysis of the ethnic issues relating to the growth of civil society is beyond the scope of this paper.

The third contributor to the publication, Zunetta Liddell defines civil society as: “Free associations of citizens joined together to work for common concerns or implement social, cultural, or political initiatives which complement, as well as compete with, the state”.
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However, she suggests that this presupposes citizens enjoying the “fundamental freedoms” of thought, opinion, expression, association, and movement, and that these freedoms are not respected by the present regime in Burma/Myanmar.

Marc Purcell, the final contributor, looks specifically at the role of international NGOs in building civil society, using the framework of David Korten that outlines four different “generations” or NGO strategies:

•   First generation — direct delivery of services such as health, food, shelter;

•   Second generation — development of the capacity of communities to meet their own needs — encouraging self-reliance;

•   Third generation — focus on sustainable systems development to produce supportive environment (delivery systems) in which resources can get to where they are most needed. Response to HIV is used as an example;

•   Fourth generation — facilitation of social movements which mobilize people for social change (such as the women’s movement).

He makes the observation that many, if not all, international NGOs in Burma/Myanmar are focusing their efforts on the first and second generation stages, and that for civil society to grow, “It is crucial for INGOs to initiate development strategies which foster independent thinking, and democratic structures and management in the communities that they target, including their local staff.”
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Whilst there is not total agreement between these writers about what constitutes civil society in Burma/Myanmar, there are areas of convergence that can be summarized as follows:

1.   Civil society organizations require autonomy from the state in terms of decision-making structures and ability to implement their stated activities;

2.   The meaning of the term “civil society” in the context of Burma/ Myanmar is not necessarily limited to mean the existence of well organized social and political lobby groups, but includes any organization or group that has as its central tenet the aim of bringing about social, economic, or political change for the “greater good”;

3.   Civil society groups include international actors (such as international NGOs) as well as local actors;

4.   While civil society is a somewhat nebulous concept, it involves such elements as participation and empowerment.

A report produced by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2001
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detailed the development of civil society in Burma/Myanmar from the era before Ne Win’s takeover of power, noting that a number of factors have inhibited its growth. These include the lack of the rule of law, severe restriction of access to communications technology, the stifling of independent organizations, and the corresponding growth regime-sponsored organizations (such as the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA)), and limitations on educational and cultural development. The impact of all these factors is magnified in areas controlled by armed ethnic nationalist organizations.

Both this report and others
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suggest that factions and the pursuit of power politics have been a key part of the Burmese political landscape from the very beginning, and that these have had a profound impact on the ability of people to organize and reach consensus through democratic means, as well as, therefore, on their ability to form any robust civil society movement. Rather, they suggest, the organizations that have developed have more often than not re-created the existing autocratic structures of power.

Because Myanmar has been under military rule for so long, few people today understand the role that civil society is meant to play in a democracy or that a healthy democracy requires broadmindedness and a dispersion of power. Thus, even organizations outside the regime’s direct control tend to replicate the hierarchical organizational structures and lack of tolerance for
dissent which characterize state-controlled organizations. Low levels of education and cultural factors mean many ordinary people in Myanmar lack confidence in their ability to effect change.
¹²

If this is true, it would indicate that political reform will require much more than simply a change in government. The growth of civil society can and should become a tool through which processes of democratic decision-making and public accountability are engendered at every level of community life, a mechanism through which all people have the opportunity to participate on equal terms, despite their age, gender, ethnicity, or status. Ashley South suggests that: